SOVIET FEDERALISM
A SOLUTION TO THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM

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A Solution to the Nationality Problem

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. SCOPE AND METHOD

This thesis is an analytical and descriptive study of federalism and the problem of nationality in the political organization of a state. The study is concerned generally with the nature of federalism and the nationality problem wherever found, and specifically with the nationality problem in the Soviet Union and the federal solution of it there.

Chapters two and three of the study are analyses of federalism and the nationality problem. Upon reading the literature in these fields it is apparent that there are several concepts about the nature of each problem that are generally held by scholars. Using these general concepts, this study attempts: (1) to establish a model of federalism, (2) to outline the general nature of the nationality problem, and (3) to indicate how federalism could be used to solve it.

The second section of the study uses a descriptive method to indicate the solution to the national minority problem in the Soviet Union. Use of primary source material for this study has been limited by an English language
barrier and the unavailability of documents; however, there are a great many intensive secondary works on the problems of various nationalities in the Soviet Union and on the Soviet system of government. In nearly every case the authors of the secondary sources have documented their studies with citations from Russian and other foreign language sources.

II. DEFINITIONS

The element that makes federalism different from unitary organization of state power is that in a federal system, state power is divided between central and regional governments and each has an independent sphere of authority over the same population. In a unitary system the population has one citizenship; government authority rests with a central government and any decentralization is at the discretion of the central government.

Nationality is a collective concept of group relations. It finds its fullest expression in the national state which is an institution that gives the nationality the tools to enforce its collective will on a population and to protect itself from outside threats. A nationality is a people who possess the desire to become a nation. Among the characteristics of nationality are common
language, religion, national territory, and national consciousness. This consciousness is an awareness that one's best interest is served as a member of one's own people rather than of another people and a concern for the welfare, security, and progress of one's people.

The national minority problem is a problem of competition among nationalities within a single state. The goal of each nationality is to achieve the maximum security, welfare, and progress for its people. This goal may be reflected in demands for secession from one state and union with another of which a nationality's kin are members, or secession from a state and creation of a new national state, or within the multi-national state the goal may result in demands for cultural autonomy or federalism that will guarantee the minority nationality freedom from suppression.

III. THESIS

The Soviet Union claims to have a federal system of government. As generally defined, federalism does not describe the Soviet government; yet, the symbolism is used as a part of the regime's efforts to govern a multi-national state. As the regime's position in relation to the minorities has changed so has the use of federal symbolism.
Federalism was a device that was used to reunite the territory of the Russian Empire that broke away from Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. From the inception of the Soviet Union through the promulgation of the Soviet constitution of 1936, there was a steady consolidation of power in the central government. The federal symbolism has become institutionalized and continues to exist although the reasons for its inception are no longer present. The Soviet Union now has moved away from a federal solution to the minority problem and concentrates on an attempt to assimilate the nationalities and create a Soviet nationality.
CHAPTER II

FEDERALISM

I. INTRODUCTION

The organization of a political system\(^1\) can range from a type of shared authority to an absolute concentration of authority in a single unit. The former is a federal tendency and the latter is a unitary arrangement. To have no authority delegated to a central government, is to have no union. To have no authority withheld from the central government, is to have a unitary system.

The task is to distinguish federalism from unitary organization. Answers to three questions help. What determines, if anything, whether a system will be federal? What peculiar means are used to meet the problems facing a federal system as contrasted to the means of solving problems in a unitary system? How little authority can the regional governments have for the system to be called federal instead of unitary? Answers will distinguish the systems and provide models for examining other systems.

A statement of causality is tenuous at best

because of the great difficulty in empirically testing the assertion for verification. However, there seems to be a logical correlation between the organization of a political system and the forces which that system is organized to meet. This list of forces pressing a system is here given the name of a force pattern. The force pattern is a complicated arrangement of specific problems, threats, potentialities, desires, and traditions that work in opposite directions on the system. Some tend toward centralization of authority--centripetal forces--by pulling the community together. Others work toward a decentralization of authority--centrifugal forces. The effect is a fragmentation of the community. It is possible to label a specific problem or phenomenon as either centripetal or centrifugal. For example, the threat of military domination by a foreign power is a force that moves a community closer together. It is not possible, however, to make a list of specific forces that will result in federalism in a deterministic manner. The most that can be said generally is that federal and unitary systems face different force patterns. Federalism compromises centripetal and centrifugal forces; a unitary system reflects the predominant position of centripetal forces.

The institutions of a system are initially created to meet the force pattern existing at that time. If a problem is solved the institution responsible does not tend to disappear with the end of the problem. It tends to continue with its personnel demanding consideration and new tasks. An administrative success is an invitation to expand an agency's operation, not to curtail it. Successes also produce favorable opinions and invite the development of tradition around the institution. Thus, the agency may no longer serve its original function but continues to operate by taking on new functions that may be far from its original role. The significance of this for the student of political systems is that to grasp an accurate picture of the functioning system it may be essential to go beyond the formally enumerated functions of the various institutions. The substantive importance of this is that, while the institutions of a system may continue to exist in form, the force pattern may have changed so greatly as to make the community operate under different systems through its traditional institutions. For example, the Constitution of the United States has not been substantially altered in content through its life; but there has been a great centralization of power in the central government during the period after the economic crisis of the
1930's and the second World War. These events carried tremendous centripetal force and required a change in the political system, though it still operates with the same principal institutions.  

II. FORCE PATTERN OF FEDERALISM

Requisite to the existence of a federal system is a force pattern of conflicting centripetal and centrifugal forces which the system compromises through a reservation and allocation of authority between a central government and regional governments. The centripetal forces are those which push the system toward greater centralization of authority, and the centrifugal forces work in the opposite direction. It is not possible to know what specific arrangements will produce federalism, but it is known that force in two directions is necessary for a federal system.

**Centripetal forces.** In discussing centripetal and centrifugal forces the purpose is to show the complexity of a system's force pattern by describing specific centripetal and centrifugal forces.

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The threat of military insecurity is the most powerful centripetal force. It has two aspects: defense and aggression. Through closer cooperation, various regions will have available greater defense capability to oppose a common enemy. Military alliance has pushed logically incompatible systems into a working relationship. The second World War produced examples of this. Nazi Germany's pact with the Soviet Union in 1939 and the Soviet alliance with the United States and Great Britain are examples. It was military insecurity that first united the Swiss nationality.

The second aspect of this force is that the threat of military power can be used to coerce a reluctant region to join a federation. This was the principle operating in the United States Civil War. The Union armies used superior power to force the Confederate States to reunite. In this condition, if the reluctant region cannot withstand the military power of those regions desiring union, they will be forced to join.


Closely associated with the centripetal force of military insecurity is the threat of foreign economic or political domination. This can push regions to work together to rebel or to defend themselves depending on the nature of the foreign threat. This was among the chief forces uniting the thirteen American colonies against Britain.

A potential economic gain is another centripetal force. Union brings superior economic tools into play through the combination of the potentials of several regions. Resources, capital, and manpower of formerly foreign regions can be tapped without the inconvenience and limitations of trade barriers. Union opens a greater domestic market, gives the central government a larger tax base and can promise a higher standard of living for the population because of the combination of regional potential.

A similarity of political traditions among regions and a common or similar nationality are less objective and less identifiable centripetal forces, but seem to be important. The importance is largely negative. Regions that

6 Wheare, op. cit., p. 37.
7 Rogers, loc. cit.
8 See Nationality section of this thesis, Chapter III.
find no significant differences in political traditions or
nationality may find important similarities that compel
them to unite. Union is not assured among similar nations
that exist apart if that union depends solely on the
strength of national and political similarities. It is
obvious that such similarities are not centrifugal forces,
but the degree of their centripetal force is not known.
Differences in nationality and political tradition are
among the strongest centrifugal forces, however.

Geography has a role as a centripetal force, but
not an absolute one. It can not be demonstrated that any
particular type of physical environment is more or less
conducive to union than any other environment.9 But it can
be shown that a common environment for persons is a centri-
petal force and that persons separated geographically are
less inclined to desire union. The important question is
one of the relative common experience of the persons who
might or might not unite.

The role of a leader as a centripetal force is no
less important than his role in other times of historical
change.10 While there is no precise measurement of the
leader's importance, it would be wrong to exclude his role

9Rivero, op. cit., p. 16.
10Wheare, op. cit., p. 40.
from the list of centripetal forces. One who defines goals, suggests methods and organizes the procedures to reach the goals is making a substantial contribution to the undertaking. This is the leader's role as a centripetal force; he articulates the advantages of union, devises means for achieving union, and answers critics of his plans.

**Centrifugal forces.** While potential economic advantage through union may be a force pushing toward union for some regions, at the same time it may work to push other regions away from a union. A rich region, on the basis of economics alone, will be disinclined to join with poorer regions because its wealth will be tapped to support the weaker areas and its standard of living might fall. The rich region would provide a substantial section of the tax base for the central government and carry a greater load than if it were independent. A potential economic disadvantage is a centrifugal force.\(^\text{11}\)

Different and particularly hostile political traditions are centrifugal forces.\(^\text{12}\) A political union requires that its lesser parts have some agreement on the meaning and nature of the community institutions and

\(^{11}\)Ibid.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 41.
functions. There apparently is no requirement that any specific traditions insure a greater chance of unity. Democratic and free traditions have united persons of similar experience and monarchies have also merged. What is required is that those persons who hold political power have common points of view with those who might unite with them. It is clear that regions would be reluctant to transfer responsibility for their security to institutions hostile to their interests. There is a traditional identification of the cultural characteristics of nationality—language, religion, race, and consciousness—with the collective political goals of the state. Competition is the result with discrimination its chief device. A group that would become a minority nationality in a union would be particularly opposed to union on the basis of nationality alone. The extent to which the nationalities have traditionally been hostile to each other determines the strength of this centrifugal opposition.

A closely associated centrifugal force is previous independence of a region. If the region has faced the problems of government successfully, the experience of running one's affairs builds inertia to resist change.


14 Wheare, op. cit., p. 40.
Without other factors, a successful period of independence can not possibly move a region toward union with another area. The greater the success, the greater the desire for continued independence. Of course, failure in this regard becomes a centripetal force for union with other regions. Leadership is a sixth centrifugal force. It works to oppose unification in the same manner that leadership functions in the formation of the union. The leader, who opposes union, will articulate the advantages of continued separation and will devise means of meeting challenges to the integrity of the region.

In summary, no single force from either of these lists can be said to be the reason for a specific type of political system. There is no single force or combination of forces that can be said to cause federalism or a unitary system; however, it is helpful to conceive of a high correlation between the political system and the force pattern it is required to meet. A unitary system will exist in a community with overriding centripetal forces. A federal system requires some combination of centripetal and centrifugal forces which it compromises.

An empirical examination of existing systems will show federal and unitary tendencies in every system. A

\[15\text{Ibid.},\ p.\ 42.\]
given federal system may be faced with something different from an equal balance in centripetal and centrifugal forces and a unitary system may contain centrifugal forces as well as centripetal ones, but the unifying forces are overwhelming. For example, in Imperial Russia there were centrifugal pressures from different nationalities for cultural freedom, but the state was unified and Russified by the even greater centripetal pressure of the Tsarist administration and army. In Great Britain the tradition of local autonomy in municipal government is a centrifugal force that limits the authority of Parliament.

III. STRUCTURE AND PATTERN OF FEDERALISM

Federalism and unitary systems are distinguishable also by the structure of the systems in meeting the different force patterns. The structure of a unitary system is much easier to understand than that of a federal system. In a unitary system the force pattern is strongly centripetal and to meet this force pattern, authority will be concentrated in a central government. To the extent that the system meets any centrifugal forces the central regime delegates power and decentralizes its functions, perhaps giving administrative functions to local agents. But the continuance of a given arrangement is a decision reserved for the central government.
Since the federal system is a compromise of a push-pull type force pattern, its structure is more complicated. There are three critical threats to an operating federal system: (1) usurpation of regional authority by the central government, (2) absorption of the federal system into the government of an over-powerful region, (3) a breakdown in the system because enough power was not transferred to the central government for managing its responsibilities.

**Regional equality.** Regions should be as nearly as possible equal in size, power, and status. The goal is to avoid one region domination of the federation as in the case of Russia in the Soviet Union and Prussia in Imperial Germany. Population, natural resources, and representation in a legislature of the central government are factors in determining the relative positions of regions. Three examples from the United States help to make the point. Texas is big and wealthy; New York's huge population balances the Texas natural wealth; Rhode Island is neither big nor wealthy nor populous but it is a state with two Senators which is the same number as every other state.

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16 Rogers, op. cit., p. 341.
Such equal territorial representation in the upper house of the central legislature is a standard device which smaller regions demand to check the authority of the larger more populous regions which have greater representation in the lower house of the central legislature.

**Constitutionalism.** Federalism implies a rearrangement of authority within the community. Traditionally, federalism has been a means of centralizing power. The method starts with the independent existence of the regions. The regions transfer some power to a central government because of the promise of improved conditions. Such a federation might end or ease a threat of military insecurity, or it might provide economic improvement, or association with those of similar background. Federalism also could result from the breakup of a former unitary state. In either situation—unifying independent regions or breaking up a unitary state—it is difficult to imagine the regions acting in a manner not in their self-interest.\(^{17}\) Other things being equal, it is not logical that an independent region would agree to a union in which it would be inferior to former equals or equal to former inferiors; or in the breakup of a unitary state that a new region would

\(^{17}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 343.}\)
agree to a subordinate position in relation to those parts of the state formerly equal to it.

There are two implications apparent from this assumption. First, the central government must administer its responsibilities without particular prejudice for a specific region. Second, a rearrangement of power in which a region delegates responsibility for its security to a central authority is a transaction of such magnitude that it demands some guarantee that the agreed-upon division of powers will be subject to change only through mutual agreement.

Constitutions are the vehicles for such a guarantee.\(^{18}\) Though theoretically not necessarily written, practice dictates the necessity of a written document. The constitution must be a contract outlining future responsibilities rather than a record of the existing political relationship; it must contain a division of powers and an amending process.\(^{19}\) The amendments must be more difficult to make than federal statutory laws; otherwise, the central government could modify the contract without the consent of the regional governments, also parties in contract.

\(^{18}\) Wheare, op. cit., p. 55.

\(^{19}\) Rogers, op. cit., p. 343.
The dangers in not having a constitutional contract that precedes political action are that the central government will overstep its authority or that the state will refuse to accept central authority. Each case would bring the operation of the system to a halt.

Some institution must exist to cope with almost inevitable disputes arising from definition of the spheres of independent authority between central and regional governments.20 This could be the task of a Constitutional Council removed from the control of either the regional or central government; however, traditionally the task has fallen to a high court of the central government isolated from immediate pressures of politics, but vital enough to interpret the constitution in light of contemporary problems.

**Expulsion, Secession.** The contractual nature of the federal constitution implies stability and permanence. The essence of the definition of federalism is independence of action within the limits of a constitutionally defined sphere. The concepts of expulsion and secession are incompatible with stability, permanence, and independent action. In none of the existing federal constitutions is

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20Wheare, op. cit., p. 62.
expulsion or reduction in rank included as a provision. If it were it would give the central government or the other regional governments acting in concert a club with which to beat the independence from a recalcitrant region and thus eliminate the essential provision of the federal system—-independent, constitutionally defined action by a region. If a region were reluctant to halt a violation of its defined responsibilities, the central government must require, by force if necessary, that the region quit its illegal practice; but the central government can not go beyond pushing the region back into the latter's proper sphere.

Within the federal system it is legitimate to redraw boundary lines among the regions and to redefine the delegated and reserved responsibilities, so long as it is done according to the amending process in which both the central and regional governments have a voice. What is actually accomplished in such action is a mutual adjustment in the contract.

Such a reconsideration of the contract, even if it results in the elimination of a region, is far from the use of or threatened use of expulsion. A federal system in which the centripetal forces are strong would have no use for expulsion because there are few forces working
against the inclination to concentrate power in the central government. In a federal system with many centrifugal forces, the threat of expulsion probably would not increase the likelihood of agreement among the regions. In such a federal system there would be little enough inclination toward cooperation at the central level without increasing the negative forces by threatening to expel a region that did not cooperate. Certainly the goal of any union—unitary or federal—is to increase the affection of the population for it over the long run. The negative influence of an expulsion threat would not help in this regard. Only in the case of an extreme military or economic crisis would a threat to expel a region be a centripetal force. But such crises themselves produce great centripetal forces and there is doubt whether the threat of expulsion could do more.

Secession would have a weakening effect on the federation also. It is a practical impossibility. The threat of secession would give the regional governments a veto over the action of the central government and would destroy the latter's independence. However, the theoretical right of secession may be necessary to draw wary regions into the federation in the first place. A federal constitution may grant the right of secession; but an
attempt to exercise that right certainly would be halted by force if the federation were to continue to maintain its vitality.

**Willingness.** Several safeguards are available to a federal system to avoid those three dangers. One that can not be built into the system, however, is a willingness on the part of the persons who hold authority to make the system work.21 The essence of the federal system amounts to a limitation of the power of the central and regional authorities; the success of such a limitation is largely dependent on the power holders' self-restraint. Military units are traditionally in the jurisdiction of the central government; if the system is to work the commander must refrain from seizing control from the regional governments. In some federal systems, the regions administer federal legislation. The regional authorities must be willing to honestly carry out their function in this regard or the system will not work.

**IV. ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN FEDERALISM**

How little authority can the regional governments hold and have the system be regarded as federal rather than

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unitary? There is no firm answer. To be considered a federal system, the regions must exercise some independent authority, however small, and the central government must have some independent authority, however slight. These limits will embrace such different systems as the United States and Weimar Germany. At its inception, the United States system had to meet a greater centrifugal force pattern than Weimar Germany which was marked by the centripetal force of economic crisis throughout its history.

An arrangement providing for an equal division of authority between the central and regional governments would indicate a federal system in which the centripetal and centrifugal forces exerted nearly equal pressure. The greater the centripetal forces, the greater will be the authority of the central government; and likewise, the greater the centrifugal forces, the greater the authority exercised by the regional governments. An account of the traditional division of authority makes the point clearer.

Revenue. It is necessary for the central and regional governments each to have sources of revenue independent from control of the other government; otherwise, one is not able to insure that other functions can be
executed. Revenue authority has three means of operation: taxes, loans, and grants. The first two give a government an independent potential for revenue; the latter usually results in control by the granting government. In this regard the United Nations is not independent from the will of the members whose contributions are the operating budget. The same was true of the Confederation of American States. Such contributions give the contributor a veto over the activities of the receiver. For example, the grants-in-aid from the United States central government to the state governments require that programs aided be carried out in a specified manner.

Parallel to an independent source of revenue is independent action in collecting and spending. If one government must rely on another to collect its taxes, there is no guarantee that it will be done. Without budgetary integrity to spend as it sees fit one government becomes subordinate to the other. Without independent authority to lay, collect and allocate revenue, little except administrative independence is left. Laws of the subordinate government would be meaningful only when the former approved by appropriating money for execution. Administrative independence is significant in the federal

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22Wheare, op. cit., pp. 97-126.
relationship. Administrators may in effect veto the policies of the government by weak or negligent execution. However, the former government may appoint supervisors and require work to be done and reported in a prescribed manner, bringing to an end even the administrative independence of the second government.

If a federation requires separate bases of revenue, how are they to be defined for each government? This has become an increasingly acute problem in the United States with the expanded role of the central government. Prior to the 20th Century, nearly all of the central government revenue came from duties and excise taxes. The constitution prohibited the central government from levying direct taxes. The demands of the Wilsonian program brought the income tax, Amendment XVI, and with the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War crisis, central government requirements for revenue have pushed federal taxation into areas formerly used by states for taxing. Now the states are pressed to balance demands for services with limited revenue. The problem in the United States is not so critical as it would have been had concurrent tax power not been used. In Weimar Germany the regional governments had wide authority to legislate until the central government had legislated in a specific area. Thereafter it was closed to the regional government.
Economic control. Control of economic affairs of the federation presents a question of the division of authority to control between the central and regional governments. No clear pattern is apparent from existing federal systems as to the scope of authority in economic control. Generally, the central government is granted power over commerce and trade with foreign countries. It has power over coinage, currency, weights and measures, copyrights and patents, bankruptcy, but often not over banking. Both an asset and a liability to the operation of the system is the vague language of constitutions in outlining the spheres of authority for each government. The vagueness has allowed the system to respond to crises in less restricted ways, but it has resulted in a multiplicity of government controls over what is alleged to be the economic unity of the state. In the United States the debate concerns the definition of what is and is not interstate commerce, which can be regulated by the central government. The central government might well have complete control of the economy with no regulatory power left to the states at all. This would not necessarily make

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operation of the federal principle impossible, for there are other areas in which the states can act independently.

**Social service.** In the area of social service by government a continuing debate exists over the division of authority. Traditionally the regional governments have managed the welfare problems of their populations, but the increasingly complex nature of the economy and correspondingly of the associated social problems and the failure of the regional governments to respond to the needs of the urban population have acted as strong centripetal forces demanding that the United States central government take action. Acting as a check on this centralizing force is the tradition of local administration of federal welfare programs. However the result of the realignment of centripetal and centrifugal forces has been a restriction of the sphere of independent action by the regional governments. What has happened is not a decrease in state activity, but an increase in central action with an increasing amount of central supervision of various regional programs through provisions of the grants-in-aid.  

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Foreign relations. Foreign relations has traditionally been controlled by the central government. Such control over relations with foreign states by the central government is implicit in the nature of the federal union. Prior existing states contract to work as a unit in areas of mutual advantage. The central government is the representative of the union in dealings with other states and its action can not be vetoed by a single region. Such authority does not necessarily preclude the regions establishing relations with foreign states, but it puts direction of such relations in the control of the central government. The treaty-making and ratification powers are a special problem. One question is whether a treaty is equal to the constitution or made in pursuance of the constitution and subject to its provisions. Can a treaty in violation of regional laws override them? The importance of the constitution to a federal system makes it necessary for treaties to be made in pursuance thereof rather than as equal to it. In the treaty-making process there is an important check. It is the separation of negotiations and ratification. In the United States the negotiation process is an executive

function, and ratification is a legislative function assigned to the Senate. This Senate ratification is a reflection of the federal principle. It gives the regional governments a voice in the treaty power that otherwise might be used to restrict the sphere of authority of the regions.

Defense. Closely akin to foreign relations power is the authority for defense of the territory. Like foreign relations, defense responsibility has been traditionally a function of the central government. The union can bring greater resources to bear for the defense of the union than can the several regions individually. There are two aspects of defense authority: power to declare war and power to wage war. To be efficient both powers should be within the sphere of the central government, but to prevent a usurpation, the regions must have a check on that authority. The problem is finding a compromise between the centripetal force of efficiency and the fear of the regions that they might be dragged into an unwanted war.

If the power to wage war is granted the central government, but the latter is dependent on the regions for the means to wage war, as the case was in the American Civil War, the federal authority for defense can be limited

26Bowen, op. cit., pp. 173-236; Wheare, op. cit., pp. 197-222.
by unwilling regional governments. If the central executive has both the power to declare and wage war the regions have no check. Here, as in the foreign affairs area, the federal system finds its compromise in the method of separation of powers. In foreign affairs the Senate must approve presidential appointments and ratify treaties. In the defense authority, the President has authority to wage war, but Congress must declare it and must appropriate money for the waging. Since the Senate has equal powers with the House in final passage of the declarations or appropriations the regions have a check on the power of the central government's defense power.

However, the President has sidestepped Congressional approval of use of the armed forces through his authority as commander-in-chief. War crises are great centripetal forces and put the federal system under its most severe test, and the checks become least effective in such periods. The growth of the war powers of the central government has wrought changes in the federal system, and the problem of control of the military power is not yet solved.

It is not incompatible with the federal principle for regional governments to exercise some military power by maintaining their own troops; however, the experience
has not been successful. The state governments in the United States organized the fighting units for the Civil War and the practice was not efficient because the states were slow to respond to threats and poorly equipped their troops. The centripetal force of the demands of total war have put the military power of a state in the hands of the central government. In the United States, the regional military units that exist are used in natural disasters and emergencies and are under tight central control.

**Personal rights.** Associated with external defense is internal peace-keeping to prevent revolution and subversion. The danger is that the governments will violate personal rights of the citizens. Since the central government has in being most of the actual weapons of naked power it is primarily a problem of limiting the central government, although the regional governments have also violated personal rights of their citizens. No effective method has yet been found to guarantee personal rights, particularly in a crisis period.

A constitutional statement of personal rights is an almost unavoidable temptation. In the federal constitution powers are usually allocated and reserved for the

27Bowie, op. cit., pp. 595-635.
central and regional governments and the people. The problem lies in keeping the established division. A constitutional review is necessary for conflicts in authority, but in a crisis period the judicial process has proved too slow and powerless in checking abuses of personal or states' rights. Japanese Americans were moved from the West Coast during the second World War, alien and sedition acts limiting speech and press freedoms were passed early in the history of the United States and again during World War I. The states have also violated human rights. Most noticeable cases are the racial discrimination incidents in the South and large Northern cities.

The citizen, the least powerful of the three powers to whom rights are given in the constitution, has found his recourse or defense in playing one government against the other. One who thinks the central government has violated his rights tries to get the states to move slowly in enforcing the alleged violation. One who feels a regional government has injured him appeals to the central government to oppose what he calls regional discrimination. The problem of guaranteeing personal rights remains unsolved except from instance to instance.
CHAPTER III

NATIONALITY PROBLEM

I. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

To define nationality is a difficult job. To list the objective characteristics is not to discuss it completely or to completely identify it. To outline a relationship among the subjective and objective characteristics is an impossibility. The best one can do is to present the elements of nationality and suggest that they are found in several nationalities in varying relationships. What is absent from literature in the field of nationality are reports of quantitative investigation measuring the effect of specific characteristics that are attributed to nationalism. Generally there are two types of investigation.

One is an intensive description of a particular nationality; the second is an intensive outline of characteristics and a discussion of the role of them in several nationalities.²

Among the characteristics of nationality most often mentioned are a common language, religion, race, territory and a national consciousness. However, before one tries to weigh the importance of the various characteristics or by using the characteristics to measure the vitality of a nationality, one has a substantial problem in defining terms. Nationality, nation, nationalism, race and people have been defined loosely, if at all by many, and certainly have been carelessly used. To make some order of this chaos, working definitions are required.

²American historian Hans Kohn is one who has produced many works of the first type. See his History of Nationalism in the East (New York: 1929); Nationalism in the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 1933); American Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1957); Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example (London: Ruskin House, 1956). A second example are the works of Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (New York: Praeger, 1955); The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New York: Praeger, 1954); Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (New York: Drummond, 1946).

Examples of the second kind of study are: Ernest Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (New York: Harper, 1927); Frederick Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943).
Race is a biological term for the classification of human species or types by anthropologists. The classifications are made by examination of head size, hair type and tooth structure. Race does not involve cultural skills the classification of which is the work of the ethnologist.\(^3\)

When persons are grouped in any manner more advanced than a specie classification, it might be done on the basis of compatible work habits or a broader concept of compatible communication patterns. In the first instance a group of people that has learned to work together is a society.\(^4\) In the second case a group of individuals who can communicate with each other directly and easily by means of similar language, folkways and institutions are a people.\(^5\) A people has a common culture.

A nation is a people with "formal political and military organization."\(^6\) One writer called this military and political organization a collection of "tools of social coercion" that can be used by the national will to enforce its desires on the members of the nation and to protect the nation from external threats.\(^7\)

\(^3\)Barker, op. cit., pp. 19-48.
\(^5\)Max Sylvius Handman, "The Sentiment of Nationalism," Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI (1921), 104.
\(^6\)Ibid.
\(^7\)Deutsch, loc. cit.
Most elusive of the definitions is that of nationality. It includes three concepts: culture, competition, and consciousness. A nationality is a people with a concern for its position, honor and welfare among other peoples.\(^8\) One writer said nationality was a people possessing the will to become a nation.\(^9\) Nationality is based on a common culture and the consciousness of the members of that cultural community that their best interest is served as members of the community rather than of a competing community. Nationality becomes a nation when it acquires power to back up its desires.\(^10\) Nationalism is closely associated with nationality. The latter is a people possessing the will to become a nation; nationalism is the will itself. It is a "militant attitude for life and honor of one's people.\(^11\) Nationalism is a preference for interests of one's own nation or nationality in competition with outsiders.\(^12\)

\(^8\) Handman, loc. cit.
\(^9\) Hertz, op. cit., p. 12.
\(^10\) Deutsch, Social Communication, op. cit., p. 72.
\(^11\) Handman, loc. cit.
\(^12\) Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations," op. cit., p. 169
The definition of nationality presents a serious problem to the researcher because so much of the weight of the definition rests on the subjective idea of national consciousness or national will. Apparently the stronger the will, the more vital the nationality, but there is no method to measure the will of a nationality. One can measure the reflections of the will and can study the objective characteristics of nationality that contribute to the consciousness.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIONALITY

Among the objective characteristics of nationality is a distinct language. Language is a principal vehicle of communication. Communication is important in developing the sense of community among individuals; the greater the communication, the better should be the understanding. Ideas communicated are symbolized in the particular language and words themselves become important and are jealously guarded by their users.


language is usually a central problem in nationality disputes. However, language is not an absolute determinant of nationality nor can one identify nationalities by identifying separate languages. More than one nationality can use the same language and more than one language can be used by the same nationality.\textsuperscript{15}

Religion is another objective indication of nationality. Religion potentially is among the strongest forces for drawing like-minded persons together and in the same degree repelling those of a different religion.\textsuperscript{16} The example of the centripetal and centrifugal force of religion is the multi-religion state, such as Imperial Russia. There, one's Russianness was judged by the orthodoxy of one's beliefs, and the degree of Russianness brought a corresponding degree of benevolent treatment.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15}The British speak English and Welsh; Irishmen, English and Gaelic; Belgians, Flemish and French; Swiss, French, German or Italian. English, Spanish, German and Arabic are languages used by many distinct nations. See Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, op. cit., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{16}Azcarate, loc. cit.; Hertz, op. cit., pp. 98-145.

\textsuperscript{17}For an account of the role of the Russian Orthodox religion in Russian imperialism, see John Maynard, Russia in Flux (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 444-56. Maynard argues that religion was the primary bond among people in the empire. For an historical account of the Patriarchate of Moscow and its role in Russian history, see Donald Attwater, The Christian Churches of the East, II (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1947). Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," American Slavic Review, VII (October, 1943), 197-213, lists religion as one of four aspects of expansion and the test of nationality.
Racial unity is perhaps the weakest of the objective characteristics of nationality because no nationality has a pure racial ancestry in the biological sense and most have been influenced heavily by the criss-cross of racial ethnology. Persons of obviously different racial ancestry belong to the same nationality. Persons with no apparent difference in racial ancestry may consider themselves members of different nationalities. In the United States, Negroes and Indo-European Caucasians have assimilated the American culture and nationality. In northern Europe, however, there is no substantial racial difference; but there are very many different nations. These two examples show nationality cutting across racial lines.

However, the fact that a nationality has a history of neither biological nor cultural purity has not dissuaded some from preaching a program based on racial purity. The appeals have often fallen on receptive ears and usually the results are disastrous. Hitler claimed that Jews were a separate race and nation. The resulting policy based on that premise had tragic consequences for the European Jewry

18 Azcarate, loc. cit.; Hertz, op. cit., pp. 52-77.

and for the world in the costly war required to defeat the extreme national racism. Another example of nationality drawn along racial lines is the question of membership in the American nation of persons of Mongolian descent. Immigration legislation in California in 1914 and by the federal government in 1924 severely limited the numbers of Chinese and Japanese coming to the United States, and the legislation worked as a centrifugal force on those living here. Also, the forced removal of first, second, and third generation Japanese Americans from the West Coast in the second World War leaves open the question of Mongolian membership in the American nation.\textsuperscript{20}

A fourth characteristic of nationality is a common territory. A national territory is the geographic area with which a people has long been associated. The main significance of territory for nationality is its influence on national sentiment through history, public opinion, education, literature, press and national symbols.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{21}Hertz, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 146-206.
A territory by its soil, climate, and configuration has a significant effect on the inhabitants; and persons of one geographic area differ from those of another area partly because of the different natural problems they face. However, there are two qualifications to this influence. First, the nationality of a territory has often made great changes in the characteristics of a country by the activities of its population. Second, territory is not absolutely necessary for nationality. The Jews have been considered, and have considered themselves, a nationality long before the state of Israel was established and while the Jewish people lived in widely separated areas of the world.

The most important characteristic of nationality and the most difficult to identify is a national consciousness. Some writers deny that it exists or if it does that empirical studies can not be concerned with it, given its subjectivity. Sociologists and psychologists have done much work on this area of nationality in trying to discover the relationship between the individual and the

22 Ibid., p. 146.


collective mentality. Literature from these disciplines suggests that groups show a lower level of inhibitions, reasonableness and responsibility and an increase in suggestibility, emotion and impulsiveness as compared to the individual. One writer said, "National consciousness consists in the combined striving for collective unity, liberty, individuality and prestige." 

The idea of a collective national personality can be a potent weapon for a population. Hitler used the potential power of national consciousness to work the German population to a fever pitch with which they approached the second World War. This characteristic of nationality seems to be the only constant one. A people is a nationality if its population thinks it to be and is not a nationality despite the objective factors if there is no conscious nationalism. The experience of the minorities of East Central Europe indicates that the conscious appreciation of one's own nationality is stronger in the multinational areas in which there is competition among

25 Snyder, op. cit., pp. 67-72.
26 Hertz, op. cit., p. 18.
27 Ibid., p. 21.
28 Ibid., pp. 15-51.
nationalities and is somewhat less appreciated in a large uni-national state like the United States.\textsuperscript{29}

In summary, the characteristics of nationality include language, religion, race, national territory, and national consciousness. One finds no consistent arrangement of these characteristics in all nationalities. In one, language may be most important, in a second, perhaps, territorial isolation is a chief factor. National consciousness seems to be the only characteristic present in all nationalities, but this consciousness may be spawned by one or a combination of the objective characteristics.

III. NATIONALITY AND THE STATE

The power and authority of the state in nationalism and the role of nationality in the operation of a state are the major sources of the problem of nationality.\textsuperscript{30} The state is an administrative device for carrying out common interest functions of a population. The concrete functions of several states vary greatly according to what is thought to be in the common interest. The first duty of a state is defense of its population; beyond that, the tasks may expand to control

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., pp.34-37; C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 50-92.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 15.
all but the most personal human responses as reflected in a totalitarian state. A nation also solves the common interest problems of its members, and often the terms apply to the same population. The nation apparently functions most effectively when it has the full authority and power of a state at its disposal. The definition of state does not require that it be identified with a single nationality, however. But the tendency has been for a state to try to become uni-national and for a nationality to strive for statehood.31 This is reflected in the development of the national states in Western Europe and the political friction among the minorities in Eastern Europe.

An apparently natural tendency to give primary consideration to one's family and friends was accentuated with the breakdown of the universality of Roman Catholicism in the Reformation.32 Groups of believers became willing to intervene in the interest of their own faith in struggles with other kingdoms. The most effective means of intervention and defense came to be instruments of warfare. Power was consolidated around a king and protected those

31Ibid., pp. 1-179, for detailed discussion of the point.
willing to recognize his authority. The race for power and prestige among the groups increased.\textsuperscript{33} This competitive nationalism reached its peak in the half century preceding the first World War. The period was marked by Polish demands for independence from Russia, the unification of the German states after 1870, and the bitter demands of Irish Catholics for independence from England. The political-legal functions of the state merged with the cultural qualities of nationality, i.e. language, religion. In Western Europe, the territory controlled by the state contained largely persons of a single nationality. In Eastern Europe, the states cut across nationality lines and produced the minority problem.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{IV. MINORITY PROBLEM}

In Eastern Europe, the larger and stronger nations consolidated control over as much territory as possible and established states to use the elements of state power for the protection of their national cultures. The heterogeneity of the population resulted in the inclusion

\textsuperscript{33}For a detailed historical account, see Boyd C. Shafer, \textit{Nationalism} (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955), pp. 57-213.

of minority nationalities within the states' territories. Often the minorities were identified with a majority of a neighboring state. When that was the case, a situation was created that could foster the same interference that the religious question developed following the Reformation. The larger group of the nationality would intervene in the interests of its national kin in the neighboring state.35

This competition for uni-national statehood among nationalities and the resulting friction with neighboring nationalities is one part of the problem of identifying state politics with nationality. Another part is that, in a multi-national state, the dominant nationality may try to make its state uni-national.36 The result is discrimination and repression on the part of the majority nation and demands for special protection from the minority nationalities. Demands for protection by minority nationalities are important in the nationality problem. If the minority demands that it be allowed to practice its culture, the

35E. H. Carr, et. al., Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 23-115, outlines this international aspect of the minority problem in Eastern Europe where it is most serious.

36Macartney, op. cit., pp. 113-52, surveys this part of the problem in Hungary, Germany, Russian the Balkans, and Austria. This is the area where the nationality minority problem is most serious.
state can rightly demand the loyalty of the minority. This loyalty may be a question in the minds of the minorities and the majority alike because both are motivated by the desire to identify their nationality with statehood. The minority may want to join fellow nationals in a neighboring state or become independent itself. The majority nation will want to purge its state of this disloyalty and create a uni-national state. So long as both minority and majority hold the desire of uni-national statehood, an absolute solution to the nationality problem can not be guaranteed in a multi-national state, and the world seems far from setting aside the concept of a uni-national state as the basic unit in the community of states. For example, the word to describe contacts between states is not, as it should be, *interstate*; but *international*. The use of international for contact between states is a reflection of the identification of state and nationality roles as one. In this study, *international* will be limited to meaning specifically contacts between nationalities; *interstate* or *multi-state* are the terms used to describe dealings between or among states in the world community. In this context, *interstate* will be used to refer to matters of an internal nature for a state.

There is another minority problem besides a demand for national statehood. In heterogeneous areas in which
competition among cultures is non-political, there may be the demand for cultural autonomy which would give the nationalities jurisdiction over the languages, religion, education and other elements of culture while they might not share political power.

V. SOLUTIONS TO THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM

**Uni-National Solutions**

**Inter-state.** There have been several devices used to solve the minority problem holding the idea of a uni-national state to be the goal. There have been attempts to solve it on inter-state and intra-state bases. No final solutions on either level have been found that would keep an identification of state and nation.

An often considered inter-state device for dealing with the minority problem is the population transfer.\(^37\) It involves moving the minority nationalities out of one state and uniting them with fellow nationals in another state. It is a final solution to the particular problem whenever it is accomplished; however, the task of accomplishing it creates such great problems that transfer has not been widely successful.\(^38\) Among the problems are

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\(^37\) Claude, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

\(^38\) Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 430.
economic and social hardships on the people transferred and on the receiving state. The danger lies in moving economically adjusted persons from their environment and putting them into a state that can not handle the increased population. The result is refugee camps which are traditionally overcrowded and poverty stricken. The transferred population may also have occupied a strategic economic role in the former state and would leave that state critically short. Because of these dangers there is a reluctance to force a population transfer, and the voluntary migrations of minority populations have not been extensive.\(^{39}\)

Another solution to the problem is the redrawing of frontiers.\(^{40}\) This is most practical when the minority lives in a compact area bordering the state in which a majority of its fellow nationals live. Generally, boundary changes present several disadvantages. The redrawing is not practical where natural barriers mark the frontiers. A territorial change may take from the state resources which it considers essential to its welfare. In that case there is a risk that the state will try to re-capture the territory by force if necessary. Often a


\(^{40}\) *Claude, op. cit.*, p. 92.
transfer of territory is a transfer of one minority problem for another. Seldom does a minority exclusively occupy the territory in question. The efforts to encourage self-determination after World War I met with this difficulty. When boundaries were redrawn, new minority problems had been created for those eliminated. 41

**Supra-state.** One solution to the minority problem is the creation of a new state. This was the Zionist objective, that culminated in the establishment of the state of Israel. The state was carved out of the former British mandate in the Middle East. This effort to create a Jewish state has not been totally successful in solving the Jewish minority problem. There are still Jewish minorities in many states, and the state of Israel itself has created a Moslem minority problem in the Middle East. Arab refugees from Israel are kept in camps on the border of the country. The camps are supported by the United Nations. Zionism has solved the minority problem for those Jews who have moved to Israel. However, for those who have not moved but would like to, the Zionist movement may have intensified the problems they face as minority nationals by intensifying

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their national consciousness. Those Jews who do not intend to move or even to consider Israel their national homeland are not affected by the nature of this minority problem.

**Intra-state.** Among the solutions to the minority problem within a state which is striving for a uni-national identity, the most efficient solution is genocide, the physical murder of the minority populations. Hitler's campaign against the European Jewry is the starkest example of this solution. The humanitarian objection to mass murder is obvious. There are other objections too. One is the problem of identification of the members of the minority groups to be eliminated. Nationality is not merely a racial or ethnological phenomenon. Identifying the minorities marked for execution is the difficult problem. Another objection to genocide is the problem of controlling the monstrous system once it is set in motion so that it will not consume its creators.

A much less efficient and slower solution is an assimilation process. This solution has worked well in the United States. It involves the agreement among national groups to demonstrate loyalty to the system, to refrain from tyrannical persecution, and to eliminate those cultural traits that are threatening to other groups in the state.\(^2\) The goal of assimilation is the creation

\(^2\)Claude, op. cit., pp. 80-86.
of a new nationality. The term describing this process in the United States is "melting pot." The solution to the minority antagonisms that worked in the United States is not suited for universal application. The United States was populated by persons moving to a new environment. The moving signified a willingness to set aside at least the antagonistic elements of their former nationality. In old heterogeneous areas there would be no resettlement and no impetus to set aside former antagonisms. Assimilation is a useful long-range solution, but can have little effect on immediate acute minority problems.

A third intra-state solution is suppression of minority nationalities. This is the effort to force the minorities to set aside the traits of their nationality and adopt the traits of the majority nationality. Suppression has the obvious disadvantage of overlooking the requirement that a nationality must have an awareness of itself. There is no method of forcefully nationalizing an unwilling population. Tsarist Russia is the best example of the use of suppression as a solution to the minority problem. The hallmark was unity--unity of faith in the Orthodox Church, unity of nationality in the Great Russian

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43 Janowsky, op. cit., p. 20.
44 Ibid., p. 20.
tradition, and unity of political power in the tsar.

During the last decades of the 19th Century the tsarist administrators carried out the policy of Russification, as the suppression was called. Native languages and cultural forms were forbidden and Russian culture was put in their places. 45

Multi-National Solutions

Inter-state. There have been inter-state and intra-state attempts to solve the minority problem on a basis of a multi-national state. The inter-state solutions have been no more effective than those solutions based on the idea of a uni-national state. Inter-state guarantees of the rights of minorities were crystallized in the period following World War I. This was the result of the failure to solve the minority problems through population transfers and boundary changes. 46 Post-war treaties carried provisions for the protection of minorities through legal


equality and cultural freedom. It was an attempt to bring the power of collective security to bear to protect the interests of national minorities. On the request of a member of the League of Nations, the League Council could consider a violation of minority rights, but unanimous agreement was necessary for action. The International Court could arbitrate disputes, but both parties had to agree to submit the dispute.

The inter-state guarantee of minority rights was not effective. It was difficult to define minority rights without meaning special privilege for the minority within a state. Also, majority nationalities were reluctant to bring problems to the attention of the League; and the inter-state machinery for acting against violations of minority rights was not strong.

A characteristic that evolved after the second World War was an inter-state guarantee of human rights.

Claude, op. cit., pp. 16-30; Robinson, op. cit., pp. 27-43.


Robinson, op. cit., Part II.
This concept of human rights replaces the idea of inter-state protection of minority rights. The human rights concept is broader and allows the inter-state body—the United Nations—to evaluate alleged violations with more flexibility. A guarantee of human rights also tends to eliminate the inference of special privilege involved in guaranteeing minority rights. However, the inter-state system of enforcing the guarantee stumbles on the same factors as the minority rights guarantee. There is a continuing reluctance of states to support an inter-state organization's investigation of incidents within their own borders.

**Intra-state.** If none of the devices of inter-state control solve the minority problem and the goal of a uni-national state is not suitable as a basis of a solution to the minority problem, are there solutions within a multi-national state? There are two: cultural autonomy and federalism.

50 Claude, op. cit., pp. 69-78.


52 Janowsky, op. cit., p. 37.
Language is a highly regarded characteristic of nationality because of the variety of concepts affected by and reflected in a nationality's language. If linguistic freedom is assured and the affairs of state are conducted in the languages of the state and there is freedom for other cultural expressions, the minority may demonstrate loyalty to a regime controlled by an alien majority. It is not a simple task to guarantee linguistic freedom in a unitary government system in which a voting majority could rest with another nationality.

South Africa is the outstanding example of the system in operation. 53 Political power is shared by persons of Dutch and British ancestry. The official languages of the state are English and Afrikaans, the language of the Boers who are descendants of Dutch traders.

Given a multi-national state or the desire to establish a multi-national state, federalism may be the best solution. 54 There is one criterion that is crucial to a workable federal system along nationality lines. The national groups should be geographically distinguishable. This is necessary so that the boundary lines among the

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53 Ibid., pp. 46-69.
several regional governments may be drawn to separate the minority nationalities. The differences among the nationalities will be a centrifugal force working against the centripetal forces.

Switzerland offers a clear example of federalism as a solution to a national minority problem. There are twenty-one regional governments with fourteen dominated by Germans, three by French and one by citizens of Italian background. Five are of mixed nationality. The central government has a bi-cameral, proportional representative legislature and a collegial executive.55

Federalism requires a willingness to make the system work. The arrangement of functions among the people, the central and regional governments should insure that the minorities will have control over those functions considered essential to the continuation of their nationality, but not subversive to other nationalities.

55Ibid., pp. 37-46; Kohn, Nationalism and Liberty, op. cit.
CHAPTER IV

SOVIET NATIONALITY PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION

To measure the strength of the national minority problem in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to apply the general concepts discussed in the preceding chapter to the nationalities of the Soviet Union.

To govern as large a territory and as large a population as that within the border of the Soviet Union is no small task. To the extent the Soviet Union has been faced with a nationality problem, governing has been that much more complex. This is true because the minority problem comes from the attempt on the part of national groups to identify the cultural characteristics of nationality with the political goals of statehood. There is a potential problem created when more than one nationality strives for statehood within the bounds of a single state or when one nation in a multi-national state seeks to eliminate the multi-national character of the state in favor of the dominance of its nationality. In the case of the Soviet Union, there were potential minority nationality problems on both counts.

First, the Great Russian nationality accounted for nearly half of the population of the Empire. Being thus in
a dominant position, in the final decades of the Tsarist era, it tried to force the several score of nationalities within the borders of the Empire to adopt the Great Russian culture and language. Second, until this period of Russification and again during the critical period of the first World War and post-war years, the border regions had experienced more or less self-rule regarding matters of local importance which involved as wide a scope of activities as possible including actual independence in the cases of Siberia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. This experience produced traditions of self-rule and strengthened the tie between nationality and statehood. The task for the student of the Soviet minority problem is three-fold: (1) How important were the border areas to the Russian central government? (2) What was the strength of the national development among the minorities? (3) What was the degree of political experience among the nationalities at the time of federation?

Regarding these problems, the vitality of the nationalities is a centrifugal force in a multi-national state because it requires the central government to be aware of and to consider the several languages, cultures, and religious forms. This in itself might no require a
federal solution because the nationalities may not be politically conscious, but the stronger the cultural vitality of a minority, the greater will be the problem for the central government in administering the state. Complicating this would be any political consciousness of the minorities that is reflected in pressure for a share in the governing of the state. In the Soviet Union, a state in which one nationality can hold a majority in an equally proportioned decision-making body, the problem potential is even larger because the single politically conscious nationality could overrule the minority representatives. For these reasons it is important to know the extent of the political experience of the minorities in order to determine the pressure they may exert for a share in the decision-making process.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE BORDER REGIONS

The Brest-Litovsk treaty and the national independence movements within the Empire following the collapse of the Tsarist regime took from Russia an estimated 32 per cent of her population (56 million persons), one-eighth of the railroad mileage, 30 per cent of the wheat lands, and one-seventh of the rye land. The iron mining area decreased by 78.8 per cent, coal decreased by 89 per cent and half the factory and plant capacity was gone. Forty
per cent of potential government income disappeared through the loss of 1800 savings banks.¹ Most of the major national groups live in territory bordering the homeland of the Great Russians. Besides the direct economic losses cited above, the loss of her borderlands cut Russia from Europe and closed out free access to the Black and Baltic seas and shrank her total area by 2 million square miles. Thus it is apparent that the Russian borderlands are of critical importance to Russia's power position.² The central government therefore can be expected to go to great lengths to control the border regions as tightly as possible. Concessions by way of political decentralization will not be made unless centrifugal forces exist to cause the decentralization. The nationality problem is one of those centrifugal forces. The concession to it has taken the form of federal symbolism in the formal structure of Soviet government.

III. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, ITS CONSTRUCTION

In the year of the revolution, 1917, the territory of the Russian Empire totaled more than 8 million


²For a detailed account of Soviet geography, see Theodore Shabad, Geography of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951).
square miles and had been accumulated at an average rate of 50 square miles a day for nearly four centuries. The empire building was marked by three characteristics:

1. There were no clearly defined geographical boundaries. Traditionally, the expansion of the Empire was interpreted as a drive to acquire warm water ports, but a more recent interpretation is that the expansion had no geographic limits and carried a concept of "mobile frontiers." This argument is that the frontiers of the Empire were temporary designations of the extent of Russian expansion and the frontiers would not stabilize with acquisition of warm water ports.

2. Religion was used as a test of nationality. Adherence to the Russian Orthodox religion was an essential factor in determining the rights one received under Tsarist rule.

3. There was no racial unity in the expansion. Russia expanded in every direction from the

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original Muscovy province and, though part of the drive, west and southwest, was to unit other Slavic peoples⁷ the Russian Empire incorporated many other racial groups—Ugro-Finnic, Turkic and Mongolian, to name three examples.

One dates the empire building from the early 17th Century when Ivan the Terrible conquered the Turkic provinces of Kazan and Astrakhan in Central Asia, Chuvash in the Volga region, and the Ugro-Finnic and Mordvinian people of the Upper Volga River area. Later in the century, Turkic, Mongolian, and Finnic tribes of Siberia were added. In 1654, Muscovy extended the protection of the Muscovite province to the Cossack population of the Ukraine.

Peter the Great renamed Muscovy Russia in 1713 and adopted the cultural tradition of Old Kievan Rus through an incorporation of the history of Rus into the history of the Muscovite province. Such an interpretation argued that when Rus fell under the Mongol invasions of the 13th Century, the nucleus of the culture was transferred from Kiev to Moscow. This interpretation allowed the Russian Tsar to claim that the Ukrainian population to the southwest and the Belorussian population to the west should

look to Moscow as the protector of their historic heritage.  

Peter took from Sweden as a war spoil the East Shore of the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia). Catherine II seized the eastern provinces of Polish Lithuania and with a war victory over Turkey extended the Empire to the north shore of the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula.

The 19th Century saw the addition of the kingdom of Georgia in 1801, Finland in 1809, Central Poland in 1815, the rest of the Caucasus Mountain area and the Central Asian area of Turkistan. Administration of the Empire was in the hands of ten Governors-General: Warsaw, Kiev, Vilna, Finland, Caucasus, Moscow, two in Central Asia, and two in Siberia. These ten areas were divided into provinces and the provinces into districts, villages or tribes.

Generally, administration was equally harsh or benevolent throughout the Empire; however, there were some special provisions for a number of peoples. The Jews had the most stringent limitations. They were restricted to a Pale of Settlement in the northwest and southwest parts of European Russia. Jews could not purchase land or move from a town unless they adopted the Orthodox faith. The administrators tolerated the traditions of the nomadic peoples of Central Asia and the Far East. They gave nothing to the

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Tsar and got little except protection from the Russians. Poland (1815-1831), Finland (1809-1899), Ukraine (1654-1764), Estonia (1710-1783 and 1795-1880) were all treated as administrative units and given some degree of self-rule in local affairs.

Tsarist policy on the national question had four definite periods. From the beginning of the empire building in the mid-16th Century until the mid-18th Century the crown and the Russian church were united, and the expansion was generally an attempt to convert persons to the Orthodox faith. With the secularization of the autocracy in the 18th Century, the policy on the national question became oriented toward political considerations as the Tsars consolidated their power and the Empire reached its peak in the period after Napoleon's defeat in the War of 1812. Early stages of the national movements appeared in the latter half of the reign of Alexander I corresponding to the national awakening among the Great Russian intellectuals. The nationalities, though their emergence was slow, made an increasing number of demands on the autocracy throughout the 19th Century and early 20th Century. The failure of the Tsars to respond to the nationality demands parallels their failure to meet adequately many of the problems facing Russia, i.e. serf poverty, industrialization, and wars with Turkey, Japan and Germany.
Alexander III carried out policies of reaction and Russification to stem the growing unrest throughout the Empire. Both the Russian people and the nationalities suffered under Alexander's policies. Regarding the nationalities, Russification attempted to replace native languages with Russian, native religions with Orthodoxy, and native cultural traditions with Russian ones. Russification was largely a failure in its intended purpose. Protests reached such intensity that Nicholas II was forced to halt the Russification and to liberalize the autocracy's policies after the 1905 revolution.

IV. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, ITS PARTS

The first census of the Russian Empire was made in 1897. It showed 104 nationalities and 146 languages. The first census of the Soviet period in 1926 listed 182 ethnic groups and 149 languages. The picture is not so confused as this might indicate. Many of the groups were of no major importance numerically or economically. The 1926 census listed every group with more than 20,000 population.

Eleven important ethnic groups contain nearly all of the


10 Shabad, op. cit., p. 514.
The largest and most important is the Eastern Slav group of Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. In 1897 this group accounted for 67.1 per cent of the Empire population and by 1926 with the World War I territorial losses in the west the percentage had risen to 78.9 per cent. Second largest are the Turkic peoples who accounted for 9.1 per cent in 1897 and slipped to 8.5 per cent in the first Soviet census. Third of the major groups is the Ugro-Finnic peoples with only 2.8 per cent and 2.3 per cent in the respective census reports. A fourth group is the Slavonic-Baltic group. These peoples numbered 3 million in the 1897 census, but the World War I settlement cut the figure to 192,500 in 1926. The main population of the group are Latvians, Latgals, and Lithuanians. Peoples who inhabit the Caucasus Mountain area are ethnically unrelated, but are grouped together as a matter of convenience. The territory is described as the most heterogeneous area in the world. With 3.6 million population, the group comprised 2.9 per cent of the Empire population in 1897 and 3.2 per cent in 1926, when the total had risen to 4.6 millions. Included in the group are the

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11 Ibid., p. 40.

12 Pipes, op. cit., p. 16.
Georgians, Armenians, Lesghians, Auars, Kabardinians, Cherkesses, Abkhazians, Chechens, Ingushes, and Dagestan mountain tribes. None except the Georgians and Armenians had more than several thousand population in either census. There were 1.4 million Georgians in 1897 and 1.8 million in 1926. In the 1897 census there were 1.2 million Armenians and 1.6 million in 1926. The Azerbaijans inhabit the Transcaucasus territory with the Georgians and Armenians but are properly classified as Turkic Moslems. The other major groups are Iranians, Moldavians, Buryat-Mongols, Siberian tribes, Paleoasiatic peoples and Jews. None except the Jews was more than a fraction of one percent of the population in either census. The Jewish people numbered 5 million (4.0 per cent) in 1897 and 2.6 million (1.8 per cent) in 1926.¹³

Ukrainians. The Ukrainian people are the second largest nationality in the Russian state and with the Great Russians, Belorussians and several small foreign national groups including Czechs, Slovaks, Serbians, and Bulgarians make up the Slavic population of the Russian state. The 1897 census listed 22,380,600 Ukrainians. In 1926 the

¹³Ibid., pp. 289-90, for population in the 1897 and 1926 census reports.
figure was 31,189,500. The greatest number of Slavs in Russia are descended from the Eastern Slav group. The Ukrainians, holding this common heritage with the Great Russians, were separated from them in the 13th and 14th Centuries by successive Mongol and Polish-Lithuanian invasions. It was not until the 17th Century that the peoples were reunited under Peter the Great. During the period of separation, the Ukrainians had developed a tradition of free agriculture, and a serf status of the Russian peasant was alien to them. Ukraine was also influenced by the traditions of the Cossacks, a group of emigre Russian marauders who inhabited south Russia. Two 17th Century peasant revolts were encouraged by the Cossacks, and two Cossack leaders—Stenka Razin and Emelyan Pugachev—gave their names to the uprisings. In the 18th Century the Cossacks agreed to recognize the authority of the Tsar in exchange for special rights of autonomy.


15Pipes, op. cit., p. 9.

The language of the Ukrainians is very close to the Great Russian and Belorussian languages. All descended from an Indo-European root. Only after the 15th Century were Ukrainian and Belorussian recognized as separate languages, and most speakers of any one understand the others as well. Ukrainian emerged from Old Church Slavonic, the language of ancient Russia and of the Orthodox Church. To this was added Polish and Lithuanian aspects from the periods of the conquests. By the late 18th Century, the language was developed enough to have a grammar and dictionary published. Most experts date the beginning of creative Ukrainian national literature from 1798 and the publication of Eneida by Katiliarevsky. The literary vernacular was a Ukrainian dialect combination of variations spoken near Kiev and Lvov, which were the cultural centers of the old Kievan state of Rus. The new nationalism was centered in Kharkov until a Tsarist ban on publication in the language forced it to move out of the Empire to Galacia in Austria whence literature was smuggled into the Ukraine.

17 Ibid., p. 480.
18 Ibid., p. 482.
20 Fitzsimmons, loc. cit.
The Tsarist attempt to integrate the Ukraine began in 1709 with the abrogation of the guarantee of autonomy after an unsuccessful revolt. From that time, Ukraine and its population were called "South Russia" and "Little Russians." Until the 20th Century, the Ukrainian movement was almost entirely one of literature and art. It paralleled, closely, the awakening in Russia from the Decembrists revolt in 1825 in which both the Russian and Ukrainian nationalities participated, through the literary protests of the mid-century and the activist nihilism of the 1880-1890 period, to the era of the political parties in the 20th Century.

The first Ukrainian political organization was the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP). The party was made up of persons with a variety of views connected only by a dissatisfaction with the purely cultural activity of the Ukrainian movement. The RUP sought the backing of Nicholas Ivanovich Mikhnovsky, author of a booklet, "Independent Ukraine." Mikhnovsky called for re-establishment by force if necessary, of the rights allegedly due the Ukraine. The alleged rights to which he referred were contained in an agreement between Tsar Alexei and the

21 Borys, op. cit., p. 35.

22 Pipes, op. cit., pp. 9-11.
Cossacks who inhabited the Ukrainian territory. The agreement, made in 1654, obliged the Tsar to protect the Ukrainian frontiers, required that the Cossacks recognize the Muscovite Tsar's suzerainty and prohibited the Cossacks from establishing independent diplomatic contacts with the Tatars or the Poles. The agreement was accompanied by a statement of Cossack rights that included maintaining separate legislative and administrative authorities, supplying an army of 60,000 men, and electing a Hetman, an executive figure. Mikhnovsky based his argument of the legality of these rights on the premise that the 17th Century agreement was a federative pact between an independent Cossack state and the Muscovite Tsar, and as such obligated later Tsars to respect it. However, the question is open as to whether the Cossacks did indeed make up an independent state. Mikhnovsky put Ukrainian nationalism above socialism and was repudiated by the left wing of the RUP.23

Soon after its formation the RUP split into numerous factions across the political spectrum. This factionalism always marked the Ukrainian movement.24 The first to split was a group dissatisfied with the drift of

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23 Reshetar, op. cit., p. 13-17.

24 Pipes, op. cit., p. 11.
the movement toward Russian socialism. The faction demanded separation of the Ukraine from Russia; it founded the National Ukrainian Party (NUP) in 1902, but had little influence.25 The socialist wing of the RUP split into two groups. One was the Ukrainian Social Democratic Union (USDU or Spilka); the other was the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party (USDLP). The Spilka was an autonomous section of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. Many of its members regarded the national question as a bourgeois fabrication, and the Spilka program put socialism far ahead of nationalism.26 It was absorbed into the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1907. The USDLP also was a socialist party; its nationalist program called for Ukrainian autonomy. There was a moderate party—Ukrainian Democratic Party—whose program called for liberal democracy in a constitutional monarchy and federation of the Ukraine and Russia.27

In the October Manifesto of 1905, the Tsar allowed greater freedom of the press in the Empire and there was a flurry of publication. While few papers lasted long, others would take the place of those that quit.28

25 Ibid., p. 9.
26 Reshetar, loc. cit.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
elections to the First Duma, the Ukrainians got 13.8 per cent of the seats. The moderate party held 30 of the 40 seats allotted. The Tsar reapportioned the seats in 1907, and the border lands were severely cut in representation in the Second and Third Dumas.29

Russian policy toward the Ukraine was guided by two factors: its strategic location and its economic wealth.30 Though the Ukraine had only two per cent of the land of the empire, it contained nearly one-fifth of the population. Between 1909 and 1913, the Ukraine produced 48 per cent of the wheat, 30 per cent of the rye, 72 per cent of the barley, 17 per cent of the oats; contained 36.1 per cent of the flour mills, 70.2 per cent of the coal production (up to 87.2 per cent in World War I), 72 per cent of the iron ore, 30 per cent of the salt, 80 per cent of the sugar refineries, and 68 per cent of the pig iron smelting.31 Through the Ukraine Russia was linked with the Balkans, Middle Europe, Poland and the Black Sea.32

29 Pipes, op. cit., p. 7.
31 Ibid., pp. 183-87.
32 Borys, op. cit., p. 53.
Belorussia. The Belorussian nationality is less important and closer to the Great Russian than is the Ukrainian nationality. The Belorussian national territory is in the Western part of European Russia in an area that has experienced Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish domination. Traditionally, the upper class of the Belorussian population thought itself to be either Polish or Russian and felt that the name, Belorussian, had been imposed on it. Before the revolution 87 per cent of the population was rural and expressed no Belorussian national consciousness, but rather, held a traditional peasant loyalty to the Father Tsar. The 1897 census listed 5,885,500 Belorussians and in 1926 the number was 4,738,200.

The national movement in Belorussia did not begin until late in the 19th Century. The first Belorussian dictionary was published in 1870, but the first grammar did not appear until 1918. The first nationalist newspaper, Our Land, was published in 1900. A nationalist

33 Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 483.
36 Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 484.
party was organized a short time later by B. Revo Hromada. 37

The national sentiment was based on a myth that argued that the Belorussians were of purer Slavic ancestry than the Great Russians. According to the myth, the Belorussians were independent 1,000 years ago; but in their turns, German, Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian invaders dominated the territory. The national movement then was based on an appeal for a return of former glory. 38 The hero of the national movement was Kastus Kakinousky, who fought for independence from Poland in the 19th Century. Of course, Poland itself had not yet gained its independence from the Russian Empire. It was an administrative unit within the Empire. The Belorussians were caught in the center of the Polish-Russian conflicts over Polish demands for independence. The Polish language, religion and culture were farther from the Belorussian than was the Russian. Therefore, the Belorussian national movement grew from an attempt to avoid "Polification." Russification under Alexander III stressed the commonality between Belorussia and Russia and was effective in curbing anti-Russian aspects of the Belorussian movement. 39 The number of active supporters of the national movement was not greater than

37 Pipes, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
39 Ibid., p. 74.
three or four thousand before the revolution. "It was clear that the movement was ill prepared to face the emergencies which arose in World War I and the Revolution."\(^40\)

**Turkic peoples.**\(^41\) Classification of peoples as Turkic is broader than either the Ukrainian or Belorussian classification because it embraces several nationalities; but the national awakening among the Turkic peoples was a form of pan-Turkism and it is most profitable to discuss the score or more of Turkic nationalities more or less as a unit. This is the second largest ethnic group with 12,374,300 in 1897 and 14,446,300 in 1926. Subdivision of the Turkic peoples would include the Volga-Tatars, Chuvash, Bashkir, Azerbaijan Turks, Central Asian groups including Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Turkmen, and Siberia groups including the Yakut, Khakass, Tuvinian, and Altay group.\(^42\)

The languages which the Turkic peoples speak are related to Mongolic and Tungusia and form with them the Altic family of languages which is distinct from the Indo-European base of the Slavic languages of the Ukrainians, Great Russians and Belorussians. The Altay Mountains are

\(^40\)Ibid., p. 92.

\(^41\)The great bulk of information for this section comes from Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960).

\(^42\)Shabad, op. cit., p. 40.
considered the home of the Turks and Mongols. The original
invasions by the Turks were in the 5th and 6th Centuries
and were completed by 1453 with the downfall of the
Byzantine empire to Mongol-Turkic invaders. The conquered
peoples, however, had a significant effect on the cultural
and linguistic development of the conquerors.\(^\text{43}\) Thus, a
four-way geographical division of the Turkic languages is
possible.\(^\text{44}\) A northwest group is the largest. It in-
cludes the Volga Tatars, the Bashkirs of the South Urals,
and the Kazakhs and Kirghiz of Central Asia. There are
three other small peoples speaking the northwest type of
Turkic. They are the Karakalpaks, who inhabit the area
at the mouth of the Amur River, Balkars and Karachay, both
of the North Caucasus region. The predominant nationality
in the southeast group is the Uzbek. The southwest group
includes Azerbaidjans in the Eastern Transcaucasus and the
Turkmens across the Caspian Sea. The Turks of Turkey are
also in this group. The smallest of the linguistic groups
is the northeast group. It has been separated geographi-
cally and has no Islamic traits. Most of the group is
scattered in Eastern Siberia. The most prominent people


\(^{44}\) Zenkovsky, op. cit., pp. 3-8.
of this group is the Yakut people. The Chuvash people of the Upper Volga region were separated from the Turkic invaders early in history and developed independently of Islamic and Turkic influence. The Chuvash have adopted the Orthodox religion and use the Cyrillic alphabet with a language distinctly different from the Altay languages of other Turkic peoples.\footnote{Fitzsimmons, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 666.}

The national awakening among the Turkic peoples did not start until the last part of the 19th Century because Moslems had more often identified themselves by religion and culture than with nation or race.\footnote{Zenkovsky, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.} To Tsarist administrators all the Moslem population belonged to a group called "Mohammodans." This helped strengthen the religious, non-national tie among Turkic peoples. Almost all Moslems in Russia were Turks and 90 per cent of the Turks were Moslems. The Turkic national awakening was preceded by a Moslem cultural revival.\footnote{Tbid., pp. 9-10.} The national movement was also hindered by language barriers with no common written language. Prayers and the Koran were always in Arabic, which was not understandable to a majority of the rural Turkic peasants. Also Persian influence
was great along the south border of the Russian Empire, and this diluted the all-Russian Moslem national movement. Another factor slowing the national awakening was the nomadic and tribal nature of many of the peoples with no sense of nationality. Also, European and Slavic immigration into the areas of Turkic population diluted the awakening.

Turkic invaders swept west from the Altay Mountains in the 5th and 6th Centuries and scattered across much of Central Asia and the southeast part of European Russia. The Turkic peoples were thus brought in contact with Indo-European groups and Iranian groups. There was a mutual cultural assimilation. For nearly ten centuries the economy was almost entirely based on tribal nomadism. Trading grew very slowly. In fact, as late as the 20th Century there was still a great deal of nomadism.

The original Turkic invaders were reinforced in the 13th and 14th Centuries when the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan swept from the east and engulfed all of Central Asia and south and southwest Russia, and dictated the policies of the various Slavic princes in what is now the western part of European Russia. The Muscovite Prince, although only one of a number of princes dominated by the
Golden Horde, nevertheless gained stature when the Mongols allowed him to collect taxes from other princes.

The Mongols carried with their invasions several Mongol-Turkic tribes. A principal one of these tribes was called Tatar. It gave its name to the original Turkic nomads in the region around Kazan, and the name continues in use. The Tatars were the most important Turkic group until the revolution because of their knowledge about the Russian culture and their cultural contacts with Central Asia. The Tatars developed a commercial and trading class.48

For nearly 200 years the Mongols dominated the Slavs. But by the 16th Century, Muscovy had grown powerful enough to start its empire building. Almost immediately after Russia took Kazan in 1552, Slavic immigration and a form of Russification started with an attack on the Islamic religion. The attack was not very successful, and was relaxed. However, Peter the Great started it again but had no more success. In 1740, the Tsar established a Ministry of Conversion. Tatar children were required to go to Orthodox schools, and soldiers had to be converted. The Pugachev rebellion was partly the result of his missionary work. The rebellion was first of all a peasant revolt, but

48 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
it got support from religious discontents, too—Old Believers and Moslems.\footnote{49}

Reforms by Catherine II opened the way for Tatar revival in the 19th Century. She permitted the construction of Mosques and she improved the legal, economic and social status of the Moslems. The Tatars led the Russian expansion to the Southeast. Trading between Russia and Central Asia was the largest occupation of the people.\footnote{50}

Three leaders stand out in the 19th Century cultural revival. Shihabeddin Merjani revised the religious and educational system of the Tatars. He used history to interest people in their past. Another leader was Abdul Kaiun Nasyri, a writer and printer, who published a textbook and a dictionary and was the first to use spoken Tatar in written form.\footnote{51} The outstanding Moslem leader of the 19th Century was Ismil bey Gasprinsky. He appealed for Moslem cultural unity and inadvertently laid the ground for the national political movement. Gasprinsky outlined a program calling for unity of religion, language, mind, and action. Since most Russian Moslems were Turks, this was the foundation for the 20th Century

\footnote{49}{Ibid., p. 14-16.}
\footnote{50}{Ibid., pp. 16-23.}
\footnote{51}{Ibid., p. 25.}
national movement, though he insisted that the Russians and Moslems should get along in the same state. His educational program stressed Turkic rather than Arabic language and included more liberal courses. This secularization, in effect, increased the national sentiment. The national awakening, however, even in the 20th Century reached only a small minority of intellectuals. Ninety-five percent of the population was still guided by the conservatism of the Koran.52

Tension between the Tatars and Russians increased from the middle of the 19th Century because of the competition between the Tatar cultural revival, the Slavophil movement, and two wars with Turkey. In the Crimean War, many Tatar soldiers deserted the Russian army. Mass reconversions to Islam was seen by the Russians as a threat though it may have been more a fear than a reality.53 The Tsar deported some Moslem Tatars and began another missionary campaign, but again there was little success.

In the mid-19th Century Russian educator, N. I. Ilminsky proposed a combination Russian and native language school system in which the national language would be used for elementary education and Russian for higher

52 Ibid., pp. 30-36.

53 Ibid., p. 28.
grades. About 100 schools were established among the Volga minorities. Ilminsky developed an alphabet with Russian rather than Arabic characters. A greater number of secular subjects was offered than in the Moslem religious schools. The Soviet government adopted this system with great success.\textsuperscript{54}

The first nationalist writings came in 1905 with clandestine pamphleteering that argued that Russia was planning to convert the Moslem populations. Yusef Akchurin, a Tatar journalist, was the most extreme in calling for political unification of the Turkic peoples of the Ottoman and Russian empires through a combination of forces hostile to the Russians. However, in early political action the Moslems showed a great caution, holding two conferences "unofficially" and issuing a mild resolution about equal treatment and personal liberties. The first was in April, 1905; the second in January, 1906, created a weak union of Russian Moslems who combined with the Kadets to elect 25 Moslem delegates in the First Duma. The compromise program called for cultural autonomy, and the Moslems agreed to eliminate criticisms of the Russian government.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 29.
A third Congress in August, 1906, was the most important. It officially formed the Moslem Union (Ittifak). The conference adopted a ten point program that sought equal opportunities and treatment for various religions and demanded the zemstvos be expanded to deal with political matters. There was no national territorial autonomy program however. In the Second Duma there were 39 Moslem seats.55

While the Volga-Ural Tatars, thoroughly Europeanized, led the pan-Turkic movement, the Turkic population of Central Asia was opposed to change. This was so because of the backwardness of the culture, the overwhelmingly dominant, illiterate, rural, largely nomadic, population and the conservatism of the Moslem clergy. From the earliest contacts with the peoples of Central Asia, the Russians never ruled strictly. The official policy was one of non-interference in cultural and religious matters. There was no compulsory military service and the administrators recognized the Islamic faith and forbade Orthodox missionaries.56 The Ilminsky bilingual school system met with some success, but most of

55Ibid., pp. 37-54.
56Ibid., pp. 72-75.
those who attended schools went to the Moslem religious institutions. The only liberal element among the Central Asian Turks was the merchant middle class that grew from trading and lending activities. It was able to function against the Islamic conservatism only with the protection of Tsarist administrators. On the eve of World War I, Islam continued to dominate the lives and minds of the Central Asians.57

The Azerbaijan Turks settled in their Transcaucasus homeland shortly after the initial invasions. At the time, it was part of Iran and continued so until Russia conquered it in 1804-13. The Persian influence remained strong, particularly in language and literature. Oil production at Baku brought the Azerbaijanans in contact with the Turkish influence of Constantinople, because of the commercial ties between the cities. Fights with an Armenian minority helped build up anti-Russian feeling in the emerging intelligentsia. Among the leaders of the Azerbaijan movement were Ali bey Hussein Zadeh, a liberal nationalist writer and publisher, and Ahmed bey Agaev, who attacked the Moslem clergy for exploiting ignorance and superstition. He blamed the clergy for the poverty of the Moslem countries. Agaev published Kaspi,

57 Ibid., pp. 81-91.
the only paper to last throughout the nationalist period of the early 20th Century until the revolution. A third notable leader was Ali Mardan, a contributor to Kaspi and chairman of the Ittifak in 1905 and of the Moslem caucus at the Second Duma. 58

The Azerbaijans were active in all of the Moslem conferences. The first political party was the Musavat, an underground leftist organization led by Mehmed Emin bey Resul Zadeh. Its program was more nationalistic than socialistic; however, the program was not clearly defined. Most of the support came from the intelligentsia because the peasants were pan-Islamic conservatives and did not trust the socialists. The revolutionary and nationalistic activity was curbed by the Russian authorities and the Islamic conservatives. 59

Ugro-Finnic peoples. The Ugro-Finnic population has lived mostly in the northwest party of the Empire since migrating from the Altay Mountains. The most important representative of the group is the Finnish people of Finland. The most significant group within the Russian state is the Estonian people, who numbered 1,002,700 in

58 Ibid., pp. 92-98.
59 Ibid., pp. 98-104.
the 1897 census, Estonia had not been re-annexed to the Russian state by the 1926 census, when the total was 154,600. The Ugro-Finnic groups can be divided into four lesser groups. The cultural level of each except the western group was very low, and few if any political demands were made.\textsuperscript{60} The western group includes the Karelians, Letts, Estonians, Chuds, and Finns. The Estonians, historically a warlike people, fought with the Danes and Swedes for control of their territory. A 14th Century Russian victory over Sweden brought Estonia into the Empire.\textsuperscript{61} Ivan IV was harsh with the Estonians, confiscating their land in favor of Russian aristocrats and building Russian Orthodox churches among the predominantly Roman Catholic people. Peter I loosened the reins, granting the Estonians self-rule in exchange for free passage to the Baltic Sea which the territory provided. The self-rule ended with the Russification policies of Alexander III.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{60} Malevsky-Malevitch, op. cit., p. 102.


\textsuperscript{62} Kolarz, Russia, Her Colonies, op. cit., pp.104-18.
Estonia participated in the Dumas of Nicholas II, but at the time of her independence there was no strong national political tradition.

Two factors seem significant here. First the Tsarist administration did not allow the Estonians to use any autonomous political power that might have aided the development. Second the political experience within the Duma framework was dominated by non-national social democracy. Menshevism had the greatest appeal among those Estonians who participated in political activity. Their program had no national separatist plank. It was only on a cultural level that there was any significant degree of national awareness preceding World War I. The Russian government was somewhat more tolerant on publishing, speaking and educating in national languages after 1905 than before. The result in Estonia was a marked increase in the publication of work on history, art, and language.63

The Karelians have a long history of union with a Russian government. They were joined to the states of Novgorod, Moscovy, Russia, and the Soviet Union. The

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language is of the Finnic group, but the culture and religion are Russian except for some "Swedification." The Karelians numbered 203,100 in 1897 and just slightly more than that in 1926.

The northern group includes the Lapars, Udmurts (Votiaks), Permiaks and Zyrians (Komi). None of this group has a population greater than a few hundred thousand. The people were the most Russified of the nationalities in the Empire. They speak the Russian language and carry the Orthodox religion. The Eastern Ugro-Finnic peoples are the Mari (Cheremiss) and Mordvinians. Both these peoples live in the Upper Volga region. The Mari had a population of about .4 million but a high level of national consciousness in which religion was most important. The religion was a mixture of Christianity, Islam and paganism. Before the revolution there was a violent anti-Russian religious sect called Kigu-Sorta. The Mordvinians have undergone seven centuries of Russification, living closer to Moscow than any other non-Russian people. The Mordvinians show little national consciousness.

64 Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
65 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
66 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
group lives in the Arctic region. These peoples have a low level of culture and economy and have not been developed. 67

**Slavonic-Baltic peoples.** The peoples living on the Baltic shore of the Russian state have been the most resistant of any minority nationality to attempts at Russification. 68 The peoples include the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Latgals, all of who by the time of annexation to the Soviet Union in 1940 had developed a high degree of culture and literary and national consciousness. Their national consciousness matured rapidly during the generation between the first and second World Wars, when the Latvians and Lithuanians had their separate national states. 69 Prior to this period of independence, the emerging national movements had reached only small numbers of intelligentsia.

These peoples have a Slavonic ancestry. They settled the area before the arrival of the Scandinavian or Russian people. 70 The languages are more closely

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68 Ibid., p. 452.

69 Ibid.

related to Slavic tongues than to any other Indo-European language, but they are not mutually comprehensible.71 The Latvian area was inhabited by its population in the Iron Age. A high cultural level was achieved through contacts with Scandinavians and Slavs. In their turns, Germans, Poles, Swedes and Russians dominated Latvia beginning in the 13th Century. Russia took control in the 18th Century, and it lasted until the end of World War I.72 German and Russian influence was greatest. The Latvian's majority religion is protestant Christianity, given by the Germans. The language is based on a German model and carries a great many German and Russian words. It was only after independence in the 1920's that the Latvians made progress in purifying the language.73

The Lithuanians have a linguistic link with the Latvians, but have been more heavily influenced in cultural development by the Poles and the Russians than by the Germans. In the 13th Century a Lithuanian kingdom covered most of Poland, Belorussia and the Ukraine. The Poles introduced the Roman Catholic religion.74 The earliest

71 Fitzsimmons, loc. cit.
72 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 450-52.
73 Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 486.
document in the Lithuanian language is dated from the 16th Century; however, little literary work accumulated until the national awakening three centuries later. The standardized vernacular was from a dialect in South Lithuania. The alphabet was based on a Polish model and was reformed and purified in the years of independence. Lithuanian nationalism was fostered chiefly by its distinct language but its growth was also the product of triangular conflict among the Polish, Russian, and Lithuanian population. In the 1897 census there were 1,658,500 Lithuanians.

Caucasus peoples. The Caucasus Mountain area is the homeland for at least 40 separate peoples. It has been a haven for people escaping invasions eastward and westward. Despite its non-Russian inhabitants the Caucasus was a part of Russia, from the late 18th Century, and it has had a major place in Russian life as indicated in the creative literature of Pushkin, Lermontov, Turgenev and others. There are two major groups. The Georgians

75Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 485.
77Pipes, op. cit., p. 16.
78Kolarz, op. cit., p. 181.
numbered 1,352,500 in 1897 and 1,820,900 in 1926. There were 1,173,100 Armenians in the Tsarist census and 1,565,800 in the first Soviet census. Both peoples have long held Christian independent religions, accepting them in the 4th Century from the Byzantine Empire. They have been surrounded by Moslems and thus have sought connections with and protection from the Russians, although both maintained a high degree of cultural and religious integrity.79

By 1870, the Georgians had a developed language, alphabet and literature and maintained a national territory. The literature was based on the classical Georgian of the 10th and 13th Centuries. A cultural movement arose chiefly among the aristocracy. It had a populist orientation in the manner of the Russian aristocratic ethos of the time. The evolution of a political consciousness linked the Georgians with the Russian Marxists in the Social Democratic Party.80 The 1905 Revolution sparked a nationalist movement in the Georgian Social Democratic wing with a demand for cultural autonomy. Getting no satisfaction from

79 Pipes, op. cit., p. 16.
80 Ibid.
the Tsar through the Duma politics, the Georgian national movement joined the revolutionary camp.  

Unlike the Georgians, the Armenians had no well defined national territory and were generally scattered through the Transcaucasus Moslem population as a large minority people. The Moslem hostility had driven the Armenians to seek Russian protection. When they felt the Tsar had let them down in the first decade of the 20th Century, the movement turned toward revolution.  

The Armenians were not as socialistically inclined as the Georgians, perhaps because there existed among the Armenians a slight middle class consciousness. The leading national party was called the Dashnak. Its program was one of cultural autonomy and federalism. The program was advanced as much to try to give the Armenians some protection from the Azerbaijan Moslems as to separate them from the Russians. Despite the fact that the Armenians had no well defined territory, they did have a distinct language and literature, and they were conscious of a distinct history and religion.

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81 Malevsky-Malevitch, op. cit., p. 105.
82 Pipes, op. cit., p. 16.
83 Ibid., pp. 15-20.
84 Ibid.
85 Fitzsimmons, op. cit., p. 457.
On the north slopes of the Caucasus are many small groups who have developed a tradition of staunch independence because of the isolated terrain. There was of course some diluting of this with the Russian settlement starting in the 19th Century. There are more than 20 distinct dialects, many from the Indo-European root or the Turkic base. However, two others, distinctly separate, can be identified. One is the afore said Georgian; the other is spoken in the North Caucasus by the Dagestan and Cherkess peoples.

**Iranians.** Two peoples trace their ancestry to Iran (or Persia). The Ossetins in the Caucasus region and the Tadziks of Central Asia. The Ossetins have been influenced by the Russians and Moslems. Orthodoxy and Islam are chief religions; the Cyrillic alphabet was adopted before the revolution for an Iranian language that has an overlay of Caucasian phonetic patterns. The population was 171,700 in 1897 and 272,00 in 1926. The Tadziks outdated the Turkic inhabitants in Central Asia by several centuries. The traditional language was closely related to standard Persian before the revolution. The religion was Moslem.

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86 Ibid., pp. 456, 495.
In 1897, the census indicated 350,400 Tadziks; in 1926 the number was 376,400. Three other small groups living in the Caucasus region are also members of the Iranian group. They are the Talysh, Tats, and the Kurds.\(^{87}\)

**Moldavians.** There were 1,121,700 Moldavians in the Empire in 1897. With the World War I settlement the figure had dropped to 283,500 by 1926. The Moldavians inhabited the former Besarabia and were closely related in ancestry and language to the Rumanians.\(^{88}\)

**Mongols.** The Mongols swept west from Mongolia under Genghis Kahn; the invasion left two main groups in the Empire: the Kalmyks and the Buryats. The Kalmyks who numbered 190,600 in 1897, were the only Mongol-Buddhist people in Europe. They moved from Turkistan to the Volga area in 1630 and enjoyed a wide measure of self-rule in exchange for protecting the east boundary of the Empire. This policy changed under Catherine II, who abolished the title of Khan, the Kalmyk ruler, and replaced the sovereign with a grant of autonomy. Most of the population left Russia for the East; those that stayed were easily assimilated.\(^{89}\) The Buryats were an Asian people of about

\(^{87}\)Ibid., pp. 486-87.  
\(^{88}\)Ibid., p. 451.  
\(^{89}\)Kolarz, op. cit., pp. 81-87.
one-quarter million in 1897 and 1926. They inhabited the Lake Baikal region.90 Also in East Asia and Siberia, there were a number of small tribes of Manchu ancestry and some Eskimo-types in the northeast and a few groups of Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans.

Jews. The Jews in Russia, as in most countries, had no national territory. Russia had the largest Jewish population in the world before World War I with 5 million counted in the 1897 census. They were restricted to settlements chiefly in the cities of Belorussia and the Ukraine. A Jewish workers' organization, the Bund, sought to represent the Jews on a national basis within the Social Democratic Party; however, the Bund did not reflect the universal attitude of the Russian Jewry. Even in the Social Democratic Party several were not particularly conscious of their Jewishness. Leon Trotsky and Gregory Zinoviev are two examples.91

Germans. The Germans, a typical alien national people, were invited to the Empire by Catherine II in the 18th Century to settle on the Volga Steppe. The

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90Roucek, op. cit., p. 333.
91Fitzsimmons, op. cit., pp. 475-78.
immigrants were offered land, religious freedom, self-government, and tax freedom.\textsuperscript{92} About 25,000 Germans came; by the 1897 census they had increased to 1,790,500. The Germans participated in the Dumas\textsuperscript{93} and in the revolutionary activity with a strong representation in the Bolshevik Party.\textsuperscript{94} During the second World War the Germans were among several small nationalities in European Russia that were accused of aiding the Nazis. The nationalities, so accused, lost official recognition from the Soviet government and the populations were transferred to Siberian Russia.

V. THE NATIONALITIES AND THE REVOLUTION

In the four days, March 12-15, 1917, the pressures within the Russian Empire that had been building for a century exploded. The collapse of the Tsarist administration was both an end and a beginning. As an end, it was the culmination of a rift between the Russian people and the Tsar that had grown from the disappointments of the Russian soldiers after the drive across Europe to Paris

\textsuperscript{92}Kolarz, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 68-76.

\textsuperscript{93}Pipes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{94}Malevsky-Malevitch, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 115.
in 1815. As a beginning, the Romanov dynasty's abdication in favor of the Duma committee was an opportunity for the politically relevant strata of the Empire to initiate those liberal policies the Russian intelligentsia had talked about for a century.

For the non-Russian nationalities, the revolution brought hope for an end to the Russification policy of the Tsarist administration and brought almost immediate and universal demands for cultural autonomy of various kinds and a federated Russian democratic state. Until late 1917 there was no separatist tendency among the minority nationalities. The Provisional Government granted the citizens of the Empire equal rights regardless of religion, race, or national origin and it gave the chores of administration to local persons. Throughout the Empire, there were great expectations about the work of the Constituent Assembly to be called in early 1918. The collapse of the Tsarist administration in the face of the deepening domestic crises in the time of war left the nationalities to their own devices in coping with the crises. The nationalities were, in fact, compelled by events to act independently whether or not their political programs had

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95 Pipes, op. cit., p. 56.
called for such independence, and few had. The Bolshevik coup in November,\(^9^6\) the subsequent dismissal of the highly regarded Constituent Assembly, the messianism of Marxist dogma and the Great Russian proletarian base of the Bolshevik party were factors that intensified the minority nationalities' drives toward independence.

Within six months after the Bolsheviks had seized power from the Provisional Government, they could claim to have control of little more than Moscow and Petrograd. Many of the nationalities had declared their independence, much of the rest of the former Empire simply was not controlled by any effective government. Declaring their independence were Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Belorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Turkistan, Bashkir, and the Central Asian Turkic peoples. That none of these independence movements succeeded except for the Baltic States indicates that the national movements were not sufficiently developed and did not have the power to withstand the Bolshevik determination to force the

\(^9^6\) The Bolsheviks executed the coup in Petrograd on November 7, 1917, according to the Gregorian (or new style) calendar which was fourteen days ahead of the Julian calendar under which Russia operated until February 1/14, 1918. Under the Julian calendar, the Bolshevik coup occurred in October.
nations back into the Russian state. To carry out the policy of unification, the Bolsheviks marshalled more military strength than any of the minority nationalities could withstand. In the case of the Baltic States, the outcome was different because set against Bolshevik strength was Allied determination to keep the four states independent. Poland had been lost to the Empire for most of the war and proved strong enough to defeat a Bolshevik military attempt to regain it.

Ukraine. The centralist activity of the Tsars had left the Ukrainian national movement unprepared when the revolution came. The Ukrainians, like most other nationalities in the Empire thought themselves a part of Russia and they put faith in the all-Russian revolution. During the first half of 1917, the three main parties advocated some form of autonomy rather than separation. The Ukrainian Social Revolutionary Party, formed after the March Revolution, had a program that differed little from the Russian SR party's program of land reform. The party drew its power mainly from the peasants and urban proletariat. The Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers Party had its strength based on labor elements and radical

97 Borys, op. cit., p. 99.
intelligentsia. Because of a closely organized group, it was the leading party in the national movement. The Social Federalists were the third party. The membership largely comprised older intellectuals devoted primarily to cultural activities. 98

To prevent civil disorder in Kiev following the breakdown of the Tsarist administration, the citizens formed a group that was to become the Ukrainian Central Rada, the Ukrainian word for Council or Soviet. 99 Ukrainian historian Mkhael Hrushevsky became chairman of the Rada. Its initial program announcement called for national-cultural rights for the Ukraine. On April 8, the Rada said the all-Russian Constituent Assembly should ratify Ukrainian autonomy. 100 An all-Ukrainian Congress meeting in mid-April urged the Rada to "seize the initiative" in the movement toward autonomy. 101 When word of the revolution reached the army, members of various nationalities began organizing into national units. In some cases, the Ukrainian units would only obey orders from the Rada. 102

98 Ibid., pp. 91-99.
99 Pipes, op. cit., p. 287.
100 Reshetar, op. cit., p. 48.
101 Ibid., p. 50.
102 Pipes, op. cit., p. 56.
The first Ukrainian Military Congress, May 5, complained that the Provisional Government had not promised independence to the Ukraine as it had to Poland and Finland. Another national issue was the question of land reform. There was a desire to apportion the rich black earth of the Ukraine for the exclusive benefit of the local population.103

The Provisional Government was not opposed to Ukrainian demands; it was simply opposed to any action at all. The Provisional Government had pledged, in effect, to do as little as possible pending the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. On the Ukrainian problem, Alexander Kerensky, key figure in the Provisional Government, was on record favoring autonomy.104 Nonetheless, the cool reception given a delegation from the Rada by the Provisional Government produced great bitterness in the Ukraine and sharpened national demands.105 Volodimir Vinnichenko, a Ukrainian Social Democrat leader and new chairman of the Rada, led the delegation to St. Petersburg in late May seeking recognition in principle of

103 Ibid., p. 57.
104 Ibid., p. 60.
Ukrainian autonomy, participation by the Ukraine in the Peace Conference, separate military units and cultural freedom. On June 23, the Rada issued its First Universal saying that without separating themselves entirely from Russia..."from this day forth we shall direct our own lives." The Universal appealed for funds and established a General Secretariat with Vinnichenko as first secretary and internal secretary. There were eight other portfolios. With these moves the Rada became a full-fledged government. A Second Universal was the product of a conference between a delegation from the Provisional Government, led by Kerensky, and the Rada in Kiev in early July. The Universal repeated opposition to separation from Russia and said the General Secretariat was an arm of the Provisional Government. It was a compromise because neither the Provisional Government nor the Rada had forces for open conflict. On August 17, the Provisional Government

106 Reshetar, op. cit., p. 56.
107 Ibid., p. 61.
108 Pipes, op. cit., p. 60.
109 Reshetar, op. cit., p. 66.
sent the Rada "instructions" that rejected the idea of de jure Ukrainian autonomy. The Rada rejected the note as an attempt to undermine the movement.  

The day after the Bolsheviks seized control at St. Petersburg, they withdrew support of the Rada. A Third Universal, issued November 20, proclaimed the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic but qualified it with a pledge of non-separation within a federated Russian state. The formal declaration of independence came January 22, 1918, in a Fourth Universal. All the Ukrainian parties voted for the measure indicating that the idea of independence had wide appeal at the time. 

Almost immediately, the Bolsheviks sent the Red Army into Ukraine. Kiev fell on February 8, but the German army kept the Bolsheviks from achieving immediate victory. Ukraine worked out a separate peace with Germany and asked for German military aid. The aid was of questionable benefit to the Ukrainian national movement. The Germans dissolved the Rada in late February and set up a puppet government under Hetman Paul Skoropadsky, an aristocratic, landowning general. He established a

110 Ibid., p. 73.
111 Ibid., p. 89.
112 Borys, op. cit., p. 121.
dictatorship.\textsuperscript{113} For practical purposes the dissolution ended the political aspect of the Ukrainian national movement. The Germans withdrew when the armistice came and there was no effective control in the Ukraine until the Bolsheviks re-established the Ukrainian Republic.

The immediate reason for the Rada's downfall was the inability to please the German occupation master. Secondary reasons included the weakness of the national movement and its failure to act to meet pressing demands that the war created. When the Rada did not act it was blamed for the problems and lost former support. As an example, when forced to flee Kiev, the Rada had difficulty finding a town in which it would be allowed to meet.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Belorussia.} The Belorussian territory was a battle ground and this had a great influence on the national movement. At the time of the March Revolution there was only one political party with a national program, the Hromada. The political life of the territory was dominated by Russian and Jewish socialist parties.\textsuperscript{115} Most of those whose nationality was Belorussian were

\textsuperscript{113}Reshetar, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 198.

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 133-42.

\textsuperscript{115}Pipes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73.
peasants with no national political consciousness. In the vote for the Constituent Assembly, the Hromada got only .03 per cent of the ballots. The Bolsheviks scored a heavy victory because of the soldier vote. It was within the military ranks that the Bolsheviks concentrated their efforts to gain support.116

After the March Revolution, the Belorussian War Relief was transformed into the Belorussian National Committee and placed demands for the Provisional Government to grant it advisory functions regarding Belorussian matters. However, the Belorussian nationalists did not speak in a single voice; there were groups claiming to represent the Belorussian people at Minsk, Moscow, Odessa, and Petrograd; none had a tie with the people.117

The Bolshevik coup provided new impetus to the national movement because it made secession the only alternative to joining the Bolshevik ranks.118 The Hromada called a National Congress on December 14 to which 1,900 delegates came; most were anti-Bolshevik Russians. The night of December 17-18, the Congress proclaimed Belorussian

116 Ibid., p. 75.
117 Vakar, op. cit., pp. 93-96.
118 Ibid., p. 98.
independence. War conditions prevented any significant exercise of the newly proclaimed independence; however, after the Brest-Litovsk treaty the Belorussian Rada issued a manifesto declaring its intent to call a Constituent Assembly. The manifesto established an interim government and executive committee. The new state found its existence was dependent upon the good will of the German occupation troops, and after the armistice, the government collapsed under military pressure from the Bolshevik Red Army.

Moslem borderlands. The national movement in the Moslem borderlands had two phases, an initial all-Russian unity movement and later a fragmented national movement. The Moslem Duma members met March 15-17 and formed a Provisional Central Bureau of Russian Moslems and called a new all-Russian Moslem Congress. The Congress met in Moscow in May and produced a number of significant resolutions. After a spirited debate it voted to emancipate the position of Russian Moslem women and set up a new liberal religious administration. Most important, the Congress

119 Pipes, op. cit., p. 75.
121 Zenkovsky, op. cit., p. 139.
voted for cultural autonomy.\textsuperscript{122} The cultural autonomy vote produced the biggest argument, and the resolution calling for a federal Russian state with national cultural autonomy for those nationalities without a distinct territory was a compromise of two positions. The Volga Tatars desired administrative unity of the Empire and non-territorial cultural autonomy. The Azerbaijans desired political federation. The Congress appointed a National Central Council (Shura) to prepare legislation for the all-Russian Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{123}

Growing dissension among Moslems and the difficulty of communicating through the chaos of the Empire resulted in the attendance of only the Volga-Ural regions at a second Congress convened in Kazan July 21. The Azerbaijans, Kazakhs, and Central Asians boycotted the conference, and at the meeting the Bashkirs broke with the Tatars because the Tatars refused to recognize them as a separate people. The Tatars set up a plan for an Idel- (Volga) Ural Moslem autonomy with no reference to specific territory. The Congress informed the Provisional Government that it would go ahead with the plans prior to the convening of the all-Russian Constituent Assembly. The extra-territorial

\textsuperscript{122}Pipes, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., p. 77.
autonomy was short lived however, because the Bolsheviks seized power in the Volga-Ural regions at the same time they did in Petrograd.124

The Crimean Tatars showed a desire to establish a Moslem autonomous government. The national party—Milli Firka—called for federation, cultural autonomy for minorities and nationalization of all church and private lands. The Moslem nationalists were in a precarious position, outnumbered two to one in Crimea by Russian settlers. Throughout the year the Bolsheviks were in a rising position, but the nationalists called a Tatar Constituent Assembly which appointed a Tatar military commander, adopted a constitution for the Crimea and set up a five-man Directory. The leader of the movement was Jafer Seydamet. The movement got its power from the support of the German troops; however, in January 1918, the Moslem government was replaced by an anti-Bolshevik Russian government. This fell under Soviet pressure in October and the Bolsheviks resurrected the Crimean Tatar Republic and made the Tatar tongue the main language.125

The Bashkirs withdrew from the Kazan conference because the Tatars refused to recognize them as a separate

124 Zenkovsky, op. cit., pp. 139-64.
125 Ibid., p. 254; Pipes, op. cit., pp. 79-81.
nationality. The Bashkirs had been mostly nomadic people and were given special consideration by the Tsar as compared to the settled Tatars. As a result, many Tatars registered as Bashkirs until the privileges were removed. The national question for the Bashkirs was based on a resentment of the Russian colonizers who had taken the best land for themselves under the post-1905 program of Stolipin. The Bashkirs were disappointed that the Moscow Moslem conference did not endorse their land reform program of "all land for the Bashkirs." During much of the Civil War period, the Bashkir territory was the scene of battles between the Red and White armies. After rejecting any alliance with the Tatars, the Bashkirs looked to the Kirghiz people. Like themselves the Kirghiz were almost entirely an illiterate, nomadic people with no political consciousness beyond a dislike for the Russian colonialist. A national party, Alash Orda, called for use of the national language in schools, and expansion of the zemstvo activity. At a conference held July, 1917, there was no expressed desire for autonomy or independence.

The Bolshevik program of the dictatorship of the proletariat was interpreted by the Bashkirs and Kirghiz as a program of Russian imperialism. They reasoned that neither people had any proletariat and the Bolshevik program, therefore, was not in their interests. The November
coup brought a declaration of Bashkir-Kirghiz autonomy on December 23. As in the other cases the Bolsheviks were able eventually to crush the independence proclamation with superior military forces. A Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established August 26, 1920; and a Bashkir ASSR was created June 4, 1922. The size of the Bashkir republic was doubled and its Bashkir population was diluted to just 25 per cent of the total population. 126

In Turkistan the national problem was similar. There was hostility by the native Moslems toward the colonization of the Great Russians and other Europeans. Traditionally, the Russian military had complete administrative authority in Turkistan. After the March Revolution actual control of the capital went to the Tashkent Soviet in an alliance with the left wing of the Social Revolutionary Party. An April Turkistan Moslem conference voted a two-point program of federation and land reform for the native population. The conference established a Central Turkistan Moslem Council.

Fear of Soviet interference caused the Council to move from Tashkent to Kokand after the Bolshevik victory. There it voted for autonomy for Turkistan and set up a

The incident that prompted the Council to shift its operations was a vote in the Tashkent Soviet, following the Bolshevik coup, that would continue to exclude Moslems from a role in the government. The vote was interpreted as indicating that Russian imperialist attitudes had not changed with the new government. The Kokand Council drew enough support from the population to rival the Tashken Soviet for authority in Turkistan. The matter was settled once again on the basis of military force. The Kokand government appealed to the Central Soviet government for recognition. The reply was negative and said that the local soviet was sovereign and would have to be destroyed by force if at all. The Kokand Council appealed for the purchase of bonds to buy weapons. Before the plan could be executed the Tashkent Soviet crushed the Moslem government in a massacre.

After the massacre at Kokand, the Tashkent Soviet's next target was the Khanate of Bokhara, a conservative Islamic stronghold in Central Asia. An attempted coup in the summer of 1918 failed and the Bolsheviks were forced to extend recognition and to grant autonomy. It

127 Pipes, op. cit., pp. 86-93.
proved to be a gesture of short duration. In August, 1920, young Bokhara socialist intellectuals and the Red Army toppled the Khanate.  

The Moslem nationalist movement found its most effective expression in Asia in the Basmachi movement, a band of anti-Soviet guerilla fighters. The leadership was from the nationalist groups who participated in the Kokand Council. "Turkistan for the Natives," was the rallying cry. The movement found its medium in a defense of the Moslem religion. There was a good response from the population. The Bashmachi group at one point called a Constituent Assembly; however, internal disputes destroyed the plans. Also, the fall of other Central Asian national movements filled the Basmachi ranks with conservative remnants, and as a result the movement slowed in tempo and was punctuated with tribal disputes. The outstanding leader was a young Turk named Enver Pasha. In May, 1922, he sent Moscow an ultimatum demanding the release of political prisoners and freedom for the cities of Central Asia.

The Bolsheviks found that their usual method of dealing with national movements--forceful repression--only intensified the Basmachi movement. The Bolsheviks began

\[128\] Park, op. cit., pp. 11-21, 22-26, 49.
a new tactic—conciliation. They called a Moslem conference, appointed local administrators, and promised land reform. The Basmachi movement lost momentum under his pressure.\textsuperscript{129}

For a year after the revolution the Transcaucasus region continued to be a unit as it was under the Tsars despite the centrifugal forces created by the three distinct nationality groups: Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis. In Azerbaijan, the main political group was the Musavat, a clandestine party since 1912. Its program called for (1) close federative ties with Russia, (2) a revised education program to include the Azerbaijani spoken language in the lower grades, and (3) use of the Ottoman Turkic literary language in publication. During the first half of 1917, there were close ties between the Bolsheviks and the Musavat. In the summer the Musavat made a tenuous alliance with the conservative federalists and moved away from the Bolsheviks. The Constituent Assembly election in the Transcaucasus gave the Musavat 63 per cent of the Moslem vote; however, in Azerbaijan the situation was not that favorable. There were several national splinter groups and a strong Russian and Armenian minority that accounted for one-third of the population.

\textsuperscript{129}Ibid., pp. 34-42, 49-55.
The Azerbaijan conflict with the Russians was over control of the oil city of Baku. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd, the Baku Soviet took control there and forced the Azerbaijan nationalists to flee. The Azerbaijanis could retake the city only with the assistance of the Ottoman troops. At the armistice, the Turkic troops withdrew and British troops took up the occupation. Inter-coalition squabbles prevented the Azerbaijan government from implementing the needed reforms. In early 1920, the Azerbaijanis sought a rapprochement with the Soviets.\textsuperscript{130}

To influence the Azerbaijan government toward capitulation, the Bolsheviks prepared a sizeable military force to seize control and worked out an agreement with Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) that he would not aid Azerbaijan. On April 27, 1920, the Kavburo, Caucasus Office of the Communist Party, demanded that power be transferred from the government to the Communist Party organ in Azerbaijan. The next day there was a new government. In March, 1922, the defunct Transcaucasus federation was re-established and in December it joined the Russian federation, Belorussia, and the Ukraine in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{130} Zenkovsky, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 254-64.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., pp. 264-67.
Georgia, Armenia. As the Musavat was the dominant party in the Azerbaijan national movement so the nationalities of Georgia and Armenia had one dominant national party. In Georgia, it was the Mensheviks who got 80 per cent of the Georgian vote in the Constituent Assembly election in November, 1917. The leading national party in Armenia was the Dashnak party. It captured almost the entire Armenian vote in the Constituent Assembly election.

When the Tsarist administration collapsed in early 1917, control of the major cities in the Transcaucasus went to the Soviets. By early 1918, pressures from other parts of the Empire and the remoteness of the Transcaucasus region forced the Soviets to relinquish control in favor of a Transcaucasian federation, which was a coalition of the three major nationalities. The purpose of the federation was to attempt to order the chaotic situation created by the pressure from Ottoman troops invading the area and the year-long absence of traditional administration. The federation survived for about a month until late May, 1918, when the three nationalities declared their independence. Azerbaijan got outside support from Turkey; Germany gave support to Georgia; but Armenia could find no ally and was at the mercy of the Turkish troops.132

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132 Ibid., p. 257.
The German occupation was apparently based on three motivations: a desire to strengthen the German war effort, a desire to protect Christians from Moslem terror, and a desire to weaken Russia in any way possible. Germany was attracted to Georgia, because of manganese, and to curb the excesses of the Turkist troops in the Transcaucasus. As in the case of their occupation of the Ukraine and the Baltic states, the presence of German troops was a factor in separating Georgia from the Russian state. With the armistice, the German troops and the Turkish troops withdrew. This opened the way for Bolshevik military operations that brought Azerbaijan back in 1920 and Georgia and Armenia in February, 1921.  

Baltic States. The course of the revolution in the Baltic states was similar to that in other areas of the Empire except that after the armistice the Allied Powers guaranteed the continued independence of the nationalities with military force. It is doubtful whether the movements would have succeeded without Allied assistance.  

Estonia was free from German occupation at the time of the March Revolution. The Provisional government

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gave the Estonians a promise of autonomy and a national council drew up a constitution and established its own military units. On November 28, the Council declared Estonia's independence. The Bolsheviks moved to set aside the declaration by arresting the leaders of the national movement; however, the captors had to flee in front of the German troops in February, 1918, and on the twenty-fourth of the month, Estonia affirmed its independence.  

Latvia had a similar course of development but with less success than the Estonians. All the Latvian parties except the Bolsheviks met at Walk on November 16, 1917, and formed a National Council with an implicit independence decree. The Bolsheviks dissolved the local government and called a new election, but the advance of the German armies forced a postponement. In July, 1918, the Latvians appealed for Allied support of their independence.

Lithuania's national development was less affected by political developments in Russia because from 1915 it was under German occupation. A national council of the Duma sought autonomy from the Provisional Government but

135 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
136 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
failed to get it. The Council appointed a provisional administrator for Lithuanian affairs and when the Provisional Government refused to hear his demands, the national movement swung toward independence from Russia. The German military had tried to get these three nationalities into a federal alliance with Germany, but was not successful because there was no mutual desire for such a federation. The next best German alternative was to encourage the Baltic nations to separate from Russia and be independent. In Lithuania, they permitted the national movement to flourish with meetings at Vilna in the fall of 1917. The Conference called for a Constituent Assembly and set up an interim National Council (Taryba). The Germans forced a postponement of the Constituent Assembly meeting in favor of a movement toward a loose permanent alliance with Germany. The Kaiser gave de jure recognition to Lithuanian independence March 23, 1918.

With the November armistice, the Germans withdrew quickly. The Allies had wanted the Germans to stay in the Baltic long enough to establish the Baltic states apart from Soviet control. When they failed to do so; the Allies had to intervene with Poland to drive the Bolsheviks out. In 1920, the Soviet government extended recognition.  

Finland, Poland. Finland and Poland had been held much more loosely by the Tsarist government than other parts of the Empire. When the revolution came, both proclaimed their independence. Poland had enjoyed de facto independence from Russia since it fell to German troops in 1915. Finland was granted de jure independence by the Provisional Government and was recognized by the Bolsheviks on December 6, 1917. During the Civil War period, the Bolsheviks sent troops into the territories of both nations, but were not successful in ending their independence. Poland was strong enough to drive the Red Army east and seize Kiev in May, 1920, before falling back to its frontier. Finland got military assistance first from the Germans and then from the British.
SOVIET COMMUNIST
THEORY AND POLICY ON NATIONALITY

In evolving a policy on the national question the Soviet Communist Party has been guided by a theoretical conception of nationality that attaches no fundamental importance to the phenomenon itself. This chapter presents a discussion of the Communist conception of the phenomenon of nationality and a discussion of the evolution of policy on the national question based on that conception. In this manner a distinction is made between theory and policy on the national question. Theory is the conception of the nature and importance of nationality, and policy is an outline of action to be taken in regard to nationalities.

I. MARXIST ORIGIN

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels are the ideological fathers of Soviet Communism, and it is to them that one looks for the basis of the Soviet theory and policy of the national question.

It is necessary to view the expression of Marx and Engels on the national question on two levels. Their theory of nationality is a subordinate to their philosophy of economic determinism with its inevitable end of the classless, nationless society. Their policy on the national question is a part of the Marxian outline for overthrowing capitalism.

The national problem in the context of economic determinism\(^2\) is a transitory problem created by the capitalistic mode of production\(^3\) and bound to pass away with the proletarian victory over capitalism. If, as Marx argued, economic factors are the sole determinant of the course of history, everything else in society falls outside or beyond the area of importance in understanding the nature and the course of society. Thus, for Marx, the phenomenon of nationality, which he saw as an instrument of the capitalist class, would pass away with that class following the proletarian victory. In effect, Marx was a-national.

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\(^2\)Economic determinism implies a single variable or causal factor in history. A change in economic factors will bring a change in everything else in society.

\(^3\)By the capitalist mode of production, Marx meant an economic system that located ownership and control of land, technology and productive capacity in the hands of private individuals. Marx said the pressure for increased profits forced the capitalists to band together in national states. States and nations were for Marx a product of capitalism and a tool of the capitalists.
Marxism can be separated from the posited end of the classless, nationless society and viewed as an outline of action for the proletariat to hasten the inevitable course of history.\(^4\) Marx was chiefly concerned with the capitalist era. He devoted relatively little attention to the emergence of the classless society and the melting of national differences. On the policy level, he sometimes spoke as a nationalist\(^5\) might speak in prescribing tasks for various national proletarians. However, he attached no fundamental significance to, for example, English proletarians as Englishmen; and in fact he was irked by their support of the English national state.\(^6\)

Marx saw that the proletariat of the various countries had common problems and he suggested a common

\(^{4}\)Adapted from Henry B. Mayo, *Introduction to Marxist Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), who argues that it is wise to separate Marxist theory and cast away the dialectic and determinism and save Marx’s social critique.


solution. He wrote, "The proletarians have nothing to lose by their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!" It is the union of the proletariat that represents the natural order of history for Marx, despite his concession that, "...The proletariat of each country...must settle with its own bourgeoisie." On several occasions Marx called for the establishment of national states. He supported the creation of an independent Poland as "a preliminary condition for the general emancipation of the European proletariat." He urged the creation of an independent Irish state for "only in Ireland can the decisive initial blow against the English bourgeoisie come." Marx and Engels hoped an independent, unified German state would result from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Writing in 1882, 

7 In the "Communist Manifesto" Marx wrote,..."In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, the Communists point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat...." See Emile Burns, *Handbook of Marxism* (London: Victory Gollancz, 1935), p. 37.


10 Marx, Engels, *Correspondence*, op. cit., p. 287.


Engels said the various colonial areas occupied by a European population would gain independence but areas inhabited by a native population "must be taken over by the proletariat and led as quickly as possible toward independence." The important point to be drawn from the examples in this paragraph is that while in each case there is emphasis on establishing a national state and a role in that establishment for the proletariat of a given nationality, such creations are only a means of weakening the bourgeois class and of moving closer to the proletarian victory which will bring the classless nationless society.

Regarding the problems of minority relations in a multi-national state like the Russian Empire, Marx and Engels failed to provide any guideline. The essence of the national question in Marx and Engels is the transitory nature of nationalism as a product of the capitalist era. Because of this conception, neither outlined policies regarding how to govern nationalities after the revolution.

\[13\] Ibid., p. 399.
II. NATIONALITY THEORY BY LENIN AND STALIN

Lenin fully accepted Marx' conception of the nature and importance of nationality, and he provided no additional theoretical expression on the subject. Lenin argued, as Marx did, that nationalism was the product of the victory of capitalism over feudalism. As such, it would pass away with the proletarian victory over capitalism. The great bulk of Lenin's work on the national question is in the area of Bolshevik policy, as he developed a plan of action designed to bring about the proletarian revolution in Russia. Lenin's policy is discussed in the third section of this chapter.

More than any of the previous writers, Stalin examined the development of nationality. As a Georgian, he was thought to have had practical experience that would be valuable to the Social Democratic Party. Though Stalin was tabbed as an authority on the national question, the ideas of Lenin are apparent in much of his early work. The significant difference is that Stalin

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was more conscious of the strength of nationalism; as a result Stalin was more conservative in his expectation of the disappearance of national differences.  

Stalin defined a nation as an "...historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." If any of the six factors was missing the community could not be called a nation. Stalin identified the rise of national states with the beginning of the capitalist era. He said that nations were the result of the break-up of feudalism and the drawing together of previously disunited parts. This was the nature of the national development in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the formation of centralized states occurred before the overthrow of feudalism because of pressure from outside powers. The results were multi-national states.

In the west, the bourgeoisie who had formed the national states used the state power to oppress the

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19 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 15.
proletariats. In the east, the dominant national groups held the minorities in a state of economic oppression. With the birth of imperialism, the bourgeoisie carried their oppression to the colonial areas, and it was in these areas that the initial blow against capitalism would have to be struck. As the bourgeois class goes, so goes the national movement. The strength of the national movement is determined by the extent of the participation in it by the proletariat and peasantry. If the oppressed class carries on the revolutionary struggle with their oppressing bourgeoisie, imperialism will break up, capitalism will crumble, the proletarian dictatorship will come, and the conditions for the final collapse of the national movement will be created. Stalin's hesitance in saying that the proletarian victory would bring the collapse of the nationality problem is an indication of his conservatism. Stalin postponed to some indefinite future time the classless, nationless society.

23 Ibid., p. 7.
24 Ibid., p. 15.
25 Ibid., p. 10.
27 Ibid., p. 182.
28 Ibid., p. 189. My italics.
when he identified two types of nations—bourgeois capitalist nations and socialist nations. The latter are identified by his phrase, "national in form, socialist in content."29

III. BOLSHEVIK NATIONALITY POLICY

Because the Marxist attached no fundamental significance to national sentiments, he relegated a discussion of the national problem to one of strategy and tactics in the proletarian revolution.30 One can see changes in Soviet Communist policy as the position of the Party changed in relation to the minority national groups. Each shift of policy was made to accommodate the proletarian movement, as Lenin testified.31

The heart of Lenin's policy on the national question was self-determination32 in a very restricted meaning of the term. In its broadest sense, self-determination would mean determination by a nationality as to its affiliation with another nationality, i.e. in a unitary centralized state, a unitary state with autonomy

32Lenin, Collected Works, op. cit., p. 47.
for the nationalities, federalism or some other arrangement, or no affiliation at all. Lenin offered the right of self-determination as "the right to separate state existence."\(^{33}\) It was posed in an "either-or" sense; and he argued that if the national minorities chose to stay with the large multi-national state, as he expected them to do, the administration of that state would be tightly centralized.\(^{34}\)

The Russian Social Democratic Party first officially considered the national question at an 1897 Congress in Minsk; a resolution stipulated the recognition of the right of self-determination for nations.\(^{35}\) The Congress also decided to organize the party on an all-Russian basis. The two potentially contradictory resolutions reflected the split in the Social Democratic Party on the national question. Georgi Plekhanov, first Russian Marxist, had led the party with a distinctly Great Russian orientation. The position was that of the party leftist who would ignore the national question.


\(^{34}\) Lenin, *Collected Works*, op. cit., XIX, p. 51.

altogether. At the other extreme was the rightist who proposed a national federation of the party and the Russian state. Lenin rejected the rightist position outright but realized that the national question could be used as a weapon in the struggle to gain power in Russia. In 1903 Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party adopted a nine point program including local self-government and the right of self-determination as a means of unifying the Empire and getting acceptance of the party among the national minorities. Lenin was a strong supporter of the self-determination part of the party’s program because of its potentially disruptive effect on the Tsarist administration in the areas of the minorities. He argued that renunciation of that point in the program would be a "shameful concession" to Great Russian nationalism.

Among many of the Russian minorities, the Russian settler was an unwanted colonizer, and Lenin hoped that the idea of self-determination among the


37 Bcrys, op. cit., p. 22.

38 Lenin, Selected Works, op. cit., VI, p. 38.
minorities would win support for the party and would "foment mass action and revolutionary attacks on the bourgeoisie."³⁹

Lenin insisted that recognition of the right of self-determination would not encourage the break-up of the Empire;⁴⁰ and he clearly said that the aim of socialism is the merger of national states.⁴¹ He said that the fundamental question in the class struggle "must be raised from the all-Russian point of view."⁴² Lenin argued that a federated party system would be "a shameful state of affairs" that must not be allowed to happen.⁴³ He insisted that it was absolutely essential to make a unified attack on the Tsarist system, and such an attack required the unified proletarian party.⁴⁴ The essence of the Bolshevik national policy on the eve of their takeover was to promise the right of self-determination as an attempt to disrupt the Tsarist system and to gain support

⁴⁰Lenin, Collected Works, op. cit., XIX, p. 50.
⁴¹Lenin, Imperialist War, loc. cit.
⁴²Lenin, Selected Works, op. cit., VI, p. 290.
⁴⁴Ibid., p. 322.
among the nationalities while planning to centralize the administration of the socialist state. Suggestions of federalism, and forms of cultural autonomy were rejected on the grounds that they were bourgeois programs designed to divert the proletariat from its true interest. 45

As soon as the minorities began to take advantage of the right of self-determination, the policy was modified in such a way that the Bolsheviks could agitate for it in territory in which they did not have control and suppress it in territory they had captured. 46 The essential modification was to define self-determination as the right of the working class of a nation and not of the nation itself. 47 This meant that the Bolsheviks, who claimed to be the party of the workers, through their iron tight discipline actually pre-empted the choice of the workers, if there were any, of a nationality in which the Soviets were in control. In those areas not governed by Soviets, the Bolsheviks would insist that the workers had been captured by bourgeois nationalists. 48

47 Lenin, Selected Works, op. cit., II, p. 322.
48 Stalin, Stalin's Kampf, op. cit., p. 198.
Stalin, who was Commissar of Nationalities after the November Revolution, articulated two other conditions to the right of self-determination. One was an attempt to justify the use of the Red Army in capturing those nationalities that had elected to secede, and the other was a justification for the acceptance of federalism as a political form of organization even though it had earlier been rejected by the Bolsheviks. Stalin said while it was true that the workers of each nationality were granted the right of self-determination, which meant a choice to secede or remain in a centralized state, the proletariat must decisively and actively influence the nationality toward a decision in the interest of the proletariat. He said that to solve the national question in a socialist way, it must be subordinated to the interests of the workers organized in Soviets. Stalin went a step further, too, adding, "...Petition for secession becomes a question of character...determined by interests of the peoples both in the center and in the border regions." To avoid being cast as Russian imperialists, the Bolsheviks adopted federalism as the formal outline of the

50 Ibid.
51 Stalin, Stalin's Kampf, op. cit., p. 201.
Russian state into which could be fit the pieces of the former Empire when they were captured by the Red Army or by Soviet coup. Stalin recognized federalism as a formal relation between Russia and the borderlands.\textsuperscript{52} The Bolsheviks called federalism a transitional form of organizing the state in the period of the proletarian dictatorship.\textsuperscript{53} One critic has said, "There is no doubt that the form of Union was a synthesis of the desired and the possible." The party desired a completely unitary system, but it underestimated the force of nationalism and overestimated the class consciousness of the minorities. Thus the Bolsheviks compromised.\textsuperscript{54}

In the following chapter of the thesis is a discussion of the federal solution to the national question. Below is an outline of other aspects of the post-civil war solution. There are two other techniques in the solution of the nationality problem besides the formal federal outline of the Russian state. They are the industrialization of the borderlands and elevation of the cultural

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Borys, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 324.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Schlesinger, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 335.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Borys, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 344.
\end{itemize}
level of the minority nationalities. Stalin was largely responsible for formulating the policies for dealing with the Soviet Union’s nationalities. In his words:

   The crux of the national problem...lies in the obligation to put an end to backwardness of the nationalities we have inherited from the past and afford the backward peoples the opportunity of catching up with Central Russia...We must unfailingly take into account all the peculiarities of economic life, class structure and historical past in pursuing this policy.55

This Stalinist prescription has been the orientation of the Soviet Communist policy on the national question from the mid-Twenties. Statistics corresponding to Stalin’s consolidation of his power on the eve of World War II indicate the success of these cultural and economic aspects of the national policy.

Between 1926 and 1939 the per cent of literates between nine and twenty years of age increased in the Soviet Union from 51.1 per cent to 81.2 per cent. Among the major minority nationalities the literacy rate at least doubled in every case. In 1926, there were 3.7 per cent of the young Tadzik population literate; by 1939 the per cent was 71.7. The lowest percentage of literacy in the

55Stalin, On the National Question, op. cit., p.20.
nationalities in 1939 was among the Turkmens and Uzbeks where the figures were 67.2 and 67.8 respectively.56

The national cultures have been considered, though national in form, socialist in content, which means elements hostile to the regime have been the subject of attack as reflections of "bourgeois nationalism." National differences have been tolerated where they do not hinder the socialist movement and encouraged where they would aid the movement. For example, written forms have been developed for former vernaculars of several Central Asian peoples. National languages are used in the lower grades of the Soviet school system.

The orientation of the Soviet Union has been toward creating a strong industrial power status for itself.57 The question of nationality policy has been kept subordinate to questions of industrialization. Apparently the role of the nationalities in building the Soviet industrial machine has not been greatly different


from the Russian citizen's role. The primary considerations of the regime in dealing with the minorities have been economic rather than national in the area of national culture.

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CHAPTER VI

SOVIET FEDERALISM

I. INTRODUCTION

The history of Soviet federalism has shown it to be what its founders said it would be—a transitional device from the disunity of the civil war to a highly centralized state. By Lenin's testimony, federation is the surest step to the most solid unification of the nationalities.¹ Implicit in the Bolshevik use of federalism as a transitional device is the same assumption which underlay the pre-revolutionary policy. The Marxist always assumed that nationalism would be neutralized by the class struggle; therefore, it was not necessary for him to give juridical meaning to the nationality desires for a share in political decision making.² The psychological impact of a facade of words would be sufficient in


the political area\(^3\) while the primary orientation of the regime would be non-national economic development.\(^4\)

The analysis of Soviet federalism in this chapter will be made under two categories: similarities to other federal systems and differences from other federal systems. The discussion of differences is divided into three classifications: centripetal and centrifugal forces, constitutional differences, and operational differences. As outlined by the Soviet constitution, the Soviet system has always been highly centralized and there was a tendency toward greater centralization through the promulgation of the present constitution in 1936. On the basis of operation, the Soviet system is unlike a true federal system because of the sovereignty of the Communist Party and the iron discipline within its ranks.

II. SIMILARITIES TO OTHER FEDERAL SYSTEMS

There are four points of similarity between the Soviet federation and other federal systems. (1) Federalism has been a traditional means of unifying formerly


independent or nearly independent regions as in the case of the thirteen American Confederated States. The regions, because of various centripetal forces, transferred some authority to a central government by means of the constitutional contract. In the Soviet experience, the nationalities declared their independence of the Russian state; then, formally at least, through treaties and ratification of the federal constitution they transferred their authority to the central Soviet government.\(^5\) (2) The federal system in the Soviet Union was the result of armed force. In the words of one critic, the actual formation of the Soviet Union "...in many respects was an anticlimax, a mere legislation of conditions brought about by the Red Army, by the Communist Party, and by the government of the Russian federation between 1917 and 1922."\(^6\) However, the experience differs in degree only from several other federal systems that have used force to preserve the federation by defeating regions that would declare independence. The American Civil War is a most notable example; Switzerland also had a civil war. There of


\(^6\)Pipes, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
course is a difference between the preservation of a system by armed force and the formation of a system by military action, but the important point of similarity is that in both cases force is used as a centripetal force in the union. (3) The Soviet federation did not succeed until one party controlled all the federating units. Here again there is only a difference in degree from other federal systems. The Swiss and German federations, while not formed by a single political party, were agreements among similarly oriented persons initially—Swiss aristocrats and German princes. 7 Charles Beard 8 argues that the Constitution of the United States was the product of the efforts of a group of similarly oriented individuals. Of course the Federalists, who according to Beard, were united by common economic interests, did not control all of the states, and in fact gained approval for the constitution by only a narrow margin. The point is that the process of politically integrating a community requires some degree of mutual interest among the elements of the community. In the Soviet Union this factor was accentuated. (4) A fourth similarity is the language


of the federation, proclaiming free association when it is apparent such is not the case. Again, the Soviet system parallels other federations. Nearly all federations proclaim that the basis of the union is the voluntary consent of the regions, when any attempt to leave the union surely would have to be opposed. Thus, in a comparison of the Soviet federation with other systems in a search for similarities, the Soviet federal system differs in degree with a pronounced tendency toward centralization.

III. DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER FEDERAL SYSTEMS

Centripetal and Centrifugal forces.

Examination of the force pattern of the Soviet system will show strong centripetal forces and relatively weak centrifugal forces. In the formation of the Soviet Union, the military aggression of the Red Army and the subversive actions of the Communist Party were the strongest immediate centripetal forces. They were strong enough to bring to an end the secession of nearly all of the independence movements. The common history of Russia and her borderlands and the predominance of Russian population in most towns and cities of the Empire no doubt blurred an image of the Red troops as outright aggressors in the manner in
which the Ukrainian Rada complained about the German occupation. The Red Army and also the White Army were Russian armies, and the nationalities had seen Russian armies in their territories before.

Leadership was a centripetal factor working for the reunification of the Russian state. The Bolsheviks had been organized longer and had gained support for their program from the army and the workers. The Bolsheviks tapped these bases of support and forced the nationalists into the country to seek their support from among the largely non-national peasantry. Also, the national movements had not thought in terms of independence from Russia until it was thrust upon them in late 1917 and early 1918. Thus the national movements were unprepared to solve effectively the critical problems that faced their populations. As a result of the failure, the movements were not able to attract new support and in some cases saw one-time followers become discouraged and abandon the movements.

The chief centrifugal forces were nationality, geography, and foreign support of the national movements.


during their independence. A fundamental centrifugal force was the pressure of national differences among the population. All of the pre-independence national programs sought some kind of freedom for cultural expression of the various national groups. In Central Asia, there was hostility over land appropriation by the Russian colonizers; among the Moslem peoples there was hostility over religious differences with the Russians and Armenians. Several national groups based their national programs on the right to use the native language, which had from time to time been forbidden by the Tsarist school system. While none of the nationalities was well prepared to accept the responsibilities of independence, the extent to which they met the challenges in the period after the Bolshevik revolution tended to institutionalize self-rule. It is in such crisis periods as the revolution and the civil war that movements are made and broken. Infant political movements can mature rapidly under such strains. For example, the Bolsheviks themselves had never administered a state before the November Revolution, and it was very much a question whether they would be successful for some time after they seized power.

A second centrifugal force is the geography of the Russian state. The tremendous expanse of the country
required some decentralization of administration if the
government were to function with any efficiency.\footnote{11} For
example, the Russian Far East territory has always been a
special administrative problem because of its geographical
isolation.\footnote{12} The Transcaucasus area, isolated from Russia
by the Caucasus, enjoyed the longest period of independence
after the revolution because of the logistics problems
the Bolsheviks encountered in supplying the Red Army in
any campaign to capture the three Transcaucasian nation-
alities.

If the military strength of the Red Army and the
conspiracy of the Communist Party were the chief immediate
centripetal forces at work in the civil war period, then
the chief immediate centrifugal force was the role of
foreign military units. In no case were the Bolsheviks
able to capture a national territory while it was occupied
by German or Allied troops. The only successful inde-
pendence movements, those of the Baltic states, can trace
their success to the military assistance given them by
the Allies. In those territories that fell to the Red

\footnote{11} John Hazard, "Soviet Public Administration and

\footnote{12} Walter Kolarz, \textit{The Peoples of the Soviet Far
Army after the German withdrawal, the Bolsheviks chose to consolidate their victory by means of establishing the outline of a federal system rather than incorporating the territory directly into a unitary state. Such a choice reflects the respect the Bolsheviks had for the power of foreign troops and the fear of reprisals against the Red Army's aggression.13

Constitutional differences. The first moves toward federalism came in the establishment of the Russian federation. In early 1918 the Executive Committee of the Central government decreed the formation of the Tatar-Bashkir and Turkistan republics. The republics were not successfully established because the military pressure of the White Army broke down the Bolshevik administration. On July 10, 1918, the Fifth all-Russian Congress of Soviets ratified a constitution of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR).14 The constitution identified autonomous regions and autonomous republics without a clear distinction between them. Through 1923 there were 17 autonomous units set up in the territory of the RSFSR.15

13 Park, loc. cit.
14 Pipes, op. cit., p. 287.
15 Ibid., p. 246.
A second step in creating the Soviet federal system was the establishment of the Soviet Union in the last phase of the civil war. Stalin was chairman of a constitutional committee that worked from October to December, 1922. The constitution created a supreme legislative organization in the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR), a Central Executive Committee to function in the absence of the Congress, and a supreme executive body in the Council of Peoples' Commissars to be elected by the Executive Committee. The Commissariats included foreign affairs, war and navy, foreign trade, communication, post and telegraph, inspection, labor, supply, and finance. Also on the Council were the chief of the secret police, chairman of the Economic Council and a chairman and deputy chairman. The structure of the regional units, Union-republics, was similar to the central government.

The Union-republic commissariats were supply, finance, labor, inspection, agriculture, internal affairs, education, health, and social security. The first four of the list were directly subordinate to the corresponding central government commissariat.16 The relationship was

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16 Ibid., p. 248.
called a "unified" power, corresponding vaguely to the concurrent powers in the United States Constitution in that both the central government and the regional governments have responsibilities in a single area. However, the unified powers are very much more centralized because the Union-republic commissariat was subordinate to the central commissariat. In the United States, while the federal and state governments may exercise similar powers, they do so independently as in the case of social welfare legislation.

In July 1923, the Central Executive Committee approved the Stalin constitution, and on January 31, 1924, it was ratified by the all-Union Congress of Soviets. The Soviet Union included the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasus SFSR. Uzbekistan and Turkmen were promoted to Union-republics in 1925, and Tadzik was promoted in 1929. In 1936, the Transcaucasus SFSR split into three Union-republics: Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In the same year, Kazakh and Kirghiz were given the status of Union-republica. The Soviet-German treaty of 1939 prompted the Soviet Union to move troops across her western frontier. Between 1939 and 1941, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, and

\[17\] Ibid., p. 282.
territory inhabited by Karels and Finns were made Union-republics. Recently the Karelo-Finnish SSR has been reduced to an autonomous republic, and there are fifteen Union-republics now. There are eighteen autonomous republics with fourteen of them in the RSFSR, two in Georgia, and one each in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. There are ten autonomous regions with seven in the RSFSR and one each in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tadzik.  

Regarding the division of powers, the 1924 constitution allowed the Union-republics to legislate in fields of agriculture, health, and justice. In 1929, agriculture was made a unified function, and health and justice followed in Stalin's 1936 constitution.  

The division of power in the 1936 constitution delegates several powers to the central government and reserves others to the Union-republics. The delegated powers include: control of foreign relations, questions of peace and war, admission of new republics, control over the observance of the constitution, boundary changes, defense, foreign trade, internal security, economic  


19Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 388.
planning, the consolidated state budget, transportation, commerce, monetary system, insurance, education and public health, labor, citizenship, and marriage and family. There are no powers either specifically reserved or delegated to the Union-republics. The constitution made allowance for what it called "independent authority" of the Union-republics. Such independent authority includes any area that falls outside the powers delegated to the all-Union government and is consistent with the constitution.\(^20\) The scope of the delegation of powers to the central government makes it difficult to imagine the regional governments exercising a wide range of "independent authority."

The institutional structure of the Soviet Union in the 1936 constitution did not differ greatly from the outline in the earlier documents. The system was similar to a parliamentary system with the legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, the highest organ of state power.\(^21\) However, in practice, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dominates the former body, which functions as a ratifier and forum for policy statements. The Supreme Soviet consists of two chambers—the Soviet of the Union and the

\(^{20}\) Articles 14, 15.

\(^{21}\) Articles 30, 32.
Soviet of Nationalities. The Soviet of the Union is elected by districts of 300,000 population; the Soviet of Nationalities consists of 25 deputies from the Union republics, 11 from each autonomous republic, 5 from each autonomous region, and one deputy from each National Area which are large sparsely populated areas of the Arctic North. The Presidium convenes the Supreme Soviet semi-annually or for special sessions. The Presidium acts in the absence of the Supreme Soviet, and the constitution gives it wide authority including decree power.

The Council of Ministers is the highest executive body. The Ministers are granted virtual decree power in pursuance of policy outlined by the Supreme Soviet. The Ministries include: foreign trade, foreign commerce, transportation, medium industry, transport construction, chemical industry, power plant construction, internal affairs, education, geology, public health, foreign affairs, culture, defense, communications, agriculture, and finance. The ministries of internal affairs,

22 Articles 33, 34, 35.

23 Article 49.

24 Articles 64, 66, 67, 68, 77, 78.
education, geology, public health, foreign affairs, culture, defense, communications, agriculture, and finance are Union-republic ministries also, and as such are directly subordinate to the ministry on the central level.\textsuperscript{25}

The institutional outline of the Union-republics is similar to that of the central government. Each has a Supreme Soviet of the Union-republic, a Presidium and Council of Ministers. The 1936 constitution delegates no specific independent powers to the Union-republic. In fact, the regional government functions as a subordinate administrative unit of the central government. The Union-republic Supreme Soviet's functions include ratification and confirmation of the economic plans and budgets from the central government and supervision of the execution of laws from the central government.\textsuperscript{26}

Supreme judicial authority is vested in a Supreme Court elected by the central Supreme Soviet. The court supervises all judicial matters of the central government and the republics. The Procurator-General is the state prosecutor, charged with supervising strict observance by

\textsuperscript{25}Article 76.

\textsuperscript{26}Articles 60, 81.
officials and citizens of the laws and the constitution. The Procurator of the central government appoints those who function at the lower levels of the state organization.27

Amendment of the constitution is by a two-thirds majority vote of each house of the Supreme Soviet of the central government.28

As in most constitutions, Soviet citizens have an elaborate statement of personal rights including freedom of speech, press, assembly, work, leisure, and religion. However, there is a fundamental qualification to this constitutional guarantee. The rights are granted "in order to strengthen the socialist system."29 This is a limitation on personal liberties because it requires the individual to limit himself to those actions that will strengthen the socialist system. This limitation makes more difficult the already substantial task of preserving the individual's liberties.

This analysis of the Soviet system in terms of its constitutional differences gives a picture of a highly centralized system. A socialist system with the necessary

27Articles 102-17.
28Article 146.
29Articles 118-33.
central economic control would tend to make a federation more centralized than a system that operated in a free economy and did not require the instruments of planning and control. However, the 1936 Constitution has left no area of independent action for the regional governments; therefore, the Soviet system can not be considered even a formally outlined federal system, and it certainly is not federal in operation.

Operational differences. The Soviet government operates in a manner that is antithetical to federalism. The government is an iron dictatorship of the Communist Party hierarchy, and it accepts no limitation on its authority as a true federal system would require. The point is made clearer by discussing the dominating role of the Russian government in the operation of the Soviet Union, the place of the constitution in the Soviet Union and the role of the Communist Party in the Soviet government.

The first indictment of the Soviet federal system is the basic inequality of the regions. The Great Russian population is nearly equal to all the other population combined. Without Russian assent in the Soviet of the Union, legislation would not be possible. The territory of the RSFSR is three-fourths of the territory
of the Soviet Union. The resources of the Russian republic far exceed those of any single republic though not the other republics together. The Russian government took the lead in the formation of the Russian federation and the formation of the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik government unilaterally pronounced the constitutions and the existence of the republics in the RSFSR.

A second operational criticism is the lack of true constitutionalism in the Soviet system. The existence of a constitution for a federal system implies use of the document as a guide for political action on the central and regional levels. The constitution provides stability by allowing units of the system to predict the behavior of other units. In this way the federal constitution is a precept for the political system. The Soviet constitution does not have this role and, as a result, the federal quality of the system suffers. In Stalin's words the constitution "...is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of gains already achieved. In other words, it is a registration...of what has already been achieved."\(^{30}\) The implication is that the constitution

may change to fit practice rather than practice being restricted by the constitution. Soviet Marxian theory can accept no limit on the authority of the proletariat such as a constitution would imply. The proletariat or its would-be representatives do not accept the restrictions a system based on a constitutional government requires. Such restrictions are essential to a workable federal system. Until the promulgation of the 1924 constitution, a single ministry of the Russian government—Commissariat of Nationalities—handled the political affairs of the would-be autonomous governments of the federation.

The strongest indictment of the Soviet federal system is the role of the Soviet Communist Party. Its monolithic unity and iron discipline make it incompatible with federalism. The reason is obvious. A party with dictatorial discipline that controls both the regional


and central governments permanently\textsuperscript{34} can circumvent the constitution without objection from the injured government.\textsuperscript{35}

The Marxian rationalization for the existence of a single party in the Soviet Union is that political parties represent class interests. Since there is a dictatorship of a single class, there is only one party and nothing will be enacted contrary to the party's interest.\textsuperscript{36} The party is a dictatorship of the highest levels over the lower with "...absolutely binding...decisions of higher bodies upon lower bodies."\textsuperscript{37} The 1936 Constitution said, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union...is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build a communist society and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."\textsuperscript{38}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34}The Constitution (Article 141) allows any organization to nominate candidates for election, but only the name of the candidate receiving the party's endorsement appears on the ballot.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 347.
\item \textsuperscript{36}John Hazard, "Federalism in the USSR," State Government, XVIII (June, 1945), 94.
\item \textsuperscript{38}Article 126.
\end{itemize}
With the party playing such a central role in the decision, any question of what role nationality has in Soviet decision making must embrace an intensive study of the party as well as the structure of the state. Such a study was not the objective of this thesis.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

This thesis has been a study of the problem of nationality and the federalist solution to the problem in a multi-national state. It has dealt intensively with the Soviet Union. It has been necessary to establish a model of a federal system as it is generally conceived in the tradition of Western Europe and the United States, to outline the problem of nationality and various solutions of the problem and to suggest how federalism might be used to solve the problem. Regarding the Soviet Union, this thesis discussed the Soviet nationalities and federal system applying the concepts developed in Chapters two and three of the thesis. Such an approach allows a summary of this thesis to be made in the following points.

I. FEDERALISM

Federalism is a contractual agreement among central and regional governments to divide governmental authority over the same population. It is in the compromise nature of federalism that regions find advantage in union and other advantages in maintaining some degree of separation. The specific arrangement of the centripetal
and centrifugal forces varies from system to system as
does the division of powers between the center and regions.
Essential to the operation of a federal system is a
willingness on the part of those who hold power to make
the system work by adhering to the constitutional division
of authority.

II. NATIONALITY PROBLEM

Nationality becomes a potential problem when there
is competition among national groups. The competition may
be for cultural freedom or in the area of political power
when a nationality tries to identify itself with a single
state or at least gain access to sufficient instruments of
power to protect itself. The political competition among
nationalities is more serious.

If federalism is to be a solution to the minority
problem, there must be some centripetal force impelling
the nationalities toward a union. The centrifugal force
of competition among the nationalities will be sufficient
to maintain regional integrity, but there can be no union
if there is not, with this centrifugal force, some pattern
of reasons that push the nationalities to establish a
central government. The centripetal forces could be any
from the list discussed in the body of the chapter on
federalism, i. e. military insecurity, economic advantage, geographical similarities, or leadership; or perhaps others.

III. SOVIET NATIONALITY PROBLEM

The territory in which the minority nationalities live provides a great incentive for any Russian government to try to control by virtue of the national resources, location, and manpower of the borderlands.

At the time of the revolution there were more than 100 national groups and more than 150 languages in use in the Empire. The differences in language were the sharpest points of distinction among the peoples. Though about 75 per cent spoke mutually understandable Slavic languages of Great Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian, the remainder of the population could seldom be understood or understand persons outside their group. The Slavs were the most significant group. Other major ones were the Turkic peoples, residents of the Baltic States, Georgians, Armenians and Jews. In the Empire there were wide differences in religion, as in language. Orthodox Russian Christianity was the predominant faith; however, there were other forms of Christianity like the religions of the
Georgians and the Armenians and Roman Catholicism. There were also Judaism, Islam, some Asian religions and paganism.

Few of the national groups had strong national political consciousness. Where such existed, it was mostly held among small groups of intellectuals who had little support among the predominantly non-national, illiterate rural peasantry.

Development of a national political consciousness among the Turkic peoples was hampered by the non-national Islamic religion. The national spirit developed in the Ukraine in the last half of the 19th Century. The Georgians had for a long time a distinct language, literature, religion, and territory; and as a result they had perhaps the strongest national consciousness among the minority nationalities, as indicated by their leadership of the rightist split in the Bolshevik party on the question of nationality. The Armenians had somewhat less political consciousness than the Georgians because the former did not maintain a distinct territory. Among the Russian Jews, there was no pattern of national consciousness. The same was true of the Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians until the crisis of the revolution forced the growth of national consciousness.
Among many of the small national groups there was a high level of tribal loyalty, but it usually was not expressed in political demands.

Almost universally the national programs sought land reform and cultural freedom from the Tsarist policy of forcible Russification. The proposals for cultural freedom included extra-territorial or territorial autonomy and/or federalism. Many national groups saw the Bolsheviks as a Russian party. The Bolshevik program on the national question allowed either secession or unity in a centralized state. Continued unity was not the answer for the nationalities. Secession was the only alternative.

Declaring their independence were the Finns, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Armenians, Bashkirs, Kirghiz, Turkmen, Volga-Tatars, and Crimeans Tatars. The chief cause for the failure of the independence declarations was the power of the Red Army in concert with the subversive actions of the local Communist Parties. The first five nationalities achieved independence because of support from foreign troops.

The Bolsheviks, because of their Marxist orientation that saw nationalism as a tool of capitalist
oppression that would pass away with the proletarian victory, underestimated the strength of nationalism and at the same time overestimated the force of class consciousness.

IV. SOVIET FEDERALISM

The civil war situation was ripe for a federal resolution of the crisis. The Bolsheviks were compelled to try to re-collect the shattered Empire. The nationalities had not sought independence until it was thrust upon them as the only alternative to answering their demands for land reform and cultural freedom within the Empire; they chose to secede rather than to stay in a unitary Russian state in which political power was controlled by a Russian government. Foreign powers granted several nationalities de facto or de jure recognition, which in effect gave legal status to their independence. Thus federalism was chosen as the veneer for the Red Army's military victories in the borderlands.

However, one fundamental criterion for a legitimate federal system was missing. The Bolsheviks were not willing to make work a system that implied a limitation on the authority of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. In the Soviet system the proletariat through its representative—the Party—is supreme and therefore can accept no limitation on its authority. In a true federation, the constitutional contract is supreme. The Bolsheviks once rejected federalism, but yielded to the centrifugal forces of the Civil War and adopted its symbolism as a solution to the nationality problem.
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B. BOOKS


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