STUDENTS AND POLITICS IN INDIA: PAROCHIALIZATION
AND POLITICIZATION IN A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate School
University of Missouri

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Anil Baran Ray
December, 1975

Paul Wallace                Dissertation Supervisor
The undersigned, appointed by the Dean of the Graduate Faculty, have examined a thesis entitled

STUDENTS AND POLITICS IN INDIA: PAROCHIALIZATION AND POLITICIZATION IN A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

presented by Anil Baran Ray

a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

and hereby certify that in their opinion it is worthy of acceptance.

signatures redacted
PREFACE

I acknowledge with a deep sense of appreciation my debt to Professor Paul Wallace for excellent counsel at all stages of writing, for constructive comments on the dissertation, and for helping to sharpen the focus of the study. I appreciate the assistance of the members of my dissertation committee, Professors Lloyd M. Wells, N. Gerald Barrier, Herbert K. Tillema and Richard A. Watson.

While writing the first draft of the dissertation at the Joseph Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago, I enjoyed the privileges of an "advisee" from Professor Susanne Hoeber Rudolph of the University of Chicago. I am extremely grateful to Professor Rudolph for bringing me materials from India, and for helping me with friendly criticism and constructive comments on the dissertation.

I appreciate the kind hospitality extended to me by the South Asia Language and Area Center of the University of Chicago, and I thank the members and staff of the Center, especially, Professor Edward C. Dimock, Jr., Director of the Center, Professor Ralph W. Nicholas, and Professor Lloyd I. Rudolph.

Special thanks are due to Professor D. P. Chattopadhyaya for giving me the needed help from India.
Two personal friends, Dr. Ranadhir Mitra and Tapan Chakraverty deserve thanks for giving me their kind cooperation.

Special appreciation is due for a Fulbright fellowship (1971-1975) which allowed me to complete the Ph.D. program in the United States. Indeed, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the U.S. Educational Foundation in India, and to Jadavpur University for granting me leave of absence from 1971 to 1975. Thankful acknowledgment is also due to the University of Missouri-Columbia for financial assistance through a curators' scholarship.

Finally, it is impossible to acknowledge adequately the contributions of my parents, Chitta Ranjan Ray and Rajnandini Ray, and of my late grandfather, Adwaita Nath Ray towards my education.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part I. Early Parochialization and Politicization</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I MOVEMENT FOR A HINDU UNIVERSITY: REVIVALISM</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II POLITICIZATION FROM OUTER ENVIRONMENT: BHU STUDENTS IN THE NATIONAL FREEDOM MOVEMENT</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III PAROCHIALIZATION AT BHU: VICE-CHANCELLORS AND THE INTERNAL CONTEXT OF CASTE, LANGUAGE AND SUB-REGION</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Part II. Three Case Studies of Student Agitations at BHU:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Expressions of Parochialization and Politicization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE &quot;PROBLEM&quot; AT BHU: THE MUDALIAR COMMITTEE REPORT</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE EASTERN U.P. GROUP'S REACTION: BHU STUDENTS' AGITATION OF 1958</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES: &quot;BATTLE&quot; IN PARLIAMENT OVER THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII SECULARISM AND POLITICAL PROTEST: BHU STUDENTS' AGITATION OF 1965</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII POLARIZATION OF PARTY POLITICS: BHU STUDENTS' AGITATION OF 1968</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Districts of Eastern U.P.

a. Banaras  g. Ballia  m. Pratapgarh
b. Mirzapur  h. Deoria  n. Rae Bareli
c. Allahabad  i. Gorakhpur  o. Bara Banki
e. Ghazipur  k. Faizabad  q. Bahraich
f. Azamgarh  l. Sultanpur
INTRODUCTION

In delivering a convocation address, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, outlined the aims of a university in the following terms:

A University stands for humanism, for tolerance, for reason, for progress, for the adventure of ideas, and for the search of truth. It stands for the onward march of the human race towards even higher objectives. If the universities discharge their duty adequately, then it is well with the nation and people.¹

Such a normative conception of a University excludes the role of politics from the academy.² And yet it is an acknowledged fact that politics (for furthering private, group and party interests) plays a substantial role in Indian universities.

The politicization of Indian university students receives substantial attention. In the judgment of Seymour M. Lipset, Indian students have become "a major headache for a beleaguered government."³ The pervasiveness


²In the words of the Committee on "Model Act for Universities," "It implies that the University ought not to be . . . drawn into the ambit of party or power politics," ibid., p. 8.

of the problem created by students in India has been well summarized by Philip G. Altbach:

Student unrest has been one of India's most serious educational and political problems. . . . Students have paralyzed colleges and universities and have caused serious damage to public facilities as well as to educational institutions. Hardly a week goes by without an outbreak of student "indiscipline" in one part of India; student problems are discussed by such diverse groups as police officials, the Prime Minister and the cabinet, and educational authorities. 4

If the student agitations and disruptions continue, states Edward Shils:

They will demoralize the Indian police services and render them incompetent to maintain public order or they will precipitate harsher repression resulting in many deaths which will in turn place heavy strains on the Indian political system. 5

It is obvious from the above comments that students in India are "viewed as a problem," 6 and they truly pose problems for educational and political authorities. They act as an important pressure group with regard to the established educational and political authorities. Major modes of pressure include strikes, demonstrations and agitations.


Physical means of expression comprise part of the political context. The politics of maneuver and management in which the elders of students engage is equally important. Detailed case studies can throw considerable light on the nature of such politics at Indian universities. Unfortunately, such case studies are relatively few in number. Major scholarly publications began in the late 1960's with Joseph Di Bona's monograph on Allahabad University. Di Bona points out that the mass enrollments of first generation students from rural areas changed the elitist character of Allahabad University. The majority of students were alienated from the expressed goals of the University. This made it easy for student union leaders to mobilize students against university and external authorities. Student leaders received support and encouragement from faculty factions who themselves were occasionally allied with dissident political factions in the state legislature. Such is the environment in which, Di Bona holds, higher education operates at Allahabad.

Robert C. Shaw used Myron Weiner's classificatory scheme for describing student agitational activities

The term "elders" has been used in this research to refer to teachers and party politicians, in so far as they stand in relation to students.


at Osmania:

1. "Activities associated with larger political movements in the area surrounding the school, college, or university."

2. "Demands by students upon university authorities."

3. "Student demands upon non-university authorities on issues of special concern."

4. "Sporadic, generally unorganized outbursts by students only vaguely associated with concrete demands, such as walk-outs on examinations . . . beatings inflicted by students on ticket collectors, and other acts of delinquency."

Using this framework, Shaw gave suitable examples of relevant student activities at Osmania.

Carolyn M. Elliott's study of Osmania University shows that a university can successfully resist political pressure from outside if it is an integrated community and if it can mobilize sufficient political resources. In

---


1965-66, the Government of Andhra Pradesh enacted legislation increasing its authority in matters of major educational policy, including the removal of university vice-chancellors. The attempt of the Andhra Pradesh State Government to increase its control led Osmania University into a massive protest movement against the State Government. The University was able to mobilize the support of the press, such prestigious academic bodies as the Inter-University Board of India and Ceylon, the major opposition parties in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the dissident faction in the ruling Congress party and above all, the Government of India. The Supreme Court of India ruled against the concerned state legislation and the University thus scored a significant victory against the State Government.

In his discussion of the Ranchi University case, Amar Kumar Singh\textsuperscript{12} views the university as "one part of the network of organizations that the dominant elite uses for its political advantage."\textsuperscript{13} Singh bluntly says that politicians see the university as a colony and exploit it to promote their political power. He also sees a political equation in the teacher-student relationship

---


\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 234.
in which teachers use students to gain political power in the university and society and students form a clique with teachers to further their parochial concerns. Singh urges the need for protection of the university against "political vultures who are polluting the temple of Saraswati"14 (the Goddess of learning).

In their essay on Baroda University, Susanne H. Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph15 hold that the inner environment of Baroda University, i.e., its residential and unitary structure, the diverse geographic and social composition of its student body and "sufficiently strong" academic self-confidence of the university faculty protected the university from academic deterioration and student disorders which affected many other universities of India. Unlike many universities of India, Baroda did not become a partisan issue in state politics, even though there was some pressure on the university from Baroda city and Gujarat state politicians (representing two dimensions of the outer environment of the university). Efforts were made to lower the standard of admission to the university, and to use the regional language rather than English as the medium of instruction. The Rudolphs

14 Ibid., p. 227.

point out that no attempt was made to subsume Baroda University to the interest of party factions as had happened in Uttar Pradesh."\(^\text{16}\) The university was not, of course, entirely free from internal politics of academic politicians. Politics at Baroda University, however, were for promotion of personal interest rather than party interest.

All of the works cited above point out the many ways in which Indian universities are politicized. Such politicization has been facilitated by linkage between the educational political systems. The linkage exists through the government's power of supplying funds, of nominating members to the legislative and executive bodies of the universities, and of advising the chancellor on the exercise of his functions, including the choice of vice-chancellors. The linkage exists also through the affiliation of student organizations on the university campus with national party organizations and through the career aspirations of professional student politicians who use campus politics as a ladder of mobility for subsequent integration into the world of professional politics. The observations of Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph, and Karuna Ahmed are revealing on this point:

\(^{16}\)\textit{Ibid.} p. 255.
Student politics (in India) . . . has its connections with political parties. The major ones, particularly the SSP, Jan Sangh, Congress and CPI-M and CPI, attempt to penetrate, organise, mobilise and recruit students as a social category and a political class by taking an interest in student demands and grievances and by establishing or patronizing student or youth organizations and leaders. And students who mean to go into State and national politics know that making a name and a following in the university arena can contribute to that end.\textsuperscript{17}

The situation in Indian universities has been complicated by the actions of teacher-politicians. There is nothing objectionable to a teacher being a member of a political party and participating in politics outside the university just like any other member of his party. But if the same teacher uses his party connections to further his own ends or the ends of his group, if he forms alliance with students to further his parochial concerns, he becomes a source of trouble to the university. As B. R. Vithal points out:

A teacher-politician can be either a teacher who takes part in outside politics or a teacher who creates politics within the university out of matters which are purely parochial and are of no larger significance. The teacher taking part in outside politics in a democracy is a common phenomenon in other democratic countries. Nor does there seem to be anything inherently harmful in this . . . The real danger to the university is the other type of teacher-politician—a teacher who dabbles in politics outside merely to acquire influence

for purposes internal to the University or the teacher who creates factions and politics within the University not on ideological grounds, not even on party lines, but on petty individual considerations which ultimately are exaggerated to become university functions. This is the real bane of some universities.¹⁸

The present research will be a case study involving local, regional and national politics in Banaras Hindu University. The rationale for choosing BHU for a case study is that it illustrates the various problems of parochialization, politicization and linkage between the educational and political systems. A study of BHU provides us with what is probably the most notable example of parochialization and politicization in Indian universities.

The University was formed in 1916 through the efforts of Hindu elites. It was supposed to revive the ancient glory of India, to be a repository of Hindu culture and tradition and a symbol of the progress of India. (See Chapter I.) But the parochialization of the University started soon after its foundation. Caste-based discrimination of Non-Brahmins in the matter of appointment to the faculty was one dimension of early parochialization. Another dimension was the discrimination against non-Hindi speaking Vice-Chancellors in the

University. (See Chapter III.) Parochialization of the environment within the University was compounded by politicization of its student body in the pre-independence period. Such politicization flowed from the efforts made by country's political leaders and BHU's teachers to involve students in the freedom movement. (See Chapter II.) The twin process of parochialization and politicization, started in BHU in its pre-independence period, has been continued in BHU in its post independence period, despite the efforts of the Government of India to counteract the process.19

The Government of India attempted to maintain an All-India environment within the University in terms of the recruitment of students and faculty from different linguistic and cultural areas of India. The Government sought to make BHU analogous to India's nationally

---

19 After independence, the Government of India made BHU a national university. The ultimate responsibility for management of the university rests with the Government of India. The President of India is the Visitor of BHU and other four national universities, namely, Aligarh Muslim University, Visva-Bharati University, Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University. The President of India being the constitutional Head of the Republic, his Minister of Education is the chief spokesman of the Government of India in matters relating to higher education, especially in national universities. Serious malpractices in national universities could occasion the direct intervention of the Union ministry of Education in such universities. The Ministry lays much importance to annual reports of the University Grants Commission, a quasi-independent body with primary responsibility for standards and innovation in the field of higher education in India.
recruited IITs (Indian Institutes of Technology). A faction within BHU known as the Eastern U.P. (Uttar Pradesh) group, on the other hand, sought to make the University locally oriented. It put pressures toward localization in the recruitment of faculty and students of the University and sought to control the patronage of the University with a view to distributing them among the members of the Group. In a word, the Eastern U.P. group's position was that "locals" should always be accommodated in the University before "outsiders" (i.e., non-Eastern U.P. people) even if the former did not satisfy the prescribed standards for recruitment to the faculty or for admission to the University.

The parochial position of the Eastern U.P. group was bound to arouse conflict in the University and with the Government of India. The Vice-Chancellors,20 as representatives of the Government of India and as Heads of an All-India institution, had to look after the interests of everyone in the University. They were not supposed to be partial to a particular group. Thus, the Eastern U.P. group and vice-chancellors structurally were continually in a conflict situation. The Group defeated the vice-chancellor's candidate for the post of pro-vice-chancellor

20 With the sole exception of Pandit Govind Malaviya, the Vice-Chancellors sent by the Government of India were all "outsiders."
(as in the case of Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan), cast indirect aspersion on the vice-chancellor (as in the case of Narendra Deva), or incited its student followers against the vice-chancellor (as in the case of Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar and Dr. V. S. Jha). (See Chapter III.) The message that the Group delivered in these ways to vice-chancellors was clear: Do as we say or face these troubles.

Dismayed at the power politics of the Group, the vice-chancellors kept sending reports to the Government of India that the machinations of the Group were making it impossible for them to continue in the University. Thereupon, the Government of India appointed (in 1957) an inquiry committee consisting of eminent persons in the country. The inquiry committee highlighted in its report the activities of the pressure group in the University. (See Chapter IV.) Thereupon the Government of India took action as they were convinced that the dissolution of the pressure group was necessary in the interest of maintaining a cosmopolitan and All-India environment in the University. Threatened with ouster from the University, the Group engaged its student followers in strikes and agitations against the University vice-chancellor and the Government of India. (See Chapter V.)

The BHU students' agitation of 1958 represented the struggle for survival of parochial forces against the "cosmopolitan" onslaught of the Government of India.
The agitation was the product of strain between the dual environments of BHU—an All-India environment represented by the vice-chancellor and the Government of India on the one hand and an Eastern U.P. environment represented by a local campus group on the other. This struggle between parochialism and cosmopolitanism in BHU became an issue in the nation's partisan politics and opposition political parties acted as votaries of parochial interests with a view to embarrassing the Government of India (or so to say the ruling Congress Party) and gaining electoral support from the linguistic area in which the University was located. (See Chapter VI.)

Formation of the Eastern U.P. group and its maintenance, can be attributed largely to a particular type of identity consciousness revolving around linguistic homogeneity, caste and economic backwardness of the region. Eastern U.P. is one of the poorest areas of India. As Paul R. Brass writes:

Here (in Eastern U.P.), population densities are over 1,000 persons per square mile, land holdings are extremely small (usually an acre or half an acre per person), and the resource base is very narrow. There are fewer industries here than in the West and much less urbanization; only three of the seventeen cities of Uttar Pradesh with a population over 100,000 are in this region—Allahabad, Banaras and Gorakhpur. Unemployment is acute; villagers from the Eastern districts go as far as Calcutta and Bombay for work. Heavy floods are an annual occurrence in much of the area and famine conditions are common.²¹

The intense poverty, wide-spread illiteracy (as contrasted with the cultural richness of relatively few elites) and linguistic homogeneity of the area of Eastern U.P. provide the sub region with a strong identity consciousness. This makes the task of group formation in BHU relatively easy.

The students of the colleges of Ayurveda, Arts, and Law—the students who were in the forefront of the agitation of 1958—came from predominantly rural areas in the eastern districts of U.P. Many of them are first-generation college students. In a typical case, the father of such a student contacts some teacher of the University who is known to him by virtue of belonging to

---

22 Some economic indicators for the poverty of the Eastern U.P. area can be provided. At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, the per capita income in Eastern U.P. was only RS. 194.67 compared to RS. 261.33 for U.P. as a whole and RS. 330.00 for India. The predominantly rural and agricultural economy of Eastern U.P. is indicated by the fact that 91.2 percent of its working population is dependent on agriculture. The corresponding figure for U.P. as a whole is 84.5 percent. See P. N. Masaldan, "Politics in Uttar Pradesh since 1947," in Iqbal Narain (ed.), State Politics in India (Meerat: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), p. 283.

23 The percentage of literacy in U.P.'s population is 17.6 as against 24.0 for the country as a whole. The separate figure for the rate of literacy in Eastern U.P. is not available, but it can be asserted safely that the rate of literacy is far less in Eastern U.P. than in Western U.P.

24 67.5 percent students of the College of Ayurveda, 81.5 percent students of Arts College, and 87 percent students of the Law College were from U.P. Most of these students came from the eastern districts of U.P. These figures were for the year 1957-58. See K. C. Gorawala and others, (Sponsors), A Factual Analysis of the Banaras Hindu University Mudaliar Committee Report. (N.P., 1958), Appendix 3, p. 53.
the same geographical area or the same caste, and his son is admitted to an All-India University through these connections. The teacher becomes the local guardian of the student when the latter joins the University. The caste and regional link between the student and his teacher becomes further strengthened by the teacher's ability to favor the student with patronage in the form of financial help from the university. The teacher also can influence the examination result of the student. Thus a patron-client relationship develops and it becomes possible for the teacher to use the student for agitating on his behalf.

The group formation between a junior lecturer and his powerful senior colleague takes place in a somewhat similar way. It is possible that a junior lecturer is appointed to the university through the influence of a senior professor from the same district or of the same caste. He remains grateful for the appointment. He has expectations for examinership and for promotion to a higher post. His senior colleague can help him in these matters. The grateful junior colleague becomes a supporter of his senior colleague. The senior colleague himself

---

25 Brahmins (Pande, Upadhyay, Tiwari, Misra, Ojha, Dwivedi, Tripathi, etc.), Kshatriyas (Rajputs and Thakurs), and Bhumihars are the dominant caste groups in Eastern U.P. The four other caste-groups of the area are Chamars, Ahirs, Kurmis and Kayasthas.
aspires after a Deanship, Principalship or higher posts. He needs the support of other powerful colleagues (the Heads of departments, for example) in the teaching staff and support of members of the executive council. He approaches his caste and district fellows for support. They support him and it is understood that he will support them in turn. In this way, group formation takes place among members of the teaching staff on the basis of caste and regional affiliations and on a mutual benefit process. Caste and region provide the primary bases of group formation and a significant fact to be noted is that the leading members of the Eastern U.P. group—as it operated in BHU in the 1950s—belonged to the Brahmin caste and came mostly from the Eastern U.P. districts of Banaras and Ballia.26

26 For a list of the leading members of the Eastern U.P. group, see Ministry of Education, Report of the Banaras Hindu University Enquiry Committee (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1958), Appendix 3, p. 39. The list showed that while most of the members of the Group were on the teaching staff of the University, some were also members of the University Court and the University Executive Council.

Following the assessment of the "problem" of BHU through a Central Government-appointed enquiry committee in the middle of 1958, the Government of India took strong measures with a view to eliminating the parochial group from the University. The Government dissolved the University Court and the Executive Council and appointed in their places nominated bodies consisting of eminent persons drawn from all over India. It also appointed a Reviewing Committee to "try" teachers who indulged in local group politics in the University. Following the students' agitation in the Fall of 1958, the Government also dissolved the Students' Union in BHU. The purpose clearly was to de-parochialize and de-politicize the University. It was not successful.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which had a two-room office on the BHU campus from the 1930's remained uninvolved in university politics at BHU during

---

27 In the process, some leading members of the Eastern U.P. group were eliminated from the University.

28 The Students' Union was one of the main instruments through which the local groups and political parties used to politicize the University.
the 1950's. The attempted de-politicization of the University, however, provided the RSS with an opportunity to spread its influence among the students and teachers. The advantage of the RSS was that it was, in theory, a cultural organization and the nominated bodies of the University could not raise objections to persons being members of the RSS. Thus, in practice, the process of parochialization and politicization of the University was renewed, (though in a form different than previously), soon after the Government of India thought that it ended or at least checked the twin process.

Much of the operation of parochialization and politicization remained subterranean in the period between late 1958 and mid-1965. It surfaced when the Government of India, willing to end its control of the University, introduced in Parliament the Banaras Hindu University Amendment Bill, 1965. Along with certain structural

29 The RSS, a Hindu cultural organization, was founded in 1925 with a view to regenerating Hindu society. With the RSS emphasizing the same goals as those of BHU, i.e., Hindu revivalism and revitalization, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the founder of the University, allowed the RSS to construct a building for itself on the campus in 1938. Suspicious that the RSS was involved in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, the Government of India declared it an illegal organization. Consequently, BHU made the RSS vacate its building on the campus, but permitted it to reoccupy the building in 1952 after the Government of India lifted the ban. As a condition for relegitimization, the RSS promised the Government of India that it would not take part in political activities, and would act strictly as a cultural organization. The non-involvement of RSS in university politics at BHU in the 1950s can be explained by this undertaking that the RSS gave to the Government of India.
changes in the University, the Bill sought to drop the word Hindu\textsuperscript{30} from the name of the University and give it a secular name, i.e., Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. The revivalist RSS and its political mentor, the Jana Sangh (the People's Party), which "feel that Congress policies since independence have threatened Hindu culture and religious values,"\textsuperscript{31} engaged in agitations and demonstrations to oppose government measures relating to the name of the University. The Jana Sangh\textsuperscript{32} mobilized public opinion in Eastern U.P. and the RSS encouraged the students into agitating against the proposed dropping of the word Hindu from the name of the University.

The Samjukta Socialist Party (SSP) and the Communist Party of India (CPI) condemned the 1965 agitation as a communal-parochial one. They accused the Government of India of abdicating its responsibility (relating to promotion of secularism in the country) when the latter, in the face of the agitation, decided to "shelve" the BHU Amendment Bill 1965. (See Chapter VII.) The inability

\textsuperscript{30} M. C. Chagla, the Union Minister of Education, strongly felt that All-India educational institutions should not bear denominational or sectarian names.


\textsuperscript{32} The Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad—the other two "Hindu" parties helped Jana Sangh in its act of mobilizing public opinion in Eastern U.P.
of the SSP and CPI to counteract the 1965 agitation convinced them of the necessity of building their own political bases in BHU vis-a-vis the RSS and Jana Sangh. With this end in view, the SSP recruited D. Majumdar, an ex-president of BHU Students' Union, as its student leader on the campus. The CPI recruited N.P. Sinha, the General Secretary of BHU Students' Union during the 1965 agitation, for the same purpose. The 1968 agitation in BHU represented the struggle between those rival political forces for supremacy on the campus. It was a struggle between student followers of the SSP and CPI on the one hand and student followers of the RSS and Jana Sangh on the other hand for control of the campus. (See Chapter VIII.)

In brief, this study is divided into two parts. Part I traces the history of parochialization and politicization at BHU from pre-independence to the early post-independence years. Part II analyzes three cases of student agitations (1958, 1965, and 1968) to elaborate the themes of parochialization and politicization in BHU in recent years. The historical findings in Part I facilitate the comprehension of intra-mural and extra-mural political forces at work in BHU in recent years.

This study hypothesizes that parochialization and politicization at BHU can be comprehended in terms of the following:
1. Hindu revivalism, a basis for the foundation of the University, led both to parochialization and politicization. Hindu groups, especially the RSS, are institutional manifestations of this process.

2. The University has acted as a center for group politics centering around caste, language, and region. Political parties such as the Jana Sangh, SSP and CPI are involved, support their respective clients and thus use the University as a political platform.

3. Students are used as a pressure group by intra-mural groups and extra-mural political forces.

The materials for Part I were drawn primarily from the documents relating to the founding and development of the University. The materials for Part II have been drawn mainly from newspapers, legislative debates, government reports, periodicals and books.

---

CHAPTER I

MOVEMENT FOR A HINDU UNIVERSITY: REVIVALISM

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the intense Hindu revivalist sentiment that characterized the movement for a Hindu University at Benares and to trace the founding of a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh1 branch on the Hindu University campus to the same kind of sentiment.

I

An acute sense of nostalgia for the past glory of Hindu India, the aspiration to restore it to present India and the desire to regenerate Hindu society provided the motive forces for the establishment of the Benares Hindu University.2 The founders noted that:

There was a time when India could claim to be the largest contributor, at least in the Aryan portion of the human race, not only to religion and philosophy, but to sciences, arts, manufactures, and all else that makes up civilization. European scholars and investigators now acknowledge that India is the birthplace of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, astronomy, and medicine, and own their indebtedness to our ancestors for the discovery of another most important factor of civilization, viz., the use of metals. But, for the last eight or nine

---

1Hereafter, normally referred to as RSS.

2Hereafter, normally referred to as BHU or the University.
hundred years, Indian civilization has not only been making no progress, but has been steadily declining.³

The founders felt that India's decline was because Hindus had been divorced from their Vedic culture—their ancient religion and literature. The secular education that Hindus received in government institutions did not help them form their character, as they were deprived of the noble teachings of the Hindu religion, i.e., truth, forgiveness, fortitude, control of senses, control of the mind, compassion, philanthropy, etc.

Emphasizing the need for the revival of Sanskrit learning and religious teaching, the founders of BHU held:

A great revival of Hindu learning must precede any real advancement of the Hindus. No scheme for their elevation can be regarded as sound which ignores the principle of historical continuity and the achievements of their great ancestors. No modern Hindu language or literature can thrive which is not fed from the fountainhead of Sanskrit literature.⁴

The founders further noted that the whole fabric of Hindu civilization was the product of Hindu religion and that the records of that civilization were best preserved in Sanskrit literature. A system of education, therefore, had to be devised which would combine Sanskrit learning


⁴Ibid., pp. 58-9.
(i.e., religious instruction based on classical culture) with scientific, technical and artistic education. The University was founded to exemplify such a system of education.

BHU was the product of a Hindu movement. It symbolized the efforts of the Hindu chiefs and other Hindu elites to regenerate Hindu society. The most active leader in the movement was Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. The movement began in early 1904 with a meeting at the "Mint House" at Benares presided over by the Maharaja of Benares. The following year the Indian National Congress was scheduled to hold its twenty-first session at Benares. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya took this opportunity to convene a meeting of distinguished Hindu gentlemen at the Town Hall at Benares. This meeting approved of a scheme for the Hindu University at Benares. The proposed scheme for the University was next laid before the Sanatan Dharma Mahasabha (Congress of the Hindu Religion) at Allahabad in January 1906. The Mahasabha under the Presidentship of Paramhans Parivrajakacharya Jagadguru of Govardhan Math resolved that in the interest of preservation and promotion of Sanatan Dharma and for the study of Sanskrit language and literature as well as scientific and technical knowledge, a Hindu University be established at Benares. A committee with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya as secretary was constituted to give effect to the scheme of the University.
The proposed Hindu University scheme had much to commend itself to the Hindu public. As G. Subramaniam Iyer wrote in the *Indian Review*:

The whole scheme, so grand, so patriotic, and so inspiring to every true Hindu, is, it will be seen, permeated by a spirit of revival combined with that of progress, and though the difficulties that beset its accomplishment, both in regard to the getting up of the vast organization necessary for the preliminary labours and the collection of the funds estimated at a crore of rupees . . . are truly staggering and calculated to cow down the spirit of everyone but the most robust and optimistic patriot, still the very magnitude and magnificence of the scheme, the lofty ideals it places before all lovers of Aryavarta, its past glories and its future greatness, all constitute its claim on the devoted service of every individual ruling chief, nobleman and educated Hindu in fulfilling the aim of this grand movement, our regeneration on truly national and progressive lines.  

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya wanted Jagadguru Sri Sankaracharya of Sringeri to lay the foundation stone of the proposed University and sent D. K. Damle to Sringeri to bring the Jagadguru to Benares with him. The Jagadguru himself could not come but "gave a pair of his guru's padukas (sandals) to Damle which, he said, had greater power than what he could ever possess, to ensure the prosperity of the great institution which was to be established in the most sacred city of Bharatvarsha (Ancient India) for the revivification of the culture of India."  

---

5Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, *op. cit.*., p. 79.

Keeping in mind the ideal of the ashramas of ancient sages, the Universities of Takshashila and Nalanda, it was proposed to make the Hindu University at Benares a residential one. The residential character would distinguish the proposed University from the existing examining Universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Lahore and Allahabad which were modelled after the University of London.

The scheme for the Hindu University did not make much headway in the years 1905-1910. This was a period of political unrest in India. Lord Curzon partitioned Bengal in 1905 on the ground of administrative convenience. Bengalis reacted sharply and viewed it as a British policy to divide and rule. The Indian National Congress supported the Bengali movement for annulment of the partition. It was resolved to boycott British goods and use only swadeshi (indigenous) goods. The idea of national education was also propagated. The British Government answered with repression. The Press Act and the Seditious Meetings Act were passed in 1908. Some of the national leaders were prosecuted, jailed and deported. Muslims were encouraged to demand separate electorates which were granted in the Morley-Minto Reforms Act of 1909. With the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1911, the atmosphere of the country became calm and this permitted the movement for Hindu University to grow again.
An English woman whose contribution to the movement for the Hindu University was no less than that of any Hindu is Annie Besant. Born on October 1, 1847 in London, she joined the Theosophical Society in 1889 and came to India in 1893 to live there for the rest of her life. She joined the Indian National Congress, subsequently served as President, and was imprisoned for championing India's right to "Home Rule." Mrs. Besant felt dissatisfied with the existing system of education in India. She suspected that the education imparted in Christian missionary and government schools in India was "subtly denationalizing" and could not produce any originality among Indians. The uppermost thought in Mrs. Besant's mind was the reinvigoration of India and she was convinced that this could be done only by reviving India's peoples, India's literature and India's religion. With this aim in her heart, she started the Central Hindu College in 1898 at Benares. While secular education was not to be neglected in her college, moral and religious training prescribed by the Hindu Shastras (treatises) was to be given special emphasis.

In Annie Besant's mind, Hinduism and India were inseparable. As she observed:

Everyone might pass away as they come, and India would still remain. But let Hinduism vanish, and what is she? A "geographical expression" of the past, a dim memory of a perished glory. Her history, her literature, her art, her monuments, all have Hinduism written across them. India lived before their coming: India could live
after their passing. But let Hinduism go, Hinduism that was India's cradle, and in that passing would be India's grave.⁷

The Central Hindu College, under the able guidance of Annie Besant, issued in 1902 the **Sanatan Dharma** Series of Hindu religious textbooks containing a lucid exposition of the fundamental principles of the Hindu religion.

While Annie Besant's interest in the Hindu religion and culture was sincere, she was by no means disrespectful of other religions and religious communities in India. As a matter of fact, she drew up in 1907 a detailed scheme for an all-denominational "University of India," and sought royal approval for her proposed scheme. The Muslim community of India, however, wanted to have a University of their own and under the leadership of the Aga Khan, they applied for a royal charter to convert the existing Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh into a university. This development led the Hindu leaders to intensify their movement for the Hindu University which had lost its momentum during the troubled period of 1905-1910. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya sat in a conference with Annie Besant and they agreed to blend their respective University schemes. As Mrs. Besant wrote to the King-Emperor through the Government of India in April 1911:

A change of name is imperative, as the establishment of the Aligarh University will make the sweeping title of the "University of India" a misnomer. When I chose it, I had hoped that both communities would unite. We have therefore agreed to change this name to the "University of Benares," in Hindi, the Kashi Vishva-Vidyalaya." Doubtless the two universities will be popularly known as the Hindu and Moslem Universities, but territorial designations are everywhere adopted for such institutions.  

It was also agreed between Mrs. Besant and Pandit Malaviya that Hindu culture would be the presiding spirit of the proposed University, that the University was to be a residential and teaching one and that the Central Hindu College would serve as the nucleus for the University.

Annie Besant left for England for six months immediately after the announcement of the amalgamated scheme of the University. The announcement of amalgamation, however, raised some controversy. Annie Besant's theosophical philosophy did not find favor with all the Hindus. Some elements in the Hindu community expressed the fear that in the proposed new University, Annie Besant's voice would be the dominant one and that she would impose her theosophy on the new University. Invectives were also poured on Madan Mohan Malaviya for joining with Annie

---

8 Annie Besant's Letter dated April 11, 1911, compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 103.

Besant. Faced with hostile denunciations from some Hindu quarters, Malaviya proposed some alterations in the amalgamated scheme of the University agreed to earlier between him and Annie Besant.

The objectives of the University in Malaviya's revised scheme remained substantially the same. The objectives were more explicitly worded: \(^{10}\)

1. To promote the study of the Hindu Shastras and of Sanskrit literature generally as a means of preserving and popularising for the benefit of the Hindus in particular and of the world at large in general, the best thought and culture of the Hindus, and all that was good and great in the ancient civilization of India.

2. To promote learning and research in liberal education.

3. To promote learning and research in scientific, technical, and professional education.

4. To promote the building up of character in youth by making religion and ethics an integral part of education.

Pandit Malaviya explained the reasons for establishing the proposed University. It will not be just another University. It will be distinguished from the other existing Universities by its special character. He claimed that whereas the existing examining Universities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Lahore and Allahabad led to "the development of the memory out of all proportion to

\(^{10}\)"The Hindu University of Benares—why it is wanted and what it aims at," compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., pp. 111-12."
the other faculties of the mind,"¹¹ the proposed University at Benares by virtue of its becoming the residential and teaching university will put stress on the formation of character in addition to cultivating the intellect.

Pointing out that Hinduism was the predominant religion of India (for seven out of ten persons), Malaviya claimed the obvious importance of providing training to teachers of Hindu religion and religious instruction to students. He claimed that no education was complete which did not provide for religious teaching and asserted that by providing such religious teachings, the proposed University will "make up an acknowledged deficiency in the present system of education,"¹² and provide also the real foundation of character. Pandit Malaviya argued that five universities were too few for a country of the size of India and that India's poverty was not so much in material resources as in trained manpower. He hoped that the establishment of the new University at Benares would fill the gap in this respect to some extent. Making a powerful plea in favor of the establishment of the new University, Pandit Malaviya appealed to the Hindu princes and the Hindu public for funds and to the Government for a charter for the University.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 126.
¹² Ibid., p. 137.
The tone of Annie Besant's University of Benares scheme and of Madan Mohan Malaviya's revision was substantially the same. There was, however, one important change in Pandit Malaviya's version. It related to the controversy this "change" aroused in 1965 when the Government of India wanted to change the name of Benares Hindu University. In the revised scheme, the name of the proposed University was changed from "University of Benares" to "Hindu University of Benares." The addition of the word "Hindu" in the name of the University is a clear indication that Pandit Malaviya wanted the association of that word with the name of the University. During the debate in Parliament over the Benares Hindu University amendment bill in 1965, some members of Parliament thought otherwise.\(^{13}\) The evidence seems to be contrary to what those members believed. Malaviya's draft specifically provided that the University shall be called the Hindu Vishwavidyalaya, Kashi—in English, the Hindu University of Benares.\(^{14}\)

Immediately after Annie Besant's return to India from England, a meeting took place between her and a few Hindu notables, including Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and

\(^{13}\)This has been explained in detail in Chapter VII.

\(^{14}\)"Draft Scheme of the Proposed Hindu University, Benares," compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
the Maharaja of Darbhanga. This meeting resolved the differences among the respective schemes put forward by Annie Besant and Pandit Malaviya. The short memorandum that this meeting produced said that "the name of the University shall be Hindu University."  

In response to the Hindu University Society's application for a royal charter for the proposed Hindu University at Benares, Sir Harcourt Butler, the Education Member of Viceregal Council, wrote that the Secretary of State for India decided that the proposed University at Benares should in future be called the "University of Benares." The Maharaja of Darbhanga, as President of the Hindu University Society, strongly objected:

. . . the new name proposed for it (the University) will not appeal to the Hindu public. . . . Located at Benares, the sacred city of the Hindus, the association of the word Hindu with the name will not only satisfy a much-desired sentiment, but will also indicate and point out that it will be for the benefit of the entire Hindu community of India . . . and that it must be regarded by them all as their

15 Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 193.

16 The Hindu University Society was founded in November, 1911, at Allahabad with the object of collecting funds and helping in other ways toward the establishment of the University. The members of the Society, especially Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, traveled extensively around the country in order to collect the estimated one crore of rupees needed for establishing the University. For a list of sixty-one original members of the Society, see Ibid., pp. 195-197.

17 Harcourt Butler's Letter dated August 9, 1912, to the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the President of Hindu University Society, compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., pp. 212-13.
own special institution. The Executive Committee (of Hindu University Society) has consulted the donors on this point (as on other points too), and they find that public opinion is very strongly in favour of retaining the name originally proposed. The Committee hope that the Government will be pleased to allow them to do so. 18

With regard to Sir Harcourt Butler's point that the Secretary of State had decided that the proposed University at Benares should have no powers of affiliation outside the locality in which it may be established, the Maharaja of Darbhanga expressed the overwhelming concern of the Hindu University Society that:

... if no colleges are affiliated outside Benares, the cherished hope of the promoters to shape a curriculum which will conduce to the development of Hindu culture will be realisable in Benares alone. 19

He pleaded that the possible conflict of jurisdiction20 with the older Universities that might occur in case of the proposed University having the power of affiliation could be prevented by adopting proper safeguards.

The Government refused to budge from its policy that the proposed University should have no power of

19 Ibid., p. 220.
20 The Government's apprehension was that the affiliation would lead to: 1) the conflict of jurisdiction with the older universities; 2) the lowering of standards of the proposed University; 3) the loss of peculiar benefits of the residential system; 4) the difficulties of exercising control over colleges situated in distant parts of the country.
affiliation beyond the locality in which it would be established. The Government did not like the idea of denominational Universities but pointed out that "in order to meet the sentiment of the subscribers, it has been conceded that the University shall be called the Benares Hindu University." 21

The Benares Hindu University Bill, enacted in October, 1915, provided that no person who is not a Hindu shall be a member of the University Court, that not less than three-fourths of members of the Senate shall be Hindus, and that the Faculty of Theology shall be manned entirely by Hindus. Some members of the Imperial Legislative Council expressed apprehension that the proposed University would be sectarian, that it would widen the gulf between Hindus and Muslims and that eventually it might foster separatist tendencies. Pandit Malaviya defended the provisions relating to the teaching of religion on the ground that there was a difference between denominationalism and sectarianism. Religious instruction, he asserted, far from producing narrowness, liberates the mind and promotes brotherly feelings between man and man. He pointed out that the absence of religious instruction in the existing State Universities did not prevent the growth of sectarian feelings in the country and argued

21 Harcourt Butler's Letter dated July 18, 1914, to the Maharaja of Darbhanga, compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 251.
that the inculcation of religious spirit in Benares Hindu University would foster national spirit and thus "lead to nothing but good."\(^{22}\) He defended the exclusive Hindu membership of the University Court in the following words:

> Well, membership on the Court has been confined to Hindus in order that Hindus who may make benefactions in favour of the institution should feel satisfied that their charities will be administered by men who will be in religious sympathy with them and in a position to appreciate their motives and their desire. With that knowledge they will make larger endowments to support the University than they would make if the endowment was to be administered by men of different persuasions and faiths.\(^{23}\)

Pandit Malaviya held that the Hindu University of Benares would be open to students of all faiths, that teachers of all creeds and races would be recruited and that Hindu religious teaching will not be compulsory for any but Hindus. Opponents argued that Hindu theological teaching should not be compulsory even for Hindus as there were differences among sections of the Hindu community as to the forms of worship and as to certain religious practices. Pandit Malaviya replied that only those precepts and truths of Hindu religion would be taught which were acceptable to all sections of the Hindu community.

\(^{22}\)Madan Mohan Malaviya's Speech in the Imperial Legislative Council, compiled in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 282.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 283.
A corollary dispute involved the location of the new University. This controversy provides a measure of the intense Hindu religious sentiment centering around the establishment of Benares Hindu University. The Hindu University Society selected the Nagwa lands in Kashi as the site for the new University and after the passage of the Benares Hindu University Act made preparation for the acquisition of the site at Nagwa. Some orthodox Hindus raised the objection that the proposed site at Nagwa was not within the holy area of Kashi (Benares) and demanded that a site be chosen which was within the Pancha Kroshi area of Kashi and which stood in closest proximity to the Ganga (the holy river Ganges). They proposed that some arrangement be made for a wider expression of Hindu public opinion on this matter. Babu Bhagavan Das, a leading member of the Hindu University Society, wrote an article at that time about the controversy relating to university sites. He wrote that he appreciated the Hindu's anxiety about the proposed University site being within the holy area of Kashi and close to Ganga. After all, Ganga and Kashi, he wrote:

... were dearer to the heart of the Hindu than Mecca and its holy tank to the Musalman, than Rome and Tiber to the Roman and the Christian, than Jerusalem and Jordan to the Hebrew, than Memphis and Niles to the Egyptian, than Babylon and Euphrates to the Babylonian! Is it self-complacence to say "dearer"? Perhaps not! For, the love of the others was and is largely "physical," "national," "political,"
historically "religious"; while the Hindu's is all that. . . . 24

Babu Bhagavan Das quoted extensively from Hindu religious scriptures to assure the Hindu public that the proposed University at Nagwa actually fell within the periphery of the holy area of Kashi. He mentioned that Tulsi Dasa's prophecy was going to come true:

It may be interesting to mention here that one of the comparatively recent "seers" of Hinduism, Tulsi Dasa—a reincarnation of Valmiki as popular tradition would have it—has left behind a prophecy that Kashi would grow again southwards, upstream, in which direction is the site selected. So were the site-seeking members of the Hindu University Society told by one of the occupants with a regretful smile of resignation—regretful because of his own coming dispossession, smiling and resigned because of the coming fulfilment of the prophecy and the better hopes of a better Hinduism. 25

Babu Bhagavan Das asked the Hindu people to desist from further controversy about the University site at Nagwa and work for the revival of "the highest ideals and the finest culture of genuine Hinduism" 26 in the new University. The controversy subsided after this appeal and persuasion. The Governor-General of India laid the foundation stone of the University in February 1916, and the University started functioning from the next year.

24 Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 327.
25 Ibid., p. 328.
26 Ibid., p. 329.
II

The conviction of Madan Mohan Malaviya that the inculcation of religious spirit in the Benares Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim University would promote brotherly feelings between the Hindus and Muslims and lead to "nothing but good" proved to be false. There was a brief period of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in the Non-Cooperation movement launched by Gandhi in 1921. But then the Muslims were not so much concerned with the independence of India as with the fate of the Turkish Caliph. That there was no real bond of amity between the two communities was proved by the widespread communal riots of 1921-1923 in different parts of the country, including Moradabad, Meerut, Allahabad, Bonda, Agra, Rae Bareli and Saharanpur of U.P. As Paul R. Brass wrote:

The riots of 1921-1923 led to the resurgence of Hindu and Muslim communal politics. The Hindu Mahasabha became active again in 1923 and the Muslim League, which had been dormant during the Non-Cooperation movement, reemerged as a political force in 1924. The Congress Civil Disobedience movement of 1930-1931 was followed by another series of communal riots, culminating in the terrible Kanpur riot of 1931. . . . From 1937 on, the Congress and the League went separate ways. 27

The Hindu-Muslim tension in the country had its impact on Aligarh Muslim University and Benares Hindu

University. The former became a stronghold of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and a center of Muslim communal and separatist politics while the latter became the center of Hindu religious revival under the leadership of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. Pandit Malaviya was a "staunch Hindu." He presided over the 1923 session of the Hindu Mahasabha in Benares, over the Provincial Sanatan Dharma Sammelan at Rawalpindi in 1924, and over the Provincial Sanatan Dharma Mahasabha at Allahabad in 1928. In 1928, he also organized the all-India Sanatan Dharma Sabha at Benares. "Malaviya's revivalism," Paul R. Brass observed:

"... led almost inevitably to communal conflict, for in nineteenth century Uttar Pradesh, there remained many vestiges of Muslim dominance in the life of the province. Thus, to support Hindi language, Malaviya had to attack Urdu; Malaviya led the movement in Uttar Pradesh, which began in 1883, to change the Court character from Persian to Devnagari, essentially a change from Urdu to Hindi." 29

Realizing the functional importance of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) as the Hindu counterparts to the separatist Muslims, Pandit Malaviya patronized both of these organizations and in 1938 permitted the RSS to construct a two-room building on the Benares Hindu University campus for carrying on its activities. The RSS aims at revitalizing and moulding

---


29 Paul R. Brass, op. cit., p. 20.
the Hindus of India into a conscious unity. The Benares Hindu University aimed at essentially the same goal. The RSS could, therefore, be regarded in a sense as the product of the University, i.e., the same Hindu sentiment that marked the movement for the University.

Anti-Mohammedanism and anti-communism have been the hallmarks of the RSS since its foundation. It condemns Muslims as disloyal to India and the communists as subservient to foreign ideologies. The RSS also regards socialist thinking as abharatiya (non-Indian) and therefore has contempt for the Socialist parties of India. It has never pardoned the Congress Party of India for becoming a party to the destruction of "the sacred indivisibility of the Bharatmata"\(^3^0\) (mother India) and regards the secularist policy of the Congress Government as the negation of Hinduism. The anti-Communist, anti-Socialist and anti-Congress activities of the RSS are carried on by the Jana Sangh in the political field and by the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarshi Parishad (All-India Student Organization) in the student activity field. They claim to be separate organizations but are interrelated. Persons who are members of one organization are often members also of the other two organizations. The role RSS and its

\(^3^0\) Joseph Curran, Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the RSS (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), p. 15.
associates have played in the post-1958 student agitations in the Banaras Hindu University has important political significance and will be dealt with in later chapters when I take up the analysis of specific cases.

31 The word "Benares" was spelt as "Banaras" in the Banaras Hindu University Amendment Act of 1951. Ever since, the University has been known as Banaras Hindu University.
CHAPTER II

POLITICIZATION FROM OUTER ENVIRONMENT: BHU STUDENTS
IN THE NATIONAL FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Politicization of BHU in the pre-independence period flowed from its outer environment, i.e., the national freedom movement in the country. The official policy of the University was to keep away from involvement in the freedom struggle so that the University could pursue its revivalist goals undisturbed. The University authorities were afraid that political involvement would bring upon the University the indignation of the British Government of India and thus hinder the academic progress. The effort to keep the University away from the political mainstream failed. The Nationalist leaders of the country

1Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the founder of the University, was in the forefront of India's struggle for freedom for nearly four decades. He, however, was opposed to the Indian National Congress policy of using students in the struggle against the British. Pandit Malaviya firmly believed that while at the University, the students should concentrate all their energies in character building and not dabble in politics of the country. He was also convinced that it was "essential for the success of the University that it should secure the good will and sympathy of the Government, and that it should always retain that sympathy." (Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, History of Banaras Hindu University (Varanasi: BHU Press, 1966), p. 287. He, therefore, decreed that BHU should keep itself out of politics and that no employee or student of the University should take part in politics.
and certain teachers of the University acted contrary to the policy of the University authorities and involved students in the movements against the British Government of India. How this was done in 1921 (Non-Cooperation movement), 1930 (Civil Disobedience movement) and 1942 (Quit-India movement) is described below.

Efforts to politicize the students started almost immediately. Addressing the students on the occasion of the foundation stone laying ceremony of the University in February, 1916, Mahatma Gandhi urged that non-violent resistance should be adopted as a means of fighting the British Government of India.

In 1920, the Congress, under Gandhi's leadership, launched a Non-Cooperation movement against the British Government. Congress leaders felt the necessity of utilizing the youthful energy and idealism of students in building up resistance to the British. With this end in view, the Congress Party at its annual conference in 1920 passed a resolution calling for:

... gradual withdrawal of boys and girls from schools and colleges and earnest attempts to establish National Institutions. ... By a National Institution it is meant any Educational Institution that does not receive aid from government, is not in any way controlled or inspected by government and is not affiliated to any university established by government.  

Pandit Malaviya opposed the Non-Cooperation movement. He believed that the country was not yet prepared for a non-violent mass movement and that it would halt the progress of education in the country. He could not, however, prevent the students and teachers of BHU from being involved in the Non-Cooperation movement. J. B. Kripalani, a teacher in the Political Science department of the University (he later became President of the Indian National Congress), led some two hundred students of the University in the Non-Cooperation movement.

While Pandit Malaviya was opposed to students' taking part in political agitations, he encouraged them to take to constructive social service. This was consistent with the revivalist goal that he formulated for the University. In his convocation address to the students of the University in December 1929, Pandit Malaviya said:

I call upon every one of you, young men and young women, to take a vow that you will start a crusade against illiteracy, a campaign to spread knowledge and enlightenment among the teeming millions of India. Organize your strength. During the period of your leisure or vacation, make it a point to go to the villages and work among your countrymen. Be determined to dispel the darkness which envelopes our masses. Open schools.³

In 1930, Mahatma Gandhi launched the Civil Disobedience movement demanding Purna Swaraj (complete independence). The Congress involved students from all over India, including students of BHU. The Benares

³Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 572.
students joined the local Congress workers in picketing at the University and in demanding the closure of the University for a few months. The picketing disrupted the entire work of the University. Failing to convince the local Congress workers about the desirability of ending the picketing from the Benares Hindu University, which he claimed to be a non-governmental people's university, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya approached Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then acting President of the Congress. Patel decreed:

... the method adopted by the Local Congress Committee, that of causing physical obstruction by lying in the passages and forming cordons and disturbing the classes by singing songs, was contrary to the policy of the Congress, and if the local Committee could not carry on picketing in any other way, then it should be entirely stopped.

The picketing at the University was not entirely stopped. Only methods milder than previously adopted were followed.

In August, 1942, Mahatma Gandhi launched his "Quit India" movement. The aim of the movement was independence. The Government promptly took the whole of the Congress Working Committee into custody. The entire country was indignant over the actions taken by the

---

4Some teachers of the University, U. A. Asrani and Pandit Jagannath Bajpai, for example, were also involved in the Civil Disobedience movement.

5Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 615.
Government and the students were especially agitated. The nationalist students all over India left their educational institutions, took part in strikes and demonstrations, went to jails and when the front line of Congress leadership was arrested, "took over some leadership responsibilities, and provided a key liaison between the underground leaders and the movement." 

Benares was one of the major centers of student activity in the country. A large number of students of the University participated in the Quit-India movement. Classrooms became empty. The picketing at the University became so intense and the situation in general in Benares and the surrounding areas became so disturbed that the University authorities had no option but to close the University. K. N. Gairola and Radhey Shyam Sharma, two teachers of the University, led some students of the University into violent activities in order to disrupt the British administration. Students raided the armory, burned the railway and police stations, and disrupted the telegraph wires, telephone connections and railway lines. Pandit Malaviya's appeal to students to desist from violence did not have any effect.

---

The Government alleged that some students who were committing violent activities were hiding themselves from the law by taking shelter on the University premises. The Government demanded that the University be cleared of all students. Soon the Military occupied the University without giving any advance notice to the University authorities. In the early morning of August 19, 1942, the Police and Military forced open the gate of the University, threw the students out of their hostels and established their camp at the University library.

In response to the University's appeal for vacating the military occupation of the University's premises, the Governor of U.P. wrote:

First, I must express my certainty as a result of investigation that the serious disturbance and sabotage which occurred in the Benares area and which radiated out from Benares was caused in a great measure by Benares Hindu University students, led and encouraged by certain members of the staff. . . . A very considerable number of students, under the particular leadership of Dr. Gairola and Professor Radhe Shyam, did embark on a campaign of sabotage which has had no parallel elsewhere in the province.

. . . there has arisen in the University an unduly political atmosphere, encouraged and fostered by frequent political meetings and addresses delivered by extremist leaders, and it is this atmosphere which has provided the background for recent events.7

The Government demanded compliance on the following four points by the University: 1) That the University

7Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 730.
shall not allow students to hold any meetings or organize any activities on the campus without the prior permission of the University authorities. 2) That the University shall exclude certain persons from the University. 3) That the University shall tighten up discipline. 4) That the University shall cooperate with the Intelligence Staff of the Government.

The University replied that it always advised students to desist from violent activities, that it had withheld the salaries of those teachers and clerks who were arrested for participating in the Quit-India movement and that it had terminated the services of K. N. Gairola and Radhey Shyam Sharma even though they were not yet arrested by the Government. The University promised to take all necessary steps to comply with the four points raised by the Government. Subsequently, the Government vacated the military occupation of the University and allowed the University to reopen for normal work.

In brief, the political involvement of BHU students in the movements for independence was encouraged, organized, and guided at every stage by the leaders of the Congress Party and certain teachers of the University. That the tradition of using the students by party politicians and teachers has been continued in BHU in its post-independence years will be shown when I discuss the specific cases of student agitations in BHU in Chapters V through VIII.
CHAPTER III

PAROCHIALIZATION AT BHU: VICE-CHANCELLORS AND THE INTERNAL CONTEXT OF CASTE, LANGUAGE AND SUB-REGION

As politicization has been a continuous process at BHU, so has been parochialization. This chapter will show that the caste, language and sub-region were the bases of parochialization at BHU and that it led to the resignation of successive Vice-Chancellors from the University.

The University was established with a view to serving an instrumental purpose: the University must be a mechanism for regenerating the Hindu community and for modelling the particular cultural style of the Hindus. How was this to be done? The answer was: by teaching theology and Hindu religious teachings. Who were to teach such subjects? Only the high-caste Brahmins, or any Hindu competent for the job? The beginning of the parochialization centered around an answer to this question.

On the 7th of March 1919, the Faculty of Theology of the Benares Hindu University passed a resolution that only orthodox Brahmins who combined learning with piety and who observed strictly the traditional rules of morality should be appointed as teachers of religion in the Benares Hindu University. Babu Bhagavan Das, a member of the
University Court,\(^1\) the Council,\(^2\) the Senate\(^3\) and himself a non-Brahmin member of the Faculty of Theology took exception to this resolution of the Faculty of Theology and in the next meeting of the Faculty of Theology, he moved that it be rescinded. Pandit Malaviya offered a compromise which would enable non-Brahmins to lecture, but not receive full appointments. This was not acceptable to Babu Bhagavan Das.

Bhagavan Das next moved the Council to rescind the resolution in question. The Council asked the Faculty of Theology to indicate to the Council in specific terms if the resolution passed by the Faculty of Theology precluded or permitted the appointment of a non-Brahmin as a teacher of religion. The Faculty answered that:

> ... only such Brahmins as combine piety with learning and are sanctified by the practice of long-cherished *Sadachar* (noble conduct) should be appointed as teachers of religion in the institutions of the Hindu University (leaving apart the arrangements for the religious instruction of Sikh and Jain youths). If such an *apatkal* (distressing emergency) should come when Brahmins of the description given above should not be found, the Faculty will consider the question of recommending, in accordance with the rules laid down by Manu that non-Brahmins, who possess qualifications similar to those indicated

\(^1\)The Court was the supreme governing body of the University in administrative matters.

\(^2\)The Council was the executive body of the Court.

\(^3\)The Senate was the academic body of the University. The Syndicate was its executive body.
above in the case of Brahmins, may be employed as teachers of religion in the institutions of the University."

Dissatisfied at the answer given by the Faculty of Theology, Babu Bhagavan Das again moved the Council for rescinding the said resolution. The Council, however, accepted an amendment moved by another member and requested the Court to direct the Faculty of Theology not to lay down a policy in the matter of appointment which would have the effect of shutting out any caste from the employment of the University. In the discussion which took place before the Court, the Brahmin members including Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Lakshmana Sastri Dravid and Pandit Prabhu Datt Shastri argued that Brahmins stood at the head of the caste-hierarchy and the resolution passed by the Faculty of Theology was in conformity with the general sentiment of the Hindu community and that from time immemorial only the Janmana Brahmins (Brahmins by birth), not the Karmana Brahmins (Brahmins by work) had been considered as competent to be teachers of religion.

The non-Brahmin members including Babu Bhagavan Das, Ajit Prasad, Munshi Ishwar Saran, and Babu Siva Prasad

---

Gupta, argued that the Brahmin members' narrow interpretation of the caste system constituted a slur on the other three castes and that any Hindu, Brahmin or non-Brahmin, who was endowed with learning and piety, should be appointed as a teacher of religion. There was a division between the Brahmin and non-Brahmin members of the University Court and the Council on this issue and eventually such conflict led non-Brahmin members such as Babu Bhagavan Das to resign from the University in 1920. It might be worth noting that some of the distinguished professors of the University, like Jadunath Sarkar, N. C. Nag, Birbal Sahani—all non-Brahmins by caste—left the University in 1919-20. Reflecting on the atmosphere prevailing in the University in its early years, Annie Besant observed that "everybody was trying to be a Brahmin or half-Brahmin or a quarter-Brahmin" in the University.⁵

Another dimension of parochialization, started in the University in its early years and continued later, was the sub-region and language-based discrimination against the Vice-Chancellors who came from outside the Eastern U.P. area in which the University was located. P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar, the second Vice-Chancellor⁶ of the University, was subjected to such discrimination. He

⁵Ibid., p. 497.

⁶Pandit Sundar Lal, the first Vice-Chancellor, was a Hindi-speaking native of Eastern U.P.
came from Madras. His ignorance of Hindi language made it difficult for him to continue in the University. In the meetings of the University Court, some members of the Court always delivered their speeches in the vernacular of the area in which the University was located, i.e., Hindi. Not knowing Hindi, P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar found it almost impossible to conduct the meetings of the Court. As Annie Besant, herself a member of the University Court, observed:

... it was made impossible for him (P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyar) to remain here ... He was called upon to decide points of order which had been discussed in a provincial language of which he did not know a single word. No self-respecting man could remain in such a position as that and in the end he was obliged to resign...  

Annie Besant felt that the members of the Court should not have used the vernacular of a particular province for carrying on the business of an All-India institution like BHU. Addressing the members of the Court, she stated:

If you speak in the language of your province, then you must take your officers from your province and not from outside.

That was exactly what was done when, after Sivaswamy Aiyar's resignation, the University Court elected Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, a Hindi-speaking native of Eastern

7Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 490.
8Ibid., p. 491.
U.P., as the Vice-Chancellor of the University. As the founder of the University, Pandit Malaviya was widely respected and he remained the Vice-Chancellor for twenty years (1919-1939) without having to face the kind of problem that Sivaswamy Aiyar had to face.

Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan (subsequently the President of Independent India) was the next Vice-Chancellor. The early 1940's were a difficult time period for the University. The involvement of the University students and teachers in the Quit-India campaign of August, 1942 displeased the British Government of India. Vice-Chancellor Radhakrishnan's outstanding scholarship and persuasive personality helped to save the University from the wrath of the Government. Radhakrishnan was, nevertheless, an "outsider." He, like Sivaswamy Aiyar, came from Madras and did not speak Hindi. In the late 1940's a so-called Eastern U.P. group came to be formed against Vice-Chancellor Radhakrishnan. The leader of the Group was Pandit Govind Malaviya.

In January, 1947, a vacancy occurred in the office of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University due to the resignation of the incumbent Pro-Vice-Chancellor. Vice-Chancellor Radhakrishnan proposed to a special meeting of the Court that Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee be elected the Pro-Vice-Chancellor. He believed that the appointment of Dr. Mookerjee would add to the reputation and efficiency
of the University. Hailing from Bengal, a non-Hindi area, Syama Prasad Mookerjee was an "outsider" in the eyes of the Eastern U.P. group and the nomination of Dr. Mookerjee was contested by Pandit Govind Malaviya. Finding that a unanimous election was impossible and that a conflict was inevitable, a deeply hurt Dr. Radhakrishnan withdrew the name of Dr. Mookerjee. The special meeting of the Court then decided that the election of a regular Pro-Vice-Chancellor should be postponed to the next annual meeting of the Court. Dr. Radhakrishnan next recommended Dr. A. B. Misra for filling up the vacancy in the office of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and this was approved by the Council.

At the annual meeting of the Court on December 13, 1947, the most important item on the agenda was the election of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor. Pandit Govind Malaviya contested Dr. A. B. Misra, who already had served as Acting Pro-Vice-Chancellor for nine months and who was known to have the confidence of Vice-Chancellor Radhakrishnan. Pandit Govind Malaviya won by a slim majority. This was a symbolic defeat for Dr. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-Chancellor, who was deeply disturbed at the operation of the anti-Radhakrishnan group in the University. The following day (i.e., on December 14, 1947) he sent in his resignation to the Court.

Dr. Radhakrishnan sarcastically pointed out the existence of a Hindi clique in the University after
resigning his post as the Vice-Chancellor. Proposing before the Court that Dr. Amarnath Jha of U.P. be elected the new Vice-Chancellor, he observed:

There are great difficulties in securing a Vice-Chancellor for this University. He must be a Hindu. He must be a teacher. He must be an experienced administrator and there is one other qualification which he should possess, and it is this that he should be able to speak fluently both in Hindi and English. Dr. Jha possesses these requisite qualifications and the Pandits (emphasis added) will feel satisfaction on knowing that we have been able to secure the service of Dr. Amarnath Jha, who knows Hindi.\(^9\)

With Dr. Radhakrishnan gone, Dr. Amarnath Jha took over the Vice-Chancellorship. He was the chairman of the Public Service Commission in the State of U.P. at the time of his appointment as Vice-Chancellor. He came to the University, as he himself said, "almost as a stranger."\(^10\)

He belonged to U.P. He was an "outsider" not in the sense of coming from a non-Hindi area but in the sense of not belonging to the Eastern U.P. group on the campus. He lasted less than a year. As a matter of fact, he served out the residue period of Dr. Radhakrishnan's third term as Vice-Chancellor. The Court sat in its annual meeting on December 5, 1948, to elect the Vice-Chancellor for three years. The choice was between Dr. Amarnath Jha, the incumbent Vice-Chancellor, and Pandit Govind Malaviya,

\(^9\)Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, *op. cit.*, p. 758.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 722.
who offered himself as a contestant for the office. Addressing the Court, Dr. Jha appealed to it to rise above narrow ritualistic and dogmatic considerations. Sensing that his appeal was not effective, he withdrew his name, leaving Pandit Govind Malaviya to be elected.

Dr. Jha came to the University with high aspirations, but left the University frustrated. As Dr. A. B. Misra, who, as a participant-observer, knew Dr. Jha intimately, wrote:

Dr. Amarnath Jha . . . realized that he was not wanted in the BHU. The invitation extended to him to become the vice-chancellor of the Hindu University was, in fact, a well-laid trap into which he fell unawaringly. It was, at best, an interim measure designed to smoke-screen the secret ambition of an aspirant to the gaddi (the throne). And so his stay in the BHU was short, uneventful, and featureless. He left the University a wiser but a sadder man.\(^{11}\)

Pandit Govind Malaviya was very involved in the politics of the campus. He led the opposition to Vice-Chancellors Radhakrishnan and Jha. Unfortunately for himself, Pandit Govind Malaviya as Vice-Chancellor developed a rift with some of his earlier supporters who happened to be members of the Court and the Council.\(^{12}\) Those supporters-turned opponents wanted to get rid of him. In November, 1949, the Court appointed a committee


\(^{12}\)How this happened will be described in detail in Chapter VI.
to recommend changes, if any, in the Act and Statutes of the University. The committee recommended that the Vice-Chancellor of the University should be a person of distinguished academic ability and should have academic and administrative experience of at least fifteen years. The recommendation was forwarded to the Government of India and, if accepted, was intended to apply to future Vice-Chancellors of the University.

Pandit Govind Malaviya did not have the qualifications which were thought to be desirable of the future Vice-Chancellors. He thought his opponents had a hand in the formulation of that recommendation and that it was formulated with the purpose of indirectly reflecting on him and preventing him from being reappointed Vice-Chancellor in future. He tendered his resignation to the Court and asked the Court to re-elect him if it had confidence in him. His opponents in the Court introduced a resolution condemning him for resigning and seeking re-election at the same time. Such action, the resolution held, amounted to introducing the practices and methods of political organizations in the University. That resolution was lost and Pandit Govind Malaviya was re-elected Vice-Chancellor, defeating Professor Mukut Behari Lal, who also contested for the office of the Vice-Chancellor. On receiving representation from various quarters against continuing Govind Malaviya as Vice-Chancellor, the
President of India as the Visitor of the University refused to approve of the election. Pandit Govind Malaviya's exit as Vice-Chancellor thus represents a case of being disowned by his own supporters as well as of being disapproved by the Government of India.

The Parliament of India amended the Benares Hindu University Act of 1915 in October, 1951. The Amendment Act, 1951, provided for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor by the Visitor (i.e., the President of India) from a panel of names suggested by the Executive Council.  

The Executive Council of BHU suggested the names of Dr. P. Parija, Acharya Narendra Deva and Pandit Govind Malaviya for Vice-Chancellorship. The Visitor appointed Acharya Narendra Deva as the Vice-Chancellor of the University from December 6, 1951. He was an outstanding Socialist leader from U.P. and was widely respected as a man of principle. He was given an unprecedented welcome.

---

13 The previous arrangement provided for the election of the Vice-Chancellor by the University Court. The Amendment Act of 1951 introduced the following other changes: The word "Benares" was now spelt as "Banaras." Religious instruction was made optional. The provision that "no person not being a Hindu shall become or be appointed a member of any Court other than the First Court unless he has been a member of the First Court," was omitted. The President of India was made the Visitor and the Governor of Uttar Pradesh the Rector. There were to be no patrons or vice-patrons any longer. The number of Pro-Chancellors was reduced to one from two. The Council was renamed the Executive Council, the Senate the Academic Council, the Syndicate the Standing Committee of the Academic Council, the Standing Finance Committee as the Finance Committee, and the Board of Appointment as the Selection Committee.
the day he arrived at Banaras to assume the duties of his office. There was, nevertheless, opposition to his appointment. Dr. P. Parija, the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, left Banaras, severing his official connection with the University the day Acharya Narendra Deva arrived at Banaras. The appointment was for six years, but he lasted a little more than two years. In the annual meeting of the Court in April, 1954, his opponents gave notice for moving a proposal containing some insinuations against the Vice-Chancellor. Acharya Narendra Deva was deeply hurt and he made a spirited speech after which the proposal was not moved. But this incident, more than his failing health, made him take the irrevocable decision to resign with effect from May, 1954.

Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar was the next Vice-Chancellor of the University. At the time of his appointment to BHU, he was the Vice-Chancellor of the Annamalai University at Madras. He came to Banaras with high hopes. As he himself said:

I had made elaborate arrangements at another place, but it was put to me very strongly that I should take up work here. There was something in the tradition of Banaras that exerted a pull and in consequence I have accepted this responsibility. 

---

14 This will be referred to in detail in Chapter VI.

15 Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 820.
That Dr. Aiyar wanted to serve out his full term of six years was indicated by the fact that he drew up elaborate schemes for improving the state of affairs at Banaras Hindu University and had transferred the whole of his library to Banaras. He lasted less than two years. He was frustrated in his idealism to make "the Banaras Hindu University not only an ideal national University but an international University" representing "people belonging to every part of India and indeed of the world." 16 Dr. Aiyar found "the background and personnel of the University" unsatisfactory 17 and resigned. He felt that they were unsatisfactory "due to unchecked and untoward developments during several years." 18

It is the desire to counteract the "unchecked and untoward developments" in BHU—an All-India University—which brought the Government of India into the scene. The following chapter will deal with the efforts that the Government of India made towards assessing the problem of parochialization at BHU.

16 Quoted in Dar and Somaskandan, op. cit., p. 826.

17 C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar's letter to the President of India. See Lok Sabha Debates (Second series), XIX, No. 16, September 1, 1958.

18 Ibid. Reflecting on the resignation of Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, Dr. A. B. Misra wrote that "he was not wanted here (BHU) by the local elements and he decided to go away." "Vice-Chancellors Whom I Have Known: Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar," in Prajna, The Banaras Hindu University Journal, Vol. 12 (1), p. 171. The cases of other Vice-Chancellors starting with Dr. V. S. Jha who succeeded Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar in the Vice-Chancellor's office, will be discussed when I take up the analysis of specific cases of student agitations at BHU in Chapters V through VIII.
CHAPTER IV

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE "PROBLEM" AT BHU: THE MUDALIAR COMMITTEE REPORT

A series of Vice-Chancellors leaving before the completion of their terms convinced the Government of India that there was something seriously wrong at BHU. Therefore, the President of India in his capacity as the Visitor of the University, appointed in the middle of the year 1957 a Committee of Enquiry. The Committee was headed by A. L. Mudaliar, the Vice-Chancellor of Madras University. The other members were M. C. Mahajan, ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, P. Subbarayan, MP, Sucheta Kripalani, MP, and N. J. Wadia, the Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University. The Committee was asked to examine the general state of discipline in the University and the general and specific workings of the Act, the Statutes and the Ordinances of the University and recommend such remedies and measures of reform as it considered desirable. This chapter will highlight the findings of the Mudaliar Committee Report¹ and note the

reaction of the Eastern U.P. group, against whom the Report was directed, to the Report.

I

The Committee asked for memoranda and oral evidence from members of the teaching staff and others interested in the affairs of the University. Eventually, the Committee received about one hundred memoranda, interviewed seventy-four persons and reached its conclusions on the basis of evidence gathered from these sources. The Committee did not specify, except in rare instances, the interviews or memoranda from which it drew its conclusions. The shorthand record of oral evidence was never published. But as the copies of the confidential memoranda submitted to the Committee were available, I will make suitable reference to them in order to indicate the kind of sources from which the Committee drew its conclusions.

Many memoranda attributed the parochialization of the University to the politics of the Eastern U.P. group. Since referring to them all will be repetitive, I will refer to a cross section of opinion represented through such memoranda. Kedar Dutt Joshi, Lecturer in Jyotishi (Astrology) Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya (College), BHU, wrote that the existence in the University of an Eastern U.P. group had been one main factor for the short stay of Vice Chancellors in recent times in the University. This group
used "the most improper and unworthy means" to maintain itself in power and used students to bring down its opponents, Joshi asserted.²

Dr. Nada Lal Singh, Reader, department of Spectroscopy, BHU, held that this group consisted of "some local teacher-pliticians and some interested persons outside the University" and had become "formidable" ever since the days of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Dr. Radhakrishnan.³ Some of the leading members of the group were, in fact, blood relations of one another. Pandit Ram Vyas Pande, his son Pandit Ram Shankar Pande, and his father-in-law Ramdeo Misra, for example, were members of the same group.⁴

The main trouble of BHU, Dr. Suryakantha, the Head of the Sanskrit department of BHU, wrote, emanated from the fact that the Eastern U.P. group tried to capture all positions of vantage in the University, so much so that "if a man of this group becomes principal of a college, he keeps vacant the post of even a chaprasi (peon) till he gets a man from his own village."⁵

²Confidential Memoranda Submitted to the BHU Enquiry Committee (n.p., n.d.), pp. 120-l. Hereafter referred to as Memoranda.

³Ibid., p. 135.

⁴Memorandum by Acharya Shri Nagesh Upadhyaya, Ibid., p. 233.

⁵Ibid., p. 125.
Dr. Daya Swarup, Principal of the Mining and Metallurgy College of BHU, wrote that if Vice-Chancellor after Vice-Chancellor had to leave before the completion of their terms, it was the Eastern U.P. group which was responsible. The Group made it impossible for the Vice-Chancellors to introduce any reforms in the University and tried to dictate terms to them.\(^6\)

Both Dr. Daya Swarup and the Commissioner, Banaras Division, submitted to the Enquiry Committee that the teacher-politicians of the Eastern U.P. group incited the students to agitate against the University authorities. They created situations with a view to discrediting the University authorities, particularly the Vice-Chancellor.\(^7\) The domination of the Eastern U.P. group was such that Mrs. K. Venkateswaran, Principal, Women's College, went to the length of observing that the University practically belonged to them.\(^8\)

From an examination of the opinions of respectable professors of the University and from other "irrefutable evidence" gathered from other witnesses who appeared before the Enquiry Committee, the latter came to the

\(^6\)Ibid., p. 172.
\(^7\)Ibid., p. 237.
\(^8\)Ibid., p. 203.
broad conclusion that "the real menace to the satisfactory working of the University lies in the teacher-politicians and the formation of groups which dominate in all affairs of the University," especially the formation of what was popularly known as the "Eastern Uttar Pradesh group."

In specific terms, the Committee found that the Eastern U.P. group pressured Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, Dr. Amarnath Jha, Pandit Govind Malaviya, Acharya Narendra Deva, and Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar into leaving the University before the completion of their terms as Vice-Chancellor, and that the group was active against the incumbent Vice-Chancellor, Dr. V. S. Jha.

The Mudaliar Committee observed that the Eastern U.P. group was so characterized by the spirit of regionalism that it regarded the Vice-Chancellors who came from outside their area as "outsiders." The Committee referred

---

9Report, op. cit., p. 10. In stating this conclusion, the Committee pointedly referred to the fact that the Chairman of the University Grants Commission reached a similar conclusion from his own independent study of the situation at BHU. Report, p. 11.

10Several persons who submitted memoranda before the Committee brought additional charges of casteism and linguism against the Eastern U.P. group. Kedar Dutt Joshi, Lecturer in Jyotishi (Astrology) BHU, held that the members of the said group were "greatly caste-conscious, prejudiced and narrow-minded" and were very much hostile to all not belonging to their group." Memoranda, op. cit., p. 210.

Mrs. K. Venkateswaran, Principal, Women's College, BHU, wrote: "The feeling is that it is not a "Hindu" University, but a Hindu University. The national character of this University has long been forgotten. The non-Hindi person, unless he or she becomes a stooge of the party, has to undergo many penalties. The South Indian, in particular, is a hated person and Hindi is the frightening rock against which he is dashed." Ibid., p. 203.
in this connection to the appointment of Dr. V. S. Jha as Vice-Chancellor of the University. On the resignation of Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, the Executive Council of BHU recommended to the President of India for Vice-Chancellorship the names of four persons: M. C. Bijawat, the incumbent Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University, Dr. R. S. Tripathi, the Principal, Arts College of BHU, Gurumukh Nihal Singh and Dr. V. S. Jha. Dr. R. S. Tripathi was strongly backed by the Eastern U.P. group for Vice-Chancellorship. The President, however, appointed Dr. V. S. Jha as the Vice-Chancellor. "The appointment of Dr. V. S. Jha," the Committee observed, "evidently created considerable resentment in this particular group (the Eastern U.P. group) and we were given to understand that they have not reconciled themselves to the position of "an outsider being appointed as Vice-Chancellor of the University."\(^{11}\)

The memorandum that the Mudaliar Committee received from J. S. Yajnik of BHU was very outspoken as to the strategy of the Eastern U.P. group towards Dr. V. S. Jha:

Even before the present Vice-Chancellor (Dr. V. S. Jha) arrived here, the leaders of the party (i.e., Eastern U.P. group) began to make things hot for him here. They gave him six months' term of office, and greeted him on arrival with a carefully planned

\(^{11}\) Report, op. cit., p. 4.
and timed strike of students. This was a cold war and the "open conflict" (their own term) began when he did not accept their suggestion subtly conveyed to him, that if he desired smooth sailing here he should appoint Dr. R. S. Tripathi, Principal, C.H.C. (Central Hindu College) as the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and another person of the party as the Chief Proctor.

The Mudaliar Committee found that the teacher-politicians of the Eastern U.P. group incited the students to agitation against the University authorities. The admission issue provided them with a whip hand. The student community of Uttar Pradesh in particular and parts of Bihar came to look upon BHU as a University to which admission should be guaranteed to all students who wanted it. This attitude provided occasions for clashes between students and the University authorities who wanted

12 The reference was to July, 1956, student strike on the demand that the University withdraw the restriction regarding the admission of third divisioners to certain classes in the University.

First, Second and Third divisions in Indian Universities are roughly comparable to "A," "B" and "C" grades respectively in American Universities.

13 Memoranda, op. cit., p. 65.

14 Report, op. cit., p. 5. The Committee quoted a representative of Students' Association as follows: "... that there should be no restriction as to the number of students to be admitted, that there should be no qualifications prescribed for admissions, and that whether a student has a third class qualification or had qualified at more than one attempt, admission should be guaranteed.
to restrict admissions according to prescribed standards. The Mudaliar Committee found that the pressure tactics that the students used in order to force the University authorities to yield to their demand for unrestricted admission received considerable sympathy and support from a section of the interested teachers.\(^\text{15}\)

In July, 1957, for example, Vice-Chancellor, Dr. V. S. Jha, wanted to exclude third division students from being admitted to the University. The students, particularly of the Arts College, Law College and the College of Indology, struck over this decision. Satish Kumar of the Law College, the leader of the strikers, went on a hunger-strike. In describing this strike, in her memorandum to the Mudaliar Committee, the Principal, Women's College, BHU, wrote:

> The noteworthy feature in this strike was that the students while taking out the processions and uttering undignified words against V. C. (Vice-Chancellor) stopped at the houses of some Principals and cheered, wished them "zindabad" (life forever).

> I am fully convinced that this strike and many others in the past have been backed by members of the teaching staff of intriguing politics.\(^\text{16}\)

Prof. S. C. Das Gupta, the Chief Proctor of BHU observed that the July, 1957, strike was staged by the "unholy

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Memoranda, op. cit., pp. 203-4.
combination of unworthy teachers and students."  

The Eastern U.P. group of teachers and students looked upon BHU as an instrument for serving local needs. The Group propounded the theory that "the first claim" to admission in the University "should be of those students who come from the neighbouring areas" of Banaras, and that the first claim of jobs—academic and administrative—in the University should be of those people who come from the neighbouring areas of Banaras. It is such attitudes, which, the Mudaliar Committee observed, made BHU lose much of its All-India character.

The Committee noted that the politicization at BHU was carried on through the cooperation of political parties and some of the members of the teaching staff. To quote the Committee:

... various leaders of political parties have not hesitated to maintain their offices within the campus... Their activities are carried on through the agencies in the different (students') hostels and with the cooperation of some of the members of the teaching staff.

---

17 Ibid., p. 85. This combination or group, according to Prof. Das Gupta, consisted of teachers and students mostly from Eastern U.P., West and North Bihar.

18 Report, op. cit., p. 18.

19 The Mudaliar Committee received several memoranda complaining of nepotism in the appointment of teaching staff. See, for example, memorandum by Head of the department of Economics, Memoranda, op. cit., p. 39.

20 Report, op. cit., p. 4.

21 Ibid., p. 15.
"One aspect of life in the University" which shocked the Mudaliar Committee was the prevalence of a certain amount of demoralization at BHU. In the memorandum submitted to the Committee, the Divisional Commissioner of Banaras referred to students visiting houses and lodges of disrepute and to certain teachers committing offences involving moral turpitude.\(^{22}\) Confirming the allegation of the Divisional Commissioner, the Chief Proctor of BHU wrote in his memorandum:

Records in the Proctor's (office) will bring out that we have a few students here running ignominous trade—you will please excuse me that Chief Proctor's pen feels shy to disclose further details.\(^{23}\)

Upon enquiry, the Committee did not "see any reason to discount . . . charges and imputations of immorality in the University."\(^{24}\)

From its study of the situation at BHU, the Mudaliar Committee came to the painful conclusion that the University "has become a hot-bed of intrigue, nepotism, corruption and even of crimes of various description."\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) Memoranda, op. cit., p. 239.  
\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 85.  
\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 14.
II

The intent of the Mudaliar Committee's major recommendations to the Government of India was to ensure the All-India character of the University. To quote the Committee:

... as this is a Central University and practically all the funds are given through the University Grants Commission by the Central Government, the spirit of a Central University should be maintained and the composition of the various bodies should reflect the characteristics of a Central University. It may be necessary wherever possible that due representation is given to the component parts of the Indian Union and no monopoly should be allowed for any particular area wherever the Central University may be situated.²⁶

In order to check the parochialization, the Committee recommended the elimination of the Eastern U.P. group from the University. Since this was not possible under the normal constitution of the University, the Committee recommended the temporary suspension of the BHU Act, dissolution of University bodies—the Court and the Executive Council—and appointment of an ad hoc committee with the Vice-Chancellor as chairman to perform the functions of the University. Another major recommendation of the Committee was the provision for a screening committee to "try" those members of the teaching and administrative staff who played major roles in parochializing the University. The Committee urged the Government of India to immediately implement these two measures.

²⁶Ibid., p. 23.
The Committee felt that the Government of India should suitably amend the University Act at some future date and restructure the University bodies—Court, Executive Council, Selection Committee (for recommending appointments to the teaching and administrative staff) in such a way that no parochial group is able to dominate them. The Committee made several recommendations to that effect. The Constitution of the Court permitted the ex-students of the University to send fifteen representatives to the Court. The Committee found that the Eastern U.P. group monopolized the ex-students' constituency by using questionable means in the election of representatives from that constituency. The result was that there was "little or no chance of the alumni residing in different parts of the Indian Union to gain representation under present conditions." The Committee recommended representation of ex-students on an All-India basis and their election under the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.

The Committee recommended that fifteen representatives of learned professions, industry and commerce, and

---

The Committee gave an example: "The postal ballot has been misused and evidence goes to show that ballot papers are collected in numbers from the Registrar's office or from the post-offices by interested persons." Report, op. cit., p. 25. In order to prevent the misuse of the postal ballot, the Committee recommended "the system by which votes can be exercised in polling booths."

Ibid.
eight representatives of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain culture and learning should be nominated by the President of India to the Court rather than be elected by the Court itself. The rationale for this recommendation was as follows:

We are convinced that this method of representation (i.e., election by the Court) has been utilised by the power bloc to import into the Court persons who would at all stages be inclined to support them on the basis of quid pro quo for their assistance at the election.  

The Committee's recommendation regarding the composition of the Executive Council was that it should consist of fifteen members rather than the existing twenty-one members. Recommending a reduction in the representation of teaching element in the Executive Council the Committee observed:

Theoretically, in a University which is run on academic lines, there may be every reason to suggest that the teaching element should be fairly represented. In actual practice, however, this has again led to a state of affairs where group politics dominated.

The Committee strongly felt that the recruitment of faculty should be on an All-India basis. In order to ensure this, the Committee recommended that two out of three experts of the Selection Committee should come from outside the State of Uttar Pradesh.

29 Ibid.

The Committee rendered the following suggestions regarding the officers of the University. The Chancellor and Pro-Chancellor need not be elected by the Court. These two officers hardly had any functions relating to the University. Yet their offices, especially the office of the Chancellor, had practical significance because of the Chancellor's power of nominating members to the Court and the Executive Council. Group politics predominated in the election of these two officers by the Court because the concerned group sought to have their own "favourites" elected by the Court. To avoid such a state of affairs, the Committee recommended that the Vice-President of India and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be appointed ex-officio Chancellor and Pro-Chancellor respectively.

The Committee strongly recommended the faculty-wise division of the University in place of the existing college-wise division and strongly urged that the posts of University college Principals be abolished. The Principals, the Committee observed, had too much power concentrated in their hands and they did not always use their power to the best interests of the University.

Under the BHU Amendment Act of 1951, the Vice-Chancellor was selected by the Visitor from a panel of names suggested by the Executive Council. The Committee recommended that from now on, the Vice-Chancellor should be directly selected by the Visitor without the Executive Council playing any role in it. The Committee gave the
following reason for its recommendation which is quoted in view of its importance:

Unless the Executive Council is so composed that it can avoid group politics and come to right decisions, this at once puts the Vice-Chancellor into a very unfortunate position. If the name has been included by a majority vote as is likely to be the case, or if one of those persons whom even the minority—a vociferous minority—has been backing is not appointed as Vice-Chancellor, the person who assumes office is at once heavily handicapped with the result that attempts are made to suggest that there are rival parties, the Vice-Chancellor's party and party opposed to the Vice-Chancellor. This has been the bane of the Banaras Hindu University (emphasis added) for several years. It would, therefore, be well for the Vice-Chancellor to be selected by the Visitor.31

III

The Eastern U.P. group's expected response to the Mudaliar Committee Report as set forth in A Factual Analysis of Banaras Hindu University Mudaliar Committee Report32 was that the Report was biased. The Group held that the Mudaliar Committee had done "a great disservice to the University by creating a false alarm. It has twisted facts, laid wrong emphasis on facts and misinterpreted them and indulged in sweeping generalisations on the basis of half-truths and falsehood."33

31 Ibid., p. 24.


The Group claimed that there was nothing wrong with the University. "The only flaw is that the Vice-Chancellor and the official bloc do not allow democracy to prevail." The Group complained that the Vice-Chancellor "used his high office for creating an alarm in Delhi. He is lucky in having the unqualified support of the Ministry of Education. He has poisoned the ears of the Chairman of the U.G.C."  

The Group argued that the Mudaliar Committee's recommendation for the institution of a Screening Committee smacked of "sinister intention" and was designed to persecute those members of the teaching staff who honestly differed from the University authorities.

The Group felt that the direct appointment of the Vice-Chancellor by the President would open the floodgate of Government intervention in the affairs of the University and make a myth of University autonomy.  

---

34 The Group's opinion as represented through the memoranda presented to the Mudaliar Committee. See Report, op. cit., p. 22.

35 K. C. Gorawala and others, op. cit., p. 44.

36 Ibid., p. 34.

37 Ibid., p. 38.
The Group expressed its firm conviction that the approach of the Mudaliar Committee to the whole question of University reform was not "positive, but negative, not generous and democratic but narrow and totalitarian."38

IV

A perusal of the Report of the Banaras Hindu University Enquiry Committee and A Factual Analysis of Banaras Hindu University Mudaliar Committee Report makes it very clear that the conflict in BHU was between the Vice-Chancellor on the one hand and Eastern U.P. group on the other hand. As representing the All-India constituency of the University, the Vice-Chancellor had the support of the Education Ministry of the Government of India and the University Grants Commission. As representing the local constituency of the University, the Eastern U.P. group had the support of local students and of political parties who were opposed to the ruling Congree Party of India, namely, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party of India. The conflict was over the control of the University, i.e., for policy determination

38 Ibid., p. 39. It might be noted in this connection that the Mudaliar Committee anticipated the criticisms of the Eastern U.P. group against the Report and wrote in the epilogue to the Report that such criticisms arose out of "the fear entertained by those who are largely responsible for the present state of affairs that their part in the deterioration of the University would be taken serious notice of." Report, op. cit., p. 33.
and the single most important element, dispensation of patronage.

The Eastern U.P. group defended its position in terms of preserving "democracy" and "University autonomy." They were the main bases of the Group's arguments against the Mudaliar Committee recommendations for the Government of India taking over the University administration. In the opinion of the Mudaliar Committee and the Government of India, the Group's arguments for democracy and autonomy reflected the Group's carefully camouflaged desire for power and domination of the University. In order to counter the organizational effectiveness of the Group, the Government felt it necessary to resort to more directive and less representative measures. The Governmental action and the Eastern U.P. group's response through students' agitation will be the subject matter of discussion in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE EASTERN U.P.

GROUP'S REACTION: BHU STUDENTS' AGITATION OF 1958

Upon the recommendations of the Mudaliar Committee, the Government of India took prompt action with regard to BHU. The Government promulgated an ordinance replacing the major University governing bodies—the Court and the Executive Council with nominated bodies and providing for

1 The Mudaliar Committee submitted its Report to the Government of India in May, 1958.

2 The ordinance was promulgated on June 14, 1958. Unless approved by the Parliament, an ordinance could remain in force only for six weeks. As soon as the Parliament met in August for its autumn session, the Government sought to replace the ordinance with a Legislative Act. This part of governmental action and the opposition parties' reaction to it will be the subject matter of analysis in the following chapter.

3 The Court was now reduced to an advisory body consisting of fifty-one members, most of whom were nominated by the Government. The Executive Council was now composed of nine members, namely, the Vice-Chancellor, ex-officio; seven persons nominated by the Government and one person nominated by the Chief Rector, i.e., the Governor of U.P.
a Selection Committee and a Screening Committee. Reacting sharply to the Governmental action, the Eastern U.P. group proclaimed that there was really no emergency in the University justifying an ordinance and condemned the Screening Committee as an instrument of persecution. Threatened with termination from the University, the Group conceived the students' agitation in the Fall of 1958 as a political weapon to fight against the Governmental "onslaught" on the Group. The purpose was to pressure the Government into withdrawing the ordinance or, so to say, the nominated governing bodies of the University and the Screening Committee and thereby "save" the existence of the Group in the University. The Group's strategy was to preach continuously that the Mudaliar Committee scandalized the University and defamed the students, teachers and people of Eastern U.P. and to build up agitation on the

4The composition of the Selection Committee (for evaluating the qualifications of candidates for teaching positions and making recommendations for teacher appointments to the Executive Council) was left to the discretion of the newly appointed Executive Council.

5The Screening Committee was to examine the cases of all persons who, on June 14, 1958—the date of commencement of the ordinance—were holding some post, academic and administrative, under the University and in respect of whom there were complaints of parochializing the University. The Screening Committee would forward its recommendations to the Executive Council which would take necessary action in regard to the guilty persons after giving such persons a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves.
basis of grievances generated or existing among students. This chapter will deal with the 1958 agitation which really represented the struggle of the Eastern U.P. group for political survival in the University.

I

Shortly after the promulgation of Governmental ordinance, the Eastern U.P. group lined up its supporters into organizing a meeting of the citizens of Banaras. The meeting was not very largely attended but it condemned the Mudaliar Committee Report as well as the ordinance. The Group's real opportunity for "activating" the campus came with the firing by the police upon the students of the Ayurvedic College of Lucknow in the beginning of August, 1958. The Ayurvedic College students of Lucknow occasionally struck in 1958 demanding basic changes in the curriculum—demanding that "the Allopathic Department (of Lucknow Ayurvedic College) should be made as complete with material as is the Medical College" and "only such subjects from Ayurveda should be taught as are desired by the students." The students of BHU Ayurvedic College also demanded, inter alia, the same thing, i.e., a

---

"modernization" of their curriculum or so to say, a greater emphasis on subjects of modern medicine.⁷

Speaking in the U.P. Legislative Assembly on August 5, 1958, Kamalapati Tripathi, the Home and Education Minister of U.P., justified police firing on the violent students in Lucknow and held the opinion that in an Ayurvedic College, the place of Ayurveda should remain predominant in the curriculum. Rajeshwar D. Shastri, the Acting Principal of BHU Ayurvedic College, expressed a similar opinion regarding Ayurvedic education at a conference organized by the Uttar Pradesh Government at Nainital and the Home Minister quoted Shastri in his speech in the U.P. Legislative Assembly.

The students of BHU Ayurvedic College, who were already agitated for police firing on their fellow students at Lucknow, learned about Tripathi's statement around the midnight of August 5-6. They immediately rushed to the Vice-Chancellor's residence on the campus and demanded of him that he immediately call a meeting of the Standing Committee.

---

⁷Ayurveda (traditional medicine) in BHU was supposed to be taught along with developments in the field of modern medical science. In demanding a greater emphasis in the curriculum on subjects of modern medicine, what the students really sought was status, i.e., a desire to be treated at par with the M.B.B.S. graduates in terms of salary and social status. To add in parenthesis, the starting salary of an Ayurvedic graduate in Government service, a Central Government-appointed Committee reported in 1959, was about one-third of the starting salary of his modern medical counterpart. Ibid., p. 457 footnote.
Committee of the Academic Council and dismiss Shastri forthwith. The Vice-Chancellor pointed out to the shouting students that it was simply not possible to call a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Academic Council at midnight and that dismissing a Principal was not as easy as the students thought. The students then demanded that a meeting of the Standing Committee be called early next day. When the Vice-Chancellor pleaded his inability to do so, the students went away raising clenched fists and threatening the Vice-Chancellor with serious consequences.

The Vice-Chancellor called the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Academic Council in the afternoon of August 6, 1958, to consider the situation arising out of the Ayurvedic College students' demonstration at his lodge and to consider the demand of students for removal of Shastri. The Standing Committee deliberated for four hours, from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m., in the Committee-room of the University Central Office. The Ayurvedic College students, assembled before the Central Office, kept shouting "remove R. D. Shastri or resign from Vice-Chancellorship"

As a shuddha (pure) Ayurvedist, Shastri was not much interested in the modern medical aspect of the Ayurvedic education at BHU. His opinion that Ayurveda should have dominant place in the curriculum of the Ayurvedic College ran counter to students' opinion (in favor of a greater emphasis on subjects of modern medicine) and their status aspirations. That explains Ayurvedic students' anger with Shastri and their consequent demand for his dismissal.
for the entire four hours. They also demanded that Dr. K. N. Udupa\(^9\) be appointed Principal of their college. The Standing Committee rejected the students' demand for removal of Shastri and condemned the students' demonstration at the Lodge of the Vice-Chancellor on the previous night. The Committee felt that it was improper on the part of students to dictate to University authorities as to who should be removed and who should be appointed to the teaching staff. The Committee, however, resolved on the appointment of a seven-man Committee to enquire into the grievances of the Ayurvedic College students.

After the Standing Committee meeting, the Vice-Chancellor tried to address the assembled students. But they told him that they were interested only in the decision arrived at by the Standing Committee and not in the Vice-Chancellor's lecture. When the decision of the Standing Committee was read out to those shouting students, they besieged the Vice-Chancellor and other members of the Standing Committee and said that they would allow the members to go home only when the decision was changed in their favor.

\(^9\)Dr. K. N. Udupa was an ex-student of BHU Ayurvedic College. He subsequently earned M.S., and F.R.C.S. degrees from Canada and was employed as a Civil Surgeon in Himachal Pradesh. As one qualified in both traditional and modern medicines, Dr. Udupa, the students presumed, would "modernize" the curriculum in the Ayurvedic College, which consequently would improve the "status" of the Ayurvedic students.
As soon as the news spread around that the Vice-Chancellor and members of the Standing Committee were "surrounded" by students of the Ayurvedic College, a large number of students of the colleges of engineering and agriculture, rushed to the spot. They released the Vice-Chancellor and other members of the Standing Committee. They assured the Vice-Chancellor that peace would prevail in the campus and accompanied him to his residence where some of them (about 50-60 in number) kept vigil for the whole night so that the Ayurvedic College students could not stage their demonstration at the Vice-Chancellor's Lodge like they did on the previous night.

The students of the Ayurvedic College had some long standing grievances. They did not have a permanent Principal at the college for many years. They also resented the non-recognition of their A.B.M.S.\(^{10}\) degree. The University authorities had been trying to persuade Dr. K. N. Udupa to accept the post of Principal at the Ayurvedic College but he was unwilling to accept the offer. The recognition of the A.B.M.S. degree was beyond the competence of the University. It was the business of the Indian Medical Council. The students of the Ayurvedic College, however, believed that the University authorities did not try their utmost to redress their grievances.

\(^{10}\) Ayurvedacharya and Bachelor in Medicine and Surgery.
They simply calculated that the authorities would concede their demands only if they could "force" the authorities into conceding them. The intervention of the students of the colleges of mining and metallurgy and agriculture in favor of the Vice-Chancellor convinced them that they needed "allies" — reinforcement from other quarters in their struggle against the University authorities.

Such a situation of the Ayurvedic College students provided the teachers of the Eastern U.P. group with the opportunity that they were looking for. They could readily see that the movement of the Ayurvedic College students could be transformed into a bigger movement against the Mudaliar Committee Report and the Government ordinance. An alliance of convenience took place between the students of the Ayurvedic College and other BHU students who owed allegiance to the Eastern U.P. group.

Opposition political parties had reasons to be interested in the issue involved in BHU. The political situation in U.P. in August-September, 1958 was tense. The Socialist Party, Praja Socialist Party, and the Communist Party launched a joint agitation at that time against the State Government of U.P. over the Government's alleged failure to check the soaring prices of food grains. Speaking before the newsmen at Allahabad, Raj Narain Singh, leader of the Socialist Party in the U.P. Assembly, alleged that about three hundred persons had died of starvation in
the Deoria district of Eastern U.P. alone. The U.P. State Praja Socialist Party (PSP) also expressed deep concern over the fast deteriorating food situation, especially in the eastern part of the state. All opposition groups in the U.P. Legislative Assembly jointly moved a no-confidence motion against the State Government on this issue.

Under such circumstances, some opposition parties such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party thought: why not take advantage of the students' and teachers' grievances and extend the base of opposition against the Congress Government? A students' movement against the University authorities for removal of the ordinance promulgated by the Government of India, side by side with opposition parties' food movement against the State Government, would be sufficient to embarrass the Congress Governments both at the State and at the Center. The parties further calculated that the building up of a students' movement would be a means of recruiting political leadership. It would increase the parties' supporters among students and interested teachers. They might have also calculated that the Congress Party Government already dominated BHU. Why yield further ground to it by letting it oust the Opposition parties' supporters among teachers

\(^{11}\) *Indian Affairs Record*, September, 1958, Vol. IV, No. 8, p. 188.
and students by means of the ordinance and the Screening Committee? Why not create the impression among Eastern U.P. people that the Mudaliar Committee insulted them by blaming the Eastern U.P. group for all problems at BHU, and that by acting on the basis of the Mudaliar Committee Report, the Government of India became a party to such insults to the people of Eastern U.P.?

The political parties' link with University politics exists through the affiliation of student leaders. So far as University politics is concerned, the high-ranking provincial and national leaders of political parties act mainly through the agency of their student-representatives but they also can be direct participants in the act of guiding the student agitators.

Among the Opposition parties, the Socialist Party of India was the most active in the BHU agitation of 1958. It acted not only through its student representatives, such as Shivadas Tiwari of BHU Law College, but also through its recognized political leaders, e.g., Madhu Limaye, the President of the Socialist Party, Gaure Murahari, the General Secretary of the Party, Raj Narain Singh, the leader of the Socialist group in the U.P. Legislative Assembly, and Ramchandra Shukla, an important local leader of the Party. All of them addressed the students at different stages of the agitation, and asked them to carry on the agitation against the established
authorities. In one of his speeches, Murahari bluntly told the students that the Education Ministry of the Government of India was engaged in a conspiracy to oust the Eastern U.P. group from the University and the students must prevent it. The Aj, a local daily of Banaras, reported one such speech of Murahari in the following words:

It is the sacred duty of the students of this University (BHU) to fight against the blows which the Mudaliar Committee has struck against the honour and reputation of this great University. It is imperative to expose the intrigues of the Education Ministry. This vast conspiracy has been planned by the Education Ministry solely for the purpose of throwing a particular group out of the University. Every step taken by the Government in this direction is unjust.\(^{12}\)

It was politically advantageous for Opposition parties to create an atmosphere of struggle and combat in the University and to try to rouse the University populace against the ruling party. In the context of BHU, the ruling party was supposedly represented by the University authorities, especially the Vice-Chancellor against whom the Eastern U.P. group of teachers and students as well as the students of the Ayurvedic College directed their fight. Thus, the interests of the three groups, viz., the Ayurvedic College students, the Eastern U.P. group, and the Opposition parties (Socialist Party and the Communist

\(^{12}\) Aj, local daily, October 4, 1958. Similar speeches were delivered by Communist Party leaders such as Rustam Satin to agitating students. Quotations of the local press are derived from S. L. Dar, Agitation of 1958 (Banaras: Banaras Hindu University Press, n.d.).
Party) coincided. This made it easy for them to lead a combined agitation against the BHU authorities and by implication against the Ministry of Education of the Government of India which sought to reform the University by screening out its parochial elements.

"The Banaras Hindu University Students' Action Committee" was formed by the agitating students and the three constituent groups agreed on the following five demands:

(1) removal of the Acting Principal, R. D. Shastri, and the appointment of a permanent Principal for the College of Ayurveda having expert knowledge of modern medicine and Ayurveda;

(2) recognition of the degree of the College of Ayurveda;

(3) withdrawal of the Mudaliar Committee's Report and the ordinance, and the restoration of the University's autonomy;

(4) the institution of an open judicial enquiry into the charges of moral turpitude brought against students of the University in the Mudaliar Committee Report;

(5) removal of the present Vice-Chancellor for his failure to contradict and condemn the portions of the Mudaliar Committee's Report.
which are based on wrong facts and wherein the students and the teachers in general have been scandalized.\textsuperscript{13}

The agitating students resorted to hunger strike, slogan-shouting, noisy demonstrations and pamphleteering etc. as the means for realizing their demands. One of the several pamphlets that circulated in the University during the period of the agitation described the Vice-Chancellor in the following terms:

A wooden doll knowing nothing and being horrible, has shown total failure in administration. Kick away the devil.\textsuperscript{14}

II

The agitation lasted for a little more than two months. It started on August 5, 1958 and ended on October 8, 1958. If one takes a close look at the agitational activities of the students, one could see a progressive intensification in the pressure tactics that they adopted.

\textsuperscript{13}See statement by Dr. H. N. Kunzru, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, cols. 2844-6.

\textsuperscript{14}Quoted by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Union Minister of Education, as an example of indecent pamphleteering resorted to by students. Lok Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 4, November 20, 1958, col. 808. See also Lok Sabha Debates, XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, cols. 1176-7.
The incident of August 5-6 in which the Ayurvedic students pressed the University authorities for the instantaneous removal of the acting Principal of their college has already been described. On August 11, the Socialist Party, one of the key defenders of the Eastern U.P. constituency of BHU, entered the scene through its student representative, Shivadas Tiwari. Tiwari started a hunger-strike on August 11 in protest against the Mudaliar Committee Report and the Government ordinance and announced his intention of continuing it for eleven days. The hunger-strike threw into turmoil the campus which had already been activated by the demonstrations of the Ayurvedic College students.

On the evening of August 11, a meeting was held in the University under the chairmanship of the Socialist leader, Ramchandra Shukla. This meeting commended the demands of the Ayurvedic College students and condemned the Mudaliar Committee Report and the actions taken by the Government on the basis of the Report. After the meeting, the agitating students seized the Union Building by breaking open its lock apparently as an "answer" to the Student Union President Ganga Rai's disapproval of their strike. The agitating students then surrounded the Vice-Chancellor's lodge. They demanded the resignation of the Vice-Chancellor for his failures to remove Shastri and counteract the "false" allegations of the Mudaliar Committee, and bluntly
told Vice-Chancellor Jha: "No Vice-Chancellor can stick on here. You will also not be allowed to do so."\textsuperscript{15}

The Vice-Chancellor explained that he was only present at the meetings of the Mudaliar Committee as the Representative of the University. He was not a member of the Committee. He should not, therefore, be held responsible for any observations made by the Mudaliar Committee in its \textit{Report}. Regretting the indecent pamphleteering resorted to by students, the Vice-Chancellor said:

\begin{quote}
If there were any means of enforcing the authority of the University at any time—and there appears to be nothing more pathetically impotent than the authority of the University—I would ruthlessly eliminate the practice of scurrilous pamphleteering.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

The agitators were so incensed by the statement of the Vice-Chancellor that they held a meeting on August 14 and decided to debar him from taking part in the Independence day celebrations of August 15.\textsuperscript{17} After the meeting was over, the agitators went in a procession to the Vice-Chancellor's lodge and demonstrated in front of


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 30-1.

\textsuperscript{17} According to convention, the Vice-Chancellor unfurls the national flag, addresses the students and takes the salute at the National Cadet Corps (N.C.C) parade.
it. Later on, they burnt the effigies of the Vice-Chancellor and the Union Education Minister. On August 15, Independence day was celebrated without the Vice-Chancellor who, anticipating trouble, did not take part. The agitators called for a general strike, i.e., cessation of academic work in the University, on August 16.

On August 18, the Vice-Chancellor left for Delhi to appraise the Governmental authorities of the situation. In the absence of the Vice-Chancellor, the agitating students demonstrated at the residence of the Registrar. They demanded that he too resign, and that he inform the Vice-Chancellor of the students' decision that he won't be allowed to enter the University on his return from Delhi. They also removed the name-plate from the gate at the Vice-Chancellor's residence symbolizing their rejection of him as Vice-Chancellor.

Determined to paralyze the University administration, the agitating students started picketing at the residence of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, M. C. Bijawat, and extended the picketing to the Registrar, S. L. Dar's residence from September 2. These two high officers of the University were thus immobilized. They could not come out of their residences and nobody was allowed to go and see them. As a member of the University Executive Council, Santosh Kumar Basu, M.P. had a first-hand experience of the situation prevailing in the University.
Referring to the picketing at the Pro-Vice-Chancellor's residence, Basu said:

A solid wall of human beings had been put up at his gate; nobody can get in; nobody can get out; and that gentleman whose health and life depends on his morning walk has been deprived for a period of about fifteen days from having any such amenity. So is the Registrar of the University. His old parents, father and mother, are suffering from heart trouble and they also have been kept confined inside the house and with no amenities being provided to them. That is the position. 18

A meeting of the Executive Council was proposed to be held on September 6 in the Committee Room of the University. As a rule, the Vice-Chancellor presides over the meeting of the Executive Council. But the Students' Action Committee was determined to prevent the entry of the Vice-Chancellor in the campus and with this end in view, the agitating students collected at the main gate of the University on September 6. This forced the Executive Council to hold its meeting outside the campus. The Action Committee of agitating students regarded this as a great "victory" for students. 19

Three members of the Executive Council, viz., Dr. H. N. Kunzru, Mr. Santosh Kumar Basu and Mr. Khosla, wanted to see the "besieged" Pro-Vice-Chancellor and the

18 Santosh Kumar Basu, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2906.

19 Statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Union Minister of Education, Lok Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 4, November 20, 1958, col. 805.
Registrar but they were not allowed to go by the picketing students. Santosh Kumar Basu described this incident in the following terms in the *Rajya Sabha*:

> The members of the [Executive] Council, who wanted to see the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, were told that they could not be allowed to go inside the house. They requested them not to be so unreasonable. But the reply was, "Because we are doing this kind of thing, you are here at this door. Had we not done so, you would never have come here."²⁰

More "punitive" measures followed soon. The agitators cut off the telephone connections of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar, and the Chief Proctor. They also seized the guest car of the University and the car of the University Chief Proctor. Picketing was started at the University Central Office. Over and above all this, Girija S. Singh of Ayurvedic College launched a "fast unto death."

By the end of the second week of September, the University announced the appointment of Dr. K. N. Udupa as the Principal of the Ayurvedic College. Thereupon, Girija S. Singh terminated his "fast unto death." The University authorities were hopeful that the agitation would subside, now that a major demand of the Ayurvedic College students had been fulfilled. The Government of India was also hopeful. As Dr. K. L. Shrimali, the Union Minister of Education, announced in the *Lok Sabha*:

After a great deal of persuasion, the Health Minister and myself (Dr. Shrimali) were able to send him (Dr. K. N. Udupa) to Banaras. He was most reluctant, but we persuaded him to go to Banaras and he ultimately agreed to join the College in January after his assignment was completed. We had hoped that this would put an end to the trouble. Many members of the Executive Council and many members of the House assured me that if only Dr. Udupa would go there that would put an end to all the trouble, but that was not the end.  

The agitating students claimed that the agitation would not end unless their other demands also had been conceded. As early as September 6, upon being unable to hold the meeting inside the Campus, the Executive Council informed the State Government of U.P. that the students' agitation was inspired by considerations other than academic and that the State Government should take care of law and order inside the Campus. The Uttar Pradesh Government was so occupied with the food agitation jointly launched by the Opposition parties (the Socialist Party, the Praja Socialist Party and the Communist Party) that it could not pay any attention to the situation in BHU. On September 15, the Home, Education and Information Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Kamalapati Tripathi, asked the students to withdraw the picketing from the residences of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Registrar, and from the Central Office. The Minister received a negative answer from Satish Kumar,

---

21 Statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates (Second Series), XXII, No. 4, November 20, 1958, col. 806.
the President of the agitating Students' Action Committee.

With Home Minister Tripathi failing, the Chief Minister of U.P., Dr. Sampurnanand called a delegation of teachers and a delegation of agitating students to Lucknow and warned them that the State Government could not tolerate picketing at the residences of the two senior-most University Officers and at the University Central Office any longer. Picketing was then withdrawn but the agitation continued in other ways. On his visit to Banaras, the Union Home Minister, Pandit Govind Vallabh Pant, tried to persuade the student leaders to suspend the agitation, but did not have any success.

The second meeting of the new Executive Council was scheduled to be held on September 27 on the University Campus. On that day, about fifty students kept guard at the main gate of the University so that the Vice-Chancellor could not enter. In order to insult the Vice-Chancellor,

22 The strike in Ayurvedic College was called off on September 22, following the appointment of Dr. Udupa as the Principal of the College.

23 Determined to prevent the entry of the Vice-Chancellor in the University, they would search all incoming vehicles. The extent to which searching for the Vice-Chancellor went could be seen from the Leader's reporting of Justice Dhavan's experience on his visit to BHU: "when the car reached the University gate, it was stopped by several students. They looked inside the car as if searching for something. Not finding it, they opened the "boot" (trunk). Finally, they allowed the car to enter the University campus. He (Justice Dhavan) asked his professor-host what all this was about, and he replied "They are looking for the Vice-Chancellor. He is supposed to be contraband." Leader's report quoted by Union Minister of Education, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXIII, No. 11, December 9, 1958, Cols. 1666-67.
the students kept in readiness a donkey with the Vice-Chancellor's name written on it. They also proposed to insult the members of the Executive Council with garlands of shoes. On the evening of September 27, the Vice-Chancellor, along with members of the Executive Council arrived at the main gate of the University but on the refusal of the students to permit the Vice-Chancellor's entry, they all had to turn back and hold the meeting outside the Campus for the second time in one month.

With the advent of October, the pressure tactics of agitators became even more intense. They took possession of the Chief Proctor's Office, put the Proctor's Hall under lock and key, and controlled all entrances to the University as well as exits from the University. Next, they assaulted Ganga Rai, the President of the University Students' Union, who came to the Union Building for the first time on October 3, since the agitators seized the Union Building in August. After assaulting Rai (for his opposition to the agitation), the agitators painted his face with tar and turned him out of the Campus.

The agitators organized a meeting in the evening of October 3 at the University which was addressed among others by Madhu Limaye and Gaure Murahari, the President

---

and General Secretary of the Socialist Party, respectively. Both the Socialist leaders asked the students to carry on the agitation and foil the Government attempt to oust the Eastern U.P. group from the University. The political leaders impressed upon the students that if they could keep up their pressure tactics, they would get what they demanded.

The physical assault and public humiliation of the Students' Union President on October 3 finally activated the non-agitating students. The following day, the atmosphere in the University Campus was extraordinarily tense. The Bharat, a local daily, reported it in the following terms:

The split among students with regard to their attitude towards the agitation has emerged into the open since the attack on the President of the Union, Shri Ganga Rai. The whole of yesterday (i.e., October 4) it seemed as if the students of the two rival groups might any moment come to blows. By evening the excitement became still more pronounced.

Both the parties started shouting slogans. While one side shouted "Agents of V. S. Jha, Get Out!"; the other side's slogan was: "Hooligans of the University, Get Out!" This kind of shouting went on till about ten in the night. 25

Afterwards, the students led by Mr. Ganga Rai held a meeting in the amphitheatre and warned the agitators that no more hooliganism and bullying of peaceful students would be tolerated. They formed a Peace Committee to

25 Bharat, daily, October 5, 1958.
bring the University back to normal. After the meeting, the supporters of Ganga Rai took out a procession and shouted slogans, "We shall not tolerate any hooliganism!"; "Stop this rowdyism!"; "Professional Leaders, get out!" etc.

The agitators held a counter-meeting at the University main gate. They reaffirmed their determination to continue the agitation irrespective of the opposition of "Agents of V. S. Jha." The meetings and demonstrations of the two antagonistic groups of students continued throughout the night of October 4.

As early as September 27, being unable to hold its meeting for the second time in the University, the Executive Council of the University took the decision to close down the University indefinitely. The announcement of the decision was postponed until October 7. The Governor of U.P., V. V. Giri, was to visit the University on October 5. University authorities hoped that the Governor might be able to persuade the students to give up their agitation and they might not have to implement their closure decision. The Governor's efforts to persuade the agitating students to discontinue the agitation failed. Apprehending the imminent clash between agitating students and the students led by the President of the University Students' Union, the University Executive Council made public its closure decision on October 7.
The Executive Council gave the following reasons for closing down the University:

1. Rampant indiscipline and lawlessness by the agitating students.
2. Refusal to let the Vice-Chancellor enter the Campus and thus perform his legitimate statutory duties.
3. Forcing the Executive Council to hold its meetings outside the University.
4. Immobilizing the University administration by refusing to let the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar and the Chief Proctor function effectively.
5. Threatening the University authorities with serious consequences for failure to concede the demands of the agitating students.
6. Demanding the resignation of R. D. Shastri, the Acting Principal of the Ayurvedic College, and refusal of the Ayurvedic College students to accept him in any capacity in the College.
7. Turning the newly constituted Executive Council virtually ineffective in terms of carrying out the object and purpose for which it was constituted by the Ordinance and later by the Act of Parliament.

In announcing the closure of the University with effect from October 8, the Registrar directed that all students residing in the hostels and approved lodges of the University leave the University immediately but not later than October 11, 1958.

The closure decision was announced at 11 a.m. on October 7. At 3 p.m., the agitators held a meeting at the main gate of the University to protest against the decision of the University authorities. The meeting assailed the closure decision of the University as "uncalled for," "improper" and "unjust" and declared that "they would not let the University close down nor would they allow the
students to go to their homes and would forcibly compel the professors and lecturers and the students to attend the classes." After the meeting, the agitators marched in a procession to 'Moti Jheel' residence of the University Treasurer where Vice-Chancellor Jha was staying.

The demonstrations at "Moti Jheel" was described in the 'Banaras,' a local daily:

Addressing the Vice-Chancellor by name, the spokesmen of the agitators declared, "If the police touches a single student, we will set the country on fire. You (the Vice-Chancellor) are only a puppet of Kalua Mali (the Union Education Minister, Dr. Kalu Lal Shrimali). If we find him, (Dr. Shrimali), we shall bind him with a rope and drag him along the street. If Nehru tries to save him, he shall also be hung by the legs and skinned. . . . If you intend to enter the University under police escort you should be prepared to risk your life."

Following the demonstrations at "Moti Jheel," the Government concluded:

A stage had come when serious danger to the life and property of the people in the University and to the general public in the city had arisen, and matters could not be allowed to drift any longer.

26 Statement by Union Minister of Education, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), Vol. XXII, No. 4, November 20, 1968, col. 809. According to Bharat, as early as October 3, a student leader told its correspondent: "If the University is closed, we shall run it with the help of teachers who approve of the agitation. If there are teachers who do not cooperate with us, we shall agitate for their removal." Bharat, October 3, 1958.

27 Banaras, October 8, 1958.

28 Statement by Union Minister of Education, Lok Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 4, November 20, 1958, col. 809.
The Government issued orders prohibiting processions and demonstrations throughout the city and the University. On the morning of October 8, the police entered the University. The agitators offered resistance, but the police dispersed them through lathi charges. With the police taking possession of the University, the agitation ended.

III

The agitation of 1958 represented attempts by organized groups to coerce the University authorities and the Government. University authorities claimed that the agitating students constituted a tiny minority of the 8,586 students at the University. The agitators came mainly from the Colleges of Ayurveda, Arts and Law, i.e., Colleges which recruited its students mostly from U.P. and especially from the local districts of Eastern U.P.

29 Coercion was also directed toward the local press. The agitators beat a correspondent of Gandiva (see Gandiva, September 25, 1958), damaged some property of Bharat and abused Banaras (see Banaras, October 8, 1958) for not writing in favor of the agitation.

30 Vice-Chancellor Jha's statement dated October 7, 1958, compiled in S. L. Dar, op. cit. p. 91.

31 67.5 percent students of Ayurvedic College, 81.5 percent students of Arts College and 87.0 percent students of Law College were from the State of U.P. These figures of enrollment are for the year 1957-58.
The Colleges\textsuperscript{32} of Engineering, Mining and Metallurgy, Agriculture etc. which recruited its student population mainly from outside the State of U.P. did not take part in the agitation.\textsuperscript{33} The termination of the Eastern U.P. group from the University was not a matter of concern to them.

The leaders of the agitation—such as Satish Kumar and Vidya Sagar Nautiyal were students from the local districts of Eastern U.P. Nautiyal was connected to the Communist Party of India through its student wing, i.e., Students' Federation of India. He led the agitation of local students for unrestricted admission to the University in July, 1956. Satish Kumar led a similar agitation of local students in July, 1957. Referring to these student leaders, Bharat, a local daily, observed that they were "professional agitators" and acted as "the principal agents of those teachers" against whom the University

\textsuperscript{32}64.5 percent students of the Engineering College, 59.0 percent students of the College of Mining and Metallurgy and 61.4 percent students of the College of Agriculture in the year 1957-58 were from outside U.P. See K. C. Gorawala and others (sponsors), A Factual Analysis of the Banaras Hindu University Mudaliar Committee Report (n.p. 1958), Appendix 3, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{33}The students of the Colleges of Mining and Metallurgy, and Agriculture passed resolutions disapproving of the agitation. See Statement by Dr. H. N. Kunzru, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2842. Following the physical assault on his person on October 3, 1958, the Students' Union President mobilized some of these students against the Eastern U.P. group of students.
was contemplating some action.\textsuperscript{34} Gandiva, another local daily, made an analogous observation:

For the last three months a clique in the University has created havoc with the collaboration of a few student hooligans. . . . What they are doing corroborates the findings of the Report of the Mudaliar Committee.\textsuperscript{35}

Some of the leading national dailies reached a similar conclusion. Hindu wrote:

From the time the decisions were taken on the basis of the Mudaliar Committee Report, a determined minority among the students in the Banaras University were out to create trouble and compel the University authorities to take certain steps of which only they (this minority) approved.\textsuperscript{36}

Statesman observed that "it was a students' agitation only in name, the propelling force came from a corner in the teachers' colony."\textsuperscript{37}

The special correspondent of Stateman made an empirical survey of the situation in BHU. His finding deserves to be quoted in view of its importance:

During my two-day stay here I have met leading personalities of the two rival camps. The first comprises members of the University administration who stand for cleaning up the campus of the elements which have brought it dishonour. The other is a group of teachers who have raised an army of students to resist a change. . . .

\textsuperscript{34} Bharat, August 17, 1958.

\textsuperscript{35} Gandiva, September 16, 1958.

\textsuperscript{36} Hindu (Madras), October 9, 1958.

\textsuperscript{37} Statesman (Delhi-Calcutta), October 14, 1958.
The teachers of the latter camp startled me with their defence of student behaviour. They were a picture of offended innocence... The extent to which teachers went away explaining student behaviour was amazing.

They raise the suspicion that perhaps they are the authors of the agitation in which students have played the role of mis-guided puppets. The teachers treat the Vice-Chancellor as a legitimate target for criticism, for he leads the new reformist party, supported by the new Executive Council and the Government of India.\textsuperscript{38}

In brief, the Government of India's concern for the All-India character of the University led the Government to actions threatening the existence of the Eastern U.P. group which sought to localize the University. The Eastern U.P. group's defensive reaction to the Governmental action was represented through the 1958 agitation.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Statesman} (Delhi-Calcutta), October 15, 1958.
CHAPTER VI

THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES:  
"BATTLE" IN PARLIAMENT OVER THE ACTIONS  
TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

As a follow-up of the ordinance, the Government of India introduced the Banaras Hindu University Amendment Bill in Parliament in August, 1958. During the extensive discussion in Parliament on the bill, the Opposition parties such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party and the Government defended their respective constituencies, namely, the Eastern U.P. group and the Vice-Chancellor. The Socialist and Communist members backed the Eastern U.P. group, and the agitating students by condemning the Mudaliar Committee Report and the Government ordinance, and by demanding the removal of the Vice-Chancellor who, they claimed, was responsible for the problems of the University. The Government and the ruling Congres Party members, with the exception of a few who represented Eastern U.P. and Western Bihar, strongly supported the Mudaliar Committee Report, defended the ordinance, and commended the role of the Vice-Chancellor of the University. In this chapter, I will focus on the attitudes of the Socialist and Communist parties and the Government towards the Report, the ordinance and the 1958 agitations by analyzing
the speeches delivered on the floor of Parliament by members concerned.

The Socialist and Communist parties followed two kinds of tactics in order to pressure the Government into accepting the demands of the Eastern U.P. group or so to say, the demands of the agitating students. Outside Parliament, they encouraged the students to carry on the agitation assuring them that if they could keep up the tempo of the agitation and their pressure tactics, they would prevail. Inside Parliament, the Socialist and Communist Parties defended the Eastern U.P. group and the agitating students by blaming the University and Governmental authorities for the agitation.

There was a relationship between the pressure tactics of agitating students and the activities of the Government in Parliament. The more the Government pressed for the passage of the Banaras Hindu University Amendment Bill, 1958, the greater was the intensity in the pressure tactics of students.

On August 11, 1958, the Union Minister of Education, Dr. Kalu Lal Shrimali introduced the bill. On the same day the students held a meeting on the campus under the chairmanship of the Socialist leader, Ramchandra Shukla, and threatened Vice-Chancellor, Dr. V. S. Jha with ouster from
BHU. On August 14, the Union Minister of Education moved in the Lok Sabha (The House of People) that the proposed bill be referred to a select committee. On the same date, the students responded by burning the effigies of Shrimali and Jha.

The agitating students were disappointed at the minor changes¹ that the select committee made in the original provisions of the Bill. They did not want any penal measure from the Government. They demanded the withdrawal of the ordinance and the removal of the Vice-Chancellor. They had already decided not to let the Vice-Chancellor in the University and on August 27,—the date on which the Bill was reported out by the select committee—they "interned" the

¹The only change worth noting that the select committee introduced was with regard to the screening committee. The select committee changed the name of the screening committee to reviewing committee and outlined a new procedure to be followed by the reviewing committee. Under the new procedure formulated by the select committee, the Executive Council of BHU would send the cases of those members of the staff who allegedly behaved contrary to the interest of the University to the Solicitor-General of the Government of India. If the Solicitor-General was satisfied that a prima facie case existed against such persons, he would forward the cases to the reviewing committee. The reviewing committee would give the concerned persons a chance to defend themselves in the process of reviewing such cases and forward the cases to the Executive Council along with its judgment. The Executive Council would give the concerned persons a second chance to defend themselves before finally deciding on the action that it would take with regard to such cases. Thus, under the altered procedure, the Solicitor-General was brought into the picture and the "guilty" persons were given two chances (formerly, there was only one) to defend themselves.
Pro-Vice-Chancellor in his house for the purpose of not allowing him to discharge any official functions.

On September 2, the Lok Sabha passed the BHU Amendment Bill, 1958. On the same date, the students imposed picketing at the Registrar's residence with the intention of continuing the picketing for an indefinite period of time and thus immobilizing the Registrar, in addition to the Vice-Chancellor and Pro-Vice-Chancellor. The Rajya Sabha passed the bill on September 11, 1958. On the same date, the students cut off the telephone connections of the University and isolated the University from the rest of the world. The pressure tactics of students clearly bore some relation to Governmental activities in the Parliament. The intention might have been to deliver the message to the Government that going ahead with the bill meant increasing trouble for the University.

II

Inside the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, the Socialist and Communist Parties joined with the agitating students in opposing the Government position. They, of course, knew that they could not make the Government deviate from their course of action as their numbers were too few. Nevertheless, they utilized the public platform provided by Parliament in a full manner.
They objected to the Mudaliar Committee Report on the following grounds:

1. There were certain factual inaccuracies which vitiated the whole Report. For example, the table of law cases provided in the Appendix 4 of the Report contained certain cases which were never filed or disposed of in the courts of justice. Similarly the list of inter-related members of the staff provided in Appendix 3 of the Report contained the names of certain persons who were not, in fact, related to each other.

2. The Report was written on the basis of uncorroborated and unverified evidence. No cross-examination was conducted and no counter-evidence was called by the committee members. The result was sweeping generalizations on the basis of certain isolated cases.

3. BHU did not lose its All-India character in the hiring practices of its teachers and in the recruitment pattern of its students. The number of non-U.P. teachers in the University was far greater than the number of U.P.

---

2 For Appendix 4 of the Report and the factual inaccuracies allegedly contained in it, see Appendix 1.

3 For Appendix 3 of the Report and the factual inaccuracies allegedly contained in it, see Appendix 2.
teachers. Likewise, the number of non-U.P. students in the technological and Engineering colleges of the University was far greater than the number of U.P. students.

4. The Report maligned the people of Eastern U.P. by referring to a certain group in BHU as the Eastern U.P. group and by blaming this group for the situation.

5. The Report maligned the whole student community by referring to the moral turpitude of certain students as "one aspect of life in the University." Such vilification of "patriotic, polite, democratically-minded" students of BHU was inexcusable.

6. The Committee members were "not competent for the job" entrusted to them. They never visited the campus of BHU while drawing up the Report.

7. The Report was drafted poorly. Instead of writing that the Committee found such and such things, it wrote, "it was stated," "It is believed" etc.


6 Ibid., col. 2927. Several other members held a similar position.
On the basis of these objections, the Socialist and Communist Parties asked the Government to reject the Report altogether.

Rejecting the Opposition appeal for rejecting the Report, the Government side answered all the above-mentioned criticisms systematically:

1. The Government acknowledged that there were certain inaccuracies in the Report. But they concerned "very slight and immaterial things" and did not affect the major conclusions of the Report.

2. The findings of Mudaliar Committee were based on memoranda, on evidence, and on witnesses. Anybody who was interested could submit a memorandum to the Committee. Anybody who wanted to appear before the Committee was allowed to do so by the chairman. The list of persons who were interviewed by the Committee was provided in Appendix 1 of the Report. The cross-examination was done by no less a person than M. C. Mahajan, the ex-Chief Justice of India.

---

7 In reading the Government answers, please refer to the Socialist and Communist criticisms in the preceding pages. The answer Number 1, for example, corresponds to criticism Number 1 and so on.

8 See Statement by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, col. 1129.
The Committee reached its conclusions after carefully weighing all the facts. The Committee members could not have any vested interest in making sweeping generalizations. They performed their duty being motivated by the highest considerations for the good of the University.  

3. It was only proper that an All-India University like BHU should have drawn student and faculty from all over India. The national character of the University had been affected "to some extent" because the local group tried to pressure the University authorities into admitting "indifferent" students from local districts and into recruiting local teaching staff on considerations other than merit.

4. The Committee's observation that the Eastern U.P. group was responsible for the situation was never meant as a disparagement to all the people of Eastern U.P. or of adjoining Western Bihar. Sucheta Kripalani, M.P. (Congress

---

9See especially the statement by Sucheta Kripalani (Congress), Lok Sabha Debates, XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, cols. 1147-52.

10See statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2925.

11See statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, XIX, No. 16, September 1, 1958, col. 4017.
Party), who was a member of the Mudaliar Committee, expressed her regret on behalf of all the members of the Committee, if the expression "Eastern U.P." had hurt the sentiment of the people of those areas. She explained that the label "Eastern U.P." was used by the Committee because the group that the Committee referred to in its Report was popularly called the Eastern U.P. group.  

5. In referring to the moral turpitude, the Committee did not intend to malign all the students of BHU. It spoke of only those students who were involved in immoral activities.

6. The Government could not have appointed a more competent committee to inquire into the affairs of BHU. It was a "very great committee" which investigated "not from a party point of view, not from a governmental point of view, but from the point of view purely of education, purely of Banaras Hindu University." The Committee

---

12 See statement by Sucheta Kripalani, Lok Sabha Debates, XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, col. 1155.

13 See statement by Dr. Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., September 1, 1958, col. 4017.

14 See statement by Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 16, col. 1129.
spent five days in Banaras. It preferred to carry on its work outside the campus because it did not want any "disturbances" from any quarter in the campus. While the Committee did not visit the campus as a team, some of its members did that individually. 15

7. The Government admitted that the Report could have been drafted in a better manner. Some of the unfortunate expressions like the "Eastern U.P. group" which aroused controversy could have been avoided. But then the Committee probably wanted to be outspoken about the situation and thus expressed its opinion somewhat bluntly.

III

The Opposition members were sharply critical of the ordinance that the Government promulgated and the BHU Amendment Bill that the Government introduced in order to "regularize" the provisions of the ordinance. Their main criticisms were as follows:

1. There was no emergency in BHU justifying the promulgation of an ordinance by the Government

15 See statement of Nehru, ibid., col. 1128. See also statement by Dr. P. Subbarayan (Congress), a member of BHU Enquiry Committee, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 4, August 14, 1958, col. 960.
in June, 1958. The Mudaliar Committee deliberated for ten months before it submitted its Report in May, 1958. Instead of promulgating an ordinance, the Government could have waited for two months more for Parliament to meet in August.

2. The remedy suggested by the Government (i.e., the ordinance and the bill) for 'curing' BHU was worse than the disease. The remedy was likely to defeat itself. The Government ignored the fact that the real source of trouble in BHU was the administrative "clique," i.e., the 'balti' (bucket) group\(^\text{16}\) headed by the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Dr. V. S. Jha. The simple solution of the problem was to remove the Vice-Chancellor. He was an incompetent person and the 'trouble' in the University centered around him. The Government should remove him as quickly as possible and also take steps to liquidate his group. Instead, the Government was "purging"\(^\text{17}\) the

---

\(^{16}\) See statement by Dr. R. B. Gour (C.P.I.), Rajya Sabha Debates, XXIII, No. 11, December 9, 1958, col. 1615. Dr. Gour explained that the Vice-Chancellor's group was nicknamed 'balti group' in Banaras because this was a group which was fond of playing cards keeping a balti (bucket) full of bhang (hashish) by its side.

\(^{17}\) See statement by Dr. R. B. Gour, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 18, September 10, 1958, col. 265.
students and teachers by means of a reviewing committee.

The reviewing committee was an "evil" and should be "pushed out"\(^\text{18}\) altogether. If any teacher or student had erred, the Government should make them realize their mistake by treating them with sympathy and understanding. Punitive punishment will not bring the desired result.

3. The ordinance and the bill constituted the worst interference in the history of University education in India. It was a matter of shame that a National Government was doing what even the British Government of India did not dare during the worst period of BHU's crisis in 1942. In 1942, the University teachers and students were involved in the freedom movement of India and the British Government of India threatened to take over the University. But the Chancellor of BHU wrote directly to the Emperor in England and the threatened action did not occur. Now, the National Government was bringing an end to that tradition of Governmental non-interference with the University.

\(^{18}\) See statement by Prof. H. N. Mukherjee, (CPI) Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 14, 1958, Col. 917. Several other members also spoke in this vein.
4. The Education Ministry of the Government of India also had interfered in the affairs of BHU in 1956. That it 'stage-managed' the appointment of Dr. V. S. Jha as Vice-Chancellor could be seen from the speech delivered by Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar just before his departure from the University. Dr. Aiyar told the Executive Council that the persons connected with the Union Ministry of Education suggested the name of Dr. V. S. Jha for Vice-Chancellorship and that he was ready to sponsor him even though he did not personally know Dr. Jha. This showed that the Education Ministry had already made up its mind about the appointment of Jha as the Vice-Chancellor and eventually appointed him the Vice-Chancellor even though Dr. Jha scored the lowest number of votes among the four persons who were recommended for vice-chancellorship by the Executive Council.\(^1\)

5. Most Universities in the country suffered to a certain extent from groupism, student indiscipline, etc. Why did the Government single out BHU for taking action?

---

\(^1\)This was pointed out by several members of the Opposition parties. See, for example, statement by Bhupesh Gupta (C.P.I.), *Rajya Sabha Debates*, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2869.
The Government side replied at great length. The major points are as follows:

1. There was full justification for issuing the ordinance. The Government could not wait for two months more for the Parliament to meet and then take action. Even before the Mudaliar Committee Report was formally submitted to the Government, a whispering campaign was started against the Report by certain teachers of the University. The interested people would surely have started another agitation if the Government waited until August to take action.

The Government consulted many eminent educationists and they all urged the Government to take action before the University opened in July after the Summer vacation. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared that "personally I think it would have been a risky adventure for us not to have taken the course and allowed matters to drift." The Mudaliar Committee Report urged immediate Governmental action and the Government could not ignore the Report "without ruin to the University, and not only to the University but to the larger cause of University education and education generally."  

---

These replies correspond to relevant opposition criticisms.


Ibid., col. 4247.
2. The remedy suggested by the Government was an appropriate one. The real trouble in BHU emanated from the fact that certain teachers of the University who hailed from a local geographical area deviated from their main duty of teaching and research and indulged in group formation. The only "fault" of the Vice-Chancellor was that he "faced" those teachers and their student followers with admirable courage and integrity.\(^23\)

The Government of India could not allow the Vice-Chancellor to resign under pressure whether it emanated from students or a political party.\(^24\) If the Government of India did so, it could not expect any self-respecting man to agree to serve as Vice-Chancellor of BHU in the future. If anybody had any viable charge against the Vice-Chancellor, he could have the Vice-Chancellor "tried" by the reviewing committee. To say that the Vice-Chancellor led a group in the University was unfair. It was almost the same as saying that the judge who tried a batch of criminals was the leader of a group against the criminals.

The opposition members were overly sensitive to the Reviewing Committee. It was headed by Dr. Radhabinod Pal, a jurist of international standing. Moreover, any person

\(^{23}\) Ibid., col. 4248.

\(^{24}\) See statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, the Union Minister of Education, *Rajya Sabha Debates*, XXIII, No. 11, December 9, 1958, col. 1169.
who was charged with offences against the University had
two chances to defend himself, first before the reviewing
committee and then again before the Executive Council.
Ample safeguards had been provided in the provisions of
the BHU Amendment Bill relating to the reviewing committee
and any fear of victimisation was unfounded.

3. The autonomy of the University was meant for
enabling it to carry out a specific mission, namely, the
communication and enlargement of knowledge.\(^\text{25}\) If the
University deviated from its main goal and was turned into
a center of parochial activities by a local group, then
the Government as the Principal agent of Society and as
the principal contributor of funds to the University cer-
tainly had a right and a duty to intervene in the affairs
of the University.

The Government measures aimed at putting the
University on a sound footing. The Government eliminated
the principle of election and appointed a nominated Court
and Executive Council. Theoretically, eliminating election
from the University was improper. But in actual practice,
election created groups and parties; it made the teachers
deviate from their main goal of teaching and research and
dissipate their energies in building up groups, in canvass-
ing and getting the support of students to canvass for

\(^{25}\) See statement by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Lok Sabha
Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 4, August 14, 1958,
col. 895.
them. It was in the interest of the University that the Government put an end to such unhealthy practices.

It had to be noted that the Government picked up some of the best people available in the country as members of the Executive Council—individuals who were eminent educationists and had a distinguished record of serving the country in various capacities. Their appointment was not on party line; their distinguished record of service to the country was the only criteria that the Government weighed in appointing them. Nobody could reasonably claim that such eminent persons would act according to the dictates of Government. They would be guided only by the highest considerations for the good of the University and the Government felt sure that the interests of the University were safe in their hands.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the arrangement provided by the present Government bill was a temporary one. The Government proposed to bring a comprehensive bill for BHU at a future date after necessary

---

26 Statement by Jawaharlal Nehru, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, col. 1132. The following persons were picked up as members of the Executive Council: Patanjali Shastri, former Chief Justice of India; Hansa Mehta, formerly V.C., M.S. University of Baroda, H. N. Kunzru, M. P., A. R. Wadia, M.P., Director, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, S. K. Basu, M.P., A. N. Khosla, M.P., V.C., Roorke University, and Sukhdev Pande, Birla Education Trust, Pilani.
consultations with the University, the University Grants Commission and the Government of U.P. The members of the opposition should not, therefore, be unduly suspicious of the motive of Government.

4. The charge of Governmental interference in the selection of the present Vice-Chancellor (Jha) in 1956 was not true. As soon as the Union Education Ministry came to know of the statement attributed to Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, the Ministry wrote to Dr. Aiyar asking him if the reported statement was correct. Dr. Aiyar replied that the so-called report was "inaccurate and mischievous and designed to denigrate the Ministry of Education." Dr. Aiyar pointed out that all that he wanted to do was to give the Executive Council some guidance in the choice of the new Vice-Chancellor as the previous Vice-Chancellors had done. He consulted Humayun Kabir and K. G. Saiyidain (Saiyidain was an official in the Union Ministry of Education at the time Dr. Aiyar consulted him, but Humayun Kabir was not) and told the Executive Council in strict confidence that persons in whom he had full confidence suggested Jha's name and he was willing to sponsor Jha's choice.

Dr. Aiyar observed that evidently what he said in the Executive Council in strict confidence was leaked out by a member of the Executive Council and deliberately distributed and circulated to members of opposition parties with an "ulterior purpose." 28

The Union Minister of Education placed the letter of Dr. Aiyar before the Lok Sabha and pointed out that Dr. Aiyar had a right to ask for suggestions from any person. It was immaterial whether that person was in the Ministry of Education or not. The persons who were approached also had a right to give their suggestions. If an official of the Ministry of Education gave a certain suggestion on being asked, it could not be said, just on that basis, that the Ministry of Education interfered in the administration of the University. 29

Moreover, the Executive Council was not under any obligation to follow the advice of departing Vice-Chancellor, C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar. The Council could have held that V. S. Jha was not fit for the post of Vice-Chancellor and that the Council would not include his name in the panel that was to be sent to the Government of India.

The Education Minister asked how the members of the opposition knew that Dr. V. S. Jha scored the lowest number of votes? After all, there was no mention in the

28 Ibid., col. 4009.
29 Ibid., col. 4012.
proceedings of the Executive Council of the number of votes that were scored by persons recommended for the Vice-Chancellorship by the Executive Council. In any case, that was an immaterial question because the President of India had unfettered discretion to choose any person as the Vice-Chancellor from the panel of names suggested to him by the Executive Council.  

5. The argument that the Government need not have singled out BHU for taking action because admittedly similar evils existed in other universities was not a sound one. The Government had to start somewhere and it rightly started with BHU. BHU was a national university. The University was the direct responsibility of the Central Government and the Central Government gave the University more funds annually than it gave to any other University—RS. fifty-five lakhs which constituted about fifty percent of the total budget of BHU.

BHU should have had the largest share in building up the elite of the country. But the Government found that in recent years BHU did not produce any outstanding students and that the University stood lowest among the Universities of the country in terms of the results of its students in the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.) and allied examinations. That was an indication of the fact

---

30 See statement by Dr. Shrimali, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2935.
that teachers of the University were not giving attention to the studies and guidance of students. No University in the country had as many distinguished persons as Vice-Chancellor and yet no University was subjected to as much indiscipline. The Government had, therefore, to do something in order to reconstruct BHU.

IV

On behalf of his Government, Nehru said that perhaps it would have been worthwhile if the Government had taken actions with regard to BHU earlier than 1958. The Government referred at great length to the notes and reports of various Vice-Chancellors of the University to prove its contention that the situation in BHU was progressively deteriorating and was worthy of Government intervention even before 1958.

The "evil day" of BHU started, the Government side contended, as far back as January, 1947, when the then Vice-Chancellor Dr. Radhakrishnan's effort to have Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee as Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University was frustrated by the local campus group led by Pandit Govind Malaviya. Dr. Radhakrishnan wrote

31 See Dr. Shrimali's statement, Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 19, September 11, 1958, col. 2930.
32 See statement by H. C. Mathur (Congress), Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, col. 1118.
Mahatma Gandhi informing him that he was interested in having Dr. Mookerjee as the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and asked for Gandhi's opinion about the choice of Dr. Mookerjee for the post. Gandhi wrote back: "My congratulations on your decision... Dr. Shyama Prasad is an ideal man for the post." Referring to Gandhi's advice to Dr. Radhakrishnan about the appointment of Dr. Mookherjee as Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Education Minister Shrimali observed:

I wish that advice had been followed. Many of the difficulties of the University which have happened since then would not have happened if this advice had been accepted.

Pandit Govind Malaviya and his group not only prevented the appointment Mookerjee as Pro-Vice-Chancellor, they also "ganged up" against Radhakrishnan and made it impossible for him to continue as Vice-Chancellor with honor. Radhakrishnan either had to yield to the pressure tactics of that powerful group and act according to its interested desires or had to leave the University by resigning his post. He preferred the second course.

Dr. Radhakrishnan was the Vice-President of India at the time the BHU Amendment Bill, 1958, was under consideration in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The

---

33 Gandhi's letter to Dr. Radhakrishnan, dated December 17, 1946, quoted by Education Minister Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, col. 1182.

34 Ibid., cols. 1182-83.
Vice-President of India, as a rule, presides over the Rajya Sabha. Addressing Dr. Radhakrishnan in the course of piloting the bill through the Rajya Sabha, Education Minister Shrimali said:

Sir, I would not like to embarrass you in any way by relating the circumstances under which you had to leave the Banaras Hindu University. I would, however, like to say that the University has fallen on evil days since your departure in 1948. 35

Just before he left the University, Dr. Radhakrishnan wrote Dr. Amarnath Jha, the Chairman of the U.P. Public Service Commission, requesting him to accept the Vice-Chancellorship of BHU "for at least a period of three years." 36 Jha assured Radhakrishnan that he would serve the University for longer than three years if he found the atmosphere of the University favorable. 37 Amarnath Jha left the University within a period of ten months of his joining the University and "the conclusion

35 See Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 18, September 10, 1958, Col. 2629. During the Lok Sabha debate on BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, Maharaj Kumar Vijaya Ananda, MP, (Congress) and a member of BHU Executive Council for nine years in succession, explained the reason for Dr. Radhakrishnan's leaving the University in the following terms: "He (Dr. Radhakrishnan) tried his best to improve matters, and towards the end he was absolutely fed up and said: "This is a hot bed of intrigue. We are here to uplift, to do our best for education. But here we settle people's quarrels and intrigues." That was the reason for his leaving the University." Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 15, November 24, 1965, Col. 3691.

36 Dr. Radhakrishnan's letter to Amarnath Jha, quoted by Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 4, August 14, 1958, Col. 893.

37 Ibid.
which we have to draw," observed Education Minister Shrimali, "is clear that he did not find the atmosphere of the University favourable." 38

Pandit Govind Malaviya's position as Vice-Chancellor (1948-1951) involved him in a role conflict due to his position simultaneously as the leader of his group. His position as Vice-Chancellor demanded that he be an impartial arbitrator of affairs at the University; his position as the leader of his group demanded that he be 'partial' to his group. His preference for his former position brought him the rejection of his group. The note that Govind Malaviya wrote in 1951 to the Governor of U.P. (at that time, the Visitor of the University) is revealing:

There has been, however, for a very long time, a strong group in the Banaras Hindu University and its Council, which works on party lines. Pandit Krishna Deva Tiwary, Dr. Ram Ugarh Singh and Sardar Trilochan Singh of Lucknow, Dr. Ramyash Lal, Pandit Ram Vyas Jyotishi and Pandit Sitaram Chaturvedi of Banaras and a few others are important members of this group. One has only to ask even a man in the Banaras Hindu University, to find out the truth of the existence of this group, and its working purely on party lines. 39

The clash between Govind Malaviya and his own group took place on the issue of an appointment to the

---

38 See Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 18, September 10, 1958, cols. 2629-30.

which we have to draw," observed Education Minister Shrimali, "is clear that he did not find the atmosphere of the University favourable."³⁸

Pandit Govind Malaviya's position as Vice-Chancellor (1948-1951) involved him in a role conflict due to his position simultaneously as the leader of his group. His position as Vice-Chancellor demanded that he be an impartial arbitrator of affairs at the University; his position as the leader of his group demanded that he be 'partial' to his group. His preference for his former position brought him the rejection of his group. The note that Govind Malaviya wrote in 1951 to the Governor of U.P. (at that time, the Visitor of the University) is revealing:

There has been, however, for a very long time, a strong group in the Banaras Hindu University and its Council, which works on party lines. Pandit Krishna Deva Tiwary, Dr. Ram Ugarh Singh and Sardar Trilochan Singh of Lucknow, Dr. Ramyash Lal, Pandit Ram Vyas Jyotishi and Pandit Sitaram Chaturvedi of Banaras and a few others are important members of this group. One has only to ask even a man in the Banaras Hindu University, to find out the truth of the existence of this group, and its working purely on party lines.³⁹

The clash between Govind Malaviya and his own group took place on the issue of an appointment to the

³⁸ See Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 18, September 10, 1958, cols. 2629-30.

³⁹ Govind Malaviya's note to the Governor of U.P., dated October 9, 1951, quoted by Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 14, 1958, col. 887.
teaching staff. Dr. Ramyash Roy was an applicant for a post of a Professor in the Botany Department of the University. The two experts of the Board of Appointment, viz, Dr. Iyyengar of Madras and Dr. Agharkar of Poona, and the Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Dr. P. Parija, an outstanding botanist himself, recommended three names in order of preference. Dr. Ramyash Roy's name was not one of those three. Some members of the Board of Appointment pleaded vociferously for the inclusion of Dr. Ramyash Roy's name in the list and the experts reluctantly added Dr. Roy's name as the fourth on the list. Vice-Chancellor Govind Malaviya, as the Chairman of the Board of Appointment, was expected by his own group to favor the candidature of Dr. Ramyash Roy.

The group backed Govind Malaviya for Vice-Chancellorship and expected him to favor the members of the group with patronage. That was the rule of the game. Pandit Govind Malaviya broke that rule first by 'keeping quiet' in the meeting of the Board of Appointment and later by proposing in the Executive Council that the person recommended highest by the experts be appointed. Pandit Krishna Deva Tiwary moved the counter-proposal in the Executive Council that Dr. Ramyash Roy be appointed.

Vice-Chancellor Malaviya's proposal was carried in the Executive Council. But from that day the defeated group set itself to the task of opposing Vice-Chancellor
University would accept the verdict of the supreme body of the University gracefully. "But," Govind Malaviya wrote in his note to the Governor of U.P., "this group has not done so. They are doing what Pakistan is doing about Kashmir, trying to win their already lost battle through vilification, false propaganda and misrepresentation." Malaviya requested the Governor to constitute a direct enquiry into the activities of "the opposing group" in BHU.

Referring to the plight in which Govind Malaviya found himself as Vice-Chancellor, Harish Chandra Mathur, the Congress M.P. from Pali, Rajasthan, observed that Govind Malaviya was paid back in his own coin. The pressure methods which he and his followers employed to make the atmosphere of BHU "suffocating" for a person like Dr. Radhakrishnan and were responsible for keeping away a person like Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, recoiled on Govind Malaviya and "he himself screamed under those very circumstances" and begged for an enquiry. Thus as far back as 1951, the Government of India pointed out, an enquiry was demanded and the main thesis of the Mudaliar Committee that the intransigence of a certain group had made the smooth-functioning of the University impossible was also substantiated back in 1951.

---

44 Ibid., col. 937.


46 Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), XVIII, No. 5, August 16, 1958, cols. 1118-9.
The Government argued that experiences of Acharya Narendra Deva (the Vice-Chancellor from 1951 to 1954) and of Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar (the Vice-Chancellor from 1954 to 1956) were much the same as those of the previous Vice-Chancellors. Acharya Narendra Deva was in poor health during his Vice-Chancellorship. He was deeply hurt when a member of the Court, a representative of the local group within the University, introduced a resolution in the Court to the effect that BHU did not make any progress during Deva's Vice-Chancellorship. The resolution stated that in appointing a Vice-Chancellor in future, the Government of India should select a healthy person with a sense of justice and administrative ability. This was a reflection on Acharya Narendra Deva. Though the resolution was eventually withdrawn at the urging of other elements within the Court, "it was enough," said Education Minister Shrimali, "to break the heart of Acharya Narendra Deva" and he resigned before the expiration of his term. Though the official reason for his resignation was ill health, "we should not forget," observed Shrimali, "the fact that immediately after one month of the notice of this Resolution, Acharya Narendra Deva resigned and people in whom he confided, would agree

47 See Rajya Sabha Debates, XXII, No. 18, September 10, 1958, col. 2631.
with me that his heart broke when notice of this Resolution was given." \(^{48}\)

Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar wrote in his letter to the President of India that the whole atmosphere of the University was vitiated, charged and countercharged. Dr. Aiyar wrote that his work in the University became too taxing and he failed to influence major policies in the University which alone was his justification for becoming the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, he resigned. \(^{49}\)

The Government of India asked of the Opposition: Why did so many Vice-Chancellors leave BHU if something was not seriously wrong there? Did not the notes, comments and letters of Vice-Chancellors already indicate what the Mudaliar Committee Report indicated in 1958—that is, that the University had become a center of intriguing group

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar's letter to the President of India, quoted by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Lok Sabha Debates, (Second Series), Vol. XVIII, No. 4, August 14, 1958, Cols. 891-2. During the Lok Sabha Debates on BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, Maharaj Kumar Vijaya Ananda (Congress), who was a member of the University Executive Council during the Vice-Chancellorship of Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, pointed out how exasperated Dr. Aiyar felt at BHU. Ananda claimed that Dr. Aiyar told him once: "What is the work here? Have I come to improve the lot of the students, or to see that there is no intrigue? I am asked to get up at 2 o'clock in the night to settle professors' quarrels." Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., Nov. 24, 1965, Col. 3692.
politics to the detriment of its main goal of pursuing knowledge?

The Chairman of the University Grants Commission, Dr. C. D. Deshmukh, made an enquiry into the situation at BHU and felt dismayed at the way it functioned. When the Education Minister Shrimali showed him (Dr. Deshmukh) the Mudaliar Committee Report, he told the Minister that he fully agreed with the observations in the Report and endorsed its recommendations. The University Grants Commission (U.G.C.) was an independent body charged with the task of supervising the universities. The Central Government funds to Universities were distributed through the U.G.C. The U.G.C. had reservations about the granting of RS. 55 lakhs annually to BHU as it was. It demanded of the Government that either it introduce necessary reforms in BHU or find some institution other than the U.G.C. to subsidize the University.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out that some of the eminent Vice-Chancellors including Radhakrishnan, the then Vice-President of India, the distinguished Chairman of the U.G.C., the "completely independent and impartial and highly competent" members of the Mudaliar Committee—they all came to the same conclusion about BHU.

---

50 See Dr. Shrimali's statement, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 16, 1958, col. 1179.

51 See Nehru's statement, Lok Sabha Debates, August 16, 1958, col. 1130.
Nehru asked: From whom will the Government take their guidance if not from these people? The Government was, therefore, justified in interfering with BHU by promulgating an ordinance and then following up the ordinance by means of a bill in Parliament.

V

A noteworthy feature of the Parliamentary debate over the BHU Amendment Bill, 1958 is that some Congress members who came mostly from Eastern U.P. and Bihar joined the Socialist and Communist Parties in criticizing Government measures. Certain observations in the Mudaliar Committee Report, especially the reference to a certain group in the University as the "Eastern U.P." group evoked their sentiments and they spoke with a certain amount of injured innocence.52

Not so innocent, however, was the speech of Govind Malaviya, the Congress MP from Sultanpur, Eastern U.P. Govind Malaviya nursed a personal grievance against the Government of India for not approving of his reelection as Vice-Chancellor of BHU in 1951. He maintained his link with politics in the University.

52 Most of them (Raghunath Singh, Sinhasan Singh, Kashinath Pande, T. N. Singh, Ganapati Ram, for example) claimed that the Eastern U.P. was a great area and that whatever might have been the record of students and teachers of BHU in the present India, there could not be any denying of the fact that they played a glorious part in freedom movements of India, especially in the Quit-India campaign of 1942.
Education Minister Shrimali pointed out that Govind Malaviya stepped in whenever there was trouble in the University and whenever there was a vacancy in the post of Vice-Chancellor. He canvassed strongly for himself for becoming the Vice-Chancellor after Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar resigned in 1956. In this connection, he told Dr. Aiyar that he expected considerable support from the Executive Council and asked Aiyar if he was against Govind Malaviya. Govind Malaviya's name was one of the seven originally proposed in the Executive Council for Vice-Chancellorship. The Executive Council eventually recommended a panel of four names to the President of India after taking votes by ballot. Govind Malaviya's name was not one of these four. But this episode showed that Govind Malaviya was interested in becoming the Vice-Chancellor and in recapturing his hold over the group (that he once led himself) as well as the University. According to the Government, he spoke against the Mudaliar Committee Report, Government ordinance and bill from this motive.

Speaking on the floor of the Lok Sabha, Govind Malaviya claimed that there was very little wrong with

---


54 Dr. Aiyar's letter to the Ministry of Education, read in the Rajya Sabha by Dr. K. L. Shrimali, Ibid., col. 2934.
BHU,\textsuperscript{55} that it was the privilege of students sometimes to be rash,\textsuperscript{56} that the discipline among BHU students was better than that of students in many other universities of the country and that the devotion with which the BHU teaching staff carried on its duty was "unique and inspiring."\textsuperscript{57} He also said that the Government ordinance and bill were quite unnecessary and that these Government measures "will set the whole institution (i.e., BHU) ablaze, as it has already done, and no power of any Government would be able to apply the corrective."\textsuperscript{58}

He propounded a different theory of his resignation than what he proclaimed in 1951. In 1951, he wrote in his note to the Governor of U.P. that he was resigning because the power politics of a local group had made the situation difficult for him in the University. In 1958, while speaking on the floor of \textit{Lok Sabha}, he protested that he resigned in 1951 because of his ill-health.\textsuperscript{59} P. N. Sapru, the Congress M.P., who was a member of BHU. Executive Council in 1950-51 and a witness to the situation in which Govind Malaviya found himself in the University, remembered the personal conversation he had with

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit.}, August 14, 1958, col. 947.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, col. 930.

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, col. 946.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, col. 933.
Govind Malaviya on the occasion of the latter's resigning the Vice-Chancellorship. Sapru declared that he was most "amused" to hear that Govind Malaviya resigned not because of the way pressure tactics operated on him but because of his ill-health.⁶⁰

The Government held that Govind Malaviya's speech was actually meant for the consumption of agitators in BHU. If he were sincerely interested in the problem of education at BHU, he would have responded to the request of the Mudaliar Committee to appear before it as a witness or at least have sent a memorandum to the Committee. He did neither. Again, when the BHU Amendment Bill, 1958, was before the Select Committee of the Lok Sabha, the Select Committee requested Govind Malaviya to enlighten the Committee with his special knowledge of problems at BHU. But he did not appear before the Select Committee either. The Government, therefore, dismissed his speech as a cheap attempt to gain popularity with agitators at BHU.⁶¹


⁶¹See Dr. Shrimali's speech, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 16, 1958, col. 1181.
The Government asserted that they had no interest in utilizing the political system in subsuming the purposes of education at BHU. They only wanted to make BHU a great University, a truly national university. The Government argued that there should be no partisanship, no political predilections in the discussion of educational issues and asked the Opposition to help the Government in the task of reconstructing education at BHU.\(^\text{62}\)

The Socialists and the Communists agreed that on principle there should be no partisanship in the discussion of educational issues, but then charged that the Government itself was becoming partisan in defending Vice-Chancellor Jha and his administration. R. B. Gour of the Communist Party said bluntly: "If your (i.e., Government's) politics is to defend in season and out of season the administration which could not administer the University, then my politics is to oppose that politics of yours."\(^\text{63}\)

Bhupesh Gupta of the Communist Party acknowledged that his party had supporters among students and teachers

\(^\text{63}\)See *Rajya Sabha Debates*, XXIII, No. 11, December 9, 1958, cols. 1693-94.
of the University but they did not constitute the pressure
group in the University. He claimed that the pressure
group at BHU was headed by Vice-Chancellor Jha and the
members of the group were all Congressmen, not Communists.
Gupta asserted that the main purpose of the Government in
defending the Vice-Chancellor was to preserve the "somewhat
shaken" Congress monolithic structure in BHU. 64 Braj Raj
Singh of the Socialist Party was even more blunt. He
contended that the Congress Government was out to destroy
BHU. 65

The Government contended that the Opposition
political parties were more interested in making political
capital out of the situation in BHU than in solving the
problems of the University. To quote Education Minister
Shrimali:

Leaders of political parties have taken full
advantage of the situation (in BHU) and are
exploiting them for political ends without
realising that these very methods would be used
against them when they come into power. They
have addressed the meetings of the students and
have asked them to carry on the agitation more
vigorously and forcefully so that the Ordinance
may be withdrawn and the Act may be thrown out. 66

Dr. Shrimali blamed the Communist Party and Socialist
Party in this connection.

64 See statement by Bhupesh Gupta, Rajya Sabha
Debates, September 11, 1958, Col. 286.

65 See Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., September 1,
1958, Col. 4277.

66 See Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., September 1,
1958, Col. 4015.
The Socialists and Communists counter-blamed the Congress Party for the politicization of BHU students. They pointed out that in the pre-independence days, the Congress Party leaders advised the BHU students to defy Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya who was anxious to keep them out of political agitation and involved the students in the freedom movements by telling them that discipline in an educational institution was secondary compared to freedom for the country. The tradition of student political activism that the Congress Party created during colonial times continued to the present and the Congress party was responsible for that.\(^7\)

VII

The debate in Parliament was acrimonious, marked by angry tones and characterized by accusation and counter-accusation. The main thesis of the Socialist and Communist Parties was that the unsympathetic policies of University administration and the Congress Government were responsible for the 1958 agitation. The main thesis of the Government, on the other hand, was that the agitation was the product of manipulation of certain students by a local group of interested teachers and political leaders.

\(^7\)See statement by H. N. Mukkerjee (CPI), Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 14, 1958, col. 917.
There were elements of truth in both the viewpoints. The students of the College of Ayurveda had certain genuine grievances. They had to live in "unsanitary" hostels; they did not have a permanent principal in their college; their A.B.M.S. degree was unrecognized. Recognizing the A.B.M.S. degree was beyond the competence of the University and the Government. But the University and the Government could have at least approached the Indian Medical Council for the appointment of a committee to examine the curriculum, teaching standard, etc. in the College of Ayurveda and persuaded the Council to recognize the degree after necessary improvements were effected. This was, however, an all-India problem and the indecisiveness of the Government of India in taking a policy stand on this issue had something to do with the agitation of BHU students in 1958.

The two basic issues were student poverty and unemployment. Many economically poor and intellectually indifferent students from the districts around Banaras came to BHU for admission because they could not afford the expenses of education in far-away places. There was

---

68 Prof. A. R. Wadia (nominated) said in the Rajya Sabha: "Sir, I was taken round the Ruia hostel where the Ayurvedic College students are housed and I was ashamed to go to that hostel; it is bad. . . . It is dirty with no amenities whatever. If I were a student of the Ayurvedic College, I would certainly resent it." Rajya Sabha Debates, op. cit., September 10, 1958, col. 2691.
nothing exceptional in Government of India's desire that BHU, as an all-India institution, admit only "quality" students from all over India. But the solution of the problem was not just throwing out the local students whose academic standard was poor, but to accommodate them in alternative educational institutions or, better still, to provide them with jobs so that many of them did not have to come to the University at all. The problem is that the Government's capacity to create the requisite number of jobs is necessarily low. Therefore, it happens that the greater the number of educated graduates, the larger the unemployment.

If the Government wants to restrict university education by and large to the number of university-educated men and women that the country will be needing from time to time, it will at once be criticised as the sustenance of elitism and the denial of the common man's right to the essential facilities of advancement and self-realization. On the other hand, if the Government allows the universities to follow the policy of unlimited admission, as it has done so far, it will mean overcrowded classrooms, and consequent student demands for improvement of facilities and subsequently for jobs. Limited funds and scarce resources make it impossible for the authorities to satisfy these student demands. The Government of India is thus put in an unbearable situation: it can neither check the expansion of
education, nor sustain it successfully. One clear consequence is the discontent of students and events such as occurred at BHU in 1958.

The discontent of BHU students was not the only factor leading to the 1958 agitation. A very important factor, as explained in the previous chapter, was the 'survival politics' of the Eastern U.P. group. The group engaged its student followers into agitation and approached the Socialist and Communist Parties to communicate their demands effectively to the political authorities; to plead on their behalf that everything was all right in BHU except for the fact that its Vice-Chancellor was inefficient and that his removal would solve all the problems of BHU. In Parliament, the Socialists and Communists exerted as much pressure on the Government as they could on behalf of their clients in the University. But they did not have the requisite number of votes and the Government was determined.

69 One finds considerable similarity between what the Eastern U.P. group wrote in A Factual Analysis of Banaras Hindu University Mudaliar Committee Report and what the MPs belonging to Socialist and Communist Parties spoke on the floor of Parliament. In fact, certain teachers of BHU went all the way to New Delhi to lobby with the MPs belonging to Opposition parties and supplied them with copies of A Factual Analysis of BHU Mudaliar Committee Report. See statement by Education Minister Shrimati, Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit., August 16, 1958, col. 1179. This was, however, not a one-way traffic at all. Party politicians themselves had also visited the campus, as I had pointed out in the course of discussion, for the purpose of mobilizing political opposition to the Government, for maintaining their existing support-level in the campus and for recruiting future supporters of the party from the University.
They, therefore, failed to shape the Governmental output to their liking or to the liking of their clients.

The conclusion which emerges is that the 1958 agitation was not just a students' agitation. It was the means through which organized groups sought to protect their respective interests.
CHAPTER VII

SECULARISM AND POLITICAL PROTEST: BHU STUDENTS' AGITATION OF 1965

After the 1958 agitation ended, the Government of India went ahead with the plan of reforming the University, i.e., deparochializing and depoliticizing it. With this end in view, the newly appointed Executive Council dissolved the Students' Union and dismissed certain teachers after the Reviewing Committee recommended their removal. Some of these teachers appealed to the Supreme Court against the dismissal decisions of the Executive Council and the University lost in some cases on procedural and technical grounds (mostly on the ground that the opportunity given to dismissed persons to defend themselves before the Executive Council was not "reasonable" enough in the judicial sense of the term "reasonable"). As Professor A. R. Wadia, a member of the University Executive Council, explained:

We (i.e., the University) won in some cases but we lost in some cases. We never lost on the merits of the case. We always lost on the ground of some technical defect, that we did not do this or that, and as a result of it some members (of the teaching staff) have been reinstated.¹

¹See Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 5, November 10, 1965, col. 804.
The attempted deparochialization was not successful. The attempted depoliticization met with a similar fate. It was defeated by the RSS which had a unique facility to operate from within the campus. That the forces of parochialization and politicization remained active in BHU could be seen from the 1965 agitation of BHU students. The forces inciting that agitation were, however, different from what they were in 1958. The primary catalysts in the 1965 agitation were the RSS and the Jana Sangh. The agitation represented their reaction to the authoritative move for dropping the word "Hindu" from the name of Banaras Hindu University by means of the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Jana Sangh and some other Hindu organizations considered such a move as a symbolic affront to Hindu religion and culture. As a means of creating public pressures on the legislative and executive authorities, they mobilized the local people, especially BHU students into agitation against the established authorities. This chapter will deal with the 1965 agitation which basically represented the RSS and Jana Sangh struggle with the party in power (Congress) as well as with the Socialist and Communist Parties.

2 How an environment conducive to the spread of the RSS influence was created in post-1958 BHU is explained later in the chapter.
Since the Parliamentary and Governmental action provided the immediate background to the 1965 agitation, I shall refer to them in some detail. Late in 1964, M. C. Chagla, the new Union Minister of Education, decided to end the Government control of BHU. He resolved that however useful the control might have been, a democratic government could not "govern" a University for years (six years dating from 1958) by means of ordinances and temporary Legislative Acts. On behalf of the Government, Chagla introduced in the Rajya Sabha, a draft BHU Amendment Bill which sought to restore its normal constitution along with certain structural changes in the constitution as provided by the BHU Act of 1915. The Rajya Sabha referred the bill to a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament.

The joint committee made some changes in the draft bill in reporting it out in August, 1965. It reduced the official representation (i.e., the Visitor's or so to say, Indian President's nominees) in the University Court and the Executive Council and raised the number of elected and non-official members of the Court. It abolished the offices of Pro-Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Chief Rector, and created a new wholetime salaried post of Rector to assist the Vice-Chancellor. It gave the Vice-Chancellor

---

3Chagla was appointed the Union Minister of Education after K. L. Shrimali resigned in 1963.
unqualified power to deal with disciplinary matters relating to students" (This was a new statute added to the bill by the joint committee) and empowered the Vice-Chancellor to suspend a teacher who acted prejudicially to the interests of the University subject to subsequent revocation of the suspension order by the Executive Council (This was also a new statute added to the bill by the Joint Committee).

It enabled the University to affiliate all colleges established within a radius of fifteen miles of the University (The draft bill confined the jurisdiction of BHU to the city of Banaras). It restored the Standing Committee of the Academic Council (the draft bill abolished it) and provided that the committee for the selection of names for the Vice-Chancellor's post would consist of two nominees of the Court and one other nominee of the Indian President. It restricted the Vice-Chancellor to one term of five years without eligibility for further appointment, and made the membership of the students' organization voluntary (a new statute).

"Statute 59 of BHU Amendment Bill, 1965 provided that all powers regarding "discipline and disciplinary action in relation to students shall vest in the Vice-Chancellor and he may in the exercise of his aforesaid powers order rustication and expulsion of students, debar students from appearing in any examination and cancel a student's result in any examination." The Vice-Chancellor was also given power to delegate his disciplinary powers to the Chief Proctor and such other person as he might specify."
All of the above-mentioned recommendations of the Joint Committee were accepted by the Rajya Sabha. Three features of the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965 as passed by the Rajya Sabha stood out as particularly prominent. First, the Vice-Chancellor was strengthened vis-a-vis students and teachers of the University. He was vested with considerable powers to take disciplinary action against teachers and students. Secondly, the use of elections in the constitution of the governing bodies of the University had been substantially reduced. Election through the system of proportional representation by means of single transferable vote was recommended. The Communist party members criticised the reduced use of election as undemocratic. But the Government defended it on the ground that past experience had shown that the use of political methods of election in the University had led to a scramble for power and to the formation of groups. Thirdly, while the teachers were accorded representation in the University Court (forming one third of the total membership), they were not allowed a majority in that body. The teachers had a majority in the Court as it was constituted under the BHU Amendment Act of 1951. Obviously, the teachers' representation in the Court was reduced in view of their participation in group politics which was commented upon by the Mudaliar

\[\text{\footnotesize 5See, for example, speech by M. N. Govindan Nair (CPI), Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 2, November 4, 1965, col. 277.}\]
Committee in its Report. It was provided that status and not election would be the dominant principle in the representation of teachers in the Court. Persons who had risen to positions of trust and responsibility, viz., heads of departments and professors other than heads of departments were to be represented in the Court by rotation according to seniority. Elections in the representation of teachers was avoided in order to avoid canvassing and groupism.

The two recommendations of the Joint Committee which proved to be controversial were as follows: that the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar cease to hold office immediately on the commencement of BHU Amendment Act, 1965\(^6\) and that there need not be any change in the name of BHU.

The Rajya Sabha rejected both of these recommendations. Education Minister Chagla strongly opposed terminating the services of the Vice-Chancellor and Registrar and the Rajya Sabha followed his lead in this matter. It was felt that terminating the services of two top officers of the University by a legislative fiat without framing any charges against them and without giving them a chance

\(^6\)The Joint Committee felt that there was some friction between the existing Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar and recommended that the University should be allowed to start with a clean slate, i.e., with a new set of Vice-Chancellor and Registrar with the coming into effect of the new amending act.
to defend themselves was contrary to democratic principles and against the spirit of Article 311\textsuperscript{7} of the Indian Constitution. It was more unfair to the Registrar than to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor had a limited appointment and his term of office was due to expire in March-April, 1966. But the Registrar was a permanent officer of the University. Under the terms of his contract, he had the right to continue until retirement. If there was any charge against him, the Executive Council of the University was free to take action against him and even to terminate his services by giving him four months' notice. But the Parliament, it was felt by the Rajya Sabha, should not arrogate to itself the job that belonged to the Executive Council.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{7}Article 311 protected civil servants from arbitrary dismissal by the Government without giving them a reasonable chance to defend themselves.

\textsuperscript{8}During the debate, Chagla acknowledged that he received a private and confidential letter from the Vice-Chancellor of BHU making some complaints about the Registrar. Chagla advised the Vice-Chancellor to place before the Executive Council whatever grievances he had against the Registrar and persuade the majority of the Executive Council to terminate the Registrar's service. \textit{Rajya Sabha Debates}, LIV, No. 6, November 11, 1965, col. 968.
Contrary to the other recommendation of the Joint Committee that the name of the University remain unchanged, the Rajya Sabha dropped the word "Hindu" from the name of the University and changed the name to Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. An overwhelming majority of the members of the Rajya Sabha felt that a national institution should not bear a denominational name (Hindu). It was inconsistent with the principle of secularism that India adopted as one of the fundamental principles of the Republic.

Secularism as laid down in Article 28 of the Indian Constitution provided that the State would have no religion of its own, nor would it favor any particular religion as against others. Article 28 further stipulated that no religious instruction would be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds. This provision would not apply to an educational institution which was administered by the State but had been established under an endowment or trust which required the imparting of religious instruction.

BHU was the direct responsibility of the Government of India. It was maintained largely out of the funds provided by the Government of India. But the institution was established in 1916 in the trust that Hindu religious instruction would be imparted in the institution. The Government of India, therefore, in amending the original
BHU Act in 1951 allowed Hindu religious instruction continue, but made it optional\(^9\) for all students including Hindus in accordance with the following constitutional stipulation:

No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has given his consent thereto. (Article 28(3).)

In accordance with their Secular policy, the Government of India also eliminated in 1951 the denominational character\(^{10}\) of the University Court and threw the membership of the Court as well as of other University bodies open to persons of all castes and creeds. But for the opposition of the BHU Court, the Government of India would probably have dropped the word "Hindu" from the name of the University in amending the BHU Act in 1951. As far back as 1948, the Government proposed amendments of the BHU Act, 1915 and of the Aligarh Muslism Act, 1920 to remove the denominational names—"Hindu" and "Muslism"—from the respective Universities. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then Union Minister of Education, sought the opinion of

\(^9\)Under the original BHU Act (1915), it was compulsory for all Hindu students.

\(^{10}\)Under the BHU Act of 1915, no person who was not a Hindu could be a member of the University Court. A special exception, however, was made for Annie Besant.
the Universities in this connection. Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) was amenable to the Government of India's proposal but BHU was not and the proposal was eventually shelved. Dr. Tara Chand, the then advisor to the Union Ministry of Education, explained the reason for shelving the proposal for deletion of denominational names from the concerned Universities in the following terms:

One of the Universities accepted the suggestion of the Minister (Abul Kalam Azad), but the other University did not, and because it was felt that it was necessary that the two Universities in this matter should adopt the same kind of name the matter was dropped.¹¹

The matter was taken up again in 1965 by Education Minister Chagla. He indicated that the dropping of the word "Hindu" was desirable in view of the policy of secularism that India adopted.¹² This was, however, a sensitive matter and, therefore, Chagla explained, instead of forcing the issue, the Government would like to leave it to Parliament to decide it by free vote.¹³

There was some controversy in the Rajya Sabha as to whether the new name of the University should be Kashi Vishwavidyalaya or Madan Mohan Malaviya Banaras University.


¹² See Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 6, November 11, 1965, col. 963.

¹³ True to their stand, the Government issued no whip to the Congress members in the matter of voting on the question of name of the University.
Moving an amendment, R. P. N. Sinha, the PSP member, proposed that the University be given the name, Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. He argued that the seal of the University always bore the Hindi name, Kashi Vishwavidyalaya, in addition to the English name, Banaras Hindu University, and that the name, Kashi Vishwavidyalaya, should be adopted as the only name for the University in the interest of maintaining the continuity. Denouncing the word "Hindu" in the name of the University, he said that Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya never wanted to use that word in the name of the University but was prevailed upon to do so by Annie Besant and the British Government of India. This is, of course, a distortion of historical facts, born perhaps out of ignorance. As I explained in detail in the first chapter, the word "Hindu" was inserted in the name of the University, not because Annie Besant or the British Government insisted on it, but because the organizers of the University including Pandit Malaviya wanted to make the Hindus feel that it was their own very special institution.15

14 Several other members of the Rajya Sabha belonging both to the ruling Party and the Opposition Parties argued in the same vein.

15 D. Thengari, the Jana Sangh member of the Rajya Sabha, was correct when he said that the word "Hindu" was inserted in the name of Banaras University at the instance of the donors and other promoters of BHU in the initial stages. Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 2, November 4, 1965, col. 287.
In the changed circumstances of independent and secular India, the name "Hindu" University was thought to be an anachronism and the Congress member, M. P. Bhargava, proposed by means of an amendment that the word "Hindu" be dropped from the name of the University and the University be named after its founder, "Madan Mohan Malaviya Banaras University." Chagla wanted to avoid a division in the Rajya Sabha over this issue. In the interest of general consensus, he combined the ideas suggested in the respective amendments of Sinha and Bhargava. He proposed that the University be renamed as the Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya and this motion on the part of the Minister was adopted in the Rajya Sabha. 16 Chagla explained that the word "Hindu" had to be dropped in order to adopt the name of the University to the secular philosophy of the Indian Constitution and that it did not indicate any disrespect to Hinduism or to the expression, "Hindu":

Although we have removed the word 'Hindu,' we have got the name Madan Mohan Malaviya and the word 'Kashi' both of which represent the highest, the best and the noblest in Hindu culture, Hindu philosophy and Hindu history. Therefore . . . no disrespect whatsoever was meant to Hinduism or to the Hindu religion. 17

16 Only two members of the Rajya Sabha voted against the motion and they belonged to the Jana Sangh.

17 See Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 9, November 16, 1965. col. 1572.
Consistently with their policy of secularism, the Government also introduced some changes, as noted below, in the provision regarding religious instruction in the University.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya founded BHU, as explained in Chapter I, with the special purpose of developing the University as a center of Hindu religion and culture. The BHU Act of 1915 emphasized this special character of the University in providing that "instruction in Hindu theology and religion" would be one of the essential functions of the University. In amending the BHU Act in 1951, the Government of India dropped the expression "instruction in Hindu theology" and enjoined the University to "give instructions in Hindu religion" as well as to promote oriental studies, in particular, "Vedic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain Studies." The 1965 BHU Amendment Bill went a step further in the direction of secularism in obliging the University "to promote the study of religion, literature, history, science and art of Vedic, Hindu,
Buddhist, Jain, Islamic, Sikh, Christian, Zoroastrian, and other civilizations and cultures."

Education Minister Chagla believed that this provision of the bill as well as a change in the name of the University was consistent with the secular policy that the State would not favor any particular religion as against other religions. The "Hindu" parties such as the Jana Sangh, however, viewed it differently and charged that Chagla was bent upon destroying the special character of the University and that he was 'de-Hinduizing' the University. The Jana Sangh members argued in the Rajya Sabha that the deletion of the word "Hindu" from the name of the University was unnecessary because Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the founder of the University, did not use the term in a narrow communal sense, but in a wider sense to indicate that BHU was a national institution. In fact, the word "Hindu," the Jana Sangh members claimed, was not denominational, but national. It indicated not simply a

---

18 Banaras Hindu University Amendment Bill, 1964: Report of the Joint Committee (New Delhi: Rajya Sabha Secretariat, 1965), p. 2. This stipulation was consistent with the report of the University Education Commission headed by Dr. Radhakrishnan, which said: "While . . . the Banaras and Aligarh Universities may give religious instruction, in Hinduism and Islam respectively to the Hindu and the Muslim students who desire to learn it, we hope that they will adopt our recommendations in the chapter on religious instruction and give to their students instruction in the essential principles of the other religions and unity of all religions." Quoted by Maharajkumar Vijaya Ananda (Congress), Lok Sabha Debates, LXVIII, No. 15, November 24, 1965, cols. 3692-93.
religion or a community but a nationality. The term "Indian" was derived from the word "Hindu." If the derivatory form "Indian" was not objectionable to any one, then why should the original word "Hindu" be objectionable? "Hindu" and "Indian" could be used interchangeably.  

II  
Failing to impress the Rajya Sabha with its point of view, the Jana Sangh took the "battle" to the campus of BHU and to the streets of Banaras. The RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad were the associates of the Jana Sangh in the battle to keep the word "Hindu" in the name of the University. All of them believed in the ideology of one country, one people, one culture, and one nation. All of them believed that "Hindu" was not just a denomination, but a nation, not just a community but a State. This theory was based on two grounds: (i) origin of the word "Hindu," and (ii) larger significance of Hinduism as a faith.

(i) At one time in history, the land beyond the Sindhu River was known as "Sindhu" to foreigners. It gradually came to be known as "Hindu" because of foreigners' tendency to pronounce "S" as "H." Thus origin-wise "Hindu" is a territorial word and it refers to all people who live previous

19 See statement by the Jana Sangh member D. Thengari, Rajya Sabha Debates, LIV, No. 2, November 4, 1965, col. 287.
within the boundary of India. By this theory, even Muslims and Christians living in India are "Hindus."

(ii) Hinduism is a way of life and not just a creed. The Hindu doctrine of *Karma* (Action) teaches people to be virtuous in life, to lead a pure life, and to discharge faithfully the duties of whatever station one has in life. Hinduism teaches that all faiths are equally sacred, that the ultimate goal is one and the creeds are only the different paths leading to it. Hinduism practices what it preaches. It accommodates within itself the conflicting sects and ideologies and shelters under its umbrella almost everybody, from believers to non-believers and agnostics. Hinduism, therefore, if taken as a faith, is the most cosmopolitan and tolerant faith in the world and in this sense it "is secularism at its noblest." 20

The RSS is the most articulate advocate of the above theory or theories. It was founded in 1925 by Keshav B. Hedgewar to build a strong, united Hindu society. The RSS founder viewed Indian history as a series of invasions by outsiders. While one Hindu King would fight the invaders, the others would remain indifferent. Hindus lost because they did not react as one united nation. Thus viewing history, the RSS founder made it

20 From a speech delivered at the Red Fort Grounds in Delhi on November 14, 1965, by M. S. Golwalkar, the RSS Chief. See *Organiser*, November 21, 1965, p. 9.
RSS's mission to remind Hindus of their brotherhood and weld them into a strong united nation. What was needed for this was sangathan or organization and RSS set itself to the task of accomplishing that.

The RSS demands a sense of intense devotion to the motherland. The country is not just a piece of earth; it is the mother (Bharat Mata) and Hindus are the sons of this mother. Hindus must forget the dissensions of castes and creeds and remember that they are bound to one another as members of one national family.

The minorities, especially, the Muslims of India, the RSS holds, were descended from Hindus but they were converted by the invaders. The fact of history is that they were once Hindus. It is their duty to realise this fact and "to be loyal to this land, to serve it honestly, to share the joys and sufferings of their compatriots and to respect the traditions of this land." 21

A strong advocate of Akhand Bharat (One and indivisible India), the RSS holds that Pakistan is an artificial creation whose destruction would be the fulfillment of a Divine Destiny.

To sum up in one sentence, the RSS stands for one country, one people, one culture, and one nation.

21 Ibid.
As explained in the first chapter, the RSS established its two room offices on the campus with the permission of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. In the pre-independence period, the RSS kept itself aloof from freedom movements and concentrated mostly on cultural activities. It made a name for itself when communal riots broke out on the eve of and immediately after Indian independence. The RSS did considerable work in terms of rehabilitating the fleeing Hindu population from Pakistan and giving them food and shelter in many areas. But Gandhi was assassinated shortly afterwards. The Government of India suspected the RSS of involvement in Gandhi's murder and banned the organization. Failing to prove the complicity of the RSS in Gandhi's murder in the law courts, the Government lifted the ban, but on the specific understanding that the RSS would not take part in political activities and would function strictly as a cultural organization.

22 The RSS branch in Banaras was established in 1938. Walter Andersen writes: "The founder of the Banaras Hindu University (Madan Mohan Malaviya) was instrumental in getting the branch of the RSS established inside the campus of the University. A common pattern for the spread of the RSS in the 1930's was for Hedgewar to send out students to universities outside Maharasthra and to have them recruit students. The student members encouraged lecturers to join. At Banaras, one such lecturer in Zoology, Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar was recruited. He was to become successor to Hedgewar." See Walter Andersen, "Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VII, No. 11, March 11, 1972, p. 594. Andersen observes that the RSS branch on BHU campus has continued to be a source of conflict in BHU student politics. F.N. 69, p. 596.
In the 1950's, the RSS lived up to that understanding so far as BHU was concerned. It remained uninvolved in the 1958 agitation. The picture changed in the 1960's. The Government of India took over the administration of BHU after the 1958 agitation. The Students' Union was dissolved and a new BHU Students' Association consisting mostly of nominated students was organized. The new Students' Association was not allowed to have any connection with outside student organizations and political parties. This provided the on-campus RSS with a convenient situation to fill the vacuum and spread its influence in the University. The RSS with its militant and nationalist ideology was already "attractive" to many students, teachers and officials of the University and this appeal increased considerably after the Chinese aggression of October 1962 which swept India with a wave of nationalist sentiment.

The new Vice-Chancellor of BHU, N. H. Bhagwati, was a religious-minded man. He reemphasized the necessity of developing a Hindu religious atmosphere in the campus. He introduced group prayers in the colleges and hostels of the University and insisted on the teachers and students of the University attending the Gita (Hindu religious

---

23 Bhagwati took over the Vice-Chancellorship from Dr. V. S. Jha in April, 1960. Prior to that, he was a judge of the Supreme Court of India.

treatise) lectures every Sunday.25 He conducted the entire proceedings of the 1961 Convocation of the University in Sanskrit.26 This was symbolic in terms of reviving the glory of ancient times and was hailed as a great achievement.27 All in all, an atmosphere conducive to the spread of the RSS influence was developed in the post-1958 BHU.

The removal of "Hindu" from the name of BHU was a "sacrilege" in the eyes of the RSS and its restoration was an ideological battle for it. As a cultural organization, pledged not to take part in political activities, the RSS could not openly organize political agitation. It organized the 1965 agitation covertly and acted through BHU students who were either its members or was influenced by it in other ways. The location of the RSS office on the campus facilitated this task of the RSS.

While the RSS was engaged in organizing BHU students for the 1965 agitation, the Jana Sangh was active in organizing public opinion against the Rajya Sabha

25 Ibid., p. 856.
26 Ibid., p. 848.
27 Ibid.
decision to change the name of the University.\(^ {28}\) The Jana Sangh and the RSS are sister organizations and are complementary to each other. To understand the full nature of their cooperation, one has to look into the background of the establishment of the Jana Sangh. The RSS made a considerable contribution to the formation of the Jana Sangh in 1951. The partition of the country in 1947 had shocked many RSS leaders who felt that had they been in politics, they might have been able to prevent the catastrophe. The Governmental ban of the organization, after the murder of Gandhi, brought another shock to the RSS. Nathuram Godse, the killer of Gandhi, was not a member of the RSS at the time of the assassination and yet the Government banned the RSS. Many Swayamsevaks (RSS volunteers) felt that the Government would not have been able to treat them so roughly if they had a political organization of their own. They bitterly realized that there was no substantial political group in the Legislature to defend them against what they believed to be unjust Governmental repression.

\(^ {28}\) In India, a bill could become a law only after receiving the approval of both Houses of Parliament and of the President. After the Rajya Sabha (the upper House of Parliament) passed the BHU Amendment Bill, it was the turn of the Lok Sabha (the lower House) to consider it. The agitation was intended to pressure the Lok Sabha into not subscribing to the change in the name of BHU suggested by the Rajya Sabha. Since the ruling Congress Party or so to say, the Government commanded the majority of members in the Lok Sabha, the agitation amounted to putting pressure on the Government.
While such was the realization of many RSS members, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee resigned from the Central Cabinet in 1950 over his differences with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the policy to be followed with regard to Pakistan. Sometime prior to his resignation from the Central Cabinet, he resigned from the Vice-Presidency of the Hindu Mahasabha when the Mahasabha rejected his proposal that it leave the political field and convert itself into a socio-cultural organization. Mookerjee was now without a political party and looking for a political platform. So were many RSS members. They approached Mookerjee with the request that he be the President of a new political party to be called Jana Sangh. Mookerjee agreed on the condition that the new party would be open to all persons irrespective of caste and creed. This was agreed to and the new party was formed in 1951. The RSS as an organization did not join the new party but

29 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee felt strongly over the exodus of refugees from East Pakistan to West Bengal and urged Nehru to adopt a firm policy with regard to Pakistan, including the use of economic pressure and if necessary, the application of force. See Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 186.

permitted its members to join the Jana Sangh in their individual capacities. A large section of the RSS which favored political activity did, in fact, join Mookerjee in the new political party. The influence of the RSS over the new political party could be seen in the four fundamentals that the Jana Sangh proclaimed immediately after its formation: "One country, one culture, one nation, and Dharma Raj, rule of law." Like the RSS, the Jana Sangh termed the Rajya Sabha resolution in dropping "Hindu" from the name of Banaras Hindu University as "mischievous."

Deen Dayal Upadhyay, the General Secretary of the Jana Sangh, declared that "the word Hindu did not denote communalism, but nationalism. Secularism was a gift of Hinduism, and Hinduism was the very basis of Indian nationalism. So we would never tolerate an insult to Hinduism in India."

The two other Hindu political organizations which opposed the dropping of "Hindu" from the name of BHU were the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad. If the RSS is the ideological and organizational forerunner of the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha was its political

---

31 Organiser, November 5, 1951, p. 5.

32 Deen Dayal Upadhyay was among the RSS leaders who in 1951 were eager for a political organization of their own. See Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 185.

33 Organiser, January 2, 1966, p. 11.
The Hindu Mahasabha was established in 1914 as a direct protest to the founding of the Muslim League. The Mahasabha stands for Hindu Rashtra (The Hindu Nation) and Hindu Raj (Hindu Government). A Hindu, according to Mahasabha, "means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha (ancient India) from the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland as well as his Holyland."35 This definition of a Hindu includes Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs, but excludes Muslims, and Christians who could not accept Bharatvarsha as their "holyland." Like the Jana Sangh and the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha stands for Akhand Bharat—one and indivisible India and holds that "there will never be peace unless the separated areas (i.e. Pakistan) are brought back into the Indian Union..."37

At its foundation in 1925, the relationship of the RSS with the Hindu Mahasabha was close. Both the organizations stood for the all-round regeneration of Hindu society and both aimed at the establishment of Hindu Rashtra. There was also an overlapping in the membership

34 Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 3.


36 Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism are regarded as offshoots of Hinduism.

of the two organizations. K. B. Hedgewar, the founder of the RSS, was himself a member of the Mahasabha and retained that membership until 1929. The RSS served as the volunteer corps of Hindu Mahasabha on some occasions. The two organizations started drifting away from each other from 1937 when Savarkar became the President of Mahasabha and demanded that RSS be a close follower of Mahasabha in its political activities. Hedgewar put more emphasis on cultural activities and private character building as a means of rejuvenating Hindu society and rejected the Savarkar demand for cooperation in political activities. After India became independent, younger members of the RSS recognized the necessity for a political organization, but regarded the Hindu Mahasabha as a loose association of aged leaders with no political future in independent India. It was this group of young members which "urged the RSS into active politics and was instrumental in founding the Jana Sangh." 38

There was some effort on the part of leaders of Hindu Mahasabha and Jana Sangh to merge two parties in 1953. The talks for merger failed over the differences between two parties on the question of admitting Non-Hindus to the new party to be formed out of the merger. The Mahasabha rejected the admission of Non-Hindus while

38 Craig Baxter, op. cit., p. 57.
Jana Sangh favored it in accordance with its thesis that Non-Hindus must be "Indianized" and assimilated into the Indian nation.\(^{39}\)

The Hindu Mahasabha as a party commands little influence. The RSS and Jana Sangh, on the other hand, have grown in size and influence over the years. While the Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad\(^{40}\) did some work in terms of arousing public opinion against dropping "Hindu" from the name of BHU, the major activities in this direction were organized by the Jana Sangh and the RSS. The Hindu outlook and overtone of all these organizations made them look upon the Government policy of secularism as the policy of Muslim appeasement. It was all right to drop "Muslim" from the name of Aligarh Muslim University but wrong to drop "Hindu" from the name of BHU. The word "Hindu," in their eyes, stood for the nation while the word "Muslim" stood for a denomination. Therefore, there

\(^{39}\)The assimilation or Indianization thesis, insofar as it applies to Muslims, means that Indian Muslims must get rid of their alien thinking and false beliefs that they are the children of the conquerors of India and respect the ancient heritage, tradition and culture of India by accepting the fact that they were all, or at least most of them, converted to the other faith from Hinduism. It is in this sense that Jana Sangh stands for Bharatiya Rashtra (Indian nation) rather than Hindu Rashtra. The practical difference between Jana Sangh's Bharatiya Rashtra and Hindu Mahasabha's Hindu Rashtra seems to be very little.

\(^{40}\)Ram Rajya Parishad was established by a Swami Karapatri in 1948. Its utopian political ideal is to strive for bringing back the blessed days of Lord Ram (a mythical figure) when everybody was happy, truthful, learned and religious-minded. It has hardly any influence on the Indian political scene today.
could not be any equation between BHU and AMU.  

Technically, the decision to change the name of BHU was of the Rajya Sabha. The Government of India adopted no official attitude with regard to the question of name of the University and left it to the free vote of the Rajya Sabha. But the agitating parties and their student followers reasoned that the Rajya Sabha could not have changed the name without the tacit approval and support of the Government. They saw the hand of Education Minister Chagla behind the move and singled him out for their attack. After the joint committee of both Houses of Parliament voted to keep the name of BHU unchanged, did not Chagla say on the floor of the Rajya Sabha that he personally favored the dropping of denominational names from education institutions and that he would be willing to consider a change in the name of the University if members of the Rajya Sabha desired it? Did not he himself eventually move an official amendment changing the existing

41 This argument was advanced on the assumption that Union Education Minister, M. C. Chagla, wanted to drop the word "Hindu" from the name of BHU in order to be able to drop "Muslim" from the name of AMU subsequently. This was, no doubt, one of the motivations of Chagla. During the Lok Sabha debates on Aligarh Muslim University Amendment Bill, 1965, Chagla hinted that if BHU agreed to drop "Hindu" from its name, he would move to delete "Muslim" from the name AMU. The Lok Sabha debated the Aligarh Muslim University Bill in the first week of September, 1965.

Chagla also envisioned a day when BHU would have a Muslim as its Vice-Chancellor and AMU a Hindu as its Vice-Chancellor. See Link, November 28, 1965, p. 9.
name to Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya? The agitators, therefore, directed their attacks against the Government of India and especially against Chagla, going to the extent of demanding Chagla's forthwith resignation from the Ministry.

III

An account of the agitational activities will provide us with a clear idea of the pressure tactics that the agitators adopted.

Though the Rajya Sabha adopted the official amendment renaming the Banaras Hindu University as the Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya on November 15, 1965, it became clear as early as November 11 that the Rajya Sabha would favor a change in the name of the University by a very large majority. A large number of members, irrespective of their party affiliation, spoke in favor of dropping "Hindu" and giving a new name to the University. D. Thengari of the Jana Sangh was the lone fighter against the move for changing the name of the University on the floor of the Rajya Sabha on November 11.

Though support for him was lacking in the Rajya Sabha, Thengari found it in abundance in Banaras. Echoing Thengari's view that the word "Hindu" was not communal, students of BHU sounded a note of warning to the Government on November 12 against dropping that word from the name of
the University in a meeting held at the amphitheatre of the University. Gopal Sabu, Secretary of the Banaras unit of Jana Sangh declared on November 13 that the move to drop "Hindu" from the name of the University was misconceived. He asserted that shorn of Hindu culture, Indian culture was worth nothing. He appealed to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to stop this action as it could affect the unity of the country in a period of emergency.42 The Banaras branch of All-India Vidyarthi Parishad - the student wing of the RSS and the Jana Sangh - followed Sabu in expressing deep concern and demanded that the Government give up the move.43 On the same day (i.e., November 13), Braj Narain Brajesh, General Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, protested. He said that it was his sense of Hinduism that inspired Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya to found the Hindu University. He claimed that nothing would be more insulting to the departed soul of Pandit Malaviya than to drop the word Hindu from the name of the University and substitute it by his own name. Brajesh

42 Aj, Hindi Daily of Banaras, November 14, 1965, p. 2. By "period of emergency," Sabu was referring to the state of emergency which was declared by the Government of India on the outbreak of hostilities with Pakistan in September, 1965. The war with Pakistan lasted about three weeks in September, 1965, but the Government was apprehensive of a second attack by Pakistan with the help of China and therefore, the state of emergency was continued for an indefinite period of time. Sabu meant to say that this was not the time to affect the emotional unity of the country by raising a controversy.

cautioned people that a conspiracy was on in the Rajya Sabha for dropping "Hindu" from BHU and asked them to prepare themselves for fighting against that conspiracy. 44

On the evening of November 15 - the day the Rajya Sabha passed the official amendment renaming BHU - The Students' Association of BHU responded by organizing a meeting at the main gate of the University near the statue of Pandit Malaviya. The meeting was attended by a few thousand students including students of many other educational institutions of the city. It was presided over by Ram Bachan Pandey, President of BHU Students' Association. The meeting resolved to issue an "ultimatum" to the Government of India that if the Government did not reconsider its decision within ten days, i.e. by November 25, the students would be free to take necessary action. Students took a pledge before the statue of the founder of the University to make all possible sacrifices in the struggle for retention of the original name of the University as given by its founder. 45 The first handbill written in highly sanskritized Hindi that the students brought out in this connection bore the marks of RSS draftsmanship. The handbill proclaimed what the RSS preached: "that the word Hindu stands for the nation and


45 Aj, (Banaras), November 16, 1965, p. 2.
its conscience and traditions and that its deletion is an attack on Indian nationalism and culture. 46

The Jana Sangh asked students and people of Banaras to observe a general strike on November 17 in protest against the Rajya Sabha decision. The Banaras units of All-India Vidyarthi Parishad and Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh -- the student and labour wings, respectively, of Jana Sangh -- the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad promptly approved of the call for a general strike. H. Tripathi, the President of U. P. Ram Rajya Parishad, said in this connection that the Rajya Sabha decision was very unfortunate. The word "Hindu" indicated Indian nationality and that word was inscribed on every brick of BHU. Surely the Government could not remove all those bricks from the University, he said, in the interest of its misconceived policy of secularism. 47 The Action Committee 48 of Banaras Hindu University Students' Association also appealed to students of the educational institutions of the city to observe a complete hartal on November 17.

46 Quoted in Link, December 5, 1965, p. 10.

47 Al (Banaras), November 17, p. 2.

48 The Action Committee was formed to direct the struggle of students against the so-called "Black Bill" passed by the Rajya Sabha. The announcement of formation of such a committee was made in November 15, 1965, meeting of BHU students. See Leader (Allahabad), November 17, 1965, p. 6.
November 17 in protest against what they called the "Black Bill" passed by the Rajya Sabha changing the University's name.

The "Hindu" parties and organizations propagated that Hinduism was in danger at the hands of the Congress Government. The attack on the "Hindu" name of the University was only the beginning of the process; it would be followed by cutting the "shikha" (top-knot)⁴⁹ and sacred thread worn by Hindus and by "idol-breaking and mass conversion."⁵⁰ They maintained that the Congress Government's policy of secularism meant in actual practice Muslim appeasement. They reminded people that during the Parliamentary discussion and passage of the Hindu Code Bill in 1950's the Congress Government promised that they would bring a similar bill with regard to the Muslim community in the interest of uniform civil code for all communities living in India. No such legislation for the Muslim community was, however, ever introduced in Parliament by the Congress Government. The result was that polygamy was still alive among Muslims of India even though it was abolished by some of the Muslim countries themselves, including Turkey and Pakistan. The same thing, they claimed, was going to happen this time again:

⁴⁹ As a matter of religious practice, orthodox Brahmins in India wear the hair of their head as a high knot.

while "Hindu" from the name of BHU would be removed, "Muslim" from the name of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) would never be removed.  

The appeal to religious sentiments of students and non-students was successful. On November 17, the city of Banaras, a traditional center of Hindu religion, protested against the Rajya Sabha decision by observing a complete suspension of business. Students of BHU as well as other educational institutions of Banaras were absent from their classes in response to the strike-call by the Jana Sangh and the Action Committee of BHU Students' Association.

The BHU students held a meeting on the campus on the street before the girl students' hostel on the morning of November 17. The street was so crowded with students attending the meeting that all traffic came to a halt. The student leaders took possession of the traffic stand on the street, turned it into a platform for a meeting, and addressed the gathering through a microphone. The meeting was presided over by Ram Bachan Pandey, the President of BHU Students' Association. Pandey asserted that the word "Hindu" was not communal and that Pandit Malaviya established the University as a living example of Hindu culture. He warned the Government against tampering with the word "Hindu" and threatened that if

51 See New Age, December 5, 1965, p. 3.
the Government did not revise its position in the Lok Sabha in favor of retaining "Hindu" in the name of the University, the consequences would be perilous. Addressing the meeting, a woman student pledged the whole-hearted cooperation of BHU women students in the "fight" to preserve Hindu culture. The meeting resolved to maintain the strike until the Government yielded.

On the afternoon of November 17, about one thousand five hundred students from the Kashi Vidyapeeth, Banaras, and one thousand students from the Harish Chandra College, Banaras, along with about three thousand students from the University, marched in a procession to the city carrying traditional Hindu war symbols like gongs, bells, and conches. They shouted the old Hindu battle cry of Har Har Mahadev52 (Hail, Hail, the Great God), and other slogans such as "we will lay down our lives, if necessary, but we will never permit the dropping of the word "Hindu," "Chagla, shame, shame!," "Chagla, resign your post forthwith!."53 After marching to the city, the students held a meeting there and several of them delivered fiery speeches promising to "fight to the end."54


The Jana Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha also organized a procession and a public meeting in the Town Hall of Banaras on the evening of November 17. This meeting was attended by about ten thousand people, including students of the city of Banaras. Addressing the meeting, Harish Chandra Srivastava, the Jana Sangh leader of U.P., declared that the general strike of November 17 only heralded the beginning of a movement against deletion of "Hindu" from the name of the University. If the Government did not take the hint and reconsider the whole issue within a period of ten days, the Jana Sangh would start larger movements all over the country and, if necessary, "surround" the Parliament with one crore (ten million) of people.

Demanding Chagla's resignation from the Central Cabinet, Srivastava said that the people of Hindusthan (Hindi name for India) "fought" for twelve hundred years against the external invaders of India in order to prevent the effacement of "Hindu" and they were not afraid of fighting again. He asserted that students had risen today and nothing could prevent them from becoming victorious against the Government. He claimed that the Government policy of equating BHU with AMU ignored the obvious fact that from pre-independence to the present time BHU had always been a center of Indian nationalism.

55 Ibid.
their views and feelings before coming to a final decision. In a telephone talk with N. H. Bhagwati, the Vice-Chancellor of BHU, Chagla asked him to convey to the students that the Education Minister would be glad to entertain any representation on the question and discuss the matter with student leaders. 58

Education Minister Chagla's appeal did not have any effect on the students. In accordance with their earlier decision to continue their agitation for an indefinite period, they stayed away from their classes on November 18 and held a meeting in front of the women's hostel. About one thousand of them demonstrated before the University Central Office where the Vice-Chancellor appealed to them not to boycott their classes and conduct their mass meetings only after college hours. Narendra P. Sinha, the Secretary of BHU Students' Association, declared the students' refusal and stated that the boycott and agitations would continue until their objective was realized. 59

58 See Leader (Allahabad), November 18, 1965, p. 1.

their views and feelings before coming to a final decision. In a telephone talk with N. H. Bhagwati, the Vice-Chancellor of BHU, Chagla asked him to convey to the students that the Education Minister would be glad to entertain any representation on the question and discuss the matter with student leaders.\textsuperscript{58}

Education Minister Chagla's appeal did not have any effect on the students. In accordance with their earlier decision to continue their agitation for an indefinite period, they stayed away from their classes on November 18 and held a meeting in front of the women's hostel. About one thousand of them demonstrated before the University Central Office where the Vice-Chancellor appealed to them not to boycott their classes and conduct their mass meetings only after college hours. Narendra P. Sinha, the Secretary of BHU Students' Association, declared the students' refusal and stated that the boycott and agitations would continue until their objective was realized.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58} See \textit{Leader} (Allahabad), November 18, 1965, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{59} See statement by M. C. Chagla, \textit{Lok Sabha Debates, op. cit.}, November 23, 1965, col. 3498. Another notable event of November 18 was that All-India Vidyarthi Parishad of Kashi Vidyapeeth organized a demonstration in the Vidyapeeth and resolved to continue their "sympathy" strike in favor of BHU students' demand until November 25, 1965. \textit{Aj}, Nov. 19, 1965, p. 2.
On November 19, a deputation of four student leaders of the University met Education Minister Chagla at New Delhi. They argued that the word "Hindu" was not communal and that BHU had never been a communal institution. They told him that BHU students were determined to resist the name change. Referring to this meeting with student leaders, Chagla reported in the Lok Sabha:

I advised the students to end their strike and not to injure the reputation of this great University. I also pointed out that in a democratic set-up Parliament is supreme and that it cannot be coerced into a particular course of action. The students should leave it to Parliament to take notice of their point of view when enacting the Bill on the University.  

Back in Banaras, the boycott of classes and agitation continued for the third day on November 19. Holding a meeting on the morning of November 19, BHU students declared in the RSS and Jana Sangh style that the Hindu name of the University was a concern not only of the University but also of every Hindu and that the Governmental action dishonored the University as well as every Hindu.

On the evening of November 19, five to six thousand BHU students along with students of Kashi Vidyapeeth, 


61 Sanmarg (Hindi daily of Banaras), Nov. 20, 1965, p. 4.
Harish Chandra College, D.A.V. College and of other local institutions marched to the city in a torchlight procession. They shouted such slogans as "long live student unity!," "repeal the Rajya Sabha decision in no time!," and burned an effigy of the BHU Amendment Bill as passed by the Rajya Sabha.

The BHU student leaders who were in New Delhi continued their lobbying activities on November 20. They saw Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Satya Narain Sinha, and Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda. The country was still in danger of aggression from Pakistan, they asserted, and was suspicious of Communist China's designs on the northern border. The emotional unity of the country was the most urgent need of the time, and, therefore, the Government should withdraw the controversial legislation.

A deputation from the Hindu Mahasabha, led by President V. G. Deshpande, saw Education Minister Chagla on November 20 and warned him that if "Hindu" was dropped

---

62 Students of Harish Chandra College also sent telegrams to the President, the Prime Minister and the Union Education Minister requesting them to abandon the move for dropping "Hindu" from the name of the University.

63 See Leader (Allahabad), Nov. 20, 1965, p. 6.

64 The student leaders were staying at the headquarters of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha in New Delhi. See Patriot, November 21, p. 6.
from the name of the University, it would be taken as an attack on "Hindu culture" and an affront to "Hindu sentiments." The memorandum that the Mahasabha President submitted in this connection stressed the point that no word was more secular than "Hindu" and, therefore, instead of wasting time in deliberating the deletion of that word from the name of the University, the Government should pay attention to the solution of pressing problems which were facing the country. In the meanwhile, the executive committee of U.P. Hindu Mahasabha passed a resolution opposing the name change and threatened a mass agitation against the Government. 65

The Jana Sangh organized a public meeting at Mirzapur (Eastern U.P.) on November 20. Deen Dayal Upadhyay, the General Secretary of Jana Sangh, declared in the meeting that the Rajya Sabha decision was a black mark on the history of India and expressed the Jana Sangh's determination to fight against it to the end. 66

R. Pandey, the Jana Sangh leader of Banaras, announced that the word "Hindu" was dearer to him than his life and if the Government did not decide in favor of retaining it by the end of November, he would start a fast unto death from December 1, 1965, in front of BHU. 67

65 See Sanmarg, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1
67 See Aj, Nov. 21, 1965, p. 4.
In Banaras, like on previous days, the students of BHU organized a meeting on the campus on the morning of November 20 and took out a torchlight procession to the city in the evening to express their resentment. A noteworthy feature of the meeting was that it was attended by student leaders from Gorakhpur, Patna, Allahabad, and Lucknow Universities. Addressing the meeting, Satyadev Tripathi of Lucknow University declared that the removal of the word "Hindu" was against the spirit of secularism and democracy and that it was necessary to oppose the move in the very interest of secularism and democracy. Shyam Pandey, the President of Allahabad University Students' Union, said that the struggle for retaining the word "Hindu" in the name of the University was not a struggle of BHU students only; it was a struggle in which all students of U.P. and of the rest of India were fellow-travellers of BHU students. He declared that students would impress Union Education Minister Chagla that in a democracy everybody had to bow before public opinion and that Chagla was no exception. A BHU student displayed several bricks of the University containing the inscription, "KA. HI. VI." in order to prove that the Hindi name of the University was actually Kashi Hindu Vishwavidyalaya and not simply Kashi Vishwavidyalaya which, he claimed, some people wrongly believed.

---

68 See Aj, Nov. 21, 1965, p. 2.
On November 21, Dr. Radhakrishnan, the President of India, visited Banaras in order to deliver the convocation address at the Sanskrit University of Banaras. Students demonstrated twice before him, first during his civic reception at the Banaras Municipal Corporation Building and later during the Convocation. The crowd of demonstrators, mostly BHU students, numbered over ten thousand. They threatened that they would not allow "Hindu" to be dropped from the name of BHU until the last drop of their blood had been spilled, that they would crush the "traitors" who initiated the move and that they would not tolerate the dictatorship of the Rajya Sabha. The slogan most frequently raised during the demonstration was "Har Har Mahadev." \(^{69}\) (Hail, Hail, the Great God.)

Later, during the day, the local units of Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and fourteen Presidents of various hostel unions of BHU submitted separate memoranda to President Radhakrishnan, urging him to use his good offices for the retention of the original name of BHU. The Jana Sangh memorandum stressed the following points: (i) the Rajya Sabha did not represent the true feelings of the citizens of Banaras. The word "Hindu" was used by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya in a wider sense to indicate that it was a national institution and the people of Banaras feel very strongly over the name given to the University by the

founder of the University. (ii) As a great scholar of Hindu philosophy, Dr. Radhakrishnan must appreciate that the word "Hindu" is the symbol of Indian nationality. (iii) As one who was the Vice-Chancellor of the University at a crucial period of Indian history, he knew well what a great and nationalistic role BHU played in the freedom struggle of India. There could not be any comparison between Banaras Hindu University and Aligarh Muslim University in this regard. Those who wanted to drop "Hindu" from BHU in order to be able to drop "Muslim" later from AMU equated between nationalism and communalism and were traitors to the nation, more so now because the country was passing through a period of national emergency.

In its memorandum, the Hindu Mahasabha drew President Radhakrishnan's attention to the total hartal observed by students and people of Banaras on November 19 as a protest against the change in the name of the University effected by the Rajya Sabha and urged the President to tell his Government to respect public opinion in this matter.70

BHU students' memorandum specified the reasons why the students thought that their demand for retention of the word "Hindu" in the name of the University should be conceded. The main thesis of the students' memorandum was essentially the same as that of the Jana Sangh and the

Hindu Mahasabha, i.e., that the decision to drop "Hindu" from the name of the University was unjust, unnecessary, and untimely.\(^{71}\) The students' memorandum urged President Radhakrishnan to "give due consideration to our feelings" and cautioned "the Government beforehand, before it is too late, to take a wise action in amending the bill it has passed in the Rajya Sabha and retain the word 'Hindu' once and for all."\(^{72}\)

Another significant event on November 21 was the mobbing and heckling of Mukut Behari Lal, member of the Rajya Sabha, by BHU students. Lal, one of the initiators of the move for changing the name of the University, came to Banaras to explain to BHU students the reasons why the Rajya Sabha voted to change the name. The students, however, refused to let him speak and insulted him by waving shoes.

The strike situation in BHU took a more militant turn on November 22 with the students taking possession of the main gate of the University, controlling traffic and occupying a room of the Proctor's office. The students controlling the main gate permitted only those persons to enter the University who wore a black badge round their

\(^{71}\)For the text of the students' memorandum, see Leader (Allahabad), Nov. 22, 1965, p. 7.

\(^{72}\)Ibid.
arms as a protest against the BHU Amendment Bill. A noteworthy feature of the day's agitation was the addition of a new demand to the existing one for the retention of "Hindu" in the name of the University. N. P. Sinha, the General Secretary, BHU Students' Association, demanded that the extraordinary power of discipline given to the Vice-Chancellor under the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, be revoked. Leader reported Sinha saying as follows:

BHU students would continue to strike till the University Bill was withdrawn. They objected to the Bill not only because it sought to remove the word Hindu from the name of the University but also because it proposed to kill the students' movement and to give unprecedented right to the Vice-Chancellor to withdraw degrees from the University alumni at any time after they had received them.73

Another noteworthy development was that students from other cities of U.P. and Bihar arrived in Banaras to take part in the agitation. Demanding the immediate withdrawal of the "Black Bill" passed by the Rajya Sabha, Satya Deo Tripathi and Ashoka Nigam, President and General Secretary, respectively, of the Lucknow University Students' Union, said in a joint statement issued to the Press in Banaras that the move to change the University's name was wholly "unwarranted and untimely and tends to create communal dissensions amongst the students." They called upon the student community of Lucknow to give the BHU students all possible cooperation in their "just and

genuine struggle." Meanwhile, strikes and agitations in sympathy with the "struggle" of BHU students spread to many areas of U.P., e.g., Gorakhpur, Ramnagar, Rashra, Mugalsarai, Allahabad, and Lucknow.

BHU students observed November 23 as a 'black day.' Students from other educational institutions of Banaras joined them in hoisting a black flag on the main gate of the University, on the Chief Proctor's office, and on some hostel buildings. Students pinned black ribbons on their chest and persuaded all persons who came near the gate to wear the same. They continued to control the main gate of the University and allowed nobody to enter the University without furnishing the detailed identity and purpose of the visit. According to them, the purpose of checking entry into the University was to prevent the entry of policemen and C.I.D.'s (Government intelligence agents) into the campus.75

On November 24, fifteen BHU students went on a day long hunger strike at the main gate of the University, as a token protest. Before the hunger strike commenced, the students held a huge meeting in which the student leaders reiterated their decision to continue their agitation till their demand was conceded and gave a "Delhi Chalo" (March to Delhi) call to demonstrate their feelings before Parliament. The student leaders called for a total strike in all

75Leader, November 24, 1965, p. 7.
the educational institutions of the city of Banaras on November 25, i.e. when the ten-day ultimatum that the students sent the Government for reconsidering its position expired. It was also decided to hold at Banaras on November 26 an emergent conference of U.P. students to consider the future strategy of the movement. The General Secretary of BHU Student's Association announced that representatives and leaders of Delhi, Bihar, and Calcutta Universities' Students Unions would attend the conference as special invitees.\textsuperscript{76}

Such was the situation at the University when the Lok Sabha commenced its discussion of the BHU Amendment Bill on November 24. Apparently, the Lok Sabha was under "pressure" and after debating the question of renaming the University for the whole day of November 24, the Lok Sabha decided in favor of postponing the discussion and putting off the bill for an indefinite period of time.\textsuperscript{77}

The Lok Sabha members hoped that the postponement of the issue or the shelving of the bill would lead to the immediate termination of the agitation. The agitation, however, continued in Banaras for a few days more, before its leaders called a halt to it.

\textsuperscript{76}See Leader, November 25, 1965, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{77}The debates in the Lok Sabha will be referred to in detail later.
The Jana Sangh and BHU student leaders reacted in exactly the same way to the Lok Sabha decision. The local Jana Sangh leader Gopal Sabu declared that the decision for postponement of discussion was a Government "trick." The widespread reaction of students and people of U.P. to the Government's move had unnerved the Government and the temporary shelving of the bill was just a means to "buy time." After the agitation subsided, the Government would move the same bill again at an opportune time. Sabu announced that the Jana Sangh would not fall into the trap laid by the Government and asked the students and people of Banaras to continue the agitation until total success was achieved. Following his party leader, Hriday Narain Tripathi, the local leader of the All-India Vidyarthi Parishad, asked students not to be misled by the mere postponement of the bill and exhorted them to prepare themselves for agitation for a longer period.

Echoing the Jana Sangh view, the BHU student leaders described the postponement as "political manoeuvring" by the Government and MPs to curb the students' movement for the fulfillment of their demands. By now, the students also demanded the revival of the Student Union as it existed

---

in 1958 and their three demands were as follows: 1) Retention of "Hindu" in the name of the University. 2) Restoration of Students' Union rights. 3) Scrapping of the clause in the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, which gave the Vice-Chancellor power to withdraw degrees from University graduates at any time.

Students then called a general strike in Banaras on November 25 in order to protest against the Government's failure to "respect" the ten-day ultimatum that they issued on November 15. Responding to the call for strike, the City of Banaras observed a complete suspension of business for the second time in eight days (the first one was on November 17). Students of all the educational institutions of the City abstained from their classes. In the evening, they paraded through the main streets of Banaras carrying a portrait of the late Madan Mohan Malaviya and later organized a huge meeting.

The meeting demanded the reinstitution of a BHU Student Union and asked R. B. Pandey, the President of

---

79 As noted earlier, after the 1958 agitation The Students' Union was abolished and replaced by the Students' Association which was virtually a body of students nominated by the University authorities. The students demanded a return to the old elective principle and a "free hand" in conducting the affairs of their Union.
BHU Students' Association, to function as the President of the revived Union. The meeting also resolved to extend the period of ultimatum to the Government by five days and warned that if the Government did not concede the three-point demand or withdraw the BHU Amendment Bill from Parliament by November 30, the striking students would "march to Delhi and surround Parliament." This was consistent with the earlier Jana Sangh threat to surround Parliament with 10,000,000 people if the Government did not decide in favor of retaining "Hindu" in the name of the University.

On November 26, students took over some of the rooms of the office of the Dean of Students and posted a label on his board reading: "The Students' Union." They claimed that prior to the 1958 agitation those rooms belonged to the Students' Union, and now had been taken over in accordance with the decision to revive the Union. They also served an ultimatum on University officials asking them to close down the offices of the University within twenty-four hours and allow the staff to join the agitation for the "preservation of the Hindu culture."

A general meeting of students appealed to students in other parts of the country to join the Banaras students' "March to Delhi" and stage demonstrations before Parliament. Signatures of over 200,000 people including students were

---

proposed to be collected and submitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha on November 29 as a mark of protest against the BHU Amendment Bill. The general meeting of students also decided to burn the effigy of Education Minister Chagla during the demonstration before Parliament. In reference to the University's decision to confer a honorary doctorate degree on The King of Nepal in a special convocation to be held on November 30, the students decided to request the King not to attend the special convocation and accept a degree from a University from which the word "Hindu" was being dropped. The agitational activities of students on November 26 also included the "occupation" of the main gate of the University, and the twenty-four hour hunger strike by five male students and twelve female students.

Hunger strikes and the blocking of the main gate continued on November 27 as a result of which University authorities had to put off the law examinations and postpone the Silver Jubilee celebration of the Commerce Department of the University. The first noticeable crack in the unity of the student movement appeared on November 27.

81 See Leader, November 28, p. 6. The significance behind the decision to make such a request was that as the only Hindu King of the world, the King of Nepal should not sanction the insult to Hinduism and quietly protest against it by refusing to accept the honor from the University. The students, however, decided to show due respect to the King in case he decided to come to the University and accept the degree.
Members of the Students' Action Committee were divided on the issue of continuing the agitation after the postponement of the debate on the bill in the Lok Sabha.\(^{82}\) Attendance at the meeting of students held on November 27 was poor\(^{83}\) compared to previous days. Nevertheless, the students' meeting of November 27 decided to carry on the agitation till the bill was withdrawn from Parliament. It also resolved to stick to the program of staging a huge demonstration before Parliament on November 30, along with hunger strikes before the residences of the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, and the Education Minister in New Delhi.

A rather noteworthy event of November 27 was the demonstration by Saffron-donned sadhus (holy men) and disciples of various holy order. They joined the students of some local Sanskrit schools in taking out a procession along the main thoroughfares of the city and the University campus and raised slogans that the deletion of "Hindu" would not be tolerated.

There was a strong indication on November 28 that the students' agitation was waning. Student control over the main gate of the University was lifted; the hunger strikes stopped; and the 'March to Delhi' was postponed. The only major student activity was a meeting between Vice-Chancellor Bhagwati and the students in which the

\(^{82}\) *Patriot*, November 28, p. 1.

\(^{83}\) *Leader*, November 28, p. 6.
Vice-Chancellor assured students that their demand for revival of the Students' Union would be considered. Increased support to ending the agitation resulted. Though student opinion was still divided, "bigger attendance in the library and thinner in meetings showed that the students in majority were in favor of suspending the strike." 

In a last desperate attempt to keep up the tempo of agitation and the state of excitement, the local Jana Sangh under the instruction of its All-India leadership observed November 28 as a 'demand day.' They held a public meeting and asked students to continue the agitation until the Government withdrew the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, from Parliament or provided a definite assurance that it would not drop "Hindu" from the name of the University. M. S. Masani, M.P., and the General Secretary of the Swatantra Party, Raj Narain, the Socialist leader, and Congress leaders including Raghunath Singh, M.P. (representing Banaras), on the other hand, pleaded with students to call off the agitation.

---


85 As early as November 23, Deen Dayal Upadhyay, General Secretary of All-India Jana Sangh called upon party units all over the country to observe November 28 as a demand day against the proposed deletion of the word "Hindu" from the name of BHU. see Times of India, November 25, 1965, p. 5.
With public opinion turning generally in favor of suspending the agitation, the students formally announced the suspension on November 29, thus bringing an end to their two-weeks old strike. In announcing the suspension, they claimed that the indefinite postponement of debate on BHU Amendment Bill in the Lok Sabha was in their favor and that it should be treated as their "partial victory." The students also expressed satisfaction over Vice-Chancellor Bhagwati's assurance for a sympathetic consideration of their demand for revival of the Students' Union. They made it clear that they would watch for the next move of the Government and any attempt to reintroduce the same BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, would meet with a more vigorous agitation on the part of students.

To sum up, being strongly backed by Hindu cultural organizations and parties, especially the RSS and the Jana Sangh, BHU students were on continuous strike ever since the Rajya Sabha passed the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965. For almost two weeks continuously they boycotted classes, took out processions, held meetings on and off campus, burned effigies of Education Minister Chagla and of the BHU Amendment Bill, wore black badges, and stopped people from entering the University premises. They also lobbied the members of Parliament and threatened the important leaders of the Government including the Prime Minister and
the Education Minister with serious consequences for failure to concede their demands.⁸⁶

In terms of making demands, the agitation of students can be divided into two periods: between November 17 and November 21, their only demand was that "Hindu" be retained in the name of the University. Between November 22 and the suspension of the agitation on November 29, they made two other demands: that the Students' Union as it existed prior to its dissolution in late 1958 be revived and that the clause of the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965, giving the Vice-Chancellor the "extra-ordinary" disciplinary power to withdraw the degrees of students at any time be scrapped. The latter two demands were advanced on behalf of "student delegates from the other colleges and universities in Uttar Pradesh,"⁸⁷ who started arriving in BHU from November 20 and then took a regular part in the processions and demonstrations.

⁸⁶ The deputation of BHU students told the Central Ministers that ten thousands of them would lay down their lives if the name of the University was changed. See Link, December 5, 1965, p. 11.

⁸⁷ See Hiren Das Gupta, "Dubious role played by Government and University Authorities," New Age, December 5, 1965, p. 3. According to Link (December 5, 1965, p. 11), two latter demands were suggested first "by the representatives of the Gorakhpur and Allahabad University students."
The Jana Sangh and the RSS, which had strongly backed the students' agitation, were not enamoured of the additional two student demands but they wanted to continue the agitation, to extend it all over U.P. and to bring under their influence as many students as they could. Therefore, they did not object to the additional demands. They mobilized students into agitations against the Governmental authorities by appealing to their religious sentiment. They vociferously argued in the public meetings that "Hindu" was not a communal word, that it signified the entire civilization and people of India. Hindu communalism in Hindusthan—a land where more than eighty percent of the people were Hindus could not be charged. Secularism could not mean the elimination of Hindu culture as was threatened by a Muslim Education Minister of the Government of India in regard to BHU.88 They held the Congress Party and the Government of India responsible for the so-called attack on Hindu culture and successfully worked up anti-Congress feelings in Banaras and surrounding areas. In fact, anti-Congress feelings ran so high in Banaras that U.P. Congress

88 The secular outlook of Union Education Minister, M. C. Chagla earned him the suspicion and criticism, not only of Hindu organizations but also of Muslim organizations. Chagla was charged with "de-muslimizing" the Aligarh Muslim University when he tried to reform the University following a student riot on April 25, 1965, in which the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Ali Yavar Jung, was nearly murdered. The details of the incident and the reaction to it have been discussed in Appendix 3.
Chief Kamalapati Tripathi's car was mobbed and the All-India Congress President Kamraj Nadar was advised to cancel his scheduled trip to U.P.

The fourth general elections in India were scheduled to be held in about fourteen months. The Jana Sangh anticipated considerable electoral gains by turning sentiment against parties which voted in Parliament for dropping "Hindu" from the name of the University. Exhortations were made that "since in Parliament no party except the Jana Sangh had supported the agitation, in the coming election those who stood for a change in the name should be defeated and those who opposed it helped." 89

Both the Jana Sangh and the RSS wanted to continue the agitation until the "complete" victory in the shape of withdrawal of the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965 from Parliament was achieved. Public opinion, however, turned in favor of calling off the agitation after the Lok Sabha postponed indefinitely the consideration of the bill. With the University authorities, Government and all the major political parties in the country except the Jana Sangh urging the BHU Students' Association to call off the agitation, the Students' Association leaders announced the withdrawal of the agitation. The turning of public

opinion and the RSS realization that "by itself, without the cover of the Students' Association, it could not continue the agitation," made the Jana Sangh and the RSS fall in line with the decision of the Association.

IV

The opinions of some distinguished citizens of India in favor of keeping the original name (BHU) of the University indirectly strengthened the demand that the agitators themselves were making and are worth noting.

Asking the Government not to play with the names of old and established institutions, the founder of the Swatantra Party, C. Rajagopalachari, wrote in the Swarajya:

Let us have names as they stand to indicate the history of the institutions, and let us mind only the substance of things. We cannot ask Madras Christian College to drop Christian, Jain, or Vaishnava colleges to delete Jain or Vaishnava prefixes. Our political leaders cannot be asked to change their Hindu names in order to demonstrate their secularity.

Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar, a distinguished educationist of the country and a former Vice-Chancellor of BHU, opposed the action on the grounds that it would be a dishonor to the memory of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the founder of the University, and that it was unnecessary

---

90 See Link, December 5, 1965, p. 11.
91 Swarajya, November 20, 1965.
because BHU was an institution open to the students of all communities.\textsuperscript{92}

Even before the \textit{Rajya Sabha} finally decided in favor of changing the name of BHU, Prakash Vir Shastri, an Independent member of Parliament, wrote a letter to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in which he warned that there would be widespread reaction in the country against the move and requested the Prime Minister to personally interfere in the matter.\textsuperscript{93}

Dr. Sampurnanand, the Governor of Rajasthan and an ex-chief Minister of U.P., sent a letter to Prime Minister Shastri warning him of the danger of a big loss of Congress votes to the Jana Sangh in the 1967 General Elections.\textsuperscript{94} J. K. Birla, a leading industrialist, quietly exercised his influence in favor of keeping the original name of the University.\textsuperscript{95} Referring to the state of emergency in the country following the war with Pakistan in September, 1965, Kamalapati Tripathi, President of the U.P. Congress, insisted that the present was an inopportune time for undertaking controversial legislation likely to divide the people. He acknowledged that there was force in the

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Indian Express}, November 21, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Aj}, November 14, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{Mainstream}, December 4, 1965, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
argument that educational institutions could do better without "communal associations," but insisted that this was "not the time to do it" as the controversial move might unnecessarily disturb the enthusiasm for national defense.  

Raghunath Singh, the Congress M.P. from Banaras, also lobbied Shastri opposing the change. He wrote: "It is not the name that matters but the outlook. So long as the outlook of BHU is secular and does not instigate communal feelings, it does not matter what the name of the University is."  

The pressure created by the students' agitation began to affect some other Lok Sabha Congress members. About a dozen, mostly from U.P., wrote to the Speaker and to Prime Minister Shastri urging a postponement of the BHU Amendment Bill. They stressed that they wanted "some more time" so that "they could be free from the atmosphere"

96 Leader, November 18, p. 1.

97 Quoted in Hindustan Times, November 23, p. 1.

Raghunath Singh's is a revealing case. Only two months previous during the Lok Sabha discussion of Aligarh Muslim University Amendment Bill, 1965, he proclaimed that the words "Hindu" and "Muslim" should be dropped from the names of Banaras and Aligarh Universities as they were irrelevant in the present socio-economic and political set up of India. The complete reversal in his opinion occurred probably as a result of the agitation in his constituency, i.e. Banaras.
that had been generated by the student agitation.\textsuperscript{98} Earlier, some forty members of the \textit{Lok Sabha} informally approached Education Minister Chagla with the request that in the context of the student agitation that had broken out, the whole question of changing the name of the University be reconsidered.\textsuperscript{99}

V

By the time the \textit{Lok Sabha} met on November 24 to consider the BHU Amendment Bill as passed by the \textit{Rajya Sabha}, it was clearly under pressure. Originally, the \textit{Lok Sabha} was to consider the bill in the first week of December. But then the agitating students sent an ultimatum to the Government on November 15 and demanded a decision within ten days. In view of that development, Prime Minister Shastri proposed on November 23 that the \textit{Lok Sabha} put off its scheduled business and give top priority to the consideration of the BHU Amendment Bill.

In introducing the bill in the \textit{Lok Sabha}, Education Minister Chagla reiterated the Government position to leave a decision in regard to the change of name of the University to the free decision of the \textit{Lok Sabha},\textsuperscript{100} but

\textsuperscript{98}Among the signatories to the letter were Bishwanath Ray, Sinhasan Singh, Seth Achal Singh and S. D. Upadhyay. See \textit{Hindustan Times}, November 25, 1965, p. 6.


\textsuperscript{100}This means that the Government issued no "whip" to its own party members. They were given freedom to vote any way they liked.
appealed to the members not to be "pressured" by the agitation. Chagla said that it would be a "terrible precedent" if agitators were allowed to believe that they could pressure Parliament.\textsuperscript{101} He exhorted the \textit{Lok Sabha} to decide the question on its merit. Chagla concluded his speech with the following observation:

\begin{quote}
No country can be great without discipline. . . . Therefore, we must deplore and condemn the agitation that is going on in Banaras. That is all I am asking this House to do . . . let us make it clear to the students that this is a wrong way to approach Parliament. They should not have struck work . . . they should not have done all that they have done . . . our decision is based on merit and not because the students have done this or done that.\textsuperscript{102}
\end{quote}

But an agitation was going on in Banaras and its impact could not be denied. H. V. Kamath of the PSP (Praja Socialist Party) made a pointed reference to this fact when he suggested almost immediately after the Education Minister finished his speech, that the bill be recommitted to a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament so that there would be time for a calmer consideration of the whole issue in a sober atmosphere free from pressure.\textsuperscript{103} He was supported in this move by the Congress member K. D. Malaviya. With the Speaker rejecting the move for recommittal of the bill to the joint committee on

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Lok Sabha Debates}, XLVIII, No. 15, November 24, 1965, col. 3620.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.}, col. 3622.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid.}, col. 3629.
technical grounds, Karnath proposed that the debate be postponed for an indefinite period, but this was also rejected by the House by a voice vote.

The question of the University's name was only one among several provisions of the BHU Amendment Bill. But the name being the most controversial matter, it occupied almost all the attention of the members of the Lok Sabha. Seventeen members took part in the debate. Ten were Congress members and the other seven belonged to non-Congress Parties.

Congress members were equally divided: five members, mostly from U.P., opposed any change in the existing name of BHU while the other five supported the change. Among five Congress members who supported the change, three members supported 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya' as the name of the University while the other two supported the name as given by the Rajya Sabha, i.e., Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. Of the seven non-Congress members who spoke on the issue, two belonged to PSP, one to SSP, one to CPI, one to Jana Sangh, one to Swatantra, and one was an Independent. Of these non-Congress members, all, except the Jana Sangh and Swatantra members who opposed any change, supported the change of name to 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya.'

The main argument in favor of 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya' was that it was simple, sounded very 'Indian' and had always been the Hindi name of the University. PSP and SSP members were positively opposed to adding the name Madan Mohan Malaviya to the University. They asserted that no University should be named after an individual, however great and eminent he might have been.
seventeen members speaking on the question of name, eight supported the name 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya,' two supported 'Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya,' and seven opposed any change in the existing name of the University.

Those who opposed any change in the name of the University insisted that the word "Hindu" did not convey any communal meaning. The Jana Sangh member, R. B. Singh, was the most vociferous crusader for no change in the name of the University. He argued that "Hindu" signified all people who were living in India and that there could not be a more secular word then "Hindu." In fact, the words, "Hindu" and "Secular" could be used interchangeably. "Hindu means Secular and Secular means Hindu," Singh said.105 "Muslim," however, was a communal word, in the opinion of Singh. He strongly urged the Government to drop "Muslim" from the name of the Aligarh Muslim University. The dropping of the "Muslim" from AMU should not be conditional on the dropping of "Hindu" from BHU. The fundamental difference in the implication of the two words, Singh asserted, must be recognized. The former is communal, while the latter is national. Ridiculing the idea of dropping "Hindu" from the name of BHU, he sarcastically suggested that in the interest of so-called secularism, President Dr. Radhakrishnan's name be changed

to Dr. Radha Ahmad Khan! 106

The PSP, SSP, and CPI members, on the other hand, held that designations like "Hindu" and "Muslim" should be discarded because of their communal overtones. They termed the agitation that was going on in Banaras as 'communal' and held that it showed that the University was not free from communalism. Hiren Mukerjee of CPI acknowledged that communalism could not be eliminated and secularism promoted simply by changing the name of the University, but an "attack of symbols and other things which savour of communalism" 107 was nonetheless important. A symbolic beginning had to be made and gradually followed up. Mukerjee insisted that the dropping of the word "Hindu" from the name of the University was also necessary in the interest of India's secular image abroad. So far as Kashmir was concerned, India had shown to the world that nationalism could overcome the forces of communalism. India should show a similar spirit with regard to BHU by dropping the appellation "Hindu" from its name, Mukerjee pleaded.

The trend of discussion in the Lok Sabha on November 24 had been largely in favor of a change in the nomenclature of the University. But then as the debate was in progress

106 Ibid., col. 3674. Radha is a Hindu name, while Ahmad and Khan are very common Muslim names.
107 Ibid., col. 3649.
on November 24, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri called a meeting of the members of his cabinet on a hurried representation from some Congress MPs requesting a postponement of the debate. Some Ministers held in the meeting that there was a growing volume of opinion in the Congress Party in favor of dropping the word "Hindu" from the name of BHU. The other view in the cabinet meeting was that it would be better to put off consideration of the Legislation for some time in view of the passion and emotion in Banaras and in order that the temper on the whole issue might subside. With Prime Minister Shastri tilting towards the second view, the fate of the controversial Legislation was sealed. The overriding consideration with Shastri seemed to be that at a time when the country was passing through an emergency, issues likely to divide the people and create bitterness should not be pressed.

An immediate impact of the cabinet discussion ensued in the Lok Sabha on the following day. At the beginning of debate on November 25, Congress member P. R. Chakraverti suggested that in view of the continuing agitation, "The Government must think judiciously and realistically and this bill must be withdrawn at this

stage."\textsuperscript{110} H. V. Kamath, who had pressed for adjournment of the debate on the previous day immediately took the hint and formally moved that "Further debate on this bill be adjourned." Overruling the objection of M. R. Masani (Swatantra)\textsuperscript{111} and of H. N. Mukerjee (CPI), the Speaker put the motion to vote and it was carried by a large majority, 137-51. Needless to say, the Prime Minister and a large majority of the Congress members voted for the motion. Significantly, Education Minister Chagla, who made no secret of his personal preference for the dropping of denominational names from educational institutions receiving Central Government funds,\textsuperscript{112} abstained from voting.

Hiren Mukerjee aptly described Chagla when he said:

\begin{quote}
I am sure he (Chagla) feels that here was a beginning of the attack on communalism. It was not the end of a story; merely by making Banaras Hindu University the Kashi Vishwayidyalaya, we do not eliminate communalism. Merely by deleting the word 'Muslim' from the Aligarth Muslim University, we do not eliminate
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{110} Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 16, Nov. 25, 1965, col. 3865.

\textsuperscript{111} Like the Congress Party, the Swatantra Party also issued no whip to its members on the question of voting on the name of the University.

\textsuperscript{112} Chagla believed that both the Banaras and Aligarth Universities should cease to have exclusive communal identity in the interest of national unity and cohesion while continuing to make specialized study of various aspects of India's culture and tradition.
communalism. But it is a beginning, a symbolic beginning, an important beginning, something which is going to be followed up, and to that extent, I am sure personally he must be perturbed. 113

VI

The CPI, SSP, and the national press generally reacted critically to the postponement of the debate on BHU in the Lok Sabha. They directed their criticisms against the Prime Minister and his (Congress) Government. Vasudevan Nair of the CPI complained in the Lok Sabha that the Prime Minister was behind the move for postponement. 114 New Age, the official organ of the CPI,

113 Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 15, Nov. 24, 1965, col. 3651.

It might be added in this connection that Lok Sabha considered again the question of the name of the University after about a year in November, 1966. The Lok Sabha negatived the verdict of the Rajya Sabha and decided on November 15, 1966, that BHU should continue to be known by that name and not as Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishvavidyalaya. Congress members enjoyed freedom from party whip as on the previous occasion and again prevented Chagla, who was piloting the bill in the absence of Education Minister F. A. Ahmed, from securing the Lok Sabha's concurrence to the Rajya Sabha's decision to call the University Mahan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. The Rajya Sabha accepted the Lok Sabha decision on November 30, 1966.

1966 was a year of intense student unrest all over India. In the context of that unrest, how far MPs' desire to "play safe" played a role in their decision to keep the original name of the University is a subject of interesting research.

114 Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 16, November 25, 1965, col. 3869.
observed that the Prime Minister made "a scapegoat of Chagla" in allowing the discussion of the bill to be postponed. The Central Secretariat of the CPI charged that the Congress Government succumbed to the pressure of the communal forces in the country by deciding to postpone indefinitely discussion on the bill. It asked all people who stood for basic secular policies of the country to raise their voice of protest against the "surrender" by the Government to communal forces. The CPI Secretariat asked the Congress Government either to retrace its steps and place the bill for adoption in the Lok Sabha at the earliest opportunity or accept the charge that "Hindu communalism has made dangerous inroads into the Congress Party and the Government itself."

The SSP joined forces with the CPI in condemning

115 New Age, December 12, 1965, p. 16. Mainstream also commented that "Shri Shastri has given an ungainly demonstration of letting down his cabinet colleague, the Education Minister . . . ," December 4, 1965, p. 7.


117 The SSP actively campaigned in favor of the name, Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. It gave the following reasons why that name should be accepted: 1) The denominational name of a national University was incompatible with the secular democratic set up of India. 2) The English name, Banaras Hindu University should be discarded in favor of the indigenous Hindi name, Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. 3) 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya' had always been the Hindi name of the University. It was inscribed on the foundation stone of the University and the seal of the University always carried that name in addition to the English name, BHU. By adopting 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya' as the only name of the University, the University would continue the tradition, more so because 'Kashi' represented all that was best in Hindu religion and culture.
the Prime Minister and the Union Government. Ram Manohar Lohia, the Socialist Leader, whose public meeting at Gorakhpur, U.P. was disrupted by stone throwing RSS and Jana Sangh workers,\(^{118}\) said that the Prime Minister was guilty of failure to "deal with" the RSS and the Jana Sangh challenge in the form of the agitation.\(^{119}\)

The Indian Express termed the decision to shelve the BHU Amendment Bill as "retreat from reason." It wrote:

> The responsibility for retreat from reason must be placed on the Prime Minister and collectively on his cabinet. If secularism in India is to be strengthened it will not do to submit to the pressures exerted by parochial elements and by politicians who are influenced by the narrowest of electoral considerations.\(^{120}\)

The Tribune (Ambala) wrote that there should have been no Governmental indecisiveness in the fight against

\(^{118}\) The trouble at the meeting, held on November 26 at Gorakhpur, started when Lohia tried to explain the reason why SSP preferred the name 'Kashi Vishwavidyalaya' to BHU. A section of the audience threw stones injuring Lohia and six other SSP workers. Lohia later told newsmen that about five hundred Jana Sangh and RSS workers who were present in the meeting were responsible for the incident. See Hindustan Times, November 27, 1965, p. 1.

\(^{119}\) See statement (delivered in Hindi) by Lohia, Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 19, Nov. 30, 1965, col. 4672. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on December 10, 1965, Lohia again accused that the Congress Government shirked its responsibility in having the discussion of the bill postponed in the Lok Sabha. He demanded that whoever in the Government was responsible for the postponement should resign. See Patriot, December 11, 1965, p. 5.

\(^{120}\) November 27, 1965, p. 6.
communalism. The commitment to secularism and eradication of communalism in all its forms was a vital policy matter for the Government. The Government should have, therefore, given a positive lead to the nation on the question of dropping a communal label from the name of a national University.\textsuperscript{121}

The \textit{Statesman} (New Delhi) called the adjournment of the debate on the BHU Amendment Bill "a hasty compromise" on the part of the Government and held that the way the Government handled the situation did not enhance its reputation for clarity, consistency, or firmness.\textsuperscript{122}

The left-oriented—\textit{New Age},\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Mainstream},\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Link},\textsuperscript{125} and \textit{Patriot}\textsuperscript{126}—held that the issue of dropping

\textsuperscript{121}November 26, 1965, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{122}November 30, 1965, p. 6.

On the more general question of name of the University, \textit{Times of India} (November 18, 1965, p. 6), \textit{Amrita Bazar Patrika} (November 18, 1965, p. 6), \textit{Free Press Journal} (November 19, 1965, p. 4) expressed themselves in favor of dropping "Hindu" from the name of BHU and hailed the Rajya Sabha decision to rename BHU as a triumph for secularism. \textit{Hindustan Times} (November 23, 1965, p. 7) and \textit{Hindu} (November 25, 1965, p. 6) on the other hand opined that secularism could not be promoted by merely changing name and observed that in the interest of historical continuity, the well established historical names should not be tinkered with.

\textsuperscript{123}November 28, 1965, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{124}November 27, 1965, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{125}November 28, 1965, p. 9 and December 5, 1965 pp. 9-11.

\textsuperscript{126}November 22, 1965, p. 2.
the word "Hindu" from the name of BHU provided the touchstone of the Congress Government's policy of secularism and that in failing to "whip up" its members and pushing the bill through the Lok Sabha, the Congress Government shirked its responsibility. The rightist Organiser—the semi-official organ of the RSS and Jana Sangh—also criticized the Congress Government but for an entirely opposite reason. It reminded that prior to the passage of the BHU Amendment Bill in the Rajya Sabha, the joint committee of both Houses of Parliament rejected the proposal to change the name of BHU. Instead of taking the "escapist line" and permitting a "free vote" in the Lok Sabha, the Congress Government should have directed its members to back the joint committee's report and oppose the dropping of "Hindu" from the name of the University. 

Organiser ridiculed the idea of "Hindu communalism in Hindusthan." It congratulated the students of Banaras on "humbling" "the pseudo-secular brigade in Parliament, spearheaded by the Communists" and on forcing the 

129 Organiser, Dec. 5, 1965, p. 1. Organiser also made a severe personal criticism of Education Minister M. C. Chagla. It asked, how would he, Mohamedali Currimbhai Chagla, like to be renamed Maganbhai Chimanbhai Chagla? This was in reference to Chagla's attempt to rename BHU. Organiser, Dec. 12, 1965, p. 3.
Congress Government to shelve the BHU Amendment Bill. "Credit for the achievement," wrote Organiser, "goes mainly to the students of Banaras Hindu University, who demonstrated to New Delhi in no uncertain terms that they would not suffer any secular nonsense about the University's name." Organiser praised the All-India Vidyarthi Parishad—the student wing of the Jana Sangh and the RSS—for campaigning against a change in the name of the University and proudly pointed out that "the only party which was vigilant about what was going on and which voted against the (Rajya Sabha) amendment (changing the name of BHU) was the Jana Sangh."  

VII

An intriguing aspect of the 1965 agitation was the attitude of the high University officials towards the agitation.

Jyoti Bhusan Gupta, the Honorary Treasurer of the University, made a public statement opposing the deletion of the word "Hindu" from the name of the University. He sent a telegram to the Prime Minister saying that the move to change the name of BHU would throw the students into the hands of the communalists. He held that the

130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
BHU Amendment Bill as passed by the Rajya Sabha was ill-advised and asked all concerned to realize that the word "Hindu" depicted a way of life rather than a religion in the ordinary sense. He regretted that statements had been made in the Rajya Sabha and elsewhere implying that Pandit Mahan Mohan Malaviya did not want the word "Hindu" in the name of the University and was compelled to do so by circumstances or other considerations. Gupta asserted: "I had the privilege of coming in close contact with him and I never got an impression that he was not keen to keep the word "Hindu" in the name of BHU or that he kept it on any other consideration than his own." 133

While Vice-Chancellor N. H. Bhagwati refrained from making a public statement, he expressed himself in favor of retaining "Hindu" in the name of the University to the students of the University.

As early as November 14, 1965, the Vice-Chancellor took the initiative in forwarding to the Union Education Minister, the Prime Minister and the President of India the telegram and representation of the BHU Students' Association opposing the name change. 134 After the Rajya Sabha passed the bill changing the name of the University,

133 Leader, November 21, 1965, p. 7.

134 See the Letter of BHU Public Relations Officer to the Editor, Patriot, December 19, 1965, p. 2.
he gave students permission to hold a protest meeting. It was at this meeting that the students resolved to launch and continue an agitation until the Governmental authorities agreed to restore "Hindu" in the name of the University.

A cyclostyled handbill, bearing the Vice-Chancellor's signature, asked the Students' Association to "chalk out the programme of the Association vis-a-vis the change in the name of the University." Addressing the demonstrating students on November 18, the Vice-Chancellor said that what the students were demanding was justified and the students had his full sympathy. He said that while he had no objection to students' protesting against a change in the name of the University, he would like them to keep their agitation within the bounds of decency and decorum. He disapproved of indecent slogan-shouting and suggested that students could always hold meetings after college hours in open fields of the University premises and express their protest in a dignified manner.

The Registrar of the University issued a press note on November 19. The press note said that the Vice-Chancellor and the Principals of University colleges

\(^{135}\) See *Link*, December 5, 1965, p. 10.

\(^{136}\) *Aj*, November 19, p. 2.

discussed the situation and decided to provide students full opportunity to canvass their views on the subject and hold meetings on the University premises. The press note pointed out that the University had its responsibility toward maintaining the continuity of academic life in the University and urged the students not to do anything in the process of agitating which would grossly disturb the normal work of the University.  

On November 21, University authorities "persuaded" student leaders to present a memorandum explaining their opposition to the President of India who visited the city on that day in connection with the convocation of the Sanskrit University of Banaras.

On November 22, with the student agitation the Vice-Chancellor asked students "to avoid creating conditions where those whose responsibility it is to maintain continuity of academic life and law and order in the University, may have to act." He appealed to students to vacate the "occupation" of the University gate and of the Chief Proctor's office.

138 Leader, Nov. 20, p. 1. See also Registrar's statement, Leader, Nov. 21, p. 7.

139 See BHU PRO's letter to the editor, Patriot, December 19, 1965, p. 2. The PRO explained that this was done in order to divert the students from violent agitation to constitutional methods of agitation.

140 The Vice-Chancellor's directive, quoted in BHU PRO's letter to the editor, ibid.
According to Link, the Indian News magazine, the story of the "capture" of the offices and gate of the University was not genuine. It was deliberately put out by University officials in order to produce the impression to the Government and the public that students were really serious about their demand, and that they would not let the University function properly unless their demand was accepted. To quote Link:

The fact, however, is that no office of the University was ever captured by the students. As for the gate, right from the beginning of the agitation it was under the joint control of the striking students and the proctorial officers. At times the proctorial officers withdrew leaving the gate in the charge of the students while at other times the students went away leaving the job to the proctors.¹⁴¹

In a leaflet that was widely distributed in Banaras, some of the leading Banaras citizens and alumni of BHU claimed:

It is impossible for such a big communal agitation to take place without the active support of the authorities in a University in which every kind of student activity was crushed after 1958, so much so that the students were not allowed to demonstrate against the Chinese and Pakistani aggressions.¹⁴²


According to Link, the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar of the University had some interests in the agitation of students. Link contended that though the Rajya Sabha decided against terminating the services of the existing Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar (by means of the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965), the matter did not end there. The final decision on it rested with the Lok Sabha. Therefore, the uncertainty was still there, so far as the services of the existing Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar were concerned. According to Link, the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar's interests in the agitation or so to say, in the indefinite "shelving" of the BHU Amendment Bill flowed from the motive to "save" their jobs.

Prof. Mukut Behari Lal, M.P., (PSP) who was manhandled by BHU students on November 21 on BHU Campus while addressing a student meeting there, brought the charge that the Vice-Chancellor had a hand in it: "The Vice-Chancellor had somehow informed the students that he (Mukut Behari Lal) had a considerable hand in changing the name (BHU)." Referring to the statement made by Lal on the Rajya Sabha alleging Vice-Chancellor's hand in his manhandling, Hem Barua, the PSP member of the Lok Sabha said:

I do not know why his (Prof. Lal's) statement can not be believed; he is a responsible member of the other House. He said on the floor of the House that it was the Vice-Chancellor of the University who let out the canard that Prof. Mukut Behari Lal was instrumental in changing the name of the Banaras Hindu University to Madan Mohan Malaviya Kashi Vishwavidyalaya. I do not understand the conduct of this official of the University who is supposed to be the highest administrator, who is supposed to hold the highest portfolio in the University.

Kamalapati Tripathi, the President of the U.P. Congress Party, observed that the conduct of some of the highest functionaries of the University relating to the 1965 agitation deserved an enquiry by the Government of

---

143 Lal made this statement in the Rajya Sabha on November 22, 1965. In denying the allegation, Vice-Chancellor N. H. Bhagwati said: "I made no mention of any individual's name to the students." See Leader, November 25, 1965, p. 7.

144 Lok Sabha Debates, XLVIII, No. 15, November 24, 1965, col. 3685.
India. An "all-party committee"\textsuperscript{145} formed with the purpose of fighting "communalism" in Banaras demanded a similar enquiry.

Following demands for an enquiry into conduct of the University officials, Education Minister Chagla sent a circular to all State Governments to see to it that University Vice-Chancellors, teachers and students do not associate themselves with "communal and anti-democratic" parties and "refrain from expressing open or disguised support to political activities particularly of anti-democratic and pro-communal character."\textsuperscript{146}

Characterizing the circular "as a shameful anti-Hindu and anti-democratic document," \textit{Organiser} wrote:

Mr. Chagla's circular can have only one meaning, viz., that while Vice-Chancellor and other University men may associate with other movements they must not associate with RSS. Evidently he imagines that his loss of face over the renaming of Banaras Hindu University was due to RSS, and wants to vent his spleen on it.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} The committee consisted of CPI, SSP, Congress leaders and some leading citizens of Banaras. See \textit{Patriot}, December 1, 1965, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{146} Quoted in \textit{Organiser}, December 12, 1965, p. 3: Editorial, "Chagla's war on Universities."

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
Secular orientation of the Government of India led to the policy of deleting denominational names from educational institutions which were under the jurisdiction of the Government of India. In the public eye, Banaras Hindu University and Aligarh Muslim University stood as counterparts to each other. Maulana Azad, the Union Education Minister, therefore, sought to delete the denominational labels from both of them as early as 1951. He gave up the idea as the consent for dropping the denominational label was not forthcoming from BHU.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gave a precise expression to the policy quietly followed by Maulana Azad when he wrote in 1961: "So far as Banaras and Aligarh Universities are concerned, we can only make a change when this can be done with the consent of people connected with those universities." 148

Education Minister Chagla's political mistake lay in departing from the above policy, quietly formulated by Maulana Azad and explicitly stated by Nehru. The departure was made by Chagla in two respects. First, he did not ascertain the views of the University community before going ahead with the proposal to change the name

---

of the University. Secondly, he did not attempt to delete the denominational labels from both the Banaras Hindu University and Aligarh Muslim University simultaneously. The first departure enabled interested intra-mural and extra-mural political forces to mobilize students with the argument that Chagla, contrary to the previously established Government policy, was "forcing it down" the University and that he must be prevented from the arbitrary action. The second departure enabled the same forces to mobilize students into agitation with the argument that Chagla's real intention was only to drop "Hindu" from the name of BHU and not eliminate "Muslim" from the name of AMU. An agitation for the "defence of Hindu religion and culture," as the Jana Sangh and the RSS termed the 1965 agitation, evoked the sentiments and emotions of students and they enthusiastically joined the "Hindu" parties and organizations in pressuring the Governmental authorities in India.
A direct result of the 1965 agitation was that BHU student leaders developed a sense of power. They felt that they could pressure the established authorities, especially if they had connections with political parties. The politically ambitious among them believed that making a name for themselves in the University arena could help them later in their political career. The political parties were more than ready to welcome such student leaders into their folds. The inability of the SSP and CPI to counter the RSS and Jana Sangh-led agitation over the name of BHU in 1965 convinced them of the necessity of building up their own student cadres in the University. In the process, the SSP recruited D. Majumdar, the President of BHU Students' Union in 1967 as its student leader on the campus and CPI recruited N. P. Sinha, a leader of the 1965 agitation over the name of BHU, for the same purpose.¹

¹See the memorandum submitted to the Gajendragadkar Committee by Dr. Ganesh Prasad of Political Science department, BHU. Dr. Prasad observed: "These (student) leaders subsequently secured membership cards, rather labels, from political parties just for the sake of political convenience." "BHU: Certain Basic Problems," Mainstream, September 4, 1969, p. 34.
The SSP and CPI's efforts to obtain a foothold on the campus could not but bring themselves into conflict with the RSS which was already an established force on the campus. A struggle for political control of the campus began. In this struggle, the SSP and CPI students were pitched against the RSS students.\(^2\) The latter was backed by the Eastern U. P. Thakur group\(^3\) and Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. C. Jashi. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the polarization between the mutually supporting RSS and Eastern U.P. group Thakur group on the one hand and the SSP-CPI combine on the other hand led to the agitation of 1968. The agitation, in turn, indicated the continued operation of the forces of parochialization and politicization at BHU.

\(^2\)The terms 'SSP and CPI students' and 'RSS students' are rather wide. Both the rival groups must have had some students who had no political affiliation. These terms have been used to indicate that the main bodies of the movements led by two rival groups had respective political affiliations.

\(^3\)Damodar Singh, the leader of the RSS group of students, belonged to the dominant Thakur caste of the Eastern U.P. Teachers coming from the Eastern U.P. and belonging to the Thakur caste were generally the supporters of the RSS group of students. The other group among teachers was the supporter of the SSP-CPI combine led by Majumdar and Sinha.
Since Vice-Chancellor Joshi was a party to the dispute between the rival groups of students, I will discuss at some length as to how he favored the RSS students against the SSP-CPI students.

The rift between Vice-Chancellor Joshi and Majumdar and Sinha—the respective leaders of the SSP and CPI developed shortly after Joshi joined the University as the Vice-Chancellor. The conflict occurred over the inauguration of the All-India Science Congress at BHU by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on January 3, 1968. In accordance with the decision of their parties, Majumdar and Sinha declared their intention to obstruct the inauguration of the Science Congress by the Prime Minister. At this point, the RSS group of students led by Damodar Singh formed itself into what it called the 'Resistance Group.' The 'Resistance Group' expressed its determination to resist the disruptive tactics of the SSP-CPI combine and see to it that the inauguration went off peacefully.

4N. H. Bhagwati's term as Vice-Chancellor expired in April, 1966. Pro-Vice-Chancellor M. C. Bijawat was the acting Vice-Chancellor for the next six months. Dr. Triguna Sen joined as the Vice-Chancellor in October, 1966, but resigned in March, 1967 on being appointed the Union Minister of Education. Between March and August, 1967, Rector K. N. Udupa managed the affairs of the University. Dr. A. C. Joshi joined as the Vice-Chancellor on September 1, 1967.
Vice-Chancellor Joshi inducted the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) on the campus in order to make it certain that there was no disruption of the Science-Congress inauguration. The PAC and the demonstrating students clashed on this occasion. Thereupon, the SSP leader Raj Narain, MP and a member of the BHU Court, launched a hunger strike at the University protesting against the induction of the PAC by the Vice-Chancellor. Raj Narain resolved to continue his hunger strike as long as the PAC remained on the campus. When the Vice-Chancellor's effort to persuade Raj Narain into giving up his hunger strike failed, some members of the 'Resistance Group' staged a counter-hunger strike as a protest against Raj Narain's action.

Following these incidents, the SSP-CPI combine publicly demanded the resignation of Vice-Chancellor Joshi. The demand for his resignation coming on top of their efforts to disrupt the Indian Science Congress alienated Joshi from the Majumdar-Sinha group (the SSP-CPI). On the other hand, Dr. Joshi was much impressed by the Damodar Singh group, or so to say, the RSS group of students' helpful attitude to the University administration. Thus began the process of the Vice-Chancellor's leaning on the RSS group vis-a-vis the SSP-CPI group. The continuation of this process saw Vice-Chancellor Joshi patronizing and "protecting" the RSS group.
On the night of February 17, 1968, three students who allegedly belonged to the RSS group were caught while manhandling certain women students. The Students' Court of Honor recommended that these students be expelled. The Vice-Chancellor at first agreed with the recommendation of the Students' Court of Honor and ordered that the guilty students be debarred from taking their examinations and that they be not readmitted to the University. Later on, he revised his order two times. First, on April 2, 1968, he allowed the guilty students to take their examinations, but did not readmit them to the University. Secondly, on July 25, 1968, he stated that no action would be taken against them.

On July 9, 1968, some students of the Fine Arts department, presumably belonging to the RSS group, assaulted a lecturer of that department and asked him to resign from the University. The Head of the department urged the Vice-Chancellor to take serious action against the involved students. The Teachers' Association concurred with the

---

5 The Students' Court of Honor was established during Triguna Sen's Vice-Chancellorship to allow students a say in disciplinary matters relating to them. The Court had the power of recommendation to the University authorities.

6 According to New Age, after the recommendation was made, "the Chief Judge of the Students' Court of Honour was beaten up by the RSS gang." See New Age, November 3, 1968, p. 1.
recommendation of the Head of the department. The Vice-Chancellor, however, treated the involved students leniently. The lecturer concerned was, in effect, penalized. He could not teach for ten days as a result of being hospitalized due to assault, was deprived of his salary for these ten days.

Towards the end of the academic year 1967-68, the Rector, under the instruction of the Vice-Chancellor, sent notifications to all Deans of Faculties, Principals, Heads of departments, and Administrative wardens that Damodar Singh had been especially appointed by the Vice-Chancellor to assist them in the collection of an Earthquake Relief Fund and books to be distributed to poor students. The rival SSP-CPI group believed that this administrative move was designed to make Demodar Singh, the leader of the RSS group, prominent in the eyes of the University community and to build up his group against them. They substantiated their point with reference to University authorities permitting Damodar Singh to contest for the Presidentship of the Students' Union, even though he was not eligible.

Damodar Singh was a research scholar in the Agriculture department of the University. According to the rules of the Students' Union, only a regular student

7He was satisfied with a written expression of regret from the students.
of two years' standing could contest for the elective posts of the Students' Union. A research scholar was not regarded as a "regular" student in BHU and could only be an associate member of the Students' Union. In June, 1968, Damodar Singh applied for admission to the first semester of the L.L.B. (Bachelor of Law) degree course, assuming that enrollment as a regular student would enable him to contest for the post of President of the Students' Union. Singh was admitted to the Law course late in July, 1968. On the first of August, 1968, he applied that he be allowed to contest for the Presidentship of the Students' Union in the election to be held towards the end of the same month.

At this time, the Vice-Chancellor was away in Australia attending the Commonwealth Universities' Vice-Chancellors' conference. The Rector sought legal opinion on the application of Damodar Singh. Both the legal adviser of the University and a retired judge of the Allahabad High Court opined that under the rules of the Constitution of the Students' Union, Singh was not eligible to contest. The Rector, nevertheless, permitted Singh to contest for the Presidentship in the Students' Union elections on the ground that a certain meeting of students
authorized Singh to stand for the election. 

N. P. Sinha of the CPI was the opposing candidate for the Presidentship of the Students' Union. He was backed by the SSP. The election was held on August 29 in a tense atmosphere. Each side accused the other of threatening voters and distributing money to them. The SSP-CPI side complained that "a section of the staff belonging to the caste of the RSS candidate openly canvassed for him." The election results were announced on September 1. Singh lost to Sinha by a margin of about five hundred votes. After the announcement of the election result, the winning CPI-SSP combine staged a victory procession. The procession was attacked by the rival group and the outgoing President Majumdar and the

8According to Organiser, the semi-official organ of the RSS and the Jana Sangh, (October 26, 1968, p. 1)," "Sinha and Co. . . . sought to humiliate Shri Damodar Singh by placing the matter before the general body of the students, which the Rector agreed to call. But in the meeting, tables were turned on Sinha and his supporters because the students present decided almost unanimously that Damodar Singh was eligible. There was, therefore, no other course for the Rector but to allow Damodar Singh to contest."


10Organiser alleged that the Socialist and the Communist group "had to manoeuvre hard—and spend money like water—to get Sinha elected by a narrow majority." In this connection, Organiser drew readers' attention to the fact that the "news of Narendra Prasad Sinha's (now expelled) election success on August 29 was broadcast over the Peking Radio on Aug. 30." "The Red plot against Banaras Hindu University," Organiser, October 26, 1968, p. 1.
newly elected President Sinha were beaten. According to Link, "the Vice-Chancellor did not take any action whatsoever against the students who assualted the President. This was resented by the students who felt that the Head of the University was partisan." After this incident, Student Union President Sinha led a delegation to New Delhi to complain to the President, the Prime Minister and the Education Minister about the partiality of the Vice-Chancellor towards the RSS students.

On his return from New Delhi, Sinha held the inaugural meeting of the Students' Union on September 24 to which the Vice-Chancellor was invited. This meeting ended in a scuffle between two contending groups of students. During the disorderly scene, Vice-Chancellor Joshi wanted to leave the meeting, but was obstructed by the SSP-CPI group. He was finally able to leave with the help of RSS students.

Towards the afternoon of September 24, the SSP-CPI combine raised a row over the "missing" of Satnu Ram, a Class IV employee (employed as a servant) in one of the University hostels. A rumor somehow spread that Satnu Ram was murdered by some RSS students. On September 24, 1968, Class IV employees of the University felt greatly agitated over this rumor and D. Majumdar, the President

of their Union, threatened the Vice-Chancellor with dire consequences if he (the Vice-Chancellor) could not produce Satnu Ram or his body (in the event of his being murdered) by 4:00 p.m. next day.

RSS students led by Damodar Singh maintained that the "missing" of Satnu Ram was a deliberate plot by the SSP-CPI combine to "embarrass" the RSS and the Vice-Chancellor.\textsuperscript{12} Two members of the RSS group made a trip to Satnu Ram's village, and brought Satnu Ram back to the campus after tracing him in his village. They earned the gratitude of the Vice-Chancellor for their efforts to keep "peace" on the campus.

On September 25, 1968, some police officials came to the University in connection with a search for the missing dormitory-servant Satnu Ram. The Vice-Chancellor did not know about their arrival at the campus.

\textsuperscript{12} D. Thengari, the Jana Sangh member, represented this viewpoint in the \textit{Rajya Sabha} when he said that Raj Narin's (SSP leader) followers asked Satnu Ram "to go to his village and abscond, so that a murder charge could be framed against the RSS people." \textit{Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 1, November 18, 1968, cols. 139-40.}

Organiser made the following claim as to the disappearance of Satnu Ram: "Satnu Ram has stated in writing—and also at a press conference called by the V.C.—that these very socialists and communists had asked him to disappear. This incident has torn to shreds whatever was left of the never very high reputation of Raj Narain and his clique." \textit{"The Red plot against Banaras Hindu University,"} October 26, 1968, p. 2.
as he went to the airport to receive the Union Minister
of Food and Agriculture, Jagjivan Ram. A seminar was
to be inaugurated by the Minister at the University on
that day. Angry at what they thought was the induction
of police on the campus by the Vice-Chancellor, the SSP-
CPI group closed the main gate of the University and when
the Vice-Chancellor's car approached the University gate
(on his way back from the airport), they demanded an
explanation about the arrival of the police on the
campus.\[13\] The Vice-Chancellor pleaded his ignorance.
Students were not satisfied; they attacked the Vice-
Chancellor's car and assaulted two peons who were
accompanying the Vice-Chancellor and the Rector.

The Vice-Chancellor's reaction to the incidents
of September 24 and September 25 can be stated in his
own words:

After considering all the incidents of the
previous day (i.e., September 24, 1968) and
of September 25, I felt that immediate action
was necessary to save the University from
indiscipline and mob rule. I decided to
expel those who had taken the most prominent
part in these violent demonstrations.\[14\]

\[13\] By tradition, the University campus is regarded
by students as virtually a prohibited area for the police.
The police do not usually enter the University premises
unless they are called in by the Vice-Chancellor.

\[14\] Vice-Chancellor's written statement submitted
to the BHU Inquiry Committee, *Report of the Banaras Hindu
University Inquiry Committee*, (New Delhi: Government of
Thus followed the expulsion of three leaders of the SSP-CPI group, namely, D. Majumdar, N. P. Sinha and Ravi Shankar Singh.\textsuperscript{15}

In expelling N. P. Sinha, the President of the Students' Union, from the University, the Vice-Chancellor, the SSP-CPI group contended, intended to install Damodar Singh in the office of the President of the Union. According to the Constitution of the Students' Union, a "casual" vacancy in the Office of the President was to be filled in by the candidate who polled the next higher number of votes. According to this criterion, Damodar Singh was eligible to fill the vacancy, provided the vacancy caused by the expulsion of Sinha could be considered a casual one. Along with issuing the order of expulsion, the Vice-Chancellor asked the Standing Committee of the Academic Council to deliberate on this question. The Standing Committee held that the vacancy caused by the expulsion of Sinha could not be technically considered a casual one. The Vice-Chancellor, therefore, stopped short of filling the vacancy with Damodar Singh.

\textsuperscript{15} According to New Age, the CPI organ, the Vice-Chancellor was angry for a different reason. He was "enraged" at the complaints that the SSP-CPI student delegations made against him to the President, the Prime Minister and the Education Minister, so much so "that he decided to take action against the student leaders." New Age, November 3, 1968, p. 10.
In any case, the expulsion of three student leaders raised protests from their followers. The University was "saved" for about a month as soon after the expulsion orders were issued, the University was closed for about a month for Dussehra holidays (Autumn vacation).

II

The reopening of the University on October 24, 1968, led to a series of violent acts by the SSP-CPI group, all designed to pressure the Vice-Chancellor into withdrawing the expulsion orders against the three student leaders.

On October 24, 1968, a delegation led by All-India Students' Federation (student wing of CPI) President Joginder Singh Dayal met Vice-Chancellor Joshi, and demanded the withdrawal of the expulsion orders. On the Vice-Chancellor's refusal, they declared that they would now be forced to take actions the responsibility for which would lie with the Vice-Chancellor. Following this announcement, the SSP-CPI group attempted to force a microphone and a loudspeaker through the main gate of the University with the purpose of holding a meeting on the campus. The proctorial

staff offered resistance. In the scuffle, some members of the proctorial staff were beaten up. On October 25, two members of the SSP-CPI group staged a hunger strike in front of the Chief Proctor's office to press the demand for withdrawal of the expulsion. This prompted three students of the RSS group to stage a counter-hunger strike demanding the expulsion orders not be withdrawn.

On October 28, the SSP-CPI combine called a general strike in the University. Through loudspeakers fixed near the main gate of the University, they shouted slogans against the Vice-Chancellor, appealed to students to stay away from their classes and actually blocked some of them from entering the University. One student of the Group tried to physically assault a proctor. Determined to turn the strike into a failure, students of the RSS group offered resistance to the opposing group; in the resulting clash some students on both sides were injured. Following this incident, the Secretariat of the All-India Students' Federation accused the BHU administration headed by Vice-Chancellor Joshi of "openly instigating RSS gangsters in their bid to crush the democratic students" who were conducting "a glorious movement to repulse the offensive launched by reactionary forces inside the administration."\footnote{Patriot, October 30, 1968, p. 8.}
that the protest against "the undemocratic actions of Vice-Chancellor A. C. Joshi and the diabolic activities of the RSS" would continue.\textsuperscript{18}

On November 1, 1968, a student named Gopalji Tripathi threatened to burn himself to death if the expulsion orders were not withdrawn by the Vice-Chancellor. On November 6, continuous exhortations were made to students to abstain from classes through a loudspeaker fixed in the Union Building. Later on the same day, D. Majumdar and N. P. Sinha led a procession of about five hundred students through the campus. The processionists were armed with lathis (sticks), brickbats, acid bulbs, iron bars, soda water bottles, etc. After demonstrating at the University Central Office, they went to the Vice-Chancellor's lodge and gave him an ultimatum that if he did not withdraw the expulsion orders by 3:30 p.m. the same day, he would be killed. At the urgent request of the Vice-Chancellor the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) entered the campus and kept guard at the Vice-Chancellor's lodge.

Before the PAC could arrive, the agitating students caused considerable damage to the Vice-Chancellor's lodge by stone-throwing. The Vice-Chancellor, nevertheless, sat in a meeting with agitators. In response to their demand that the expulsion orders be withdrawn with

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
immediate effect, the Vice-Chancellor said that the University decision could not be changed so casually. Thereupon, agitators threw brick bats and injured some policemen guarding the Vice-Chancellor's lodge. They also damaged the University power station and waterworks. The police arrested some agitators which included students as well as outside elements.

On November 7, Majumdar and Sinha led a procession through the campus. The processionists were armed, like on the previous day. They threatened to capture the Vice-Chancellor's lodge and force on the Vice-Chancellor the decision to withdraw the expulsion orders. They also set up roadblocks at some points on the campus and set fire to some building materials deposited on the campus. The police arrested some agitators which included students as well as outside elements. Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibiting assembly of more than five persons on the campus was also promulgated.

On November 8, in New Delhi, the All-India Students' Federation (AISF) presented a memorandum to Union Education Minister, Dr. Triguna Sen, charging Vice-Chancellor Joshi with RSS leanings and partisanship in handling students' affairs. On November 10, the All-India Youth Federation, the youth wing of CPI held a public meeting in New Delhi. The meeting was addressed by CPI leaders Hiren Mukerjee, MP, Yogendra Sharma, MP, and by AISF President Jogindra Singh Dayal. In the
meeting, the CPI leaders alleged that under the Vice-Chancellorship of Dr. Joshi, BHU—a national university—was being turned into a RSS training center.

In BHU, the arrests of agitating students continued on November 8 and November 9. Undaunted by such arrests, the agitating CPI and SSP students distributed leaflets in the campus requesting students to participate in the observance of "Black Day" in the University on November 11. On November 12, Majumdar, Sinha, and Ravi Shankar Singh—the expelled student leaders—addressed a student meeting in defiance of the Government prohibitory order. They exhorted students to continue the agitation until the Vice-Chancellor yielded. Talking to newsmen on November 15, N. P. Sinha accused the Vice-Chancellor of conniving with and shielding the RSS cadre of students and teachers. He demanded that as a first step towards restoration of "peace" on the campus, all expelled students be taken back and an impartial inquiry into the present state of unrest be instituted by the President of India, in his capacity as the Visitor of the University. 19

The agitation continued for the rest of November and gathered a new momentum from December 4 following the further disciplinary action that the Vice-Chancellor took against four more students, viz., Yadunath Singh, Phool Chand, S. P. Singh, and Deepak Mullick. Phool

Chand was expelled from the University. Yadunath Singh and Deepak Mullick were declared ineligible for admission to the University in future. S. P. Singh was suspended for the academic year 1968-69 and his readmission to the University was made subject to good behavior and a written apology from him.

Agitating students held a meeting on the campus on December 4 in which D. Majumdar and Phool Chand made violent speeches condemning the disciplinary orders passed by the Vice-Chancellor. Later in the evening, they attempted to set on fire the Agriculture Farm of the University.

On December 5, about one thousand students demonstrated on the main roads of the University. They surrounded the Chief Proctor's office and wanted to forcibly take possession of the loudspeaker and microphone in the Chief Proctor's office which had been confiscated from them the previous night by the proctorial staff. The proctorial staff returned the microphone and the loudspeaker to demonstrating students on the understanding that they would not use them on the campus. Students, 20

20 Speaking on the floor of the Rajya Sabha, the SSP leader, Raj Narain, and the CPI leader, Bhupesh Gupta protested against the confiscation of microphone from agitating students by the proctorial staff. Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 17, December 10, 1968, col. 3433 and col. 3453.
On December 6, 7 and 8, several violent incidents took place. On December 6 especially, agitating students, with the help of elements from outside, committed several acts of incendiarism. They set on fire a postal van, a teachers' training college bus and a jeep of the College of Indology. They also set fire to the Central Library as a result of which some books and a counter of the Library were burnt. They burnt furniture, sports material and smashed electric and telephone poles in the University. Their attempts to set fire to the University Central Office, University Post Office and University Gas Plant were foiled by the police.

The acts of incendiarism were continued on December 7, the targets of such acts being the Office of the Dean of Students, the Delegacy Office and University Hobby Center. Students also looted valuables from the Students' Cooperative Store and another shop named Akashdeep.

December 8 was a day of police action. The PAC posted on the campus entered the Ramakrishna Hostel without the permission of the Warden-in-charge of the hostel, severely assaulted students residing in the hostel and arrested them. Later the PAC entered the Radhakrishnan Hostel, took all the students to the police station and
beat them there. Following these incidents, panic prevailed in the campus and the University had to be closed.

III

Were the incidents of December 6, 7, and 8 preplanned? The district authorities claimed that leaflets seized from the possession of those who were arrested in connection with incidents of those three days indicated that the SSP and CPI students had definite plans for forcing the closure of the University. Several acts of violence and of incendiariism were organized on December 6 and 7 with this end in view, the district authorities asserted.

The desperation of SSP and CPI students had something to do with violent tactics adopted on December 6 and 7. In spite of the continuous agitation for about a month and a half, they could not persuade the Vice-Chancellor into withdrawing the orders of expulsion served on the three student leaders. In spite of their appeal to students to keep away from classes, classes continued to be held in the University. The attendance at classes thinned; but the RSS group not only attended

---

21 The fresh expulsion of four more students on December 4 must have added to their anger and frustration.
classes themselves but also prevailed upon some uncommitted students to do the same. This led to charges by the SSP-CPI group that the RSS cadre of students and teachers, with the help of proctorial staff of the University, "were terrorizing the innocent students into obeying their dictates."\(^{22}\)

The anger and frustration of the SSP-CPI group exploded in the forms of acts of violence including incendiaryism. That they were helped by outsiders into committing such acts of violence could be seen from the figure of arrests made during the "troubled" days: of the one hundred and sixty-three such arrests, only eighty-four were students of the University, forty-nine were outside students, and thirty were non-students. Some of the outsiders belonged to the same political parties as Majumdar and Sinha. In view of the mid-term poll in U.P. in February, 1969, the SSP and CPI, Organiser—the semi-official organ of the RSS and Jana Sangh—held, were interested in getting the University closed and thus activating their student-workers for

work in the elections.\footnote{23} If the violence of December 6 and 7 was organized by students and outsiders belonging to SSP and CPI, the counter-violence of December 7 and 8 was instigated by their political opponents with a view to punishing those who, in their view, were responsible for the incidents of December 6 and 7.

On the evening of December 6, 1968, Vice-Chancellor Joshi phoned the Governor of U.P. and wondered as to how so many acts of incendiarism could take place in the campus when such a large contingent of police force was present. Joshi pleaded for strong police action against those students who committed violence and acts of arson on December 6. The Vice-Chancellor also wrote a confidential letter to the District Magistrate of Banaras on December 6 in which he suggested that five students including D. Majumdar, N. P. Sinha, and Ravi Shankar Singh be imprisoned for some months under the Preventive Detention Act because of their disruptive activities.

\footnote{23}Organiser wrote editorially: "SSP's Raj Narain . . . would very much like to inaugurate the party's election campaign by a 'victory' in BHU. He would very much like the BHU to close down so that his student chelas (followers) can actively work for the party in the mid-term poll without the worry of examinations." \textit{Organiser}, November 16, 1968, p. 3.

Congress member Krishan Kant observed in the same vein, "It seems that the whole bane is the coming mid-term elections." \textit{Rajya Sabha Debates}, November 18, 1968, col. 113.

There used to be regular consultation in the drawing room of the Vice-Chancellor's lodge between the police officers, the proctors and the RSS group. In one such meeting, police officers told proctors and students that if they could help the police in arresting D. Majumdar, a reward of Rs 100/ to each one of them would be given. On December 7, some members of the proctorial staff apprehended Majumdar from a room in the Birla Hostel of the University and brought him to the Vice-Chancellor's lodge seriously injured. He was badly beaten and to spare him further assault by his assailants, a senior Superintendent of Police sent him (Majumdar) immediately under police protection to a dispensary for treatment. A spokesman of the Students' Action Committee formed by the SSP and CPI group complained that severe head injuries sustained by Majumdar were inflicted on him by the proctorial staff of the University.

In accordance with his policy of recommending strong action against agitating students, Vice-Chancellor Joshi authorized the police on the evening of December 7, 1968, to enter students' hostels, if and when they thought it was necessary. Armed with such advance permission, the PAC, accompanied by University proctors, entered the Ramakrishna Hostel on the morning of December 8, 1968, and severely assaulted the inmates of the hostel, causing

---

several of them to be hospitalized. The SSP-CPI group asserted that the reason for choosing the Ramakrishna Hostel for "special action" by the police was that the inmates of this hostel belonged to the faculty of metallurgy to which Majumdar belonged.

Vice-Chancellor Joshi's policy of strong action produced effects other than what he desired. Throughout the one and one-half months' agitation for the removal of expulsion orders, he steadfastly refused to close down the University. The police action on December 8, however, scared the students away from the University. By December 11, the campus student population had fallen to less than twenty per cent\textsuperscript{26} and in recognition of this exodus, the Standing Committee of the Academic Council announced the suspension of all classes in the University for an indefinite period.

Vice-Chancellor Joshi sought to counter the agitation by one political group of students by building up the resistance of another political group of students. He was not concerned if students who supported him belonged to the RSS; it was sufficient that they were de facto allies in particular University situations. Joshi did not find anything objectionable to the RSS. The RSS was only a cultural organization, he stated, utilizing the campus precincts for "innocent physical exercises."\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}Hindustan Times, December 22, 1968, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{27}Vice-Chancellor Joshi's interview to Link, Indian news magazine, "Unquiet Peace at BHU," November 17, 1968, pp. 20-2.
If anybody was to blame for the unrest at BHU, Dr. Joshi argued, it was the leftist political parties and its leaders, especially Raj Narain of the SSP who instigated his student followers to agitate against the Vice-Chancellor. To quote Dr. Joshi: "The present agitation and Shri Raj Narain made the RSS appear as the saviour of the common students, most of whom were apolitical."[28]

IV

Conflict between Vice-Chancellor Joshi and SSP leader Raj Narain, started as early as January, 1968,[29] became aggravated in the course of time. In the meetings of the University Court as well as in Parliament, Raj Narain championed the cause of his student followers and in the process vehemently criticized the Vice-Chancellor and the RSS. He received strong backing from the CPI. At the opposite end of the spectrum was the Jana Sangh which defended the Vice-Chancellor and the RSS and counter-blamed the SSP and CPI for agitations at BHU.

[28] Ibid.
Reflecting the same viewpoint, Organiser (October 26, 1968, p. 1) wrote: "This SSP leader (Raj Narain) and his 'socialist' student 'leaders' have done everything to disturb the peaceful academic atmosphere of the University. Their objective is nothing short of ousting the scholarly disciplinarian Dr. Joshi, and installing a pliable puppet in his place."

[29] The incident involving hunger-strike by Raj Narain against the induction of police by the Vice-Chancellor on the occasion of the Science Congress at BHU has been noted earlier.
In the University Court meeting of July 5, 1968, Raj Narain charged Vice-Chancellor Joshi with partiality towards RSS students. He repeated his charges in the Court meeting of October 6, 1968. He held that crimes including rape\textsuperscript{30} and murder\textsuperscript{31} were committed by RSS students and charged that by failing to take any action against the guilty students, the Vice-Chancellor himself was guilty of abetment of those crimes. In Raj Narain's opinion, the permission given to Damodar Singh to stand for the Students' Union election in violation of rules provided the supreme example of the RSS leanings of the Vice-Chancellor. At the request of Raj Narain, the Court agreed to sit in a special meeting on November 17, 1968 to consider his charges against the Vice-Chancellor. When that meeting somehow was postponed, Raj Narain charged that the Vice-Chancellor postponed the meeting.

\textsuperscript{30}A rape occurred in the Birla Hostel on October 25, 1967.

\textsuperscript{31}A man named Maqbool was beaten to death for committing a theft in one of the University hostels on November 15, 1967. No effective action was taken against involved persons in either case.

Organiser, (October 26, 1968, p. 2) denied the complicity of the RSS in the murder of Maqbool. Counter-complaining against "the morals and manners of the Socialist and Communist tools of Raj Narain," the RSS and Jana Sangh organ wrote: "There are many reported cases of misbehaving and even beating of teachers and offences against girls. For example, on 16th August last, Ravi Shankar Singh (also expelled) entered the girls' hostel by jumping over the wall. . . . . It is to cover up all these actions of student 'leaders' that Raj Narain has sought to divert public attention by talking of growing power of RSS at BHU."
so that the "misdeeds of Vice-Chancellor may not be bought to light." 32

Raj Narain wrote to the Union Education Minister and submitted a memorandum to the President of India alleging the Vice-Chancellor's partiality towards the RSS. As an example of RSS's attempt to penetrate the University, Raj Narain also handed over to the Union Education Minister and the Union Home Minister a printed card sent by the RSS to some members of the University Court inviting them to join a meeting of the RSS. 33

The main trouble at BHU, Raj Narain declared in the Rajya Sabha, emanated from the fact that Vice-Chancellor Joshi "sold himself to the RSS goondas" (hoodlums) in BHU. He demanded of the Government of India: 1) instantaneous removal of Vice-Chancellor Joshi; 2) withdrawal of expulsion orders on BHU students; 3) removal of all police force from the University. 34

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India voiced the same demands to the Government of India as those of Raj Narain. 35 Speaking on behalf


33 Ibid., cols. 124-5.

34 Ibid., col. 146.

35 New Age (central organ of CPI), November 24, 1968, p. 5.
of his party, Bhupesh Gupta of the CPI said in the Rajya Sabha:

We demand the removal of the Vice-Chancellor. This Vice-Chancellor is thoroughly unfit. He says he is non-political. What is non-political about him? He is picking up the members of the Socialist Party and others to malign the progressive and secular-minded students, to persecute them, to push them out of the University. Is he non-political? He is the champion of the RSS there.\footnote{Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 17, December 10, 1963, col. 3453.}

The Jana Sangh members of Parliament were as emphatic in defending the Vice-Chancellor\footnote{As early as November 7, 1968, a delegation of Jana Sangh, led by Party President, A. B. Vajpayee, met President Zakir Husain and said that the campaign against Vice-Chancellor Joshi was "politically motivated." The delegation contended that the RSS was an innocent cultural organization functioning in the University since the days of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, the founder of the University, and that politics into the University was injected not by the RSS but by some other interested political parties. See Patriot, November 8, 1968, p. 1. See also Viswa Yuvak Kendra, The Dynamics of Student Agitations (Bombay: Somaiya, 1972), p. 71.} as the SSP and CPI members were in demanding his removal. Bal Raj Madhok claimed that Vice-Chancellor Joshi was a renowned educationist and, if left alone, he could have changed BHU for the better. "But what is happening? Some political parties, in certain matters, are not happy with the things as they are. They are trying to create anarchic conditions there,"\footnote{Lok Sabha Debates, XXIII, No. 26, December 14, 1968, col. 66.} Madhok observed. Madhok held that the Vice-Chancellor was justified in expelling the "unruly" student leaders from the University.
Atal B. Vajpayee of Jana Sangh held that the "unholy alliance" between a section of senior professors and the student bodies of the Leftist parties was behind the agitation against the Vice-Chancellor.\(^{39}\) He opined that Vice-Chancellor Joshi was a brilliant administrator. D. Thengari of Jana Sangh denied that RSS had any hand in the trouble of BHU and claimed that the name of the RSS had been dragged in by Raj Narain in order to cover up his own personal responsibility in the entire episode of disturbances at BHU. He demanded an inquiry into Raj Narain's role in fomenting trouble at the University.\(^{40}\) Raj Narain retorted that he was fully prepared to face such an inquiry and boasted that but for him "the sins of RSS" at BHU might well have remained uncovered.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) Lok Sabha Debates, November 14, 1968, col. 237.

Elaborating the theme of Vajpayee, Organiser identified "a senior professor" and the SSP leader Raj Narain as the cause of trouble in the University. To quote Organiser, "There has been trouble in BHU because some people are interested in trouble. A senior professor—about whom the Mudaliar Committee had several adverse remarks—is very eager to become Vice-Chancellor before he retires. His secret hand is very much in the current plot to throw out Dr. Joshi." Claiming that Raj Narain was similarly interested, Organiser observed: "SSP's Raj Narain who cannot sleep properly unless there is trouble around, is all for trouble—any trouble, any time, anywhere" Organiser, November 16, 1968, p. 3. Organiser (November 23, 1968, p. 3) branded Raj Narain as the "Trojan Horse of the anarchist elements in the country" and claimed that the Government of India committed a "blunder" in nominating Raj Narain to the BHU Court.

\(^{40}\) Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 1, November 19, 1968, col. 139.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
In brief, the debate in Parliament showed in clear terms the nature of political penetration at BHU. The SSP, CPI on the one hand, and RSS and Jana Sangh on the other hand were competing with each other for control of the University. As they fought in the University, so they fought in Parliament.

V

One dimension of controversy over the 1968 agitation was the 'dispute' between the Union Education Minister, Dr. Triguna Sen and the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Dr. A. C. Joshi. Dr. Sen, speaking in the Lok Sabha on December 14, 1968, accused Dr. Joshi of "letting me down" in the matter of the appointment of a committee to inquire into the 1968 agitation. Dr. Joshi, on the other hand, complained that Dr. Sen's indecisiveness in appointing a committee of inquiry led to the prolongation of the agitation.

The difference between Education Minister Sen and Vice-Chancellor Joshi started as early as January, 1968, during the All-India Science Congress in BHU over the conferment of a honorary doctorate degree on the Union Education Minister. Joshi verbally informed Sen in New Delhi of the University's willingness to confer the degree on him and came back to the University with the impression that Sen would accept it. When they talked
to each other again in BHU during the Science Congress, Sen refused to accept the degree contending that he never promised Joshi that he would accept it. 42 Joshi interpreted the refusal by the Education Minister as an indication of the Education Minister's lack of confidence in him. He offered to resign, but Sen prevailed on him to continue.

Following their expulsion from the University, the expelled student leaders—Majumdar, Sinha and Singh— 43 made a representation to Education Minister Sen against Vice-Chancellor Joshi. The Education Minister assured these student leaders that he would inquire of the Vice-Chancellor about their expulsion. The student leaders interpreted this differently than the Education Minister intended and propagated that the Education Minister was on their side and that he would soon remove Vice-Chancellor

42 Sen refused a similar offer earlier from Aligarh Muslim University holding that the Union Education Minister should not accept any honorary degrees. It was, however, believed in some circles of the University that Dr. Triguna Sen backed out at the last moment "on the advice of a few student leaders who insisted that the proceedings of the Science Congress should be held in Hindi and threatened the agitation." Special correspondent of Hindu, "what ails Banaras Hindu Varsity," November 16, 1968. Reproduced in Organiser, November 23, 1968, p. 15.

43 While serving as the Vice-Chancellor of BHU, Dr. Triguna Sen knew these students personally. In fact, it was only through the liberal admission policy instituted by Vice-Chancellor Sen that Majumdar and Sinha were able to continue in the University as students. For further details, see Report of the Banaras Hindu University Inquiry Committee, 1969, op. cit., pp. 26-30.
Joshi. Though Sen strongly denied the student version, it may have contributed to the strain on the relationship between Joshi and Sen.

Debates in Parliament relating to BHU affairs between November 14 and December 10, 1968 show that Education Minister Sen vigorously defended Vice-Chancellor Joshi against criticism by the SSP and CPI members. He rejected the SSP and CPI demand for the removal of the Vice-Chancellor. He defended the Vice-Chancellor's right to take disciplinary action against those students who were guilty of violent and indisciplined behavior. He defended the calling in of the PAC by the Vice-Chancellor. He rejected the SSP and CPI charge that Vice-Chancellor Joshi was a RSS man. To quote Sen:

"I am as unhappy as all the Members here about what has been happening in the University. But I must say at the same time that the Vice-Chancellor is a non-political man, he is an educationist, he is a scientist, he does not belong to any party... (interruptions) It is very difficult to say. And he has been trying his best to maintain discipline in the University... (interruptions)."

44 As Education Minister Sen himself said: "If anybody has got any idea like that I am advising that the Vice-Chancellor should go, I think I should clear his mind, it is a down-right lie." Lok Sabha Debates, November 14, 1968, col. 230.


46 Ibid., col. 3438.

47 Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 1, November 18, 1968, col. 111.

Behind all this public defense of the Vice-Chancellor, however, the private disagreement between the Union Education Minister and the Vice-Chancellor continued. The basic disagreement was over the choice of the personnel of the committee to inquire into the 1968 agitation.

Following the outbreak of the agitation at BHU, Education Minister Sen decided as early as the second week of November, 1968 that it was necessary to appoint a committee to inquire into the agitation and suggest measures to remedy the situation. The Education Minister feared that if the Government of India appointed an inquiry committee, it might cast some reflection on the autonomy of the University. The purpose would be equally fulfilled if the Executive Council of the University itself proposed an inquiry committee and appointed its personnel in consultation with the Government of India, i.e., the Union Ministry of Education.

Vice-Chancellor Joshi initially was not responsive to Education Minister Sen's suggestion for an inquiry. Later, however, he changed his mind and wrote to Sen on November 12, 1968 that he would initiate the move for an inquiry in the University Executive Council. In this connection, Joshi suggested to Sen the names of certain persons as the prospective members of the
inquiry committee. Sen had some reservations about these names. He informed Joshi of his reservations and advised him to place all the facts regarding the discussion he already had with the Education Minister before the Executive Council and obtain an authorization from the Council to settle the personnel of the committee by further discussions with the Minister.

Vice-Chancellor Joshi moved the Executive Council on November 16, 1968 for the appointment of an inquiry committee. The Executive Council then authorized him to appoint a committee from a panel of names suggested by the Council. Joshi came to New Delhi on November 25, 1968 and informed Education Minister Sen of the panel of names. Sen felt that "the Vice-Chancellor let me down" by not placing before the Executive Council the understanding reached between the two as to the appointment of the personnel of the inquiry committee by joint consultation. With Sen expressing his disappointment, Joshi said, "All right, I will place it before the next meeting of the Executive Council" which was scheduled to be held on December 14, 1968.

49 Statement by Dr. Triguna Sen, Lok Sabha Debates, XXIII, No. 26, December 14, 1968, col. 99.

50 Ibid.
Parliament did not know about the "bargaining" that was going on in private between the Education Minister and the Vice-Chancellor. The Education Minister did not take Parliament into confidence until December 14, 1968. On November 14, 1968, he announced in the Lok Sabha that the Vice-Chancellor proposed an inquiry into the recent agitation by a committee to be appointed by the Executive Council and that he (the Education Minister) accepted the Vice-Chancellor's recommendation to this effect. S. M. Banerjee of CPI held that since Vice-Chancellor Joshi, the head of the Executive Council, was himself involved in the controversy, an inquiry by the committee appointed by the Executive Council might prove ineffective. Banerjee demanded instead an inquiry by a parliamentary committee consisting of representatives of all parties.

Education Minister Sen rejected the suggestion of Banerjee as well as the suggestion of another member that he (the Education Minister) go personally to BHU to study the situation. He maintained that it would constitute an

---

51 Outside Parliament, the SSP and CPI elements expressed an identical view. Talking to newsmen, N. P. Sinha, the expelled CPI student leader, declared: "We will boycott this committee since its personnel will be appointed on the recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor who himself is a party to the dispute." Patriot, November 16, 1968, p. 8.
interference in the autonomy of the University. To quote Sen:

All my life I resisted any interference by the Government in the autonomy of the University, for 36 years of my life; and I do not feel that Government should interfere in the administration of a university when the Vice-Chancellor is there and he is managing the affairs of the University to the satisfaction of the Government. Since I am in touch with him (the Vice-Chancellor) every day I do not feel that the Minister should go there. . . .

With the SSP, CPI and even some Congress members demanding the appointment of an independent inquiry committee by the Government of India, Sen provided assurance that the Government would see to it that the University appointed the personnel of the inquiry committee in consultation with the Government of India. More than three weeks after this assurance was given, SSP leader Raj Narain asked the Education Minister on December 10, 1968 as to why there was so much delay in appointing an inquiry committee. The Education Minister replied that the personnel of the inquiry committee was still under negotiation between the University and the

---

52 Lok Sabha Debates, November 14, 1968, col. 230.
53 This assurance was given to the Rajya Sabha on November 18, 1968.
54 Meanwhile, situation in the University deteriorated, so much so that the University had to be closed for an indefinite period of time from December 11, 1968.
Central Government and that "it will not be in the interests of the negotiations themselves to say further on this matter."  

Such an answer on the part of the Minister brought several Congress members to their feet. Chandra Shekhar and A. P. Jain, for example, asked the Minister how there could be negotiations without a dispute or a point of difference between the Education Minister and the Vice-Chancellor? Chandra Shekhar observed that "The Vice-Chancellor and the Minister can not be allowed to take more than enough time and here the Parliament should direct the Government to advise the visitor to appoint a Committee forthwith."  

Bhupesh Gupta of CPI requested the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, V. V. Giri, to appoint an inquiry committee to prevent further delay over this matter. Giri refused to be drawn into the controversy but expressed strongly his opinion to the Minister of Education that an inquiry committee should be appointed without further delay. He told the Minister that that was the considered opinion of the Rajya Sabha. In this

---

56 Ibid., col. 3458.
connection, Giri reminded the Education Minister that justice delayed was justice denied.\textsuperscript{57}

As a result of the pressure brought to bear upon him by Parliament and the press, the Education Minister announced in the \textit{Lok Sabha} on December 14, 1968 the appointment of an inquiry committee. He admitted that a difference of opinion between himself and the Vice-Chancellor as to the appointment of the personnel was the reason for the delay.

Sen announced in the \textit{Rajya Sabha} on December 23, 1968 the names of four members\textsuperscript{58} of the inquiry committee. Bhupesh Gupta, the CPI leader, asked for the Education Minister's response to Vice-Chancellor Joshi's claim that but for the indecisiveness of the Union Education Minister an inquiry committee could have been appointed much earlier

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., col. 3450. The dilatoriness of the Union Education Minister was severely criticized by the Press also. Since more than three weeks had passed since Dr. Triguna Sen promised Parliament that an inquiry committee would be appointed by the University in consultation with the Government and the situation in the University was progressively deteriorating, \textit{Statesman} (December 12, 1968) and \textit{Hindustan Times} (December 13, 1968) editorially asked the Education Minister not to lose any further time in appointing an inquiry committee. \textit{Hindustan Times} observed rather sharply that the Union Government's "endless capacity for dither" and the Union Education Minister's tendency to "wait on events rather than meet them" was as much responsible for the fast deteriorating situation in BHU as the meddlesome interest taken by extremist politicians in the affairs of the University.

\textsuperscript{58}The Committee was headed by Dr. P. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India. The other three members were: Justice V. S. Desai, Judge, Bombay High Court; Prof. S. K. Bose, Chairman, Inter-University Board of India; Prof. K. C. Mehrotra, Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan.
by the University and in that case the situation in the University would not have deteriorated to the extent it did eventually.\textsuperscript{59} The Education Minister responded as follows:

Had the Vice-Chancellor acted in accordance with the assurance given by him to me prior to the November (16) meeting of the Executive Council, the committee (of inquiry) would have been set up much earlier and would, in fact, have been functioning by now.\textsuperscript{60}

Whoever was responsible for the delay in appointing the inquiry committee, the fact remained that such delay contributed to the fast deteriorating situation in BHU. As the Vice-Chancellor and the Education Minister wasted time in arguing with each other, the University suffered. A firmer and quicker Government response would have been in the best interest of the strife-torn University.

VI

The 1968 agitation basically represented a struggle between RSS and Jana Sangh on the one hand and SSP-CPI combine on the other hand. The RSS spread its influence

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Rajya Sabha Debates}, LXVI, No. 26, col. 5276.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}, col. 5286.
widely inside the University from late 1958 onwards. The SSP-CPI combine wanted to dislodge the RSS from its supremacy in the campus and wanted to establish their own supremacy instead. The rival groups prepared for a showdown in the students union election in August, 1968.

With the SSP-CPI combine's victory over the RSS in the students' union election, the RSS perceived a threat to its dominance at BHU. Anxious to recover its position, the RSS rallied behind a Vice-Chancellor who felt 'harassed' by the SSP-CPI combine. The expulsion of D. Majumdar and N. P. Sinha—the two campus-based leaders of SSP and CPI—was in the interest of the RSS; and it provided the RSS with the possibility of restoring its supremacy on the campus. The RSS, therefore, stuck to its demand that expulsion orders against the concerned student leaders not be withdrawn. On the other hand, the SSP-CPI combine pressed for its withdrawal by violent agitation. The leaders of the SSP, CPI and Jana Sangh pleaded on behalf of their respective student followers.

**Note:**

61 Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. C. Joshi himself acknowledged in his report to the Union Education Minister that four Sakhas (branches) of the RSS were functioning inside the University and that some teachers and students of the University were active members of the RSS. The report of the Vice-Chancellor was read out to the Rajya Sabha by the Union Minister of Education. See Rajya Sabha Debates, LXVI, No. 1, col. 140. The unofficial claim (made by Pro-Jana Sangh elements in the campus) was that "over half of the University personnel are directly or indirectly related to RSS" See Patriot, October 25, 1968, p. 7.
in Parliament, thereby legitimating the use of the University as a political platform for strengthening their respective party positions.

The Government response was chiefly in terms of appointing a committee to inquire into the agitation and suggest remedies to improve the situation. Vice-Chancellor Joshi argued before the inquiry committee that the inept handling of the situation by Education Minister Sen and his dilatoriness in appointing the inquiry committee was responsible for the prolongation of unrest at BHU. The inquiry committee, however, found Vice-Chancellor Joshi guilty of partiality towards the RSS students and recommended his removal.62 Recommending the removal of the RSS from the University, the inquiry committee wrote that "On principle, we are inclined to take the view that on the University campus no outside organization should be allowed to have a building of its own."63

62 Observing that Vice-Chancellor Joshi "lost the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the University community," the Committee wrote: "We are clearly of the opinion that his continuance as Vice-Chancellor will not be in the interest of the University and would not help to introduce normalcy on the University campus without which the University life in the ordinary sense would not be possible." Report of the Banaras Hindu University Inquiry Committee, 1969, op. cit., p. 81.

63 Ibid., p. 99.
Disagreeing with the findings\textsuperscript{64} of the inquiry committee, Joshi resigned from the Vice-Chancellorship. The Government of India sent Dr. K. L. Shrimali, a former Union Minister of Education, as the new Vice-Chancellor. The RSS and Jana Sangh students resisted the efforts of Vice-Chancellor Shrimali to remove the RSS from the campus. They branded Shrimali as "A double agent of the Congress and the CPI"\textsuperscript{65} and repeatedly demanded his resignation. N. K. Singh wrote:

The trouble at BHU has distinct political overtones. The confrontation is no longer between the University authorities and the student community. It is now effectively between the Congress and CPI on the one hand and the united opposition front comprising CPM, Congress (O), Jan Sangh, SSP, SP, BKD, and Swatantra on the other. The agitation is being conducted on a highly sophisticated political level.

The campaign, led by RSS, JS, the Vidyarthi Parishad and the Bharatiya Yuva Sangh, and supported by the youthwings of the other parties opposed to the Congress is directed against the Congress party as such—and only indirectly against Vice-Chancellor L. (Sic) K. Shrimali, though he is, of course, the immediate target.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{64}Organiser termed the findings of the inquiry committee as "highly biased" and its recommendations as "politically motivated." "Gajendrahadkar Report shocks Banaras Hindu University," Organiser, August 23, 1969, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{65}The Jana Sangh daily, Motherland, as quoted by N. K. Singh, "Students can be pawns," Economic and Political Weekly, April 7, 1973, p. 663.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
In sum, parochialization and politicization continue at BHU. Political alignments have changed from time to time, but the twin process of parochialization and politicization has continued to operate at BHU to this day. The bi-factional structure, with the Congress and the CPI on the one side and the opposition parties, especially the Jana Sangh and the RSS on the other side, exemplifies the current operation of the twin process. Now, campus politics almost perfectly mirror national politics. It is too early to predict what effect the national emergency (proclaimed on June 26, 1975) with its emphasis on 'discipline' will have on politics at BHU.
CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This final chapter provides a summary of the findings of this study, fit the findings into the analytical framework used in the study, supports some hypotheses suggested in the literature on student politics, suggests a few for testing in future research, and finally offers a few suggestions towards dealing with problems of student activism in Indian universities in general and BHU in particular.

I

Detailed research on specific instances of student agitation in India and of the groups which participate in them has been relatively rare.¹ This research was undertaken with the aim of filling this gap to some extent. Three cases of student agitational politics in Banaras Hindu University occurring in 1958, 1965, and 1968 respectively were described and analysed. It was found

¹See J. P. Neelsen, Student Unrest in India (Munchen: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), p. 35: "There is ... a lack of detailed analysis of specific instances of unrest and of the groups which participate or do not participate in them, as well as an analysis based on these data."
that these agitations were the product of the forces of parochialization and politicization which were in operation at BHU. The study shows that the revivalist orientation of the founders degenerated in its actual operation into caste, region, and language-based parochialism.

Such parochialism was manifested in the resignation of a series of Vice-Chancellors who came from outside the linguistic sub-region in which the University is located. An inquiry committee appointed by the Government of India in 1957 found that a teacher faction popularly known as the Eastern U.P. group (whose leading members belonged to elite Brahmin castes (i.e. Jatis) of Eastern U.P.) sought to make BHU—a national university—in effect a provincial university. The committee reported to the Government of India that the Eastern U.P. group pressured the University authorities to admit local students without rigid eligibility conditions and sought to control jobs and patronage in the University. The inquiry committee pointed out that the pursuit of such a policy on the part of the local faction affected the spirit of a national university which should recruit students and faculty from all over India on the basis of merit.

\[2\] During his Vice-Chancellorship (1919-1939), Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya was able to keep parochialism in check largely because of his personality and the wide following he enjoyed in the University and the country at large. The process of parochialization, however, reasserted itself after Pandit Malaviya's departure from the University.
With the inquiry committee recommending strong measures for preventing the local monopolarization of a national university, the Government of India amended the original BHU Act. They appointed a nominated Court, a nominated Executive Council and a Screening committee (later renamed as a Reviewing Committee) to "screen out" the Eastern U.P. group from the University. In the inevitable clash between the Eastern U.P. group and the Government of India, the Eastern U.P. group enlisted its local student followers to agitate on their behalf and to pressure the Government of India and the University administration in favor of maintaining the existing power structure of the University. Political parties opposed to the Government, such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party involved themselves in the agitation of local interest groups (teachers and students) with a view to augmenting their following in the University and embarrassing the Government. As the Government refused to yield to the pressure tactics of agitators, the latter were unsuccessful in realizing their major demands in the 1958 agitation.

The Government's efforts to depolarize the University by liquidating the local group was, however, unsuccessful. Many of the Group members contested their dismissal from the University in the Supreme Court and the latter ordered the reinstatement of some of them.
The Government's efforts toward preventing the politicization of BHU students was not successful either. The politicization of students dated back to their involvement in the national freedom movement. It was legitimated at that time by the authority of their teachers and national leaders. The tradition of political activism acquired during colonial times plus their apprehension that the Government action was directed against the local interests (such as restricting admission to the University and liquidating the local group) made the mobilization of local students in the 1958 agitation easier. In the aftermath of the 1958 agitation, the Government dissolved the BHU Students' Union, apparently believing that the Union provided the avenue for political party activities on the campus.

In 1958-59, the Government could not anticipate the role the RSS could play in politicizing BHU students. The RSS branch at BHU was established during the 1930's. The revivalist orientation of the founders of BHU led them to permit the RSS, a revivalist organization itself, to function on the BHU campus. The RSS continued as a cultural organization and remained uninvolved in the 1958 agitation. Some RSS leaders, however, desired a more active political role. With this end in view, they established the Jana Sangh in 1951-52. They also founded
the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad as the student wing of the RSS and the Jana Sangh exemplifying their desire to play an active role in student politics.

The post-1958 agitation period at BHU provided the RSS with an "attractive" context so as to spread its influence among the students and teachers. Political parties were, in effect, (through the dissolution of the Student Union) barred from entering the University. A political vacuum existed in the University. The RSS, with its convenient location on the University campus, filled this vacuum.

The Government of India found to its dismay in November, 1965 that the attempted deparochialization and depoliticization of the University was not successful. The Government introduced a BHU Amendment Bill in Parliament desiring to restore the autonomy and normal constitution of the University. (Since 1958, BHU was administered by a nominated Court and a nominated Executive Council.) The draft bill that the Government submitted to Parliament did not provide for a change in the existing name of the University. The Government, however, asked a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament to examine the matter.

Parliament (the joint committee was to examine the provisions of the bill) to deliberate on the question of secularizing the name of the University. The joint committee was divided on the question of dropping "Hindu" from the name of Banaras Hindu University. When the bill came before the Rajya Sabha, Education Minister Chagla strongly expressed himself in favor of dropping "Hindu" from the name of the University in the interest of secularism. An overwhelming majority of the members of the Rajya Sabha (representing all parties except the Jana Sangh) followed his lead in voting for the removal of "Hindu."

The SSP, CPI, PSP, and Congress members of the Rajya Sabha felt that a national institution should not bear a denominational name. They believed that "Hindu" was a denominational expression and was incompatible with the secularism of the Indian Republic. Hindu parties and organizations, especially the Jana Sangh and the RSS believed otherwise. To them, the removal of "Hindu" represented an interference with Hindu religion and culture. It constituted, as the RSS termed it, a "sacrilege" in their eyes. They ridiculed the idea of Hindu communalism in Hindusthan and argued that there could not be a more secular word than "Hindu."

The Jana Sangh and the RSS conceived mass movements, especially student agitations in BHU and other educational institutions of Banaras for "vetoing" the Governmental and
legislative action with regard to the name of BHU. An atmosphere of pressure was generated. It was so pervasive that an increasing number of members of the ruling Congress Party lobbied Education Minister Chagla and Prime Minister Shastri in favor of postponing the consideration of the controversial legislation in the Lok Sabha. Taking the hint from the Government, the Lok Sabha "shelved" the BHU Amendment Bill, 1965. Organiser—the semi-official organ of the RSS and the Jana Sangh—expressed its gratification over the outcome of the agitation. It congratulated the BHU students on "humbling" "the pseudo-secular brigade in Parliament" and on demonstrating to the Government that "they would not suffer any secular nonsense about the University's name."

The BHU Amendment Bill was finally passed in November, 1966 without effecting any change in the name of the University. The new legislation restored the Students' Union rights which were suspended following the 1958 agitation. With the restoration of the Student Union, the SSP and the CPI renewed their activities on the campus. The 1965 agitation demonstrated to them the strength of the RSS and the Jana Sangh among BHU students. Their inability to counter what they branded as the "communal" agitation of the RSS and Jana Sangh in 1965 intensified their desire to displace the RSS and the

"Organiser, December 5, 1965, p. 1."
Jana Sangh from their position of dominance on the BHU campus. The struggle for control of the campus by rival political forces was soon manifested in the Students' Union elections. The first direct election of the Students' Union (since its suspension in 1958) was held in 1967. The SSP student leader, D. Majumdar, won the Presidency of the Union. A conflict-situation between Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. C. Joshi and Union President Majumdar soon developed over Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to the campus. The SSP and CPI students' decision to demonstrate against the Prime Minister led Vice-Chancellor Joshi to induct the Provincial Armed Constabulary (the PAC) on the campus. The SSP leader Raj Narain, MP and a member of the BHU Court, went on a hunger-strike in protest against the induction of the PAC and the SSP-CPI student leaders demanded the resignation of the Vice-Chancellor over this incident. RSS students, on the other hand, cooperated with Vice-Chancellor Joshi in holding the Science Congress which the Prime Minister inaugurated.

This incident marked the beginning of political polarization on the campus. On the one pole was the

---

5Under the BHU Amendment Act of 1966, Raj Narain was nominated by the President of India to represent the Rajya Sabha (the upper House of Parliament) in the BHU Court.
Vice-Chancellor and the RSS students. The opposite pole represented SSP and CPI students. A teacher faction popularly known as the Eastern U.P. Thakur group (so named because the members of this group belonged to the dominant Thakur caste of Eastern U.P.) supported the Vice-Chancellor and the RSS. Another teacher faction backed the SSP-CPI combine.

The two antagonistic groups clashed decisively in the Student Union election in August, 1968. The candidate fielded by the SSP-CPI combine won the election to the office of the Union President against the RSS candidate. The SSP-CPI combine alleged that the RSS candidate was the Vice-Chancellor's candidate and was allowed to contest even though he was not eligible according to the rules of the Student Union constitution. They complained to the President, the Prime Minister and the Education Minister of India that Vice-Chancellor Joshi was partial towards RSS students.

In less than a month after the election of the new Student Union, Vice-Chancellor Joshi expelled the three student leaders of the SSP-CPI combine including the newly elected President and the outgoing President of the Student Union for allegedly manhandling him. The expulsion of the student leaders led to the 1968 agitation by the SSP-CPI combine.

The agitating students demanded the withdrawal of the expulsion order. On behalf of the agitating
students, SSP leader Raj Narain charged the Vice-Chancellor with RSS leanings in the meetings of the University Court. In Parliament, he demanded the dismissal of Vice-Chancellor Joshi and the withdrawal of expulsion orders against the BHU student leaders. The CPI members of Parliament supported Raj Narain's demands. The Jana Sangh members, on the other hand, defended Vice-Chancellor Joshi and the RSS. They claimed that Raj Narain and his student followers were responsible for the "trouble" at BHU.

The Government of India appointed a committee to inquire into the agitation. Joshi resigned from the Vice-Chancellorship after the inquiry committee reported that he failed to discharge his duties as the Vice-Chancellor impartially. His resignation, however, did not solve the problem of student activism at BHU which in essence was the product of the parochialization and the politicization at BHU. The bi-factional structure at BHU, firmly linked to national political parties, established during Joshi's Vice-Chancellorship, continues to date, but with the ruling Congress Party essentially replacing the SSP. The polarization at BHU now reflects the polarization at the national political plane: it is the Congress and the CPI versus the opposition parties, especially the Jana Sangh. BHU today represents a microcosm of India. It has become the Indian polity in miniature.
II

This study verifies the hypothesis that strikes and agitations in BHU are the product of or the physical expression of the parochialization and politicization at BHU. The parochialization is traced to the politics of faculty faction and the politicization to the politics of political parties. The case studies show that student agitations at BHU were largely the result of the politics of maneuver and management in which faculty factions and political parties engaged at BHU. The research indicates that students generally have some grievances which provide the basis for generating and extending their unrest by faculty factions inside the University and by political parties outside the University.

In the cases studied, agitating students interrelated with teacher factions and political parties and their agitations were used as a means for exercising pressure on the established authorities (the University and the Government). In other words, student politics at BHU is indistinguishable from faculty politics and party politics and it is largely a dependent variable of the politics of the "professional" world. The study indicates that students are an easily mobilizable population. They are "capable of being provoked." 6

They act as a pressure group and their agitational behavior can be an expression "of the will of others."\textsuperscript{7}

The competition among political parties for drawing their future cadre of workers from among students of the University is intense. "Catch them young" seems to have become the slogan of political parties in India.\textsuperscript{8} The 1968 agitation showed in clear terms that "no punches are pulled and no holds barred to capture the (Students') Union by the various parties represented through their youth wings."\textsuperscript{9} In this respect, India is like Latin America rather than most developed Western democracies where the politicization of educational institutions is not considered a legitimate form of political behavior, nor is national politics generally seen as a legitimate domain of student concern.\textsuperscript{10} The Venezuelan situation, for


\textsuperscript{8}T. K. Oommen's study of Delhi University student politics led to a similar conclusion: "Since all political parties believe in the slogan, "catch them young," it is understandable that they are eager to establish contacts with University students and eventually "use" them for political purposes." Student leaders' perception that they can not become "real leaders" unless they establish contacts with political parties facilitates the process of politicization. "Student politics in India: The case of Delhi University," \textit{Asian Survey}, Vol. XIV, No. 9, September, 1974, p. 791.


example, suggests a close parallel with India. In writing about the Venezuelan student politics, S. Walter Washington pointed out:

Soon after the present Venezuelan political parties came into existence in the 1930's and 1940's, they appointed directors of student activities who recruited supporters not only in the Universities but also in the liceos, or high schools. ¹¹

The close parallel between demands of agitating students and political parties' arguments in Parliament on behalf of such demands suggests a fundamental relation between the two in India. Alliances of opinion and attitude between political parties and students as a pressure group were supplemented by relations of mutual defense and offense in the legislative and electoral fields. In other words, their relationship was one of active collaboration and their politics was the politics of linkage. ¹²

This study finds validity to Myron Weiner's observation that "political parties in India have sought to build student political movements both as a means of


¹² The same system linkage exists in "Independent Black Africa" as in India. According to W. J. Hanna, student protests in independent Black Africa are often made by student branches of national political parties "in response to orders from the party's national headquarters." "Student Protest in Independent Black Africa," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1971, p. 176.
building public opposition to the government and in order to recruit political leadership." The politicization of students in India both before and after independence flowed from political parties. There is, of course, a qualitative difference in the political involvement of students between the pre-independence period and the post-independence period. In the pre-independence period, the Indian students were involved in what Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph, and Karuna Ahmed termed "regime politics," i.e., challenging the legitimacy of the British political order. In the post-independence period, they have been involved in politics of program (party), interest and issues. Unlike the students of Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, and Ceylon, the Indian students, with the temporary exception of naxalite students in late 1960's, no longer challenge the legitimacy of the political order.

Political parties involve students in agitations mainly with a view to augmenting their organizations (students are attractive recruits for them), embarrassing the Government and maximizing their political resources, influence and power. Faculty factions use students in

13 Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 178.


15 Ibid., p. 1658.

16 See next page.
agitations with a view to promoting their interest. They enlist the help of students because they (the faculty) could not decently use the pressure tactics that students could use. Like the Banaras agitation of 1958, the faculty of Osmania University in Andhra Pradesh was involved in the 1965 agitation over the autonomy of the University. As an Osmania faculty member involved in the agitation said candidly:

We (the faculty) couldn't have done many of the things which students have done. We couldn't for instance have abducted the Registrar; nor could we have blocked the entrance to the Arts College building. If the students were opposed to us they could escort the new Vice-Chancellor to the College. What would we do then? 17

Joseph Di Bona observed a similar phenomenon at Allahabad University in Uttar Pradesh. The Allahabad University faculty was divided along caste lines. The Kayasthas controlled the University administration. The Brahmans were in the opposing faction. To "cure" the University of student indiscipline, the Governor of

16 See S. M. Lipset's observation in this connection: "They (political parties) are aware of their (students') value in increasing the size of demonstrations and of the heat which can be given to demonstrations by their youthful excitability." "University Students and Politics in Under-developed Countries," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 1966, p. 142.

U.P., as the Chancellor of Allahabad University, announced his intention of making the membership of the University Student Union voluntary in 1953. The University administration was in sympathy with the intention of the Government. In order to embarrass the University administration and the Government, the Brahmin faction allied itself with a large number of students and organized agitations and hunger-strikes in favor of the compulsory membership of the Union. The U.P. Government and the University administration yielded before the agitation. The compulsory membership of the Union was continued.

Di Bona observed:

The teachers alone could never have embarrassed the administration and the Government—on the Indian campus students make the difference. When the calamity was debated in the state legislature, the Education Minister agreed it was the teachers who had instigated the students to go on strike. . . .

III

This study uses an analytical framework with five basic elements: catalysts (faculty factions and political parties), students, demands, targets (University authorities and the National Government), and authoritative responses (outcomes). The framework is indicated in the figure drawn below.

---

The catalysts of the 1958 agitation were the faculty faction known as the Eastern U.P. group. They acted through their student followers who came mostly from the colleges of Ayurveda, Arts and Law and were recruited mostly from the Eastern U.P. districts and Western Bihar. They were beneficiaries of the Eastern U.P. group's effort to localize the University and as such their mobilization was relatively easy.

In terms of making demands, the 1958 agitation was more comprehensive than Myron Weiner's second category of agitational activities, i.e., demands upon the University authorities.¹⁹ The target of student demands in 1958 was not only the University authorities, but also the political authorities at the national level.

¹⁹Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 172.
The Ayurvedic College students' demands—for the appointment of a permanent principal with qualifications in both the traditional and modern systems of medicine and for the recognition of Ayurveda degree—were made upon the University authorities. Those demands represented in Di Bona's terms "Student efforts to promote their interests as students." The other three demands for the restoration of the University's autonomy, the institution of an open judicial inquiry into the Mudaliar committee charges of moral turpitude against students and faculty, and the removal of the Vice-Chancellor were made upon the National Government. These student demands represented the instruments of the faculty faction known as the Eastern U.P. group.

All these demands were backed by the Socialist and Communist parties. The tactic of these political parties was two-fold: (a) agitational and (b) parliamentary. They addressed the agitating students and exhorted them to continue the agitation. Inside Parliament, they utilized the public platform provided by Parliament by arguing vigorously on behalf of student demands.

---

20 Joseph Di Bona, op. cit., p. 310. See also J. P. Neelsen's typology of "Students as Interest Group," op. cit., p. 34.
The pressure tactics of students included slogan-shouting, noisy demonstrations, pamphleteering, and hunger-strike. They also included paralyzing the University administration by "confining" the Pro-Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar to their residences and by refusing to allow the Vice-Chancellor and the members of the Executive Council to enter the University, seizing the property of the University (a car, etc.), intimidating students who did not support the agitation and damaging the property of the local press for the same reason.

The only demand that the University authorities and the National Government conceded was in terms of appointing a permanent principal to the College of Ayurveda. They stood firm before other demands and met the "force" applied by agitating students with police force. With the temporary closure of the University by the University authorities, the agitation ended.

The catalysts of the 1965 agitation were "Hindu" parties and organizations, especially the RSS and the Jana Sangh. Unlike 1958, most of the students of the University were involved in the agitation and they presented a united front (in 1958, students were divided for and against the agitation). Besides students, the Jana Sangh was able to involve the local people of Banaras in agitations. The 1965 agitation showed that masses including students could be mobilized relatively easily
if the issue is intensely emotional such as relating to their religion or language. \(^{21}\)

In terms of making demands, the 1965 agitation illustrated Weiner's first category of student agitational activities, i.e., the activities of students as part of the demands of wider political movements. \(^{22}\) To use the phraseology of Di Bona, the agitation provided an instance of national politics inspiring students to action. \(^{23}\) The major demand was that the Government not tamper with the word "Hindu" in the name of the University. Towards the end of the agitation, the University authorities were

\(^{21}\) It might be significant to mention in this connection that in a survey conducted as early as 1960-61, Margaret Cormack found that a section of BHU students were militantly "Hindu" and "revivalist" in their orientation. She who Rides a Peacock (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 46, p. 170.

See also observation by Agehananda Bharati, Professor of Philosophy at BHU in early 1950's: "There had always been much 'politicking' at BHU. The main currents seem to be Hindu chauvinism and regional parochialism. . . ." The Ochre Robe (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1970), p. 200.

For a study of the mobilization potential of language and religion in politics of North India, see Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

\(^{22}\) Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 172.

\(^{23}\) Joseph Di Bona, op. cit., p. 310.
brought within the scope of demands by demanding that the Student Union be revived. But the major target of student demand was the National Government.

Pressure tactics involved boycotting classes, taking out processions, holding meetings on and off campus, burning effigies (of the Union Education Minister and of the BHU Amendment Bill), wearing black badges, and preventing people from entering the University. They also involved threatening the Prime Minister and the Education Minister with serious consequences for failure to concede the student demand.

Unlike 1958, the Government was less firm in 1965. They led the Lok Sabha into postponing the consideration of the bill seeking to change the name of the University. Satisfied with their 'partial' victory, the agitating students called off the agitation.

The catalysts of the 1968 agitation were student members of the Socialist Party (SSP) and the Communist Party (CPI). This agitation shows that there exists a linkage between the political system and the sub-system of student politics through the affiliation of student organizations on the University campus with national party organizations. The student leaders were backed by their political superiors whose link with the University existed through their membership of the University Court. Agitating students were also backed by a section of the faculty who were opposed to another RSS—supporting faculty faction
known as the Eastern U.P. Thakur group in the University. The 1968 agitation illustrated what Di Bona termed as "Student action as an extension of teacher or political factional conflicts on campus."[24] In contrast to 1965, but as in 1958, only a tiny minority[25] of students were involved in the agitation and the students were divided for and against the agitation.

In terms of making demands, the 1968 agitation exemplified Weiner's second category, i.e., demands upon the University authorities. The major demand was that the University authorities withdraw the expulsion orders served on three Socialist and Communist student leaders.

The 1968 agitation was the most violent of the three agitations. The pressure tactics for realizing the demand were characterized by hunger-strike, stabbing, beating of the proctorial-staff, stone-throwing at the Vice-Chancellor's residence, armed procession (with sticks, brickbats, iron bars, acid bulbs, soda water bottles, etc.), looting, and setting fire to the University

[24] Ibid.

[25] In the estimate of Times of India (New Delhi), the agitators constituted "a microscopic minority of 5 percent. . . . The minority is under the ideological influence of the CPI and the SSP. . . ." Times of India further observed that "But for the support and encouragement given to the indisciplined students by the two parties, the artificially created unrest among the students would have died down." October 31, 1968, p. 1.
property. The resistance tactics of the opposing RSS students were characterized by comparable violence.

The University authorities refused to concede the demand of agitators. They sought to counter the SSP and CPI students' agitation by organizing the resistance by RSS students. They induced the police into taking physical action against agitating students. The police action led to the end of the agitation, but it also led to the temporary closure of the University. The National Government responded by appointing a committee to inquire into the agitation and suggest remedies.

In sum, in theory, the University is a non-political and Universal-tending institution, but in practice it is a politicized institution and a center of caste, regional and linguistic alignments. As such, it intensifies political and group struggles.

IV

This study supports the following hypotheses suggested in the literature on student politics. The case studies indicate that the catalysts act through "professional" students leaders who align themselves with faculty factions and political parties and form "the main leadership core of the agitations."26 The

Ay, a local Banaras daily, identified the following characteristics of "professional" student leaders:

1) **Poor Academic performance.** Student leaders are academically poor students.

This is comparable with Shaw's finding with regard to Osmania student leaders: "Seven of the nine (student) leaders admitted that their academic performance has been poor." Di Bona's finding with regard to Allahabad University students leaders was the same. To quote him:

"... before independence student leaders were persons of some academic achievement. Today this is no longer the case. The Union Presidents do not come from the small percentage of "toppers" who get the First Division marks." T. K. Oommen's case study of Delhi University found that academically, most of the student leaders of Delhi University were "average students."

2) **High verbal ability.** Student leaders are articulate.

---


Shaw's finding with regard to Osmania University confirmed this quality of student leaders. Commenting on the great verbal ability of Allahabad University student leaders, Di Bona wrote:

Veritable torrents of words flow easily from their lips on even the most inconsequential occasions. As superior orators they can move a disinterested and largely apathetic crowd into a cohesive group of dedicated supporters who will implicitly flow directions.

3) Familiarity and connection with the politics of the teacher community.

Student leaders are familiar with the politics of the teacher community and are "favourites of some teachers."

This finding was also confirmed in the Shaw and Di Bona studies.

---


Oommen's study of Delhi University student leaders, however, suggests a contrast. Oommen observes that the prospective candidates for Delhi University Students' Union offices don't make any great use of the opportunity for speech making. The economic standing of a potential candidate "receives more attention from voters than his oratorical abilities, especially in the presidential election." T. K. Oommen, *op. cit.*, p. 785.


4) **Political career aspirations and contacts with political parties.**

Student leaders plan a career in politics and have "contacts with different political parties."

Six of the nine student leaders Shaw interviewed at Osmania planned a career in politics and five of them favored a particular political party. Oommen's survey of Delhi University student leaders showed that an overwhelming majority (66.67%) of student leaders aspired to political leadership. 35

5) **Desire for leadership.**

Student leaders' strong desire for leadership inclines them to consolidate their leadership through strikes and agitations.

In his study of Osmania University, Shaw found that student leaders regarded agitational activities as a means of making "a name in student politics." "One leader even went so far as to say that his participation in the (1965) strike over University autonomy allowed him to win the recent election for the Presidency of OUSA." 36 (Osmania University Students' Association). Di Bona made a similar observation about contestants for the office of Student Union President at Allahabad University. 37

---


37 "On several occasions" observes Di Bona, "Prospective candidates have sought to enhance their image by going on hunger strikes."

6) Desire for "hanging around" the University.

Student leaders spend a large number of years in the University than they would normally take to finish their studies. In other words, the "professional" student leader is older than the average student and he provides validity to Lipset's hypothesis that "the greater the number of years the student spends at the University, the greater the likelihood of student political activity." As in India, the phenomenon of professional student leaders, E.W. Bakke observes, is common in Latin American countries such as Mexico and Colombia.

Our case studies show that professional students acting as the agents of faculty factions or political parties are, after all, able to recruit only a small percentage of the total university student population into agitations. While the estimates may vary, it can

38 To quote Aj: "If we look into the personal history of most of these student leaders, it will be found that after their admission to College, they generally fail once, twice or even oftener in each class. Moreover, these student leaders are associated with most of the disturbances that occur in colleges and other educational institutions."


40 Bakke observes that such 'professional' students manage to 'hang around' the University by shifting from one autonomous 'faculty' to another and they have other motives than to get an education.

confidently be asserted that the number of agitators in the 1958 and the 1968 agitations did not exceed twenty percent of the total number of BHU students. In the 1965 agitation, the student involvement was greater. This indicates the extremely high mobilization potential of an agitation over intensely emotional issues such as religion and language. In most countries including India, the general pattern, however, is that the vast majority of students are apolitical and are uninvolved in political agitations. Generally it is a determined and organized minority of students who lead agitations.  

41 According to P. Subbarayan, the Congress MP and a member of the Mudaliar Committee, the number of BHU students participating in the 1958 agitation was five to six hundred out of a total eight thousand and half BHU students. See Lok Sabha Debates, XIX, No. 17, September 2, 1958, Col. 4251.

42 Dawson and Prewitt assert that "the amount of political participation and involvement in student political organizations varies from nation to nation, but nowhere does it involve more than a small minority of the student body. The popular picture of a whole student body participating in riots and demonstrations is a distorted one for the college and university populations of developing countries, as well as those of the more developed nations." Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 173.


The 1958 agitation indicated that the activist students come mainly from the faculties of Ayurveda, Arts (Social Sciences), and Law. In fact, the participation of Ayurveda, Arts and Law students and the non-participation of science and engineering students in the agitation prove the validity of the hypothesis that students studying subjects of doubtful job value are more prone to activism than students studying subjects with clear vocational goals and a relatively assured future.

---

43 Oommen found that 83.3 percent of student leaders of Delhi University were from the faculties of humanities, Social Sciences and Law. T. K. Oommen, op. cit., p. 789.

44 Though Ayurveda is a professional subject, it does not enjoy the job prospects of other professional subjects such as modern medicine and engineering, nor does the subject attract high quality applicants that modern medicine and engineering do. The Ayurveda majors' relatively higher levels of indiscipline, as Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph and Karuna Ahmed observe, are usually related to agitations designed to win for Ayurvedic degrees the same status and opportunities conferred by "allopathic" medical degrees.


In empirically surveying the career aspirations of Osmania University student leaders, Shaw found that student leaders of Arts and Law faculties desired political careers. Law, Arts and Social Science students' knowledge that it is difficult to obtain employment reinforce their inclinations toward political activism and political careers. The following passage from K. Bhaskara Rao's novel of Indian Student Politics, Candle Against the Wind is revealing:

"What is your major?", the fat student asked Gopi.

"Natural Science," said Gopi.

"Lucky chap," said Rajan.

"Why don't you like your major?" Gopi asked.

"You can't even get a clerk's job after studying History, Economics, and Logic. H.E.L. Add one more 'L' and it is hell," Rajan said.

"You could have taken up Science," said Gopi.

"No. I am not that intelligent. I think I'll study law and get into politics." 47

46 Robert C. Shaw, op. cit., p. 200. Shaw's observation in this connection that "Students in sciences ordinarily do not think of campus politics as a stepping stone to the politics of the adult world" finds support from Oommen who found that only 16.7 percent of Delhi University student leaders were from the faculty of science; the rest were from humanities, social sciences and law.

In other words, the spectre of possible unemployment and an insecure future provides a possible motive force for participation by Ayurveda, Social Sciences and law majors in politics and agitation.

The majority of student participants in the 1958 agitation came from predominantly rural districts of Eastern U.P. and Western Bihar. As student constituents of the Eastern U.P. group, they provide some validity to the hypothesis suggested by J. P. Neelsen:

That whenever considerable numbers of individuals from rural areas are brought together within some universalistic sector of society, as for example happens in educational institutions, this would give rise to formation of groups, groups characterized moreover by 'deviant' behaviour.

As representing the struggle between the leftist CPI-SSP students and the rightist RSS students for control of the campus, the 1968 agitation provides support to a hypothesis suggested by Soares that students on both ends of the ideological spectrum tend to be most politically

---

48 A survey of BHU students living in University hostels conducted in 1964-65, showed that the largest number of students (46 percent) belonged to U.P. 56 percent of U.P. students, the survey indicated, came from the rural area of the state. P. C. Saxena, "Some observations based on a Survey of BHU Students," Prajna, BHU Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, October 1966, p. 1.


See Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph and Karuna Ahmed's finding in this connection: "The level of indiscipline is higher in colleges with substantial numbers of rural students than in those without them." op. cit., p. 1667.

See also Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 183 and Metta Spencer, op. cit., p. 301.
active. 50 Philip G. Altbach's case study of Bombay Student politics also lends support to this hypothesis: "Both the Communist-dominated Bombay Students' Union and the right-wing RSS and Vidyarthi Parishad have been consistently more active than other groups." 51

The left versus right confrontation in BHU is not, however, so much a conflict of ideology as a conflict for power and domination. It would not be an exaggeration to say that except for the organized ideological orientation of the Naxalite student politics in the late 1960's, ideology has played a declining and minor role in student movements in India. 52

My case studies show that the pressure tactics that agitating students use are often coercive and violent. This reflects student agitators' belief in the efficacy of


coercive and violent methods. This belief might be a carryover from the colonial era, i.e., the image of the established authorities as unresponsive, and has probably something to do with the widespread prevalence of mass demonstrations, often of a violent nature, in the country. As in Indonesia and many other former colonies, public protest, as Ann Ruth Willner observes,

53 The increasing association between student indiscipline and violence is documented in the following figures provided by Lloyd I. Rudolph, Susanne H. Rudolph and Karuna Ahmed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All cases</th>
<th>Degrees of Violence</th>
<th>Percent violent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Peaceful protest (2) Some violence, but not enough to occasion the use by police of lathi charge or tear gas. (3) Lathi charge or tear gas used (4) Police firing.


has become an institutionalized mode of political behavior in India.

Student tendencies toward coercive and violent tactics are probably inspired by their moderate fear of retribution from the established authorities. In India, it is widely believed that it is the "privelege" of students to be aggressive sometimes.⁵⁷ Students know that they are "a privileged and rather indulged" segment of the population. The psychological predisposition toward coercion and violence probably arises out of such beliefs. This suggests the validity of the proposition that the lesser the fear of retribution from established authorities, the greater the violence.⁵⁸

The progressive intensification in the pressure tactics of agitating students that my case studies document suggests another hypothesis, i.e., the greater the delay in realizing demands, the more coercive and violent the pressure tactics towards frustrating agents or the target of protest. Combining the two hypotheses

⁵⁷ There is considerable truth in Philip Altbach's observation that "Political acts which would be subjected to severe Government repression if performed by labor unions or other groups, often go unheeded if done by students." Student Politics in Bombay, op. cit., p. 5.

suggested in the last and in the present paragraph and keeping in mind the tradition of moderate response to students' protests in India, I predict that student protests in India in the future will be more prone towards violence than towards peaceful methods.

The hypothesis developed from this study, i.e., the greater the combination of parochialization and politicization at the University, the greater the student activism can be tested with regard to other universities, especially the national universities. Detailed and empirical studies of the national universities at Delhi and Aligarh will be especially valuable in this connection. There is also a great need for studying student political organizations (Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, for example) and student unions as providing the loci of political party activities. Clearly many more studies of this nature, preferably on a comparative basis need to be made before definitive generalizations about the nature and pattern of interaction between students and other political forces can be made.

V

Finally, this study ventures to offer a few suggestions towards the solution of problems of student activism at BHU. It necessarily follows from the findings of this study that what BHU needs is a significant degree of de-politicization and de-parochialization.
De-politicization is difficult in a society as politicized as India. As Carolyn Elliott quoted a Government minister:

We are at the stage in Indian Society now that the politicians are everywhere and they just can not keep off, for these institutions become a base of support for them.\(^5^9\)

And yet on the intellectual plane, there is no disagreement among political parties as to the wisdom of not making the University a 'house of politics' or as to the propriety of not using students for partisan politics. In a survey of opinions of political leaders in November, 1968, the Statesman\(^6^0\) found this agreement on the intellectual plane. Sadiq Ali, the General Secretary of the Old Congress Party opined that political parties could do much by agreeing to a code of conduct on their relationship with students. He said that Congress would welcome any move for a joint declaration by political parties not to use students as their instrument.

A. B. Vajpayee of Jana Sangh said that Jana Sangh was ready to welcome any joint move by political parties to stop exploiting students for party interests.


\(^6^0\) Statesman (Delhi-Calcutta), November 18, 1968, p. 9.
S. M. Joshi of SSP held that students should not be politicized from partisan viewpoint and that political parties should join hands to give students a coordinated, national lead.

S. A. Dange of CPI disapproved of the idea of political parties financing student politics. He said that "we like students to study communism but not to be our party members." Dange also favored an "understanding" among political parties for a coordinated programme of work among students on a non-party basis.

This survey indicates that it is not inconceivable for political parties to reach an agreement to remain within certain limits where students and universities are concerned. As A. B. Shah observes:

If student discipline is to develop on positive lines in India, political parties will have to impose some discipline on themselves. Their failure in this respect so far may be due to the fear of each party that others would take advantage of its unilateral virtue. It may, therefore, be worthwhile for the Union Government to explore the possibility of persuading State Governments and political parties to adopt more enlightened norms of behaviour in relation to the universities.61

In addition to developing norms, the Union Government might also consider institutionalized means of depoliticization such as monitoring by a respected, neutral body.

Almost every case study of Indian student politics points out "professional" students as the agents of political parties for mobilizing students. As Edward Shils wrote:

The mass of students would never have come forward into the arena of agitation unless there were a few who showed that it could be done with impunity.  

The Government of India "controls" "professional" students in IITs (Indian Institutes of Technology) by allowing students to study only for a specified number of years. If a student is indifferent to his studies and does not "pass" in the normal period of time, he has to leave the IIT. Similar rules prevail in Burmese Universities. Under the three-F rule, University of Rangoon students who fail their examination three times could be dropped from the rolls. Donald K. Emmerson writes:

Since 1964, the military government in Burma has carried out a complete reorganization to depoliticize the University, raise its standards to benefit serious students and eliminate 'hangers-on,' and to harness its curriculum to the priorities of economic development (by emphasizing the sciences over law and letters). As a result, the Burmese University, once among the most turbulent in Asia, has begun to approximate the apolitical elitist African model.

---


63 Donald K. Emmerson, op. cit., p. 403.
Serious thoughts could be given to the formulation of rules comparable to the IIT's and Burmese Universities for politicized Indian Universities.

Eliminating "professional" students is not enough. After all, they build up agitation on the basis of student grievances. The establishment of some sort of machinery for looking into student grievances and for bringing them to a conference table is essential.

Parochialization is often the product of maneuver-politics by teacher-politicians. Problems posed by teacher-politicians of Indian Universities were put rather succinctly by M. N. Srinivas when he wrote:

The teacher who is not properly motivated, who does not want to improve his qualifications and keep up to date, naturally turns to easy money-making and academic politics. Academic politics is his path to self-advancement and he exploits kin, caste, region and other ties to further his interests. Influential and troublesome students are cultivated by him. The net result is a fouling up of the academic atmosphere. 64

As a means of cleansing the "fouled up" academic atmosphere in BHU, or for that matter in any Central University of India, the Government of India could set up an all-India pool of professors and transfer them from one university to the other. The "transfer system"

is prevalent in the administrative service of the Government. The introduction of the same system for teachers of Central universities would prevent them from developing parochialism.

The emphasis should be towards building a vigorous intellectual life on the campus. The first step in this direction is towards recruiting quality people to the faculty from all over India. As Philip Altach observes:

Where students feel that their educational institution is providing adequate academic preparation and a well planned and stimulating program of studies, they are less disposed towards discontent. 65

Indeed, there should be a change in the present system of education whether the University is a national or state institution. The normal teaching period in an Indian University is only two hundred days a year. This leaves the work schedule of students loose and lax. 66


66 A survey of BHU students made in 1964 showed that on an average a student spent only five hours in the library in a week (i.e., less than one hour per day). About 29 percent of students did not go to the library at all. Nearly 30 percent of the students spent an average below half an hour per day in the library. Only 3 percent of the students attended library for about thirty hours per week.

The survey further showed that the participation of students in the sports and games was not significant. The students rather preferred the "passive" entertainment, such as watching films. See P. C. Saxena, "Some Observations Based on a Survey of BHU Students," Prajna, BHU Journal, October, 1966, pp. 99-102.
Like his Near-Eastern counterpart, an Indian student has much time available to indulge in activities other than academic. It is suggested that the work schedule of students could be kept busy and fully occupied in the following ways: 1) by reducing the number of "holy days;" 2) by revising course content; 3) by introducing the system of continuous assessment throughout the course as at the Institutes of Technology in contrast to the more prevalent mode of just one written examination annually; 4) by encouraging research both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Finally, as Srinivas says:

67 The situation being what it is, strikes and agitations provide an outlet to excess energies of students. Agitations are "fun" at least to some students. Describing this aspect of the BHU students' agitation of 1958, S. L. Dar (BHU Agitation of 1958, Banaras: BHU Press, n.d., p. 72) wrote:

"...performances of snake-charmers were staged, and qawwali and cinema songs were sung. Some of the 'student leaders' used to lie in the verandah of the Proctor's Hall and get themselves massaged."

There was a somewhat similar sight in the BHU agitation of 1965. Hiren Das Gupta ("Dubious role played by Government, University authorities," New Age, December 5, 1965, p. 3) observed that "Twist and rock-and-roll are not infrequent sights at these demonstrations supposedly held to uphold the traditions of Hinduism."

That many students do not care for the issue or issues involved in the agitation and join it just for the excitement of it was observed also by Margaret L. Cormack in a different context. See Margaret L. Cormack, "Indian Higher Education in the 1960's: Hope in the Midst of Despair," in Philip G. Altbach (ed.), Turmoil and Transition: Higher Education and Student Politics in India (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 243.

68 S. M. Lipset believes that "The greater the pressure placed on students to work hard to retain their position in the University ... the less they will participate in politics of any kind." "University Students and Politics in Underdeveloped Countries," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 10, 2, June 1966, p. 143.
In education as in other fields, there is need for a few 'backroom boys' to be continually thinking on the problems which face us today and will be facing us tomorrow.\textsuperscript{69}

The most immediate task awaiting the national Government is the formulation of a national educational policy geared to fruitful channelization of youth power and its implementation.

\textsuperscript{69}M. N. Srinivas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 103.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1

BHU MUDALIAR COMMITTEE REPORT: APPENDIX 4 (p. 40)

List of disputes pending or disposed of in Courts of Justice with the University as a party

1. Dr. Akshaibar Lal, Reader, College of Agriculture.
2. Dr. Raj Bali Pandey, Principal, College of Indology.
3. Dr. S. S. Joshi, Principal, College of Science and Dr. P. N. Bhargava, Reader in Organic Chemistry.
4. Indian Wheat Loan Educational Exchange Programme—Scheme in the Botany Department.
6. Dr. Virendranath, Lecturer in Pharmacology, College of Ayurveda, B.H.U.
7. College of Mining and Metallurgy—Appointment of Readers.
8. Indiscipline in the College of Technology.
9. Re. Two posts of Lecturers in Hindi.
11. Re. Dr. R. S. Ojha, Reader in English, Central Hindu College.
12. Re. Shri Ganesh Prasad Singh, Lecturer, Teachers' Training College, B.H.U.
14. Re. Dr. B. L. Atreya, Head of the Department of Philosophy.
15. Re. Shri D. S. Pande, Temporary Medical Officer, S.S. Hospital, B.H.U.
16. Re. Shri Uma Shanker Pandeya, Art Teacher, Central Hindu School, Banaras.
19. Re. Dr. Gopal Tripathi, Principal, College of Technology, B.H.U.
20. Re. Dr. Ramlochan Singh, Head of the Department of Geography, B.H.U.
22. Re. Dr. S. S. Joshi, Principal, College of Science, B.H.U.
23. Re. Appointment of Treasurer.
The Eastern U.P. group termed Appendix 4 of the Mudaliar Committee Report "a fake document" and claimed that Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 had no case in the Law Court against the University. See K. C. Gorawala and others, (Sponsors), A Factual Analysis of BHU Mudaliar Committee Report (n.p., 1958), pp. 59-60.
APPENDIX 2

List of members of the staff who are stated to be inter-related

1. Pt. Ram Vyas Pande, Banaras and Balia: Editor, Panchang 1927, unpaid Lecturer and Editor, Panchang 1930, salaried Lecturer 1933, Head of Dept. of Jyotishi 1947, Member, Univ. Council 1946-47, member of the Senate since 1948.

2. Pt. Ramshanker Pande, Banaras and Balia: Elder son of No. 1, member, Univ. Court from Regtd. Graduates Constituency since 1951, Member, Executive Council from Court after the introduction of new act.


4. Pt. Ambika Pd. Upadhya, Banaras and Balia: Retired Head of the Department of Vyakaran, Member of University Court, Faculty and father-in-law of son of No. 1.


6. Pt. Sabhapati Upadhya, Banaras and Balia: Uncle of No. 4, member of the University Court, Board of Examiners and Faculty.

7. Dr. K. D. Tewari: Related to No. 1 through No. 5, Member, Univ. Court and Executive Council for the last many years.

8. Dr. R. S. Ojha, Banaras and Arrah: Son-in-law of No. 7, Reader in English, B.H.U.

9. Dr. R. Misra, Banaras and Jaunpur: Mrs. Misra and wife of No. 7, real sisters, Head of the Department of Botany, B.H.U.; and Member, Univ. Executive Council and Court before he joined University service.


11. Dr. C. S. Misra: Civil Surgeon, Kanpur, elder brother of No. 9, Member, Univ. Court.

12. Shri B. D. Tewari, Banaras and Balia: Lecturer, Dept. of Geology, son-in-law of No. 4.

13. Shri B. K. Tewari, Banaras and Balia: Lecturer, Dept. of Physics, son-in-law of No. 4.
16. Justice Balram Upadhyaya, Banaras and Allahabad: Judge, Allahabad High Court, Member, Univ. Court.
17. Pt. S. R. Tripathi: Lecturer, College of Indology, daughter married to son of No. 16.

The Eastern U.P. group termed Appendix 3 of the Mudaliar Committee Report "a hoax" and claimed that most of the relations shown in the list were "far-fetched."

See K. C. Gorawala and others, op. cit., p. 58.
APPENDIX 3

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY STUDENT RIOT OF APRIL 25, 1965

The immediate precipitant of student riot of April 25, 1965 was a proposal to reduce the percentage of admissions to the AMU's medical and engineering colleges which were reserved for local students from 75 to 50 percent. Vice-Chancellor Ali Yavar Jung felt that as an All-India University, AMU should recruit at least 50 percent of students in technical institutions from outside Aligarh on the basis of merit.

A section of the University's administrative and teaching staff allegedly led by Pro-Vice-Chancellor Yusuf Hussain Khan, on the other hand, felt that the Vice-Chancellor's policy would lead to the swamping of AMU with non-Muslim students. It was believed in some circles of the University that the incitement and the appeal to communal sentiment of students by this section of the administrative and teaching staff led to a physical assault on the Vice-Chancellor on April 25, 1965.

Union Education Minister, M. C. Chagla held that the agitation and assault on the Vice-Chancellor were the result of a deliberate plot by "communal and reactionary
elements" at AMU. Determined to eliminate such elements from the University, he induced the Union cabinet to suspend the University's constitution and pass an ordinance similar to the 1958 BHU ordinance which reduced the University Court to an advisory body (of 51 members, 30 were to be nominated by the Visitor, President Radhakrishnan) and concentrated authority in the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Council (of 9 members, 7 were to be nominated by the Visitor).

The ordinance promulgated on May 20, 1965, raised protests from Aligarh Old Boys' (i.e., Alumni) Association and Jamaat-i-Islami. They claimed that Chagla and his ordinance destroyed the special Islamic character of the University and threatened its autonomy.

Radiance, the English language organ of Jamaat-i-Islami, expressed the apprehension that "the nominated members of the Aligarh Muslim University can imitate Chagla (in de-Muslimizing it), earning more and more official favours in reward."  

---

1The Government registered criminal cases against fifty-three persons including some students following the murderous assault on the Vice-Chancellor. Among the accused were: Bashir Ahmed Sayed, an ex-judge of the Madras High Court, M. M. Siddique, former Registrar of the University, and Basir Khan, the Head of the Zoology Department of the University. Patriot, November 16, 1965, p. 4. Pro-Vice-Chancellor Yusuf Hussain Khan was later removed from his office.

2Jamaat-i-Islami is an anti-communist Muslim revivalist organization.

In a resolution passed on June 20, 1965, the Jamaat-i-Islami made the following demands for the maintenance of Islamic character of the University:

1. The word Muslim should not be deleted from the University’s name;
2. Care should be taken that the majority of the students, teachers, staff and office-bearers remain Muslim as before;
3. Special facilities should be continued for the religio-moral instruction of students, as well as for the teaching of and research in theology, Islamic studies, Arabic, Persian and Urdu languages and literature, and the history of the Muslim period in India;
4. Respect for Islamic features of life, like observance of Ramazan, and special facilities for the performance of religious duties;
5. The preservation and development of Muslim culture should be not only maintained but encouraged. "We are of the opinion that to a very large extent (this) depends on the presence of a considerable number of people among the teachers, office-bearers and staff . . . who sincerely believe in Islam . . . and are themselves the embodiment of Islamic character and morality."

The two-day (August 7 and 8, 1965) All-India convention of the Aligarh Muslim University Old Boys (held in Lucknow) demanded the withdrawal of the ordinance and claimed that the University was "a cultural, religious and educational centre of Indian Muslims."

The Convention asked all Indian Muslims to withdraw their support from the Congress Party if the Convention’s claims were not conceded.

The Government of India stood firm before these protests and resolutions and as in the case of BHU in 1958,

---

4 Radiance, II, 48 (June 20, 1965), p. 4.
it replaced the ordinance by a legislative Act (intended to be temporary) in September, 1965.

Among the many similarities between Aligarh and Banaras situations in 1965, one was the virulent attack on the Union Education Minister Chagla in both places. In Aligarh, Chagla was charged with 'de-Muslimizing' the University and in Banaras, with 'de-Hinduizing' the University. In denying the charge of 'de-Muslimizing' AMU Chagla said:

Although I am a confirmed and convinced secularist, ... it is both false and libellous to suggest that I am in any way opposed to the development and maintenance of Muslim culture. I want the Muslim culture to flourish in Aligarh University, not in isolation but in the context of Indian nationalism.  

---

Chagla's letter to Asad Madeni, General Secretary, of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Hind. Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Hind was among the Muslim associations which suspected Chagla's bond fides and expressed suspicions about the actions he took with regard to AMU.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents


. Ministry of Education. Annual Reports.


Debates

On Student Unrest, and Banaras Hindu University

**Lok Sabha:** 1958--August, September, November.

1965--November.

1966--November.

1968--November, December.

**Rajya Sabha:** 1958--August, September, December.

1965--November.

1966--November.

1968--November, December.

Unpublished Material


Books


Apte, D. G. *Universities in Ancient India*. Baroda: Faculty of Education and Psychology, Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, 1971.


Chandra, Prabodh. *Student Movement in India*. Lahore: All-India Student Federation, 1938.


______. *Memories of Two Universities*. 1966.

______. *University Education in India*. 1967.


Memoranda (confidential) Submitted to the BHU Enquiry Committee. n.p., n.d.


Rose, R. *Students in Society.* University of Manchester Union, 1963.


Articles


Altbach, Philip G. "The Permanent Crisis in Indian Higher Education," Quest, No. 60 (January-March, 1969), 28-34.


"BHU Agitation: A Political Fraud," Link, (December 5, 1965), 9-11.


Karve, D. D. "The Universities and the Public in India," Minerva, 1 (Spring, 1963), 263-84.


Mathur, M. B. "Banaras violence pre-planned with diabolical cunning," Hindustan Times (December 22, 1968), 8.

Mathur, M. B. "Vice-chancellors find it too hot to stay," Hindustan Times (January 5, 1969), 5.


Misra, A. B. "Vice-chancellors whom I have known: Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar," Prajna, 12 (1), 170-2.


"Paralyzed Universities," Seminar, No. 166 (June, 1973), 10-44.


Rao, Sreenivas, "Who is to blame: Students or Elders?" Swarajya (December 11, 1965), 27.


"RSS and Politics," Mainstream, (December 18, 1965), 5.


"Politics in Universities," Round Table, 1 (May 28, 1972), 2-12.


Walsh, W. "University Problems: The University in India," Twentieth Century, 168 (August, 1960), 154-60.


"What's in a Name?" Link, 8 (16), (November 28, 1965), 9-11.


Other Sources


Indian Newspapers

Aj (Banaras) (In Hindi).
Banaras (Banaras) (In Hindi).
Bharat (Allahabad-Banaras) (In Hindi).
Free Press Journal (Bombay).
Gandiva (Banaras) (In Hindi).
Hindu (Madras).
Hindustan Times (New Delhi).
Indian Express (New Delhi).
Leader (Allahabad).
Patriot (New Delhi).
Sanmarg (Banaras) (In Hindi).
Statesman (Delhi-Calcutta).
Times of India (Delhi-Bombay).
Tribune (Ambala).

Indian Periodicals

Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay).
Indian Affairs Record (Since renamed Indian Recorder and Digest) (New Delhi).
Link (New Delhi).
Mainstream (New Delhi).
New Age (New Delhi).
Organiser (New Delhi).
Seminar (New Delhi).
Swarajya (Madras).
VITA

Anil Baran Ray was born on November 15, 1945, in Bahiri, West Bengal, India. After attending high schools, Visva-Bharati University, and Calcutta University in West Bengal, he received the following degrees: B.A. (Honours) in Political Science from Presidency College, Calcutta (1964); M.A. in Political Science from Calcutta University (1966); Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri at Columbia (1975).

He taught in North Bengal University, West Bengal, India, from August 1967 to April 1968, and in Jadavpur University, Calcutta, India, from May 1968 onwards. Presently, he is on leave of absence from his teaching position at Jadavpur University.
University Libraries  
University of Missouri  

Digitization Information  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local identifier</th>
<th>[namedate]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Source information**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>duplicate copy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content type</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Notes            | spiral bound, typed single-sided  
|                  | Title page has signatures and stamp. |

**Capture information**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date captured</th>
<th>2018 July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scanner manufacturer</td>
<td>Ricoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanner model</td>
<td>MP C4503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanning software</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical resolution</td>
<td>400 dpi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color settings</td>
<td>grayscale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File types</td>
<td>tiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>some pages straightened and cropped</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Derivatives - Access copy**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compression</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editing software</td>
<td>Adobe Acrobat XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>400 dpi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Color</td>
<td>grayscale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File types</td>
<td>pdf from LZW compressed tiff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>