INFORMATION, PLEASURE, AND PERSUASION:
HOW MOTIVATIONS FUNCTION IN TALKING POLITICS

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by

LESLIE A. RILL

Dr. Mitchell S. McKinney, Dissertation Supervisor

&

Dr. Jennifer S. Aubrey, Dissertation Co-Supervisor

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The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled

INFORMATION, PLEASURE, AND PERSUASION:
HOW MOTIVATIONS FUNCTION IN TALKING POLITICS

presented by Leslie A. Rill,

a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy,

and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

Dr. Mitchell S. McKinney

Dr. Jennifer Stevens Aubrey

Dr. William L. Benoit

Dr. Wayne Wanta

I dedicate this work to my family, for their continued love and support throughout this journey. Especially to my mother, whose patience, encouragement, and continuous help prevented me from losing sight as I traveled this road.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

INFORMATION, PLEASURE, AND PERSUASION:

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Leslie A. Rill

Dr. Mitchell S. McKinney, Dissertation Supervisor

&

Dr. Jennifer S. Aubrey, Dissertation Co-Supervisor

ABSTRACT

Scholars have long debated the role that communication plays in the formation and functioning of a democratic system. Philosopher John Dewey (1927) suggested that citizen-to-citizen talk serves as the very foundation of democratic life. The sharing of one's opinions and discussion of politics with acquaintances, family, and friends builds the communities that allow the achievement of democratic society. Interestingly, however, while citizen-to-citizen interaction has been theorized and described as the very underpinnings of a vibrant participatory democracy, little empirical research has focused on this most basic communicative act of civic engagement. Employing a longitudinal design with data collected at three time points throughout the 2008 presidential campaign, this study provided empirical evidence to support Dewey's normative theory of democracy. From this research we discovered some of what motivates people to engage in political talk, as well as specific elements that contributed to changes in young citizens' political talk behavior throughout the course of the campaign season. Additionally, this study confirmed that both political talk, and one's motivation to talk politics with others, do indeed contribute to our democratic process.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Dear Helena,

The other day the topic of Sarah Palin came up at a dinner party and one of the guests started expressing opinions that struck me as the exact opposite of true. We got into a fight that ended with me saying, "Jesus, where do you get this nonsense from? It's like you live in Upside-Down World!"

There was an awkward silence, which the host tried to fill by chirping, "Who wants dessert?" I felt like I ruined the dinner party, but I couldn't help it. This woman made my blood boil. If you and a fellow guest disagree about politics, how can you stop the discussion from getting heated? Or should you just avoid the topic altogether? —Too Angry for Dessert

Dear Too Angry for Dessert,

In former days, an etiquette maven might have declared politics to be off-limits for dinner-party conversation (along with religion and probably money and sex). But you can debate politics without anyone storming out before dessert. Here's how to keep it civil… (Echlin, 2008)

Much like the etiquette columnist advises, the old taboo suggesting that politics should not be a topic of conversation among friends and acquaintances is hopefully long past. According to one news columnist, "that was so last [2004 presidential] election" (Belkin, para 3, 2008).

The disputing dinner guests were not the only people who thought it a good idea to interject discussion of politics into their everyday conversations. In fact, Hillary

Rodham Clinton announced in her Democratic presidential campaign kickoff in 2007, "I'm going to start this campaign with a national conversation." She urged the public to join her stating, "I need you to be a part of this campaign, and I hope you'll start by joining me in this national conversation." Clinton's call for political engagement through talking politics seemed to be met with some support among the citizenry. A Pew Research Center Study, for example, found that 70% of respondents reported discussing politics in their conversations with friends and family more than average. Further, a survey at the start of the 2008 primary season found that 67% of workers polled thought it was just fine to discuss politics at the office (Belkin, 2008). Bridget Starkey, a 24 year-old citizen from California, described the virtues of talking politics when she proclaimed:

> I think that people my age are very opinionated and are talking about what's important to them. Most young people want to be heard and feel compelled to talk about their stances on issues…engaging in debates over coffee, beer, or meals with friends. It comes up when we're out to dinner, when we're hanging out casually in the living room. (Lagos, 2008)

This sharing of one's opinions and discussion of politics with acquaintances, family, and friends illustrates well the communication process that undergirds the functioning of a participatory democracy. Indeed, philosopher John Dewey (1927) suggested that citizen-to-citizen talk serves as the very foundation of democratic life. Specifically, a deliberative democracy hinges on individuals' ability to understand public affairs and willingness to engage their fellow citizens – in conversations – about politics, with such communicative behavior functioning as the discourse that builds our democratic society.

Although some citizens were talking a great deal, other views regarding this vital communicative act may not be so sanguine. A recent article in the satirical news source *The Onion* (2008) actually mocks the importance of political talk in our democracy, and – as satire intends to do – such ridicule actually highlights the vital role of political talk in a democratic system of governance. The article, titled "Nation Agrees Not to Talk About Politics," boasts "After months of fevered and contentious political discourse, the U.S. populace unanimously agreed Monday that, before somebody gets upset and things get out of hand, it would be better to just stop talking about politics altogether" (para 1). Unfortunately, however, the thought that talking politics is taboo is not only the stuff of comedy, as "actual" citizens' remarks about political talk seem to parallel *The Onion's* comedic sentiment. In recent focus groups of young citizens conducted by the author of this study, when participants were asked who liked to talk about politics, only one of ten individuals around the conference table raised their hand. One person volunteered, "I try to avoid it."

The potentially contentious nature of political affairs appears to be a prime reason why people may choose to avoid talking politics, for fear that relationships may be strained. In fact, when asked directly why they do not talk about politics, focus group participants most often stated that politics is simply "too controversial." Another focus group participant concurred, describing his reticence for talking politics by adding, "Politics, while important, isn't going to make anyone happy." Such a view reflects Warren's (1996) observation that "even under the best circumstances, political relationships are among the most difficult of social relationships" (p. 244). However, other citizens may actually be drawn to political talk because of the excitement – or even

the apparent power dynamic – afforded by the argumentative nature of one's political dialogue with others. In the same focus group when participants were asked to explain why they engaged in political conversations when they did, one participant responded, "to start a fight."

Clearly, citizens' motivations to engage in or avoid political conversations vary. For example, political junkies may like to talk about politics because it is fun or exciting, perhaps affording them an opportunity to persuade others to view the world as they do; yet, others may engage in political talk because they want to learn more about political issues or simply understand others' opinions. Another participant in the aforementioned focus group discussions offered this somewhat ego-centric reason for engaging in political talk: "I never got involved in political talk until it directly affected me, because my boyfriend went over to Iraq and then I wanted to get better knowledge of what was going on." Here, we see that people may only want to talk about politics when an issue directly affects their life. Other participants in the same discussions suggested that they engage in political talk because they wish to understand different political perspectives, that political talk makes them feel smart, or they want to influence people. Overall, a number of specific motivations seem to play an important role in the democratic process of political talk and the relationship building that transpires from these conversations. Yet, at this time little to no systematic empirical analysis has explored what motivates one to talk politics with others. Such knowledge would aid researchers' understanding of the intrapersonal reasons people talk about politics with others, and also provide greater insight into the processes and functions of political talk as a form of democratic engagement.

Fortunately, for both communication scholars and democracy, reports of political talk's demise by *The Onion* are just a bit premature. Recent survey research indicates that more and more Americans claim to receive political information from their interpersonal networks comprised of family and friends (Huckfeldt, & Sprague, 1995; Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun, 2006; Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000). Research examining the 2004 presidential election revealed that citizens identified talking about politics with family and friends as their most frequent source for political information (McKinney & Rill, 2007). Thus, while some individuals may claim talking politics is something they avoid or even disdain, this communicative act appears to be a vital component of many citizens' interpersonal relationship repertoire. Although existing research has identified talking politics as a frequent citizen activity and common source of one's political information, no research to date has explored what motivates a citizen to engage in political conversations with others.

To further our understanding of the role of interpersonal political talk in the democratic process, this study will analyze citizens' motivations for talking politics with others. Specifically, the study will explore the relationship between individuals' motivations for talking politics and various behavioral and attitudinal components of the democratic process. The first chapter explicates the justification and rationale for the study; chiefly, it explains why the study of motivation for talking politics is needed as well as describes the specific goals for the study.

Study Justification

The need to study political talk can be justified on at least four grounds: first, analysis of citizen's political talk allows us to better understand the communicative

underpinnings of a democracy; second, the current study of citizen talk will provide empirical analysis to better elucidate normative democratic theory; third, uncovering the role of individuals' motivations for talking politics with others will help illuminate the important interpersonal dimension of citizen-to-citizen communication; and fourth, examining the relationships between political talk and related attitudinal and behavioral measures of civic engagement will amplify our understanding of how political talk functions in our electoral and democratic processes.

Citizen talk and democracy. The long debate regarding the function that communication plays in a democracy has been argued for decades among scholars such as John Dewey (1927), Gabriel Tarde (1989), Jürgen Habermas (1989), and more recently among contemporary theorists such as Michael Schudson (1997) and Robert Putnam (2000). Although much of this thinking is philosophical and theoretical in nature, from this longstanding debate most have concluded that citizens' ability to gather public policy information and deliberate with fellow citizens is an important communicative process that produces a deliberative system of governance. Interestingly, however, while citizen-to-citizen interaction has been theorized and described as the very underpinnings of a vibrant democracy, little empirical research has focused on this most basic act of civic engagement.

The current study is guided by political philosopher John Dewey's (1927) normative theory of democracy, a philosophy grounded squarely in citizen communication. This philosophy of democracy contends that communication is not simply a process of opinion formation through message exchange from opinion leaders to the masses; rather, Dewey argues that through citizen-to-citizen interaction individuals

build the very communities upon which a democracy stands. The following depiction embodies Dewey's theory of communication and democracy (McKinney, Kaid, and Bystrom, 2005):

communication ⟷ community ⟷ democracy

Hence, for Dewey, democracy begins in human conversation: "in its deepest and richest sense, a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse" (Dewey, 1927, p. 21). Although much of political communication research focuses on the messages of various institutions and "official" communicators (such as media messages, presidential pronouncements, or candidate communication), this study seeks to better understand the communication practices of citizens engaged in discourse with their fellow citizens, forming their relationships and associations – their communities – that build our democracy. As Dewey suggested, the impetus of democracy is located not in institutions or voices of control, but rather in the principles of associated life. Dewey's normative model of democracy is represented (and "tested") in the current study whereby individual's motivations for communicating politics with others is examined, along with their political communication networks (or communities), and how individuals' political talk affects various democratic attitudes and behaviors.

The current study also seeks to explicate McKinney, Kaid, and Bystrom's (2005) call for political communication scholars to pursue research that adopts a "communicative engagement" perspective. Their approach to the study of political communication, much like Dewey's philosophy, understands democracy as a communicative achievement. These scholars note that while democracy is driven by a multitude of actions, such as voting, attending, volunteering and participating, these very

actions are achieved through communicative behavior and thus we should "examine how message activity constructing our civic dialogue serves to advance or hinder citizen engagement in the democratic process" (p. 4). For McKinney et al. (2005), citizens' deliberation – their talk with other citizens about political affairs – is a key component of our civic dialogue. Yet, it is these acts of citizen-to-citizen communication that are often unexamined.

Empirical support of normative democratic theory. Although it is important to understand the communicative foundations of a democracy (as detailed in Dewey's philosophy), and necessary – especially for political communication scholars – to focus one's analytic lens on acts of communicative political engagement (the perspective advanced by McKinney et al.), the work of the social scientist is to merge theory and empirical analysis, producing evidence that will help us understand how theory might work in practice. Often in the arena of normative democratic theory, scholars have failed to support philosophical arguments and models with sound empirical evidence. Diana Mutz (2006) argues this very point in relation to political talk and democracy when she concluded:

> If we are to ever understand what the effects of deliberation are in the real world among ordinary citizens, if we are to move toward a kind of political science in which normative theory and empirical evidence speak to one another, then we need to begin breaking down the various components of this rich concept [*deliberation*] in order to understand its effects. (p. 6)

Following Mutz's (2006) call for a deeper look at citizen deliberation, this study pursues research that begins to examine the specific reasons why people engage in political talk

as a starting point to better understand the deliberative process. Further, an examination of the attitudinal and behavioral political variables that may be related to citizens' political talk must also be explored. Until this happens, our inability to fully support our normative democratic theories with systematic empirical evidence will continue.

Understanding motivations to talk politics. As noted, a first step in our empirical analysis of citizens' political talk behavior is to better understand an individual's desire or motivation to engage in or avoid such conversations. Rubin, Perse, and Barbato (1988) suggest a uses and gratifications perspective for understanding interpersonal interaction (Blumler & Katz, 1974), wherein communication motives are derived from one's needs or desires fulfilled through interaction and relationship development. Therefore, we engage in or avoid various conversations with specific others, including political conversations, to fulfill particular needs/desires. For example, people may have conversations with others to gather information about political candidates, thus becoming a more informed citizen; or may possibly engage in interaction in order to persuade others to share one's political opinions. Yet, existing research reveals very little regarding individuals' motivations to engage in political talk. Exploratory work thus far, such as the previously mentioned focus group discussions, suggests that a variety of motivators or needs likely encourage or hinder one's propensity to engage in political talk with others. Such knowledge will allow us to begin to understand how political talk functions as an important form of political engagement.

Understanding the relationship between political talk and democratic variables. As the next chapter will explain in greater detail, the existing, yet limited, body of research examining citizens' political talk behavior has focused almost exclusively on the

frequency of one's talk (Kim, et al., 1999; Kwak, et al., 2005; Lee, 2005; Wyatt, et al., 2000b) and with whom one most often discusses politics (constituting one's political talk network) (Eveland, et al., 2005; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995, McClurg, 2006b). The current study seeks to go beyond these commonly examined variables and extend our understanding of the relationship between talking politics and other important democratic engagement variables. Scant research has pointed to political talk's influence on a number of democratic outcomes. For example, Pan, Shen, Paek, and Sun (2006) found that as the frequency of one's political talk increases so does one's political campaign participation, interest and public affairs media consumption. Additional research has also indicated that political talk is related to increases in political knowledge, increased participation in public and political forums as well as increased campaign involvement (Eveland, 2004; Gamson, 1992; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2000).

Although these few studies provide important clues regarding political talk's relationship to key democratic variables and outcomes, no research to date has taken a more comprehensive approach that might yield insight into the various relationships between one's political talk behavior and key democratic variables, including how one's propensity to talk politics may be related to one's voting behavior. Furthermore, if links do occur between one's propensity to talk politics and other beneficial democratic engagement outcomes, then knowing what motivates one to engage in political talk will reveal important clues to help us understand the political talk – electoral engagement process.

In summary, the study of political talk should be pursued because citizen conversation serves as a foundation of democracy, yet this important communication

component has yet to be thoroughly explored in existing political communication scholarship. Further, as social scientists we need to bridge the gap between normative theory and empirical research so that we are better able to understand widely accepted notions and theories of democracy. Additionally, research thus far has ignored systematic analysis of individuals' motivations for talking politics, knowledge that will enhance our understanding of political talk. Lastly, various behavioral and attitudinal components should be explored in conjunction with an individual's motivations to talk politics in order to create a more comprehensive picture of how political talk functions in electoral and democratic processes.

Study Goals

The primary goal of this study is to discover what motivates people to engage in everyday political talk. Although previous research has speculated as to why political talk occurs, documenting people's desire for information acquisition as a prominent reason, we currently lack systematic empirical evidence as to the actual motivations for political talk. We know that interpersonal communication is a process of relationship development (Duck, 1982), and that within the civic arena it is presumed that person-to-person interaction builds the relationships and communities upon which democracy functions (Dewey, 1927). Yet, what motivates citizens to engage their fellow citizens in conversations of public and political affairs? Also, although some researchers have posited a rather linear model of political conversation, where media messages serve as the impetus for one's political talk, these models neglect the role of individuals' needs or motivations for talking politics with their fellow citizens; and this research has also largely ignored how one's talk behavior may influence other democratic outcomes.

In order to produce a more comprehensive understanding of political talk behavior, we must incorporate additional variables in our research, starting with an understanding of individuals' needs or motivations, which will help us explain why some people chose to engage in or ignore political conversations. Thus, this study seeks to produce a model of political talk behavior that explicates the relationship between one's motivations to talk politics with various political attitudes and behaviors. To accomplish this goal, the study will utilize Rill's (2008) Motivation for Talking Politics (MTP) Scale in conjunction with various measurements of political attitudes and behaviors. As described in full detail in the next chapter, the proposed model of political talk will examine the relationship between an individual's motivations for talking politics along with the frequency of one's political talk, with whom one most often talks politics (one's political talk network), where one gets their political information (their political media diet), along with key political attitudes and behaviors, including one's level of political cynicism, political information efficacy, involvement in the ongoing campaign, and ultimately, one's voting behavior.

A second goal of this study is to explore how motivation to talk politics plays out during a political campaign season. The longitudinal nature of this study allows examination of how citizens' political talk may change throughout the course of a general-election presidential campaign. Certainly, political talk occurs outside of a political election campaign; however, the historic 2008 presidential election serves as a natural stimulus in which to test citizens' political talk behaviors, and specifically if one's motivations to talk politics with other citizens change throughout the course of an ongoing election. Using a panel design, this study will explore citizens' motivations to

talk politics at an earlier stage of the general-election campaign (after the nominating conventions and before the general-election debates begin), again at the height of the campaign (just before the November 4, 2008 vote takes place), as well as one's motivations for talking politics once the election has occurred and attendant campaign communication has dissipated (with a third wave of panel responses taken approximately one month following the election). The purpose of this longitudinal study is to better understand the evolving nature of political talk throughout and following a presidential election, exploring if individual's motivations may be linked specifically to stages of a general-election campaign.

In this first chapter I have provided a justification and rationale for this study. In particular, I have explained why it is important to pursue the study of political talk, including specific analysis of motivations to talk politics with others; and I have also outlined the specific goals of this study. Chapter two provides conceptual definitions of political talk and also explicates other key variables included in this study. The review of literature includes coverage of the pertinent scholarship relating to political talk research, political information efficacy, political cynicism and electoral engagement. Next, chapter three explicates the study's design and methods of analysis. Specifically, this chapter includes operational definitions of all variables included in the study's analysis, along with a detailed description of the measurement of each variable, and finally a full description of the longitudinal design.

Chapter four provides results of the research questions and hypothesis. This chapter also includes descriptive statistics of the study's sample and details of the data analysis procedures.

Lastly, chapter five discusses the study's key findings. Here, the results are synthesized and discussed in terms of the application of the findings as well as the contribution the findings make to the field of political communication. Limitations, future research, and concluding remarks are also addressed in this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Conversations occur among a variety of people, such as friends, family, neighbors, strangers, and coworkers. Conversations also take place in our daily lives on a variety of topics and transpire in many ways, including face-to-face interactions and also through mediated channels as with instant messaging and online chats. Further, conversation, as a means of communication, has the potential to impact our lives in many ways – from relationship building to knowledge acquisition or, as with this study, as a means of civic participation. Most often we see this communication behavior studied by interpersonal communication researchers. These scholars' interest in conversation is often driven by their conceptualization of this common behavior as an everyday communicative interaction that can create, maintain, and alter personal relationships. This powerful communication behavior is frequently defined and studied as everyday talk. Specifically, everyday talk is comprised of "recurring patterns of speech events that communicatively embody or enact personal relationships" (Goldsmith & Baxter, 1996, p. 66). Further, according to interpersonal scholars, "everyday talk consists of seemingly mundane conversations that occur among various types of relational partners" (Schrodt, Soliz, & Braithwaite, 2008, p. 191). As these "mundane conversations" that comprise our everyday talk cover a vast array of topics, the present study will focus its attention on a specific topic – everyday talk about politics – that occurs in the face-to-face interpersonal context.

Following Dewey's (1927) normative theory of democracy, we can infer that the everyday conversations that take place in our personal relationships with fellow citizens

work to build our shared communities and help to further develop democracy. Given the potential influence that everyday conversation has on our lives and relationships, it is important for scholars to better understand the communication behavior that comprises our everyday political talk. Yet, at this time, very little research has explored this phenomenon, leaving us with little information as to the role, if any, that political conversations play in electoral and democratic processes. Thus, analysis of everyday political talk should investigate such matters as why individuals engage in or avoid talk of politics – their motivations – and also how political talk is related to one's personal relationships by examining one's political talk discussant network (or with whom one is most inclined to talk politics), and finally examination of the impact of one's political talk behavior (analyzing the specific democratic or political engagement outcomes that such conversations may produce).

Current literature on the interpersonal communication of politics does not provide an agreed upon definition for talking politics (Wyatt, Katz, & Kim, 2000a). This is particularly problematic as researchers have made claims regarding the role of interpersonal communication in the political process, yet most every study on this matter defines and measures political talk in different ways. Because of this lack of clarity, it is extremely difficult to determine if or how conversation functions as the "heart of democracy." Therefore, this chapter will first examine current definitions and articulate how political talk is defined for this study. Furthermore, although research examining political talk is increasing, many gaps in this scholarship still remain, gaps that the current study seeks to address. This chapter provides a review of the relevant political talk literature that informs the specific research questions pursued by this study.

Following a discussion of definitional issues, research related to the measurement of political talk is explored, followed by scholarship relating to political conversation in social networks, mass communication and political talk, as well as research that explores the relationship between various democratic outcomes and talking politics. The final section of this chapter will suggest the interrelated nature among political talk and the key variables included in this study, proposing analysis that will yield a model of political talk in the electoral process.

Defining the Focus of Study: Deliberative Democracy and Political Talk

Over time, researchers have referred to citizen's interpersonal communication about politics using vastly different vocabulary. Citizen talk about politics and public affairs has been studied variously as deliberation, deliberative talk, political talk, interpersonal political conversation, interpersonal political discussion and political discussion, just to name a few of the most common descriptors used in studies analyzing citizen-to-citizen communication about politics. Yet, at the core of the debate regarding the role that citizen talk may play in a democratic society is the notion of a deliberative democracy.

Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) explain that a deliberative democracy is a "discursive system in which people share information about public affairs, form opinions, talk politics, and participate in the political process" (p. 361). Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs (2004) suggest deliberative democracy (which they also refer to as discursive political participation) is the overarching communicative process through which public deliberation is carried out. These scholars explain that discursive participation has five distinguishing characteristics. First, the activity requires discourse with other citizens,

such as talking, debating or deliberating. Second, the authors assert that this type of communication is a form of civic / political participation. Further, in order to carry out these acts of civic participation (e.g., engage fellow citizens in public deliberation) some form of communication is required. Third, the discourse involved in deliberative democracy can include formal institutions and regulated processes of civic and political life (e.g., citizens' participation in town hall meetings or legislative assembly debates), as well as private individuals engaged in informal or unplanned exchanges (e.g., everyday talk at home, church, on the streets, in community centers). Fourth, discursive participation can take place via a variety of media outlets and channels (e.g., in person, internet, phone, email). Fifth, a deliberative democracy is focused on issues of public concern, whether these matters deal with local, national or international affairs. Yet, according to these authors, in order for a deliberative democracy to be achieved – which they define as the communicative process of opinion and will formation that precedes voting – some form of citizen deliberation must first transpire.

Using the components of a deliberative democracy as outlined by Delli Carpini et al. (2004), it becomes apparent that deliberative democracy is something of an umbrella term under which various forms of communicative acts or public deliberation about politics and public affairs occurs. At the very least, it seems in order to achieve a deliberative democracy some form of citizen-to-citizen conversation or interpersonal interaction must take place. It is also apparent that for many of the scholars and studies examining deliberative democracy, the terms deliberation, discourse, conversation, and dialogue are used rather interchangeably and as synonymous notions. Therefore, the current study will adopt the notion of political talk as its guiding term, capturing the idea

of citizens' face-to-face conversations or interactions about political and public affairs.

Beyond the specific terms used to define political talk (or deliberation, or dialogue, or conversation, etc.), the existing literature has also debated the actual features or contours that should characterize political talk or conversation in order for these citizen interactions to be deemed sufficiently deliberative in nature. In general, the arguments span a continuum from more formal or rule governed exchanges to the more informal or everyday interactions and utterances. For example, Gastil (2000) explains that public deliberation is "discussion that involves judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision making" (p. 22). Researchers aligning with this school of thought suggest that deliberation only takes place when the "judicious" or "informed" discussion of public affairs occurs. As Gastil (2008) asserts, "when people deliberate, they carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view" (p. 8). Also, the more formal and rule regulated forms of political deliberation are said to occur in bounded or predefined spaces (e.g., a court house or legislative assemblies) and feature deliberation and talk governed by specific rules (e.g., time restrictions, turn-taking, and planned rebuttals). Moy and Gastil (2006) suggest that such rule-governed political conversations (or what others define as deliberation) help citizens produce arguments and arrive at reasoned judgments that influence others. Further, these researchers explain that because such deliberation is comprised of more formal argument development it is not interrupted by "unnecessarily vague statements, innuendos, and hidden messages" that one may find in an everyday conversation (p. 445). With that, Moy and Gastil (2006) assert "sound political judgment grows out of deliberative conversation" (p. 444).

The idealist, as well as elitist, notion of formal and ruled governed political talk adopted by scholars such as Gastil (2000) and Moy and Gastil (2006) is particularly problematic as this perspective does not acknowledge that everyday interpersonal conversations can and do include some of the very same elements of interaction said to characterize formal deliberation (such as citizens' ability to produce argument, engage in respectful consideration of diverse perspectives, arrive at well reasoned solutions, etc.). Also, with the formal approach to deliberation reserved for bounded and rule-governed spaces, this leaves very little room for the masses, those individuals not privy to inclusion in legislative assemblies or sanctioned proceedings, to be part of democracy's deliberative process. Furthermore, nowhere in the studies cited above is there any evidence offered suggesting that "sound political judgment" cannot also emerge from "ordinary" political conversation.

Indeed, other scholars have also rejected the rather "purist" or formalist perspective to understanding political talk and deliberation. Those scholars that fall on the more informal end of the political talk continuum have approached their examination of public deliberation and talk by exploring the everyday interactions and political conversations of "ordinary" citizens. For example, Kim et al. (1999) regard informal political conversations as the core of a deliberative democracy, and such interactions are not bound by formal rules and occur spontaneously as part of one's everyday conversations. During ordinary political conversation, discourse is voluntarily offered even without a specific purpose or predetermined agenda by the citizens who engage in political conversation. Additionally, these "ordinary" political conversations are thought to shift between talk about common political subjects and other matters.

For example, you could be on the phone with a friend discussing your day and mention that you saw the latest poll reports for the presidential election on CNN. The conversation may then shift from talk about your busy schedule to who you think will win the upcoming election or why you think one candidate is better than the other(s). In this conversation your intent may not be to persuade your friend to support your preferred candidate, although your comments may very well influence your conversational partner. Instead, you are engaging in casual conversation with a relational partner with whom you feel free to share your political opinions. Frequently, these conversations are carried out with a person or people one is comfortable communicating with as well as in one's "everyday space" (e.g., home, office, school) (Wyatt et al., 2000a).

This understanding of the political conversation mirrors that of Coleman's (2004) definition of conversation which contains three distinct characteristics: Conversations are (1) reciprocal undertakings where (2) participants possess equal rights to speak and respond in accordance with contextual and cultural turn taking codes, and they are (3) informal, unpremeditated, and unbounded. The current study adopts this broad view of conversation in its study of citizen talk, defining the content of the conversations or talk in question as dealing with political affairs. Although the study of formal political deliberation has its place within our analyses of political talk and deliberative democracy, it seems shortsighted for scholars to focus the bulk of their attention on the more limited occurrences of formal deliberation while ignoring the vast occurrences of political talk found in citizens' everyday lives.

As pointed out, elements of formal political deliberation are also found in ordinary political conversation. Much like deliberative conversation, ordinary political

conversation also features argument, interactants who engage in turn-taking and listening, and conversational partners who may be just as willing to entertain differing points of view as those engaged in formal deliberation. Although the intended outcome of formal deliberation is often to reach decision or agreement on a stated proposition or issue, ordinary political conversation can also produce this outcome. Adopting the view that our ordinary conversations about political affairs with our fellow citizens represent an important communicative act in the development of democratic society, the focus of this study is on citizens' everyday political talk that occurs among relational partners in a variety of interpersonal contexts. Although broad, this definition is intended to cover the breadth of relationships and interactions that might feature any form of political talk. Not limiting this phenomenon by formal rules of interaction, as with formal deliberation, opens up the examination of political talk to fit the communicative practices of the common citizen. Moreover, this expansive definition allows us to truly investigate the role that political talk plays in citizens' everyday lives. Now that definitional matters have been addressed, and before discussion of literature related specifically to the study's key variables of analysis and research questions, acknowledgment and response to criticism of the role of citizen talk in the democratic process is warranted.

Addressing Criticisms of Political Talk's Role in Democracy

Unfortunately, even though many researchers attest to the instrumental role political talk plays in democratic society (Pan, Shen, Paek, & Sun, 2006), critical arguments questioning the importance of citizen conversation in the democratic process have been raised. Scholars such as Schudson (1997) and Noelle-Neumann (1993) assert that ordinary political conversation, or political talk, cannot lead to the achievement of a

deliberative democracy as there is no structure to link such conversation to democratic outcomes, that people may be afraid to share their true feelings and ideas in conversations with others who may disagree with their views (i.e., spiral of silence), and the outcome of political conversation does not necessarily lead to a more informed electorate. Because of citizens' desires to present their "best self" in social contexts and maintain relationships (thus avoiding contentious topics of conversation), Schudson claims that fruitful political deliberation is not likely to occur in the informal social context; and, as citizens may be prone to raise contentious issues only with those who already share their opinions, this limits our ability to understand competing views and reach any sort of governing consensus. Because of these limitations, Schudson goes so far as to suggest that political talk may actually be a detriment to democracy. Ultimately, he asserts that the potential fear or embarrassment we may face at the thought of articulating our political views in conversations with our fellow citizens prohibits us from crafting the well informed and valid arguments that are a necessary component of public deliberation. It is important to note, however, that these assumptions have yet to be tested empirically.

After rejecting the thought of citizen conversation as "the soul of democracy," Schudson (1997) holds out that our public affairs media is the most likely communicative savior of democratic society. With citizens unable to trust one another for useful information gained through conversation, Schudson suggests we are left to rely on elite and informed opinion leaders, transmitted through mass communication, as our most useful source for valid information and most reliable guide for the formation of informed mass opinion. In the end, Schudson argues that any democratic or political "conversation" is instigated and facilitated through mass media sources, and not citizen-

to-citizen communication. While there is little doubt that political media contribute to the conversations that transpire in a deliberative democracy, citizens' views of their world, including their political opinions, may also be guided by their everyday lived experiences (e.g., how much they paid to fill their automobile at the gas pump, or their ability to see a doctor or purchase needed drugs when they become ill). Certainly one's experiences may be validated or even challenged through exposure to media messages, but Schudson's contention that citizens are unable or unwilling to express their views or opinions without aid of the mass media seems to place too little faith in citizens' willingness and ability to engage their fellow citizens about matters important to public life.

In his rebuttal to Schudson's claims about the role of citizen conversation in democracy, Schroll (1999) acknowledges that Schudson does indeed raise several noteworthy claims. First, citizen-to-citizen conversation is not a social panacea nor will it solve our problems with/in democracy. Second, Schroll agrees that challenging our assumptions about public conversation is not necessarily a bad thing. However, Schroll sides with Dewey in his view that citizen-to-citizen communication, even if largely aided or informed by information obtained from the mass media, is the communicative foundation of a democratic society. With their critique of communication's role in democracy, both Schudson and Schroll argue we must extend our research and understanding of "ordinary" citizens' political conversations. Their challenges encourage a research agenda that seeks to craft a more detailed explanation or model of how citizens' political talk functions in our electoral and democratic processes. Research such as this would help researchers empirically affirm – or perhaps even reject – the philosophical musings of Dewey and others who claim citizen conversation really is the

"soul of democracy." Yet, before we can begin to explore the components that may constitute a model of political talk, we must first examine existing approaches used to measure political talk. Limitations in this research leads to the identification of one's motivations to talk politics as a missing component in understanding citizens' political talk behavior.

Existing Approaches to Measuring Political Talk

Understanding the role of political talk behavior has been hindered by the specific measurements adopted in existing political talk research. The extant research focuses almost exclusively on the frequency of one's political talk (Kim, et al., 1999; Kwak, et al., 2005; Lee, 2005; Wyatt, et al., 2000b), along with some attempts to understand one's political talk network (Eveland, et al., 2005; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995, McClurg, 2006b). The majority of research on political talk has been conducted using self-report data taken from such secondary data sources as the National Election Survey (NES). NES surveys have included talk questions since 1984; the political talk variables, however, are usually only included on the post-election survey and ask respondents to recall the frequency of their political talk that occurred throughout the ongoing presidential election. Such measures are particularly problematic for two reasons. First, by asking respondents to recall their talk behavior at a point somewhat removed from the time of measurement, individuals' ability to recall their frequency of talk is questionable. Also, the NES talk questions opt for a vague reference to "talk[ing] politics with family and friends," which many have argued is rather limited in its scope of one's potential talk network and also not very descriptive in helping to define for respondents the type of talk that might constitute one's political conversations. A few scholars pursing political talk

research, and who find fault with the limited approach of the NES items, have attempted to be more descriptive in their definition of what political talk might entail and with whom one might engage in political conversations. Yet, the variety of approaches measuring citizens' talk behavior is widely inconsistent across the available research.

For instance, Kwak, Williams, Wang, and Lee (2005) measured frequency of political discussion by having respondents report (on a 10 point scale from *not at all* to *very often*) how often they discuss "local politics with friends, neighbors, family and people in clubs or organizations to which one may belong" (p. 96). Whereas, Wyatt, Kim, and Katz (2000b) utilized a multi-level and topic-specific frequency of talk measure that asked participants how frequently (*often* to *never*) they discussed with others "what the President, the national government, and the Congress are doing," "what your state and local government are doing," "the crime situation and violence in society," "what is happening in foreign countries," "how the economy is doing," " what is happening in your personal life and family," "what's going on in the schools and education," "your religion and religious beliefs," and "what is happening in sports, television, music or the movies." While the attempt by Wyatt et al. to include the various "levels" of political affairs that one might discuss is commendable (i.e., personal / family life, local / state, national, international, etc.), their selection of specific political / social topics is not at all clear.

In an attempt to allow study participants to identify their political talk network – with whom they most often talked politics – McClurg (2006b) asked respondents to first identify with whom they talked politics and then report how frequently they discussed politics with their aforementioned conversational partners. Unfortunately, McClurg

employed a frequency scale that is not at all very descriptive (with only three response points ranging from *never* (0) to *often* (3)). Although Eveland, Hayes, Shah, and Kwak (2005) developed a more expansive political talk measure, including a wider talk network than many other studies, their frequency of talk measure also renders their scale somewhat problematic. Eveland et al. asked respondents to indicate their level of discussion with coworkers, neighbors, friends, family and casual acquaintances over the *past year* on a 1(*none*) to 8 (*100 or more times*) scale. Although including a frequency measurement is better than not doing so at all, one may question what the Eveland et al. measurement truly reveals about how often their respondents talked politics. How can one accurately recall just how many times over the course of a full year they talked with others about politics?

As the previous discussion illustrates, most existing research that examines citizens' political talk has focused almost exclusively on individuals' frequency of talk, with some of this research attempting to describe one's social political talk network. On both fronts – in measuring frequency of talk and with whom one talks politics – there is no agreement nor consistent approaches in the extant literature as to how these variables should be examined. Furthermore, as the preceding critique reveals, many of the existing attempts are limited at best, or not at all useful in accurately capturing measures of frequency and/or one's political talk network. This study utilizes measures of both frequency and the individuals that compose one's political conversation network and, as detailed in chapter three, the measures adopted seek to avoid the weaknesses identified in the preceding review.

The Missing Link of Political Talk Research: Motivation to Talk Politics

Beyond the limitations in measuring frequency and network of political talk, an even more fundamental shortcoming is apparent in the existing political talk research. Although knowing how frequently and with whom one talks politics provides some insight into an individual's political talk behavior, there seems to be a much more basic question in need of answering: *Why* would one seek to engage in or avoid political conversations with others? What motivates one to talk to others about political affairs? The central premise of this study is that we now need to enlarge our research of citizens' political talk, going beyond merely documenting frequency and target of such talk, to examine the underlying motivations for this important civic behavior.

A very limited number of existing political talk studies point in the direction of this study's focus on motivation to talk politics, but this research stops short of addressing the central question, Why do citizens engage in political talk? Banwart's (2007) multifaceted approach to examining political talk is perhaps the best attempt to date in understanding underlying factors that lead to citizens' engagement in political talk. While her Political Interpersonal Communication Index measures one's willingness to engage in political interpersonal communication, her work stops short of explaining the reasons individuals engage in or avoid political talk. Other scholars (Kim, et al., 1999; Lee, 2005) have linked one's overall interest in politics with frequency to engage in political conversation; yet, here again, a global measure of political interest falls short of explicating specific reasons or motivations to engage in political conversation.

To address the central question of what motivates one to engage in political conversations with others, this behavior was approached as a communication interaction

involving a citizen-to-citizen relationship. Here, the author first turned to literature exploring uses and gratifications. Then, to better understand how communicative interaction with relational partners fulfills particular needs, the interpersonal communication literature was examined. Ultimately, these needs serve as the motivators for our communication acts. As the following sections explain, a scale to tap individuals' motivations to talk politics was developed based on an understanding of human communication needs drawn from uses and gratifications theory and existing interpersonal communication literature.

Uses and Gratifications

Uses and gratifications theory is predominately used in mass communication research as a way to explain individuals' relationships with media consumption (Blumler & Katz, 1974). Specifically, this theory suggests that individuals actively seek out information from among a variety of media or interpersonal choices and select sources that best fulfill one's needs/desires (Rubin, 2002). Although many researchers argue that the specific information sources one chooses to gratify needs is based on the communication channels available, as well as individuals' predispositions, generic motivations for media consumption have been identified, including the need for information seeking, escapism, entertainment, social interaction fulfillment, and personal identity needs (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Jackson & Lilleker, 2007; Katz, Gurevitch, & Haas, 1973; Severin & Tankard, 1997).

More recently, researchers have begun using uses and gratifications theory as a way to explain communication motivation (Rubin, 1984). The idea behind this perspective is that individuals are motivated to engage in various forms of

communication with others because of their communication needs or desires they wish to fulfill. The basic tenants of uses and gratifications still apply; however, human communication sources, instead of media sources, become the medium to fulfill individuals' needs. Also, research indicates that as the communicative medium changes, so may one's motivations for communicating. In the end, researchers are finding that individuals' motivations to engage in various communication activities can be explained by their desire to fulfill particular needs. For example, Kaye and Johnson (2002) found that when using the Internet to obtain political information individuals reported using the web for guidance and information seeking, followed by entertainment and social reasons. Thus, although the motivations outlined by Kaye and Johnson are similar to the original uses and gratifications motivations, the original motivations set forth by uses and gratifications theory do not necessarily transcend across medium. Ultimately, by identifying various motivations for one's communicative choices, uses and gratifications theory gives us an in depth perspective to better understand communication behavior, helping us to answer the overarching question of *why* we engage in various communication activities.

Motivations in Conversation

Interpersonal communication scholars have long emphasized the importance of studying everyday communication as a means to understand the dynamics of social relationships (Duck, 1990; Gudykunst & Shapiro, 1996; Hays, 1984). Furthermore, a person's motives for engaging in a given form of communication can also be a significant aid in understanding the structures of individual's everyday talk. Research indicates that communication motivation is a central mediating concept in interpersonal and mediated

(e.g., television viewing) settings (Graham, Barbato & Perse, 1993; Rubin, 1984; Rubin & Rubin, 1985; Rubin & Martin, 1998).

In the development of their Interpersonal Communication Motives (ICM) scale, Rubin and Rubin (1985) adopted the uses and gratifications perspective to link interpersonal and mass communication behaviors, suggesting that the reasons one may use mediated communication may also be similar to one's motives for engaging in interpersonal interactions. From this, a functional model of interpersonal communication was developed. One assumption of this model is that motivations are produced by human needs. Therefore, each factor of the ICM scale represents a specific motive or human need (i.e., pleasure, inclusion, affection, control, and escape) for engaging in interpersonal conversation. Thus, the impetus for a conversation is driven by the intrapersonal motives one has for engaging in interaction with a relational partner. For example, one may engage in an interpersonal conversation because they have a need for affection. Building on the general concept that motives drive interpersonal interaction one might also extrapolate that context specific arenas of interaction – such as political talk – may also be driven by specific needs or motives.

However, as noted previously, from the existing political talk research we lack a clear understanding of citizens' motivations for engaging in political talk. Much like research in mass and interpersonal communication, political communication scholars should also articulate specific motives one may have for engaging in political conversation. As uses and gratifications theory suggests, motives, and the needs on which motives are rooted, determine people's choices of communication behavior, content, and relational partners. Therefore, this study contends that certain motives drive people to

make choices about their everyday talk and interactions, including their everyday talk of politics. We may also speculate that motivations driving our communication behavior may be linked to cognitive (e.g., political knowledge), affective (e.g., political attitudes such as cynicism) and behavioral (e.g., voting) outcomes.

What has been lacking, until now, is a valid measure that is able to identify and test the role that motivations play in political talk. This study will utilize Rills' (2008) Motivations for Talking Politics (MTP) Scale, seeking to identify how one's motivations to talk politics might be related to key attitudinal and behavioral political outcomes. The following sections of this chapter explain how the MTP scale will be tested, positing specific research questions related to each of the variables analyzed.

Measuring Motivation to Talking Politics

In an attempt to understand citizen's motivations for engaging in political talk with other citizens, a Motivations for Talking Politics (MTP) Scale (Rill, 2008) was created (see appendix A-1). The 35-item multidimensional scale identifies five specific reasons why people do or do not engage in political talk. With parallels to both interpersonal and mass communication motives, the MTP scale reveals that people are motivated to engage in political talk by their need for *information acquisition* (i.e., people are motivated to engage in political talk to discover/learn about the political world from others), as well as for *pleasure* (i.e., one's motivation to engage in political talk stems from their personal enjoyment of discussing political affairs). The MTP scale also covers a third factor of motivation, *understanding others' perspectives,* which suggests that individuals are motivated to engage in political talk because they are interested in other's views regarding the political world. Additionally, the MTP scale identifies a fourth

motivation for talking politics as *persuasion*. People who are motivated by persuasion engage in interpersonal conversations about politics because of their desire to persuade others to agree with or adopt their views, feelings and opinions concerning the political world. Lastly, the MTP scale captures a negative factor: *conflict avoidance*. This factor suggests distinct items that tap into individuals' unwillingness to engage in political talk. This subscale suggests that citizens disengage in political talk because of their need to avoid conflict that ensues from political conversations or, conversely, engage in political talk because of their desire for conflict in conversation.

As stated, the primary purpose of this study is to understand how individuals' motivations for talking politics may be related to other factors associated with political talk behavior. First, this study will examine the relationship between motivation to talk politics and one's frequency of political talk. As discussed previously, citizens' political talk has been most often measured in terms of frequency. Thus, this study will also examine frequency, but will link one's frequency of political talk to their motivation for talking politics. For example, do those who are more highly motivated to talk politics in fact engage in political conversations more frequently? Also, this relationship will be examined at various points throughout the election campaign. The initial measure of citizens' talk behavior will be taken following the nominating conventions but before the presidential debate series begins. The second measurement will be taken approximately six weeks later, just before the early November balloting. The final measure will be taken approximately six weeks after the election is held. This relationship is examined at each of the three campaign phases as one's motivation and frequency to talk politics may well

change throughout the ongoing election campaign. To understand this relationship, the following research question is proposed:

RQ1a: How does one's level of motivation for talking politics relate to one's frequency of political talk at different phases of the campaign season?

Additionally, because specific motivations are grounded in particular psychological needs, one may be more or less motivated to talk politics with others based on differing needs. For example, those who have a higher desire to talk about politics to fulfill persuasion needs may more frequently engage in political conversations than those who are more motivated to talk politics based on a higher pleasure need. Discovering if specific motivations lead to more or less political talk will add depth to our understanding of citizens' political talk behavior. Also, specific motivations and inclinations to talk politics with others may evolve throughout the campaign election. For example, while information needs may be higher at an earlier stage in the election campaign, persuasion needs may come to the fore – and even increase frequency of talk – just before the election. Thus, to understand these potential relationships, the following research is proposed:

RQ1b: What is the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding other's perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and frequency of one's political talk at different phases of the election campaign?

Social Networks and Political Talk

Beyond examining the frequency of political talk, past research has also explored with whom one is most likely to engage in political conversations – one's political talk

network. When examining how citizens exchange political information, research is beginning to focus on the notion of interpersonal networks as a key way to disseminate information. As Dewey (1927) first posited, face-to-face conversation and resultant community are central to democracy. Based on this model, citizens' interpersonal communication has been defined as "the heart of democracy" (Kim, et al. 1999, p. 380). According to Marsden (1987), our most common social networks are predominately composed of family and friends, and these networks are formed through our day-to-day conversations based on our desires to maintain relationships with significant others. Presumably, a specific topic discussed via these social networks is politics as individuals attempt to build relationships and communities that conform to our political needs and interests. In fact, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found that political conversations represent a frequent topic of interaction in our close social networks. Pinkelton (1999) confirmed this conclusion when he reported that face-to-face discussions with friends, neighbors and relatives constitute a major source for political information.

Furthering the importance of social networks in democracy, research has found that discussion of political matters in one's social network is correlated with higher levels of political action (Kenny, 1992; Knoke, 1990; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Leighly, 1990; McClurg, 2003). In other words, individuals who are part of social networks that freely and more frequently incorporate politics into their conversations are more likely to become involved in political activity. Additionally, McClurg (2006a) and Mutz (2002b) both found that political agreement among individuals within the same social network influences how often one discusses politics – with those networks in greater agreement discussing politics more frequently. Walsh's (2004) work also demonstrates the

importance of social networks in democracy. When comparing the conversation patterns of two groups, a women's guild that avoided political talk and coffee shop regulars – all men – who frequently engaged in political talk, it became apparent that the coffee shop regulars, unlike the women's group, began to associate politics and political involvement as an integral component of their life. For these individuals, political talk became a daily occurrence and many more topics of conversation would somehow be framed as political matters. As these studies demonstrate, the individuals that comprise one's social network influences the political talk that takes place.

Researchers have also found that features of one's social network can influence one's political participation. Mutz (2002a) found that larger or more diversified social networks promote cross-cutting discussions (i.e., discussion where one is exposed to disagreeable viewpoints), which, in turn, improves tolerance for others and results in greater understanding of others' political views; but, interestingly, these types of social networks actually decrease political participation (Mutz, 2002a). However, social networks that are homogeneous in nature have been found to spur greater political participation such as voting and working for a political campaign (Barabas, 2004; McClurg 2006a; Mutz, 2002b; Price, Capella, & Nir 2002). In other words, it seems that when one engages frequently in conversation with those who hold similar beliefs it reinforces one's own beliefs and encourages political participation; whereas engaging in conversations with those who hold different political opinions encourages one to be tolerant of others' views. However, this behavior has also been found to create dissonance in our own political beliefs, perhaps leading us to doubt our political stances and opinions and in turn discouraging political participation.

Further, having political discussions with those who are more informed about politics increases the likelihood of obtaining relevant information as well as provides clarity of information (McClurg, 2006a). This is especially true for the less informed citizen because they have a greater opportunity to obtain new political information that they may not otherwise seek out through media sources. We rely on our social network (those with whom we are most likely to engage in political talk) to provide us with information shortcuts. Here, social interaction functions as a shortcut for acquiring political information through conversation rather than searching for political information on the Internet or watching the nightly news. This relational shortcut for gathering political information may be particularly useful as we are likely to trust those individuals in our social network. In fact, the political information shortcuts provided by one's social network may well be where one satisfies their information acquisition need or motivation to talk politics with others.

The preceding review of literature illustrates that one's social network influences our political talk in various ways. What has not been examined, however, is the relationship between one's social network and motivations to talk politics. As an initial step along this path, this study will first determine who is included in one's political talk social network. Based on the longitudinal feature of this study, participants' social talk network will be examined at each phase of the election campaign to see if political discussion networks are stable or change over the course of the election campaign. Thus, the following question is posited:

RQ2: With whom does one most frequently talk politics at different phases of the election campaign?

Next, as RQ1 explained, a primary goal of this study is to examine the relationship between individuals' motivations for talking about politics with others and key variables related to one's political talk behavior. The following research question is offered in order to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship between one's political talk network and motivation to engage in political conversation. This line of inquiry will also examine one's motivation and with whom one most often discusses politics at each phase of the election campaign:

RQ2a: What is the relationship between one's level of motivation for talking politics and one's frequency to engage in political conversations with specific discussants (e.g., friends, family, coworkers, casual acquaintances) at different phases of the election campaign?

Lastly, it is important to examine if specific motivations might produce more political talk with specific conversation / relational partners. For example, if someone has a higher persuasion desire to talk politics are they more likely to talk politics with friends or family than with coworkers or casual acquaintances? The following research question is posited to address this line of inquiry:

RQ2b: What is the relationship between specific motivations to talk politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and the frequency that one engages in political conversations with specific discussants (e.g., close friends, casual acquaintances, family, coworkers) at different phases of the election campaign?

Mass Communication and Political Talk

In addition to the role of frequency of talk and our political discussant networks, research has also focused on the influence of mass communication on political talk behaviors. Specifically, scholars have centered their research on more traditional news media sources (e.g., newspapers and television news) and also the Internet as specific communication information channels that affect political talk. Because interpersonal communication and media-centered political campaigns are often viewed as complementary channels for information exchange, it is important to explore the relevant literature examining the role of the news media and the Internet on political talk.

News media

Within the limited media research that is available on this topic, researchers have consistently identified a link among newspaper reading, television news use and political talk (Lee, 2005; Kim et al., 1999; Koch 1994; Pan et al., 2006; Wyatt et al., 2000b), with those who read and watch/listen more to political media also engaging in more political talk. For example, Lee (2005) found that newspaper reading was a significant positive predictor of political discussion. McDevitt and Chaffee (2000) found similar results among family members. Specifically, as political news consumption increased within households, political discussion also increased among family members (McDevitt & Kiousis, 2004). McDevitt (2005) also found as individual's media use for political information increased, their frequency of political discussion with family members also increased. Additionally, Kim et al. (1999) explored the relationship between news consumption and political conversation. Specifically, these authors established that issue-specific news media use (e.g., attention to stories about Medicare) served as a positive

predictor of issue-specific political conversation (e.g., more likely to engage in conversations with others about Medicare), as well as general political conversation (e.g., general talk about the ongoing election campaign).

Further, researchers have established a link between one's political discussion network and their media use. Moy and Gastil (2006) found as an individual's news consumption increased so did the size of one's social network. Additionally, these researchers determined that the more heterogeneous an individual's discussion network, one will use a greater variety of media sources for their political information. Scheufele, Nisbet, Brossard, and Nisbet (2004) found similar results indicating that the more frequently individuals engage in political discussion with heterogeneous discussion groups, such as work-based rather than church-based groups, the greater variety of news sources one will use for political information. In general, although researchers have explored the relationship between traditional media sources (such as newspaper and public affairs television) and political talk, this area of research remains underdeveloped. Most recently, political communication scholars have called for greater attention to the role of new communication technologies in the political communication process (Moy & Gastil, 2006), and a very limited amount of research in this area has examined political talk.

Internet

In their exploration of new communication technologies, Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) note that past research consistently points to a positive relationship between interpersonal discussion and mass media use. Based on this link, these researchers hypothesized that this relationship would exist between political discussion and Internet

use. Using NES data, Nisbet and Scheufele examined respondents' media use (i.e., attention to newspaper and television), frequency of political talk, Internet or web campaign exposure, political efficacy, and forms of campaign participation. Overall, Nisbet and Scheufele found that Internet users who also engaged in face-to-face political discussions – versus those who relied primarily on the Internet for their political information – achieved additional political benefits in terms of increased efficacy and greater campaign participation.

Beyond its usefulness as a communication tool that might yield increased political benefits, another way to examine the Internet as a communication technology is how this medium is used as a channel for political talk. Although the present study will focus on face-to-face political talk, it is important to acknowledge that political talk can and does occur via the Internet. In the previously cited Lee (2005) study, participants were also asked if they used the Internet to discuss politics with strangers. Lee posited that younger people, as well as individuals more interested in politics, were more likely to engage in online political discussion with strangers. He found a positive relationship between one's "everyday political talk" (face-to-face interactions) and political discussion with strangers online. As individuals' frequency of face-to-face political talk increased so does their frequency of online political discussion with strangers.

In another online political talk study, Wojcieszak and Mutz (2007) surveyed respondents who had participated in online discussion groups over the previous year. To gain a better understanding of how Internet chat users incorporate political talk into their online conversation behavior, these researchers asked questions about the types of discussion groups they participated in and the level of political talk in which they

engaged. They found that discussion of politics occurs in various discussion forums, both political and apolitical, confirming that political talk occurs frequently online and in a variety of conversation environments. Expounding on the similarities between face-to-face and online political talk, Kim (2007) found that both face-to-face and online talk have positive effects on participants' political efficacy and their willingness to participate in politics. However, one advantage to online deliberation appears to be the candid nature of the medium. Kim concluded that participants in online forums were more open and direct in stating their political opinions and assertions than discussants in face-to-face conversations.

Clearly, mass communication plays an important role in one's political talk behavior. As explained previously, researchers have found newspaper reading, public affairs television, and Internet use to be important contributors to the frequency of one's political talk. To confirm this relationship this study poses the following hypothesis:

H1: Greater use of political media will positively predict the frequency of one's political talk.

Also, existing research has established a positive relationship between one's political discussion network and political media use (McDevitt & Kiousis, 2007; Moy & Gastil, 2006). This research has found that those who more frequently talk politics with individuals use more political media. However, the link between specific political discussant and political media use is unclear. Thus, the following question is posited:

RQ3: Does frequency of talk with various political discussants positively predict political media use?

However, there are still important questions regarding media use and political talk in need of exploration. First, with new communication technologies providing many new sources of political information, along with the many "old" or traditional sources, it is important to examine the specific communication sources citizens utilize for the political information. Also, are different media sources utilized more frequently at different points throughout an election campaign? The following question addresses these issues:

RQ4: How frequently are specific political media sources used at different phases of the election campaign?

Additionally, as with other areas of political talk research, scholars have yet to examine how individuals' motivation to engage in political talk might be related to political media use. For example, do those more motivated to talk politics use more – and/or different – political media than individuals less motivated to talk politics? Also, does this relationship change at all throughout an election campaign? To address these matters the following research question is posited:

RQ4a: What is the relationship between one's level of motivation for talking politics and their use of specific political media at different phases of the election campaign?

Lastly, is there any relationship between specific motivations to talk politics and political media used? For example, if one has a high pleasure motivation for talking politics do they utilize more non-traditional sources of political media (such as late night comedy or comedic political "news" programs such as *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*)? To examine these issues, the following research question is posed:

RQ4b: What is the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and one's use of various political media sources at different phases of the election campaign?

Political Talk and Democratic Outcomes

A plethora of research has focused on the relationship between political talk and normative democratic actions and attitudes. Most commonly, researchers have linked greater frequency of political talk to increased participation in various electoral and civic affairs. The following section will explore the literature focusing on the relationship between political talk and democratic behaviors and attitudes.

Behavioral Outcomes

Voting behavior. Interestingly, although voting behavior is one of the most coveted effects to be identified in all of political communication research, only a few studies in the area of political talk have explored this behavioral outcome. Because the central focus of this study is on motivations for talking politics, rather than voting behavior, this study will focus on the relationships between political talk and voting behavior, as opposed to voting behavior and the other variables outlined in the analysis. Lee (2005) found that political talk is positively related to voting. Therefore, the more individuals engage in political talk throughout an election campaign the more likely they are to vote. Also, McDevitt and Kiousis (2004) studied political discussions among family members and friends and its impact on voting behavior. These researchers conducted a three-phase data collection among parents and voting age students, where student subjects were asked their frequency of discussion of the election campaign with

their parents and friends. Results revealed a significant positive correlation between political discussion and campaign participation. Specifically, the researchers concluded that student-parent conversations about politics lead directly to the likelihood of parents casting a ballot. Similarly, Kiousis and McDevitt (2008) found the same results. This research offers support for the idea that the more one engages in political talk the more likely they are to vote and participate in related elections and political activities. What is missing from this research is how one's motivations to engage in political talk may influence likelihood to vote. To investigate this matter, the following research question is posited:

RQ5a: Are those who are more motivated to talk politics more likely to have reported an increase in odds of voting in the 2008 presidential election?

Also, it is important to examine if specific motivations are related to one's reported likelihood of casting a ballot on Election Day. For example, if one engages in political talk because of their desire to persuade others to agree with their political views and/or candidate choice, are they also more likely to vote than someone who engages in political talk based on a greater desire to talk politics for pleasure or information acquisition? To address these issues, the following research question is posed:

RQ5b: Are specific motivations for talking politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding other's perspectives, pleasure, persuasion and conflict avoidance) related to the reported likelihood of voting in the 2008 presidential election?

Political campaign involvement. Beyond the singular act of voting as an electoral behavior, political campaign participation also comprises a myriad of campaign actions that take place during an election (i.e., actions such as volunteering for a political

campaign, contributing money to a candidate, displaying a yard sing or bumper sticker, etc.). Involvement in the political process, or campaign participation, has been frequently studied in conjunction with media factors. Specifically, print media use is linked with higher levels of campaign participation (Chew, 1994; Pinkleton & Austin, 2001; Tan, 1980). In fact, the previously mentioned Kwak et al. (2005) study found that individuals who incorporated information from the media into their political discussions were more involved in such campaign activities as volunteering and displaying campaign materials. Also, political efficacy is positively associated with campaign involvement (Bandura, 1997; Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). Therefore, the more confident citizens are with their ability to influence the political process, the more likely they are to be involved in politics and political campaigns. According to researchers, political activity increases when involvement is stimulated by a temporary social situation, such as a conversation (Atkin, 1972; Kanihan & Chaffee, 1996). Further, political conversation has been found to have positive effects on campaign participation resulting in individuals volunteering for a political campaign (Kim et al., 1999; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2000; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2004; Pan et al., 2006). Because a relationship has been established between frequency of political talk and political campaign participation, it is important to examine how motivation to talk politics fits into this relationship. Specifically, this study will examine the relationship between one's political campaign participation and one's motivation to talk politics. The following research questions are offered:

RQ6a: What is the relationship between one's level of motivation for talking politics and their level of political campaign involvement at different phases of the election campaign?

RQ6b: What is the relationship between one's specific motivations for talking politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and their level of political campaign involvement at different phases of the election campaign?

Attitudinal Outcomes

Political cynicism. Much like behavioral outcomes, an election campaign can also serve as a stimulus for attitudinal change. One of the most frequently examined political attitudes is political cynicism (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). Political cynicism is defined as a lack of confidence in and feelings of distrust toward the political system (Bandura, 1997; Perloff & Kinsey, 1992; Kaid, McKinney & Tedesco, 2000; Sweester & Kaid, 2008). Researchers often attribute poor voter turnout (Capella & Jamieson, 1997) and low public-affairs media use to individual cynicism (Chew, 1994; Culbertson & Stempel, 1986; Entman, 1989; Kaid, McKinney & Tedesco, 2000). Conversely, Chew (1994) asserts that more engaged and motivated citizens who want useful political information are willing to expend the necessary energy to get it. From this we can conclude that a relationship may exist between political cynicism and motivation. For example, those who are less motivated to talk politics with others may in fact have greater political cynicism. Also, this relationship may very well change throughout the course of an election campaign. However, at present, any such relationship between motivation to talk politics and cynicism has not been explored. Therefore this study proposes the following research question:

RQ7a: What is the relationship between one's level of motivation for talking politics and political cynicism at different phases of the election campaign?

As with previous research questions, it is also likely that specific motivations might alter the relationship between political cynicism and motivation to talk politics. Therefore, it is important to examine how specific motivations relate to political cynicism.

RQ7b: What is the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and political cynicism at different phases of the election campaign?

Additionally, limited research has tested various media sources, such as the Internet, as providing the type of political information that reduces political cynicism (Kaid, 2002). However, conclusions regarding the effects of specific political messages and information sources on cynicism are tentative at best. Interestingly, this relationship has yet to be tested in relation to political talk. Research previously discussed in this chapter suggests that political talk with more individuals – with a larger social network that tends to agree with one's political views – increases political participation (Moy & Gastil, 2006), and also sparks greater political information acquisition (McClurg, 2006b). Therefore, it may be possible that the more people with whom one discusses politics, the less politically cynical one might be. To explore this relationship, the following research question is posited:

RQ8: What is the relationship between political cynicism and one's network of political discussants?

Political information efficacy (PIE). Recently, Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) advanced the construct of political information efficacy (PIE). This attitudinal concept is grounded in important theoretical links between general political efficacy and

one's feelings of confidence in the political knowledge they possess. Although traditional efficacy has been defined as an individual's feelings that he or she has the ability to influence the political process (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954), the concept of political information efficacy is defined as the level of confidence one has in his or her political knowledge and that one possesses sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in the political process through behaviors such as voting.

In their initial empirical testing of their four-item PIE scale, Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) discovered that younger voters reported significantly less confidence in their political knowledge than older voters. Additionally, lack of confidence in one's political knowledge is significantly related to voting. Specifically, respondents with low political information efficacy were significantly less likely to vote than those citizens with higher levels of political information efficacy. Further, exposure to political debates and televised political ads was found to increase young voters' feelings of political information efficacy (McKinney & Chattopadhyay, 2007; Kaid, Landreville, Posteinicu, & Martin, 2005). As certain sources of campaign communication have been linked to individuals' level of political information efficacy, we should further explore political information efficacy's relationship with yet another important source of political information, citizens' political talk. Specifically, research should examine how political information efficacy fits into the process of one's political talk behavior beginning with one's motivation to engage in political talk. Discovering how motivations affect political information efficacy will bring added depth to our understanding of this important political attitude. Therefore, the following research questions are posed:

RQ9a: What is the relationship between one's level of motivation for talking politics and their political information efficacy at different phases of the election campaign?

RQ9b: What is the relationship between specific motivations to talk politics (i.e., information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance) and political information efficacy at different phases of the election campaign?

Finally, as our political attitudes, such as PIE, can be influenced by our motivations as well as those individuals that make up our political talk network, we should also examine the relationship between political information efficacy and one's network of political discussants. For example, if we engage in political conversation with a greater array of individuals, these interactions may lead to greater confidence in our political knowledge (increased PIE). To examine this relationship, the following research question is posited:

RQ10: What is the relationship between political information efficacy and participants' network of political discussants?

Panel Design

In the first chapter it was suggested that a dominant goal of this study is to see how individuals' motivations for talking politics may evolve throughout the course of an ongoing political campaign. One reason for this interest is to determine temporal order, or the direction of the effects between one's motivation to talk politics and related variables. As explained previously, political communication research is also often interested in studying the effects of various political communication variables on democratic outcomes such as voting. However, many of these studies suggest a causal order (i.e.,

communication predicts outcome) without actually testing for causality. Unfortunately, few political talk researchers have used repeated measures in their survey designs, allowing little to no information about the causality of communication behaviors. For this very reason, Eveland (2004) calls for panel analyses when examining political talk. Therefore, this study seeks to explore the causal direction between motivations for political talk and frequency of political talk, one's network of political discussants, political media use, and behavioral and altitudinal democratic outcomes by using a panel design that will allow greater understanding of causality among communication variables.

Pan, Shen, Paek, and Sun (2006) examined how political campaigns foster an environment conducive for political talk to emerge. Using NES panel data from the 2000 election, these researchers analyzed both pre and post election survey responses, analyzing media use, campaign contacts, campaign participation, and political talk. Unfortunately, political talk was measured on the post survey only, leaving us with no information about the pattern of political talk during the election. The study concluded that engaging in political talk during a campaign season is a form of campaign participation and that one's talk is spurred by ongoing campaign events. Also instructive for the current study, Pan et al. found a positive relationship between political talk and campaign participation, campaign interest, media consumption, and campaign contacts (one's network of political discussants). Therefore, political talk increases among participants as these other variables increase. Most importantly, the researchers were able to establish that levels of political talk increased as the campaign progressed. Research such as this provides an argument as to the importance of examining motivations,

political talk, media use, and democratic behaviors at various points during the an election campaign.

Eveland, Hayes, Shah, and Kwak (2005) also conducted a panel design study using participants in June and November 2000 to examine the assumptions of causality in research on communication and political knowledge. They found that causality is unidirectional running from both mass and interpersonal communication to political knowledge. The researchers suggest that similar studies be conducted measuring communication variables at different time lags, such as a few weeks apart. Answering this call, the variables in research questions one through seven of this study will be measured at three different points during the general-election 2008 presidential election approximately six weeks apart.

As discussed previously, a valuable component of a panel design is the ability to examine variation in variables over time. In the case of a general election campaign, the researcher anticipates that all variables will increase (with a decrease in cynicism) from the first data collection point to the second data point, as we expect campaign talk to increase along with the pace, attention to, and communication surrounding the ongoing campaign. However, what we do not know is if attitudes persist once the campaign has ended. Discovering this will allow researchers to determine lasting effects of campaign communication, but more importantly we can determine if political talk, and motivation to engage in talk, persists following a political election.

From the research provided in this review it is apparent that frequency of political talk is linked to one's network of political discussants, media use, voting, and campaign involvement. Because motivation for talking politics is viewed as an impetus for

engaging in political talk it becomes necessary to consider frequency of political talk as a mediator between motivation to talk politics and the other variables studied. Therefore, the following question is asked:

RQ11: Does frequency of political talk function as a mediator between motivation to talk politics and network of political discussants, political media diet, political cynicism, and political information efficacy?

Lastly, discovering the relationships between specific motivations for talking politics and the other variables allows the researcher to determine if motivation to talk politics is the impetus for political talk as well as what the overall model of political talk looks like. Thus, a final question is posed to explore the overall political talk model:

RQ12: What is the overall fit of a cohesive political talk model that includes motivation to talk politics, political media use, democratic outcomes, political talk, and network of discussants?

Conclusion

This chapter brings together literature that suggests the culmination of political talk and related variables that serve as contributors to the buildup of a democratic society. Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) suggest that conversation, in general, functions as a bridge between one's public and private political worlds. The authors further explain that the unique function of the democratic process is that political conversation happens in the private sphere (e.g., interpersonal conversation), yet this conversation is composed of inputs from the public sphere (e.g., media). What we glean from this process is that interpersonal interaction and relationship building – mediated through political conversations – play a large role in the democratic process. The combination of the

community that one's social network creates and the talk that occurs within the community creates an environment of increased political knowledge and participation. This study seeks to understand the role that one's political needs or motivation play in this important process. The next chapter describes in detail the study design, procedures, and measurement of all variables.

CHAPTER THREE: METHOD

This chapter explains the study design and methods of analysis used to answer the research questions discussed in chapter two. To begin, the chapter describes the study participants as well as the study's design and procedures of data collection. This chapter also explicates the measures used to represent the different variables of analysis.

Participants

In total, the sample for this study included 430 students, each of whom completed all three waves of data collection. These participants were enrolled in communication courses at the University of Missouri located in Columbia, Missouri. Although a convenience sample, motivations for talking politics (MTP) has yet to be empirically tested on any population; thus, this sample makes a unique contribution to political talk research. Further, McDevitt and Kiousis (2006) suggest that for young voters, civic development and political identity are fostered via the media as well as through their conversations with family, friends, and classmates. Thus, examining political talk among young citizens allowed the researcher to understand the effects of MTP on citizens as they are developing their political identity.

The participants included 63.3% (N = 273) female and 35.7% (N = 154) male students (with 0.9% (N = 4) not reporting their sex). Party identification among the respondents was distributed as 37.6% (N = 162) Democrat, 34.4% (N = 148) Republican, 24.1% (N = 104) Independent, and 3.0% (N = 13) Other (with 0.9% (N = 4) not identifying their political party affiliation). The sample was composed of 82.6% (N = 356) Caucasian participants. Also represented in the study were African Americans (8.6%; N = 37), Asian or Pacific Islanders (2.8%; N = 12), Multi-Racial or Mixed-Race

(1.9%; *N* = 8), and Spanish or Hispanic (1.9%; *N* = 8) participants. The remaining 2.3% (*N* = 9) did not identify with any of these categories. The mean age of the respondents was 19.55 (*SD* = 1.08), with respondents ranging in age from 18 to 23.

The total sample size is more than adequate for predicting a small to moderate effect size (*r* = .20); the power to predict that effect is better than .95 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Although at this time no published research has established a precedent for a correlation between motivations for talking politics and other variables, this size was considered adequate because previous research has shown that small to moderate effects are normal for relationships in motivation and political talk research (Kim, et al., 1999; Pan, et al., 2006). These studies indicate correlations in similar analyses range from 0.13 to 0.27. For example, research has reported that motivations for listening to talk radio predict campaign involvement, *r* = 0.13 (Rubin & Step, 2000). Further, political discussion has been found to be a predictor of voting behavior, *r* = 0.27, and news attention, *r* = 0.25 (McDevitt & Kiousis, 2007). Political talk is also associated with political participation, *r* = 0.17 (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004).

Design and Procedures

The focus of the present study was to analyze three waves of panel data with measures of MTP, frequency of political discussion, frequency of political talk with various discussants, political media diet, political cynicism, political information efficacy, political involvement, and voting behavior. The relationship between MTP and each of the other variables was examined at three different time points during the general election season to determine temporal order as well as the lasting or dissipating effects of political talk throughout a political campaign. The panel design allowed the researcher to

draw two conclusions about the relationships between variables: a) if change existed in the relationships between the variables, and b) if the change lasted over the course of the political campaign season.

Data collection for this study was conducted via online surveys at three different phases during the 2008 fall semester. The online survey link for the panel design study was distributed to students enrolled in a variety of lower level and upper level communication courses (Introduction to Speech Communication (Comm 1200), Media Communication in Society (Comm 2100), Introduction to Communication (Comm 2500), and Relational Communication (Comm 3561)) in exchange for extra credit. Because one drawback to using a panel design is the difficulty of retention of respondents, extra credit was only given to students who completed all three phases of data collection. As such, 36 students were dropped from the study due to non-completion of one or more phase of the study. Each survey took approximately 20 minutes to complete, and data collection lasted for one week at each time point.

In this study, the 2008 presidential election created an opportunity to study a naturally occurring variance in the statistical relationships being examined. Thus, data collection reflected three different stages of the general election and the communication surrounding it: the beginning, height, and termination stages. The first phase of data collection served as a baseline for participants' responses. This wave of data was collected after both major parties' conventions but prior to the first presidential debate (September 19-26, 2008). In this phase, campaign activity was not at its height, as citizens were not yet completely inundated with campaign messages; however, campaign communication was beginning to accelerate towards phase two of the campaign season

(Trent & Friedenberg, 2008). It has been argued that the period between the presidential debates and Election Day is when the height of campaign communication takes place (Carlin, 1992; Trent & Friedenberg, 2008). During this campaign phase, we see an even greater increase in news coverage of candidates, an influx of political advertisements, and a surge in campaigning. Thus, the second wave of data was collected in the week prior to Election Day (October 27- November 3, 2008), allowing the researcher to gather data at the height of the election when campaign communication was at its greatest. Because frequency of political talk was expected to increase from the Time-One (T1) wave to the Time-Two (T2) wave, using the panel design allowed the researcher to use MTP to predict variation in the amount of talk during the height of the campaign season. Lastly, once the general election was complete, there was an end to traditional campaign communication (e.g., political advertisements, debates, rallies, speeches, etc.). At this point, although campaign communication had dissipated, political communication continues via analysis and commentary about the election and the campaigns. Therefore, a third wave of data (December 5-12, 2008) was collected approximately one month after Election Day (i.e., termination of the campaign) to discover whether the effects of MTP on the frequency of political talk is lasting or whether it dissipated once the election was complete.

Although political talk research frequently uses ANES post-election data, researchers rarely use repeated measures in their studies (McDevitt & Kiousis, 2007; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004; Pan et al., 2006). Therefore, existing research is lacking in its understanding of political talk over the course of the general election. Additionally, because Time-Three (T3) data collection occurred after the general election was

complete, a measurement of voting and actual vote choice was taken. Thus, including a third time point after the election allowed the researcher to analyze how MTP affected voting behavior.

The first wave of data collection resulted in 466 participants completing the measures. By the time the third wave of data collection was complete, 430 participants were retained, resulting in 92% retention and an 8% attrition rate. Ideally, there would be no attrition between waves; however, the main concern in panel research is that those who completed all three waves of measurement were not significantly different than those who only completed the T1 questionnaire. To assess whether the attrition impacted the analyses, the scores on the variables for participants who only completed the first phase of the questionnaire were compared to participants who completed all three phases of data collection using independent samples *T*-tests for continuous variables (i.e., MTP, frequency of talk, political discussants, political media diet, political cynicism, political information efficacy, political involvement, political interest, age, grade level, parents education, and household income) or a two-way chi-square for categorical variables (i.e., sex, race, vote intention, political ideology, and political affiliation). As Table 1 indicates, of all of the variables, only one showed a significant difference between those who completed only the T1 survey and those who completed all three phases of data collection. Specifically, those who dropped out of the study after T1 talked about politics with community leaders significantly more than the participants who completed the measures at all three time points. It is possible that this result could be due to chance, or significance achieved due to having such a large sample size. Although this difference is important to note, it appears that the difference between those who only completed the

first phase of data collection was not significantly different from the individuals completing all three phases of the survey on the majority of the variables used in this study.

Measures

The online questionnaire consisted of five main groups of variables: (a) motivations for talking politics, (b) political talk, (c) political media diet, (d) democratic engagement variables, and (e) control variables including demographic characteristics of the participants. All of the measures can be found in Appendix A1-9. The presentation of the measures on the questionnaire were in the following order: Motivations for Talking Politics (MTP) Scale, political cynicism, political information efficacy, political talk, political media diet, political involvement, and the control variables. Because the primary goal of the study is to test the effects of motivations for talking politics, the MTP scale was placed first on the survey to avoid order effects, or contamination from the other variables measured in this study.

Reliability of the measures was assessed using two main criteria: (a) for the scales with multiple items, Cronbach's *alpha* was used to assess the internal consistency, and (b) the correlations between the T1 and T3 measures of the same variable were used to assess the stability of the measure.[1] Because the goal of the test re-test method is to ensure consistency of the measures across time, a moderate correlation (r = .40 to .70) is used as the minimum criterion of acceptance (Williams & Monge, 2001). Both the Cronbach's *alpha* and stability correlation are reported.

Motivations for Talking Politics

To measure individuals' desire to engage in interpersonal conversations about politics with others, the Motivations for Talking Politics (MTP) Scale (see Appendix A-1) was used (Rill, 2008). The global 35-item measure is comprised of five motives to engage in interpersonal communication about politics (see Figure 1 for CFA of scale as reported in Rill [2008]). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with statements representing reasons they have for talking with others about politics (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 5 = *Strongly Agree*). To compute global motivation, the mean score of all 35 items was tabulated. Thus, the higher ones' score, the more motivated she or he was to discuss politics with others. Cronbach's *alpha* for the global MTP measure at T1 was 0.89, at T2 *alpha* was 0.88, and for T3 *alpha* was 0.88. Further, the stability of the measures across the three time points was also high; T1 and T3 were correlated at 0.65 ($p < .001$).

The *Information Acquisition* subscale included items such as "I talk about politics with others to learn more about politics." This subscale showed acceptable Cronbach's *alpha* at T1 (0.90), T2 (0.89), and T3 (0.90). Additionally, the information acquisition subscale also demonstrated stability over time. T1 was correlated with T3 ($r = 0.61$, $p < .001$).

The second subscale, *Understanding Others' Perspectives,* contained seven items (e.g., "I talk with others about politics because I want to hear their opinions"). This subscale also reached internal consistency with a Cronbach's *alpha* at T1 of 0.89, 0.87 at T2, and 0.89 at T3. The stability of this measure between waves was also quite high. The

T1 and T3 measure of understanding others' perspectives were correlated at 0.65 ($p <$ .001), indicating this measure is stable over time.

The third subscale, *Pleasure*, was comprised of 10 items (e.g., "I talk about politics with others because it amuses me."). Cronbach's *alpha* at T1 was 0.89, 0.90 at T2, and 0.92 at T3. This measure was considered stable over the course of data collection as T1 was highly correlated with T3 at 0.70 ($p < .001$).

The fourth subscale combined five items representing *Persuasion* (e.g., "I talk about politics with others because I want to influence people"). The Cronbach's *alpha* at T1 and T2 was 0.86 and 0.85 at T3. As with the previous measures, persuasion also demonstrated high stability; T1 and T3 were correlated at 0.65 ($p < .001$).

Lastly, the fifth subscale of MTP utilized five items to measure *Conflict Avoidance* (e.g., "I don't talk about politics with others because it is too controversial"). Because the conflict avoidance category measures individuals' lack of motivation to engage in political talk, these items are reverse-coded when used as a subscale. Thus, a higher conflict avoidance score on the recoded items reflects that individuals are motivated to engage in political talk with others for the potential conflict in the conversation (i.e., conflict motivation). On the other hand, a lower conflict avoidance score on the recoded items indicates that individuals do not engage in political talk because of the potential conflict in the conversation. This scale also demonstrated internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha of 0.90 at T1 and T3 and 0.88 at T2. This measure also showed stability between waves; T1 was correlated with T3 at 0.68 ($p < .001$).

Frequency of Political Talk

As mentioned in the previous chapter, frequency of political talk is a predominant measure used in political talk research. Although frequency can be calculated in many ways, the most common measurement of this question centers on the number of days in the past week individuals discuss politics (Eveland, 2004; Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004; Pan et al., 2006). Therefore, in this study, respondents were asked to indicate the number of days in the past week that they had discussed politics with others. Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the number of political conversations they engaged in per day as well as how many minutes each political conversation lasted (see Appendix A-2). For the item, the number of days that people discussed politics with others, stability of the measure between waves was demonstrated. T1 was correlated with T3 at 0.51 ($p <$ .001).

Political Discussants

Additionally, some political talk research taps into frequency of political talk with specific individuals (Eveland et al., 2005; Eveland, 2004; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; Kwak, Williams, & Lee, 2005; Lee, 2005). The scale for this study measures with whom individuals discuss politics and is adapted from current measures used in political science and communication research (see Appendix A-3 for the full scale). Participants were asked to indicate on a six-point scale (0 = *Never*; 5 = *A Lot*) how often they discuss politics with a nine interpersonal sources (close friends, acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, community leaders, professors, and classmates). The stability of the T1 and T3 measures on all of the nine variables was adequate.[2] Because it is possible that a fair majority of the participants did not have a sibling, coworker, or

significant other, anyone indicating "never" as a response at all three time points was deleted from the analysis.

Political Media Diet

The latent political media diet variable was measured by individuals' exposure to a variety of mediated sources of political information. Participants' *Political Media Diet*[3] was measured by asking participants how much they use specific mass communication sources (e.g., television news, newspapers, Internet, social networking sites) to obtain political information. For all of the 25 sources, respondents' answers were recorded on a six-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from *Never* (0) to *A Lot* (5) (See Appendix A-4 for exact question wording). Then, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was preformed on the 25 items using principal components extraction with varimax rotation to determine variable groupings. The EFA did not yield reliable subscales for political media diet, thus, a reliability analysis using the initial factor groupings was used. Here, items that were theoretically similar were grouped together to form subscales. In the end, a total of four media diet subscales were created.

Factor 1 contained seven political communication sources (local television news, national broadcast news, cable news, CSPAN, morning television talk shows, entertainment programming, and late night television) and was termed *Television Sources*. For Television Sources, T1 *alpha* = 0.77, T2 *alpha* = 0.80, and T3 *alpha* = 0.82; reaching an acceptable level of internal consistency. The second factor, labeled *Internet Sources*, consisted of five political communication sources (political blogs/websites, political candidate websites, news websites, online newspapers, and Internet search engines). The Internet Sources factor also reached an acceptable level of internal

consistency; T1 *alpha* = 0.77, T2 *alpha* = 0.78, and T3 *alpha* = 0.81. Third, the factor labeled *Print Sources,* consisted of six political communication sources (campus newspapers, national newspapers, state/regional newspapers, local newspapers, weekly news magazines, and popular magazines). Print Sources also demonstrated suitable reliability as T1 *alpha* = 0.78, T2 *alpha* = 0.82, and T3 *alpha* = 0.83. Lastly, Factor 4 consisted of four political communication sources (YouTube, social networking sites, cell phones, and classroom) and was labeled *Social Sources*. Social Sources was also internally consistent; T1 *alpha* = 0.78, T2 = 0.76, and T3 = 0.82. For each of the media diet subscales, a higher mean score reflects more usage of those media sources for political information.

The stability between the three waves on all four factors was also acceptable. The correlation between T1 and T3 for the Television Sources factor was 0.59 ($p < .001$). Factor two, Internet Sources, was correlated at 0.60 ($p < .001$) for T1 and T3. Third, the Print Sources factor was correlated at 0.55 ($p <. 001$) for T1 and T3. Lastly, the correlation between T1 and T3 for Social Sources was 0.58 ($p < .001$).

Democratic Variables

Voting behavior. Individual's *voting behavior* was measured categorically. Respondents were asked to indicate if they were registered to vote and if they planned to vote (T1 and T2; 1 = yes; 2 = no; 3 = not sure yet) as well as if they voted in the 2008 general election (T3) using a yes/no response (1 = yes; 0 = no). Additionally, the T1 and T2 surveys included a question asking participants for whom they would have voted if the elections were held today. The T3 survey asked participants for whom they voted (see Appendix A-5 for exact question wording). A chi-square analysis between the T1 and T2

voting behavior variable revealed that the stability measure for this item was adequate ($\chi^2(4) = 231.49$, $p < .001$).

Political campaign involvement. Using the Verba and Nie (1972) Index of Political Participation as a guide, a modified Political Campaign Involvement Scale was used to measure individuals' level of *political campaign involvement* (Pan et al., 2006). The inventory was comprised of six items measuring participation in formal political campaign activities. Participants were asked if they had participated in any of the activities in the past 12 months, indicating yes/no as their response. The "yes" answers were summed to form one index reflecting individuals' political campaign involvement score. Thus, the higher the campaign involvement score, the more involved an individual was in the political campaign. The formal activities include items such as "worked or volunteered in any capacity for one of the parties or candidates" and "contributed money to any political party or individual candidate running for public office" (see Appendix A-6 for complete scale). As it was assumed that political campaign involvement would drastically drop off after the election came to a close, political involvement was only measured at T1 and T2. Within each wave, the measure reached an acceptable level of internal consistency. The T1 Cronbach's *alpha* was 0.79 and the T2 *alpha* was 0.78. As with the other measures in this study, the stability of the political campaign involvement measure was high. The T1 and T2 measures were correlated at 0.65 ($p < .001$).

Political cynicism. Individuals' level of political cynicism was assessed using a cynicism scale adapted from the National Election Studies (Rosenstone, Kinder, & Miller, 1997) and various election studies (Kaid, 2002; Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2000; Sweester & Kaid, 2008). The scale is a mean of eight items (see appendix A-7)

used to determine the level of trust or confidence that individuals have in politicians and government. Respondents were asked to give their level of agreement (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 5 = *Strongly Agree*) with eight items (e.g., "Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do"; "People like me don't really have any say about what the government does"). One item, "one can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing" was reverse coded. For this scale, a higher score is a sign of more political cynicism. Consistent with past research (Kaid, 2002; Sweester & Kaid, 2008; Tedesco, 2002), Cronbach's *alpha* for T1 was 0.71, 0.70 for T2, and 0.74 for T3. The T1 and T3 were correlated at 0.57 ($p < .001$), confirming the stability of the measure over the course of data collection.

Political information efficacy. A four-item scale was used to measure *political information efficacy* (PIE) (see Appendix A-8; Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). Participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement (using a five-point scale from *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*) with four statements reflecting one's level of confidence in their political knowledge (e.g., "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country"). The responses were averaged for each participant. Here, a higher score indicates that the participant has greater political information efficacy. The four-item measure demonstrated acceptable reliability at each time point with a Cronbach's *alpha* of 0.84 at T1, 0.83 at T2, and 0.85 at T3. Further, this measure established high stability across waves: T1 and T3 were correlated at 0.62 ($p < .001$).

Control variables. This study used various control variables in the analyses, as multiple variables have been shown to impact the outcome variables used in this study.

These controls are similar to those used in current political talk research (Eveland, et al., 2005; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999; Kwak, et al., 2005) and as such, were measured to determine if the main relationships withstand the introduction of the control variables into the models. These measurements, taken at T1 only, included age (in years), sex (1 = Male; 2 = Female), and race/ethnicity (see Appendix A-9 for control variable items). As previously explained, 82.6% (N = 356) of participants reported their race/ethnicity as Caucasian. Because the sample sizes in the remaining categories were not large enough to predict a moderate effect (Cohen & Cohen, 1983), race was recoded as a dummy variable, with one category for Caucasian and another for those identifying as other than Caucasian. Additionally, political interest (1 = *Strongly Agree* to 5 = *Strongly Disagree*), political ideology (1 = *Strongly Liberal*, 3 = *Moderate*, 5 = *Strongly Conservative*), and party affiliation (1 = *Strong Democrat*, 3 = *Independent*, 5 = *Strong Republican*) were taken at all three time points, as it was expected that these items could possibly vary over the course of the election. At the time of analysis, political interest and political ideology were consistently correlated with the main variables in this study; thus, only T1 political interest and ideology were used as control variables. This was not true for political affiliation; therefore, all three time points of political affiliation were utilized as control variables.

Additional control variables frequently used in existing literature are individuals' education and income level. However, because the sample for this study was drawn from college students, which are homogeneous in terms of their own education and income levels, this study used parental education (1 = *Less Than High School* to 6 = *Graduate School Completed)* and family household income (1 = *Less Than $10,000* to 6 = *More*

Than $150,000) as control variables as indicated by past research using college students (Niemi & Hammer, 2004).

Data Analysis

To answer the research questions and hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter, three data analysis methods were utilized. All of the results are reported in detail in the following chapter.

Structural Equation Modeling

First, for the a and b components of RQ 1-2, 4, 6 -7, and 9, the researcher sought to establish temporal order between MTP and the other variables. Doing this helped to establish causal direction between the variables and indicated which structural paths should be used in the overall talk model developed in RQ12 (see Figure 22). To determine the relationship between political discussants and political media diet, political cynicism, and political information efficacy as discussed in RQ 3, 8 and 10, similar analyses were conducted.

To answer these questions, two data analysis techniques were employed. First, zero-order correlations between T1, T2, and T3 variables were examined for each research question. If a variable was not significantly correlated with another variable at all three time points it was not included in the analysis. However, any variable with at least one significant correlation across the three time points was included in the path analyses. Second, temporal order was established by analyzing the data using cross-lagged path models with Analysis of Moment Structures 6.0 (AMOS) software. The cross-lagged path models allowed the variables to be analyzed at the T1, T2, and T3 waves of data collection, helping the researcher to establish temporal order between

variables. The goal of this analysis was to determine whether MTP at T1 predicted the other variables, such as frequency of talk, at T2 or vice versa as well as if T2 variables predicted T3 variables. For example, the structural models were able to simultaneously predict the relationships between T1 motivation variables and T2 frequency of talk, T1 frequency of talk and T2 motivation variables, T2 motivation variables and T3 frequency of talk, and T2 frequency of talk and T3 motivation variables while controlling for the aforementioned control variables.

Additionally, control variables that could possibly alter the relationship between the variables were entered into every path model for analysis. The control variables used in the models were empirically driven (i.e., derived from the data rather than theory) and were entered as the most conservative test of the main relationships. This was conservative, in that, if a significant statistical association between the main variables existed, even with the control variables in the model, then it was safe to conclude that the relationship was not explained by the controls. Thus, the goal of including the control variables in the models was to determine if the main relationships existed even with control variables in the models, not to investigate the relationships between the control variables and the other variables. Good-fitting models that contain significant paths between control variables and the main variables are depicted in the corresponding figures mentioned in Chapter 4.

To determine the best, or most correct models, the fit of each model was evaluated using several criteria: root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990), the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990), and the relative, or normed, chi-square (CMIN) were also used to evaluate the model fit. Good model fit was

judged by RMSEA < 0.08 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), CFI > 0.90 (Bollen, 1989), and CMIN < 5.0 (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004, p. 82). The results for each model are reported in Chapter 4 in the following order: model fit statistics and significant paths of main relationships in the model ($p < 0.05$). In the spirit of parsimony, only models with significant paths for the main relationships will have a corresponding figure associated with the model.

Paired Samples T-tests

Second, paired samples *t*-tests were used to answer RQ 2 and 4. These questions inquired about the relationships of the political discussant and political media diet variables at each phase of the election. Thus, the difference in mean scores for each of the political discussants and political media diet variables were tested at T1, T2, and T3 using this data analysis method.

Logistic Regression

Third, RQ 5 a and b addressed the relationship between MTP and voting behavior using logistic regression. Logistic regression should be used to predict a categorical (usually dichotomous) variable (i.e., T3 voting behavior) from a set of predictor variables (e.g., MTP). Thus, because the goal of this analysis was to determine whether young citizens' motivations for talking politics at T1 and T2 were predictors of voting behavior in the 2008 presidential election (T3) Logistic Regression was used. For voting behavior, the T3 measure ("did you vote in the 2008 general election") was employed in the analysis, allowing the researcher to establish if motivations for talking politics predicted one's likelihood of voting.

Testing Mediation

RQ11 addresses the potential role of frequency of political talk as a mediator between the motivation variables and political discussants, political media diet, political cynicism and political information efficacy. To test this, the product of coefficients equation approach to mediation was employed (Holbert & Stephenson, 2003). The product of coefficients approach is recognized as the most accurate means of testing mediation because of its ability to measure specific indirect effects (Holbert & Stephenson, 2003). This method of testing mediation first utilized path models depicting the mediation relationships outlined in RQ11. These models were tested for fit based on the previously mentioned model fit criterion. If the mediation models had an acceptable fit to the data, *z*-scores for each indirect path were calculated (unstandardized parameter estimate divided by its respective standard error). Using these scores, the product of the two *z*-scores was obtained. A significant ($p < .05$) *z*-score indicated that a specific indirect effect was present and significant. Lastly, when the specific indirect effect was deemed significant, the product of the standardized path estimates leading from the independent variable to the mediator variable and then from the mediator to the dependent variable were calculated to determine the indirect effect size.

CHAPTER THREE: NOTES

[1]Although stability correlations could be reported for the relationships between T1 and T2, T1 and T3, and T2 and T3, the stability correlation between T1 and T3 represents the most conservative estimate because the longest period of time elapsed between T1 and T3. Thus, due to the number of variables used in this study in combination with the number of stability correlations that could be reported, only the T1 to T3 relationships will be reported.

[2]The correlation between T1 and T3 for close friends was 0.53 ($p < .001$). For casual acquaintances, T1 and T3 were correlated at 0.49 ($p < .001$). Parents were correlated at 0.61 (p <. 001) for T1 and T3. Siblings were correlated at 0.56 (p <. 001) for T1 andT3. The correlation between T1 and T3 for significant others was 0.48 ($p < .001$). Coworkers were correlated at 0.40 (p <. 001) for T1 and T3. For community leaders, T1 was correlated with T3 at 0.53 ($p < .001$). Professors were correlated at 0.58 (p <. 001) for T1 and T3. Lastly, the correlation between T1 and T3 for classmates was 0.53 ($p < .001$).

[3]For the 25-item Political Media Diet scale, T1 *alpha* = 0.91, T2 *alpha* = 0.92, and T3 *alpha* = 0.93; reaching an acceptable level of internal consistency. The stability between the three waves was also acceptable. The correlation between T1 and T3 for the Political Media Diet measure was 0.62 ($p < .001$).

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

This chapter includes descriptive statistics as well as the description of analyses for each research question and hypothesis in order to address the study's overarching goal: to understand how individuals' motivations for talking politics may be related to other factors associated with political talk behavior. This chapter presents the results of the research questions and hypotheses outlined in chapter two.

Descriptive Statistics

To get a clearer understanding of the variables used in this study, I first looked at the descriptive information for each variable. Then, paired samples *t*-tests were utilized to determine the difference in means between variables across the various time points in this study. This information allowed me to determine how each variable functioned over the course of the campaign. The following section highlights the significant findings from the *t*-tests. A complete table of the descriptive statistics for each measure is presented in Table 2.

First, individuals indicated that they talked about politics with others significantly more often in the week prior to the election (T2) than at the other points of data collection. Also, participants were least active in their political talk after the campaign had concluded (T3). In regards to their motivation for talking politics, individuals reported significantly higher global motivation scores at the height of the election (T2) and this level of motivation persisted after the presidential campaign had dissipated (T3) compared to their T1 global motivation. Specifically, there was a significant increase between T1 and T2 and between T1 and T3 global motivation, but not between T2 and

T3. Thus, we can conclude that individuals' motivation to talk about politics did not drop off after the height of the election, but rather, statistically, these levels remained the same.

In terms of specific motivations for talking politics, Table 2 also revealed that both information acquisition and understanding others' perspectives are the two greatest motivators during participants' political talk, and this pattern holds across all three measurement periods. These top-two motivators are followed by conflict, persuasion, and pleasure, and this order also holds across all three measurement periods. Thus, overall, individuals' greatest reason or motivation for talking politics with others seems to be driven by a rather utilitarian purpose (to acquire information and understand others' views). Yet, overall, participants' were least motivated to engage in political talk for pleasure.

Individuals' motivation to talk about politics with others for pleasure followed the same trend as global motivation. Here, we see that individuals' pleasure motivation increased from the beginning of the campaign cycle to the height of the campaign. While the increase in pleasure motivation increased even after the campaign season ended there was no significant change between T2 and T3. Therefore, we can conclude that once the campaign season had ended, people continued to talk politics for enjoyment as they did during the height of the election.

The same pattern of results was also present for the conflict motivation. Again, we find a significant difference between mean scores at T1 and T2 and T1 and T3. However, in this case, a lower score indicates that individuals are less motivated to engage in political talk because of the conflict that may ensue from such discussion. Thus, as one may suspect, when the campaign season was at its peak, people were less

motivated to engage in political talk with others because of the potential conflict. One reason this may be is that as the election nears, people become more firmly set in their beliefs and opinions about the candidates. As such, engaging in conversations with those who may hold opposing political views could lead to conflict and therefore individuals are less inclined or motivated to talk about politics with others. Interestingly, at T3, individuals were not any less motivated to discuss politics because of potential conflict than they were at T2. Once the campaign was over, it is likely that individuals saw little need or motivation to engage in tense conversations over an issue or candidate preferences that could not be changed at this post-election stage of the campaign season.

Table 2 also reveals an increase in participants' persuasion motivation scores from T1 to T2. This finding is rather intuitive, as individuals' motivation to talk about politics with others for the purpose of persuading an other to agree with one's candidate choice would likely increase as the election nears. This pattern is similar to that of the previously mentioned motivations. There was an increase in persuasion motivation from the beginning phase of the campaign season to its height with no dissipating effects between T2 and T3. However, not all of the five motivations for talking politics with others revealed increases in motivation throughout the course of the campaign season. There were no significant differences between T1, T2, or T3 for either the information acquisition or the understanding others' perspectives motivations.

In regard to the political discussant variables, participants' talk with each of the eight political discussants from T1 to T2 increased (with the exception of classmates, which stayed the same), and participants reported a significant increase in their frequency of political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant

others, and professors from the beginning of the campaign season (T1) to the height of the campaign season (T2). Yet, participants' talk with each of the eight political discussants fell from T2 to T3 and a significant decrease in the amount of talk that took place with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, coworkers, and classmates occurred between T2 and T3. This finding is relatively intuitive, as we would expect frequency of political discussion to rise as the election became closer and then decline once the election was complete.

Participants' overall political media diet did not significantly increase from T1 to T2; but a significant decrease in overall political media diet did occur once the election ended (T2 to T3). As discussed in chapter three, the overall political media diet scale was comprised of four subscales (Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, and Social Sources). Of these four sources, participants' use of Internet Sources and Social Sources (i.e., YouTube, social networking sites, cell phones, and classmates) increased significantly from the beginning to the height of the campaign (T1 to T2) while use of Television as a source of political information decreased significantly from the beginning to the height of the campaign. In fact, the use of Television Sources in one's media diet indicated a steady decline in use for political information as the campaign season evolved (T1 to T2 to T3). The reported use of Internet Sources did not dissipate after the election was complete (T2 to T3) as there was no significant difference reported between the two measurement periods. The use of Social Sources for political information significantly decreased from T2 to T3. There were no significant differences reported for uses of Print Sources to obtain political information throughout the duration of the study.

The study's democratic variables revealed changes throughout the course of the campaign. As the campaign cycle progressed (T1 to T3), participants became significantly less cynical about politics and more confident in the political information they possessed (greater political information efficacy). Additionally, political campaign involvement increased from the onset of the election cycle (T1) to the height of the campaign (T2). Because campaign involvement is directly related to the occurrence of a campaign, it makes sense that involvement would increase as the campaign season peaked.

Only two of the control variables, which were taken at multiple time points, showed significant differences. Interest in politics increased from the beginning of the campaign cycle (T1) to the height of the campaign cycle (T2) and also from T1 to T3. Additionally, individuals' political affiliation changed significantly from the beginning phase of the election (T1) to the end of the campaign cycle (T3). Participants reported being significantly less Republican at T3, perhaps reflecting something of a "bandwagon" effect after the election of Democrat Barack Obama.

Research Question 1a and 1b: MTP and Frequency of Political Talk

RQ1 explored the relationship between the various motivations for talking about politics and the frequency that individuals talk politics at different phases of the election. The results reveal that for three out of six models, frequency of political talk precedes the motivation for talking politics variable. For the remaining three models the opposite it true. In these models the motivation variables predict individuals' frequency of political talk. The following explicates these relationships in greater detail.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Frequency of Political Talk

The zero-order correlations between the motivations for talking politics, the variable measuring frequency of political talk, and the control variables are shown in Tables 3.1-3.6. The results reveal a significant positive correlation between the T1 variables of global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance and the number of days individuals talked about politics with others at T1, T2, and T3. Global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance at T2 were also positively correlated with frequency of talk at T2 and T3. Lastly, all of the motivation variables at T3 were significantly and positively correlated to frequency of talk at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Frequency of Political Talk

To answer research questions 1a and b, path analyses were computed. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, conflict, and frequency of political talk. In total there are six motivation variables; therefore, six models will be use in this analysis. Figures 2.1-2.6 depict the models' main relationships and significant control variables.

The first path model illustrated in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between global motivation and frequency of political talk with the control variables entered. This model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (47) = 115.66, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.46). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk at T1 and global motivation at T2 was positive

and significant. Thus, the more individuals talked about politics at the beginning of the campaign season, the more *motivated* they were to talk about politics with others at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between T1 global motivation and T2 frequency of talk was not significant. However, this relationship was not reciprocal. If one's motivation to do something fulfills a need or desire, it is likely that individuals would have more motivation to talk about politics at T2. Interestingly at T2, global motivation was found to have a significant positive relationship with frequency of political talk. Therefore, the more global motivation participants had for talking about politics with others at the height of the campaign, the more frequently they talked about politics with others once the campaign season dissipated (T3). Again, the corresponding coefficient between T2 frequency of political talk and T3 global motivation was not significant. Lastly, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk at T1 and global motivation at T3 was also significant and positive. This indicates that the more frequently individuals discussed politics with others in the beginning stage of the campaign (T1), the more motivated they were to discuss politics at T3.

Research question 1b explored the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics and frequency of one's political talk at different phases of the election campaign. Similar to the global motivation model described above, two of the five remaining models indicated that frequency of political talk predicted motivation to talk politics. However, in three of the five models, the particular motivation to talk politics predicted the frequency of talk. Figure 2.2-2.6 illustrates the five path models representing these relationships.

The first path model (Figure 2.2) depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk about politics with others for information acquisition and frequency of political talk. For the information acquisition model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (45) = 118.85, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 2.64). From this model, frequency of political talk at T1 was revealed as a significant positive predictor of MTP information acquisition at T2 and T3. Thus, as people engaged in more talk about politics with others during the beginning stages of the campaign, they were more motivated to talk about politics for information acquisition at the campaign's peak as well as after the campaign season came to a close. Neither of the corresponding paths for this relationship were significant. Further, there were no other significant relationships for the remaining paths between the main relationships of this model. Similar to the global motivation model, we can speculate that the more participants engage in conversation about politics with others, the more likely they are to be motivated by the need to talk politics because of their desire to obtain information.

Second, the path model between the understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of political talk (Figure 2.3) demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (34) = 116.53, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 3.43). The path coefficient between T1 frequency of talk and T2 understanding others' perspectives revealed a significant and positive relationship. This implies that the more frequently one discusses politics at T1, the more motivation s/he has to talk about politics to understand others' political perspectives at T2. Conversely, the reciprocal of this relationship was also present. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 understanding others' perspectives and T2 frequency of political talk was also significant and positive.

Therefore, the more motivated individuals are to talk about politics with others to understand their perspective at T1, the more often they engaged in political conversations at T2.

Next, the path model between the pleasure motivation and frequency of political talk (Figure 2.4) also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (34) = 89.14, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.62). Of the main relationships being examined, motivation to engage in political talk for pleasure was a negative predictor at T1 of frequency of talk at T2, suggesting that the more participants engaged in political talk for the purpose of pleasure at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the less likely they were to have political conversations with others during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. Thus, we conclude that the pleasure motivation predicts frequency of talk. Additionally, motivation for pleasure at T2 was a significant and positive predictor of frequency of political talk with others at T3, indicating that as people become more motivated to engage in political talk for pleasure at the height of the campaign, they end up engaging in more talk once the campaign is over. This model did not reveal relationships between the pleasure motivation and frequency of political talk over time; there were no significant path coefficients between the variables at T1 and T3.

Fourth, the path model illustrating the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk to persuade others and frequency of political talk (Figure 2.5) also demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (36) = 92.96, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.58). As the figure indicates, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk at T1 and persuasion at T2 was significant and positive. The corresponding

path coefficient between persuasion at T1 and frequency of political talk at T2 was not significant, suggesting that the more frequently people discuss politics with others at the onset of the election (T1), the more their desire to persuade others motivates them to engage in political talk at the height of the election (T2). Further, the path coefficient from persuasion at T2 to frequency of political talk at T3 was positive and significant. Therefore, at the height of the election, as one's motivation to talk politics because of a desire to persuade people increases, one's frequency of political talk after the campaign has dissipated also increases. The corresponding coefficient for this relationship was not significant. Finally, the last main relationship in this model indicates a significant and negative path coefficient between the MTP persuasion variable at T1 and frequency of political talk at T3. Although the corresponding coefficient between frequency of political talk at T1 and persuasion at T3 was not significant, from this model we see that the more people want to talk about politics to persuade others in the beginning phases of the election, the less often they talk about politics after the election is over.

Lastly, the fifth path model illustrates the relationships between one's motivation to engage in political talk for the potential conflict that might occur and frequency of political talk (Figure 2.6). This model also demonstrated acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (37) = 108.44, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.93). However, only one of the main relationships' path coefficients was significant. T1 conflict motivation had a positive relationship with frequency of talk at T3. Recall that this particular motivation variable is recoded, thus, a higher conflict score indicates that the individual is more motivated to engage in political talk for the potential conflict and a lower score suggests that the individual did not want to engage in the political talk because of the potential

conflict. Hence, this significant path indicates that the more individuals engaged in political talk for conflict at T1, the more one engaged in political talk at T3.

In conclusion, from these analyses we can begin to understand the nature of individuals' motivation for talking politics. Of the significant paths between the motivations and frequency of talk, all but two were positive relationships. Thus, to summarize the findings, increases in the persuasion and conflict motivations for engaging in political talk at T1 predicted increases in the frequency of one's political talk at T3. Further, increases in the pleasure and persuasion motivations at T2 predicted an increase in frequency of political talk at T3. Conversely, individuals' frequency of political talk at T1 predicted increases in individuals' global, information acquisition, and understanding others' perspectives motivations for talking politics at T2. Additionally, frequency of political talk at T1 was found to be a predictor of individuals' global motivation and information acquisition motivation at T3. From these relationships we glean that the more frequently individuals engage in political talk, the more they are motivated to talk about politics across the course of an election cycle.

Research Question 2: Political Discussants

The second research question, comprised of three parts, inquired about the relationships between political discussants and motivations for talking about politics. First, paired samples *t*-tests were used to establish differences in means between the discussants at the three time points. The goal of this analysis was to determine whether the frequency of talk with various political discussants varied at different points in the election cycle as well as to further understand who young citizens were engaging in political talk with during the 2008 presidential election. To answer the second and third

component of research question two (RQ 2a and b), the data analysis techniques outlined in chapter 3 were employed.

Paired Samples T-Test

First, to answer the research question with whom does one most frequently talk politics at different phases of the election campaign (RQ2), paired samples *t*-test were used to determine which political discussant frequency scores were different from others across each time point. Interestingly, at all three time points of data collection, each discussant was ranked in the same order based on the mean frequency that individuals reported talking politics with the particular discussant. As Table 4 illustrates, the highest mean frequency score across each of the three time points was political talk with parents, indicating that at each phase of the campaign cycle, young citizens talked about politics most often with their parents. Whereas the lowest score was for community leaders, implying that young citizens talked to local leaders about politics least often during the measurement period. As one may expect, the age of the participants in this study is likely to have impacted their rank ordering of their political discussants. For example, a typical college student may not be involved in their community to the point where they engage in conversation with community leaders as frequently as someone who is more established. The order, from greatest to least source, with whom participants talked politics at each phase of the campaign included: parents, close friends, significant others, siblings, classmates, coworkers, casual acquaintances, professors, and community leaders.

T1 results. Also important to note is that the paired samples *t*-tests revealed a significant difference, at T1, in the frequency of talk with parents and the frequency of talk with close friends ($t(425) = 2.81$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$), casual acquaintances ($t(426) =$

20.50, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .50$), siblings ($t(355) = 12.42$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .30$), significant others ($t(380) = 9.83$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .20$), coworkers ($t(349) = 16.57$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .44$), professors ($t(428) = 21.53$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .52$), classmates ($t(424) = 16.10$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .38$), and community leaders ($t(427) = 28.89$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .66$). This indicates that young citizens engaged in political talk with their parents significantly more often than other discussants at the onset of the election.

Additionally at T1, frequency of political talk with close friends was also significantly greater than the amount of time individuals reported talking about politics with casual acquaintances ($t(424) = 21.12$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .51$), siblings ($t(353) = 9.17$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .19$), significant others ($t(377) = 8.00$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$), coworkers ($t(347) = 15.76$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .42$), professors ($t(426) = 20.63$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .50$), classmates ($t(422) = 14.99$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .35$), and community leaders ($t(425) = 29.82$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .68$). This reinforces the notion described in Table 4 that young citizens engaged in political talk with their close friends second only to their political communication with parents.

The trend continued as participants' reported talking about politics with their significant others significantly more often than they spent talking politics with their casual acquaintances ($t(378) = 9.41$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .19$), siblings ($t(325) = 2.34$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$), coworkers ($t(322) = 7.22$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$), professors ($t(380) = 10.82$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .24$), classmates ($t(376) = 5.14$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .07$), and community leaders ($t(379) = 16.60$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .42$). Although participants indicated talking to their siblings about politics significantly less than their parents, close friends, and significant others at the beginning of the presidential campaign season, they also reported talking to their siblings significantly more than their casual acquaintances ($t(354) = 7.13$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .13$),

coworkers ($t(305) = 4.54$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$), classmates ($t(351) = 2.82$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$), professors ($t(355) = 8.87$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .18$), and community leaders ($t(354) = 14.68$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .38$).

Although participants did not report talking about politics with their casual acquaintances significantly more often than they discussed politics with their coworkers ($t(349) = -1.39$, $p = 0.17$, power = .18), they did indicate talking about politics significantly more frequently with their casual acquaintances than with their professors ($t(427) = 2.87$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$) and community leaders ($t(426) = 11.30$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .23$) at the beginning of the election season. Additionally, people indicated talking about politics significantly more often with their classmates than their casual acquaintances ($t(423) = 6.59$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$), coworkers ($t(346) = 3.98$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$), professors ($t(425) = 10.70$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .21$), and community leaders ($t(424) = 17.06$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .41$). It is also interesting to note that people reported engaging in political talk with their coworkers significantly more frequently than their professors ($t(350) = 4.35$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .05$) and community leaders ($t(349) = 10.25$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .23$). Lastly, the amount of time spent talking about politics at the beginning of the campaign season with professors was significantly more than that spent with community leaders ($t(428) = 7.31$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .11$).

T2 results. Similar results were present for T2 as paired samples *t*-tests revealed a significant difference in the frequency of talk between parents and the other discussants.[1] However, there was not a significant difference in the frequency of talk with parents and the frequency of talk with close friends ($t(427) = 0.83$, $p = 0.41$, power = .41). Thus, except for close friends, young citizens talked politics with their parents significantly

more often than other discussants at the height of the election. Much like the T1 results, participants also indicated talking with close friends significantly more often than the other discussants.[2] However, unlike T1, at T2 there was not a significant difference in the amount of talk reported with participants' significant others compared to siblings ($t(324) = 1.14$, $p = 0.26$, power = .26). The remainder of the relationships between the T2 discussants remained consistent with the T1 results.[3]

T3 results. Lastly, at T3, paired samples *t*-tests demonstrated that the relationships between the variables are consistent with those outlined at T2.[4] However, young citizens did not report a significant difference in the amount of time they spent talking about politics between their casual acquaintances and coworkers ($t(353) = -1.43$, $p = 0.15$, power = .16) and professors ($t(428) = 0.72$, $p = 0.47$, power = .47).

From this analysis we can glean that something of a political discussion hierarchy exists for young citizens' conversations about politics. Specifically, political talk occurred significantly more frequently among some groups of people over others. From these results, we see that, consistently, young voters discuss politics with their parents most frequently, followed by close friends, significant others, siblings, classmates, casual acquaintances, coworkers, professors, and lastly, community leaders. This hierarchy may be due to ones' level of comfort or closeness with particular conversational partners. As political conversations are often viewed as taboo by society, discussants at the top of this list seem to be those more likely trusted with one's political opinions.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

To establish the relationship between MTP and one's frequency to engage in political conversations with specific discussants at different phases of the election campaign (RQ2a and b), zero-order correlations between the motivations for talking politics, the variables measuring frequency of political talk with specific discussants, and the control variables are shown in Table 5.1-10.9. For T1, the results reveal a significant positive correlation between global motivation and the frequency individuals talked politics with each category of discussant at T1, T2 and T3, with one exception; T1 global motivation was not significantly correlated with T3 siblings. T1 information acquisition was also significantly and positively correlated with each of the discussants at T1, T2, and T3 except for T2 and T3 siblings and T2 and T3 coworkers. T1 understanding others' perspectives was not significantly correlated to frequency of political talk with siblings or coworkers at T3, but was significantly and positively related to all other discussants at T1, T2, and T3. Additionally, T1 pleasure was not significantly related to T1, T2, or T3 siblings nor T2 and T3 frequency of talk with significant others. However, T1 pleasure was significantly and positively related to the remaining political discussants at T1, T2, and T3. Furthers T1 persuasion was positively and significantly related to each political discussant at T1, T2, and T3. The only exception to this is T1 and T3 siblings, which are not significantly related to T1 persuasion. Lastly, conflict at T1 was significantly and positively correlated with each political discussant variable at T1, T2, and T3; however, conflict was not significantly related to the frequency individuals talked politics with their siblings or significant others at T1 and T3.

Global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict at T2 were also positively correlated with the majority of the political discussants at T2 and T3. T2 global motivation was not significantly related to T3 siblings. T2 information acquisition was not related to T3 siblings or T2 coworkers. The pleasure motivation at T2 was not significantly related to frequency of talk with siblings at T3 or significant others at T2 or T3. Additionally, T2 persuasion was not significantly correlated with frequency of political talk with siblings at T3. Lastly, the T2 conflict motivation was not correlated with siblings at T3.

Finally as Tables 5.1-10.9 indicate, all of the motivation variables at T3 were significantly and positively correlated with the majority of the political discussants at T3; however, there were a few exceptions. First, the political discussant variable for siblings at T3 was not significantly related to conflict, information acquisition, or the pleasure motivation at T3. Second, T3 information acquisition was not related to T3 coworker. Lastly, frequency of political talk with significant others at T3 was not significantly correlated to the T3 conflict variable.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

To answer the remaining components of RQ2, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, conflict, and frequency of political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, professors, classmates, or community leaders. Because nine

discussants were used in the analysis, there was a potential for nine different models for global motivation as well as for each of the five MTP subscales.

The results revealed that in 12 of the 54 models, frequency of talk with a particular discussant at T1 predicted individuals' motivation to talk politics at T2. Additionally, four of the models showed that frequency of talk with a particular political discussant at T1 predicted a specific motivation to talk politics at T3. Further, six of the models indicated that a specific motivation to talk politics at T1 was a predictor of frequency of talk with a particular discussant at T2. Motivations to talk politics at T2 predicted the frequency of talk with discussants at T3 in 11 of the 54 models, while four of the models revealed that the motivations at T1 predicted frequency of political talk with a particular discussant at T3. The results of the models are described in the following sections.

Global motivation and political discussants. Of the nine possible models between global motivation and political discussants, seven contained significant main relationships. Thus, Figures 3.1-3.7 depict the best-fitting path models of the data representing the relationships between global motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. From these models it is evident that four out of the seven models revealed significant and positive paths between a discussant variable at T1 and global motivation at T2. Thus, we can infer that individuals' frequency of talk with their political discussants predicted their motivation to talk about politics. Interestingly, in two of the seven models, global motivation at T2 positively predicted talk with discussants at T3, while one model showed that T1 global motivation negatively predicted talk with discussants at T3.

First, the model between global motivation and close friends demonstrated adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (55) = 175.61, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.19). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with close friends at T1 and global motivation at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 3.1). Thus, the more individuals talked about politics with their close friends at the beginning of the campaign season, the more *motivated* they were to talk about politics at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between global motivation and frequency of talk with close friends was not significant, indicating that at T1 frequency of talk with one's friends predicted the likelihood of one's global motivation to talk about politics as the campaign progressed. However, this relationship was not reciprocal. None of the other main relationships demonstrated significant paths.

Second, the path model between global motivation and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (40) = 127.53, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.19). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and global motivation at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 3.2). That is, the more participants engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more motivated they were to have political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship between T1 global motivation and T2 frequency of talk with casual acquaintances is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season. Take

note that this relationship is the same as that depicted in the previous model (Figure 3.1 between global motivation and close friends).

Next, the third path model (Figure 3.3) illustrates the relationship between individuals' global motivation to engage in political talk and frequency of political talk with parents. This model also demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (41) = 95.58, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.33). Again, as Figure 3.3 indicates, only the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with parents at T1 and global motivation at T2 was significant and positive. The corresponding path coefficient between global motivation at T1 and frequency of political talk with parents at T2 was not significant, suggesting that the more frequently people discuss politics with their parents at T1, the more their motivation to engage in political talk at T2 increases. Again, the main relationship depicted in this model parallels the previously mentioned models.

Next, the fourth path model between global motivation and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (45) = 118.12, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.63). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and global motivation at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 3.4). Consistent with the paths outlined in Figures 3.1-3.3, the more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were to be motivated to have political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

The fifth path model illustrates the relationship between one's global motivation to engage in political talk and frequency of political talk with significant others (Figure 3.5). This model also had acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (60) = 142.44, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 2.37). As with the other models in this section of the analysis, only one of the main relationships' path coefficients was significant. However, in this model we can see a change in the predictive trend, as T2 global motivation had a positive relationship with frequency of talk with significant others at T3. Hence, the more an individual is motivated to engage in political talk at the height of the election cycle, the more frequently s/he will talk about politics with his or her significant others once the campaign has dissipated.

These findings were also true for the sixth model (Figure 3.6), between global motivation and community leaders, as an adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (60) = 162.00, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 2.70). Of the main relationships, only the path coefficient from global motivation at T2 to frequency of political talk with community leaders at T3 was significant. In this relationship, the more individuals were motivated to talk about politics during T2 of the campaigns season, the more frequently they talked about politics with community leaders at T3.

Finally, the seventh path model between global motivation and frequency of political talk with siblings demonstrated adequate fit (χ^2 (56) = 125.72, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.25). Unlike the previously mentioned models, the path coefficient between T1 global motivation and T3 frequency of talk with siblings indicated a significant and negative relationship (Figure 3.7). This implies that the more motivated that one is to discuss politics at T1, the less frequently s/he will discuss politics with his

or her siblings once the campaign season is over. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 frequency of political talk with siblings and T3 global motivation was not significant.

Although demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last two models depicting the relationship between individuals' global motivation and frequency of political talk with coworkers (χ^2 (40) = 83.57, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.09) and professors (χ^2 (49) = 109.30, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.23) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, these models were not included in this section.

In summary, this analysis has explained the relationships between individuals' motivation for talking politics and the frequency of political talk with various discussants throughout the course of the campaign cycle. We can conclude that the more *frequently* participants talked about politics with their close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, and classmates at the onset of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to discuss politics at the height of the election. Also, the more *motivated* participants were to talk about politics during the height of the campaign season, the more frequently they talked about politics with their significant others and community leaders once the campaign season ended. Lastly, the more motivated participants were to engage in political talk at T1, the less frequently they engaged in political talk with siblings at T3.

Information acquisition and political discussants. Research question 2b explored the relationship between the five specific motivations for talking politics and frequency of one's political talk with various political discussants at different phases of the election campaign. Of the nine possible models between the information acquisition motivation

and political discussants, six were considered to have significant relationships among the main variables. Figures 4.1-4.6 illustrate the path models representing the relationships between the information acquisition motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. Like the main relationships between global motivation and the various political discussants, three of the information acquisition models illustrated significant and positive paths between a particular discussant at T1 and the information motivation at T2. Again, this finding supports the previous finding that individuals' frequency of political talk with discussants predicted their motivation to talk about politics. Also, like the global motivation models, one of the five models indicated that information acquisition at T2 predicted talk with discussants at T3; and two models had a significant and negative path from T1 motivation to T3 discussants. The details of these models will be discussed below.

The first path model (Figure 4.1) depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk politics with others for information acquisition and frequency of political talk with close friends. For this model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (38) = 121.16, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.19). Of the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with close friends at T1 and information acquisition at T2 was significant and positive. Thus, the more individuals talked about politics with their close friends at the beginning of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to talk about politics for the purpose of gathering information at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between information acquisition and frequency of talk with close friends was not significant, indicating that at T1, frequency of talk with one's friends predicted the

likelihood of one's motivation to talk about politics for information as the campaign progressed. However, this relationship was not reciprocal. Additionally, none of the other main relationships in this model demonstrated significant paths.

Second, the path model between motivation for information acquisition and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (34) = 76.84, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.26). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and information acquisition at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 4.2). That is, the more participants engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were motivated by acquiring information when they engaged in political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. These results are consistent with the previous model in this section; but also, the relationship between casual acquaintances at T1 and information acquisition at T2 parallels the relationship in Figure 3.2 between casual acquaintances at T1 and global motivation at T2. As with the previous model, this model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

Third, the path model between the information acquisition motivation and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (39) = 79.98, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.05). Of the main relationships, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and information acquisition at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 4.3). That is, the

more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were to be motivated by obtaining information when they engaged in political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

For the fourth model (Figure 4.4) between the information acquisition motivation and community leaders, adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (55) = 120. 85, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.20). Of the main relationships, the only significant path coefficient was between information acquisition at T2 to frequency of political talk with community leaders at T3, and it was significant and positive. Thus, the more individuals were motivated to obtain information from their political conversations at T2 of the campaign season, the more frequently they talked about politics with community leaders at T3. The corresponding coefficient between information acquisition and frequency of talk with community leaders was not significant. As mentioned previously, the results of this model mirror the relationship depicted between global motivation at T2 to frequency of political talk with community leaders at T3 seen earlier in this chapter.

Next, the fifth path model (Figure 4.5) illustrates the relationship between individuals' information acquisition motivation for engaging in political talk and frequency of political talk with coworkers. This model demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (35) = 41.10, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.02, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.17). Again, the path coefficient between the main relationship, frequency of political talk with coworkers

at T1 and information acquisition at T2, was significant and positive. The corresponding path coefficient between information acquisition at T1 and frequency of political talk with coworkers at T2 was not significant, suggesting that the more frequently people discuss politics with their coworkers at the onset of the election (T1), the more their motivation to engage in political talk for information acquisition at the height of the election (T2) increased. Interestingly, the path coefficient between information acquisition at T1 and frequency of talk with coworkers at T3 had a significant negative relationship. Thus, the more motivated participants were to engage in political talk for information prior to the height of the campaign (T1), the less frequently they talked about politics with coworkers once the campaign was over (T3). This negative relationship echoes the relationship between T1 global motivation and T3 siblings depicted in the previous section.

Lastly, the sixth path model depicts the relationship between individuals' information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with siblings (Figure 4.6). As with the other models, this model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (49) = 98.04, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.00). The results reveal a significant and negative path coefficient between information acquisition at T1 and frequency of talk with siblings at T3, mirroring the relationship between global motivation and siblings (Figure 3.7). Therefore, the more young citizens were motivated by information acquisition at T1, the less frequently they discussed politics with their siblings when the campaign season was over (T3). The corresponding coefficient between frequency of talk with siblings at T1 and information acquisition at T3 was not significant.

Although demonstrating acceptable fit to the data, the models depicting the relationship between individuals' motivation by information acquisition for engaging in political talk and frequency of political talk with parents (χ^2 (44) = 88.74, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.02), significant others (χ^2 (55) = 128.81, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 2.34), and professors (χ^2 (43) = 75.52, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.76) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, these models were not included in the analysis.

Holistically, analysis of the relationship between motivation to talk politics by information acquisition and frequency of talk with various discussants revealed that the particular individuals participants choose to engage in political talk with at the onset of the campaign season (T1) makes them more motivated to engage in political talk for information acquisition at the height of the campaign (T2). Thus, participants' political conversations with close friends, casual acquaintances, and classmates at T1 increase their information acquisition motivation at T2, the same pattern was seen in the global motivation models. Also similar to the findings in the global motivation models is the relationship between the information motivation at T2 and community leaders at T3. In this model, motivation was found to be a predictor of talk with a particular discussant. Lastly, these models reveal that global motivation and information acquisition at T1 were inversely related to frequency of talk with siblings at T3.

Understanding others' perspectives and political discussants. Research question 2b also explored the relationship between individuals' motivation for understanding others' perspectives as they talk about politics and frequency of one's political talk with various political discussants at different phases of the election campaign. Of the nine

possible models between the understanding others' perspectives motivation and political discussants, six contained significant paths among the main relationships. Figures 5.1-5.6 illustrate the path models representing the relationships between the understanding motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. Like the main relationships between global motivation and the various political discussants, as well as those represented in the information acquisition models, five of the understanding others' perspectives models illustrated significant paths between a particular discussant at T1 and the understanding motivation at T2. These results continue to support the finding that individuals' frequency of talk with their political discussants positively predicted their motivation to talk about politics. Further, one of the understanding others' perspectives models indicated that the understanding motivation at T1 predicted talk with discussants at T3. The following section explains these relationships in greater detail.

The first path model (Figure 5.1) depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk politics with others to understand their perspective and frequency of political talk with close friends. For this model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (31) = 65.31, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 2.11). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with close friends at T1 and understanding others' perspectives at T2 was significant and positive. From this, and the previously mentioned results in this chapter, we can glean that the more individuals talked about politics with their close friends at the beginning of the campaign season, the more globally motivated they were to talk about politics and also the more motivated they were for the purposes of understanding others' perspectives and gaining information at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between

understanding others' perspectives and frequency of talk with close friends was not significant, indicating that at T1, frequency of talk with one's friends predicted the likelihood of one's motivation to talk about politics for understanding as the campaign progressed. However, this relationship was not reciprocal. Additionally, none of the other main relationships in this model demonstrated significant paths.

The second path model between the understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (30) = 75.04, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.50). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and understanding others' perspectives at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 5.2). That is, the more participants engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were motivated by understanding others' perspectives when they engaged in political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. As with the previous model, this model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season. However, these results are consistent with those found in the casual acquaintances models for both global motivation and information acquisition.

For the third model, between motivation of understanding others' perspectives and frequency of political talk with parents (Figure 5.3), an adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (43) = 87.36, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.03). Of the main relationships, the only significant path coefficient was between the frequency of

political talk with parents at T1 and understanding others' perspectives at T2. This relationship was also present in the global motivation model (Figure 3.3). The significant and positive relationship indicated that the more frequently individuals talked about politics with their parents at T1, the more they were motivated to talk about politics with others to understand their perspectives during T2 of the campaign season. The corresponding coefficient between understanding others' perspectives and frequency of talk with parents was not significant.

Fourth, the path model between motivation to understand others' perspectives and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (27) = 85.84, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 3.18). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and understanding others' perspectives at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 5.4). Recall that the same relationship was also true for the relationship between political talk with classmates at T1 and global motivation and information acquisition at T2. As with past relationships discussed, the more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were to be motivated by understanding others' perspectives when they engaged in political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships.

Next, the fifth path model (Figure 5.5) illustrates the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk by understanding others' perspectives and frequency of political talk with coworkers. This model demonstrated an acceptable fit

to the data (χ^2 (30) = 48.85, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.63). Again, the path coefficient between the main relationship, frequency of political talk with coworkers at T1 and understanding others' perspectives at T2, was significant and positive. The same relationship existed between frequency of political talk with coworkers at T1 and information acquisition at T2 (Figure 4.5). Thus, the more frequently people discuss politics with their coworkers at the onset of the election (T1), the more their motivation to engage in political talk for understanding others' perspectives at the height of the election (T2) increases.

Lastly, the sixth path model between the MTP variable, understanding others' perspective and frequency of political talk with siblings demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (35) = 72.22, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.06). Consistent with the previous relationships, the path coefficient between T1 frequency of talk with siblings and T2 understanding others' perspectives motivation was significant and positive (Figure 5.5). Thus, as frequency of political talk with siblings increased at T1, motivation for understanding others' perspectives increased at T2. Further, the path between the T1 understanding motivation and T3 frequency of talk with siblings was significant and negative. As demonstrated in the relationship with global motivation and information acquisition, as young citizens' motivation to engage in political talk for understanding increased, their frequency of talk once the campaign dissipated decreased.

Although demonstrating an adequate fit to the data, the models depicting the relationships between individuals' motivation by understanding others' perspectives for engaging in political talk and frequency of political talk with community leaders (χ^2 (50) = 131.62, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.63), significant others (χ^2

(50) = 113.69, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.27), and professors (χ^2 (38) = 81.32, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.14) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, these models were not included in the analysis.

As with the motivation variables examined previously, the analysis of the relationship between being motivated to talk politics by understanding others' perspectives and frequency of talk with various discussants revealed similar results. Ultimately, the people that participants chose to engage in political talk with at the onset of the campaign season (T1) made them more motivated to engage in political talk for the purpose of understanding others' perspectives at the height of the campaign (T2). Specifically, political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, classmates, and coworkers influenced one's understanding others' perspectives motivation. Also, like the global motivation and information acquisition models, T1 understanding others' perspectives was indicated as a negative predictor of frequency of talk with siblings at T3.

Pleasure and political discussants. Of the nine possible models between pleasure motivation and political discussants, five established significant main relationships. Thus, Figures 6.1-6.5 depict the best-fitting path models of the data representing the relationships between the pleasure motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. This group of models illustrates a new trend in the relationships between MTP and political discussants. Specifically, for the pleasure motivation and political discussants, three out of the five models illustrated significant and negative paths between the pleasure motivation at T1 and a discussant variable at T3. Further, four of the five models had significant and positive paths between T2 pleasure

motivation and a T3 political discussant. From this we can glean that individuals' motivation to talk about politics for pleasure predicts their frequency of political talk with various discussants.

First, the path model between one's motivation to engage in political talk for pleasure and frequency of political talk with significant others demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (25) = 48.62, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.95). Two of the main relationships' path coefficients in this model were significant (Figure 6.1). The T2 pleasure motivation had a significant positive relationship with frequency of talk with significant others at T3. Hence, the more an individual was motivated to engage in political talk for their pleasure at the height of the election cycle, the more frequently s/he talked about politics with their significant other once the campaign dissipated. Additionally, path coefficients revealed a significant and negative relationship between T1 pleasure motivation and T3 frequency of talk with significant others. From this, we can conclude that as individuals' motivation to engage in political talk for pleasure increased at the beginning of the campaign season, the frequency in which they discussed politics with their significant others decreased once the campaign season ended.

Next, for the second model (Figure 6.2) between the pleasure motivation and community leaders, an adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (34) = 96.58, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.84). As with the relationships displayed in the preceding model, there was also a significant and positive path coefficient between pleasure at T2 and the frequency of political talk with community leaders at T3. Thus, the more individuals were motivated to engage in political conversations for their enjoyment

during T2 of the campaign season, the more frequently they talked about politics with community leaders during T3. The corresponding coefficient between frequency of talk with community leaders at T2 and pleasure at T3 was not significant. However, a significant and negative path coefficient appeared for the pleasure motivation at T1 and frequency of talk with community leaders at T3. As one's motivation to engage in talk for pleasure increased at T1, their frequency of talk with community leaders at T3 decreased. Again, this result is consistent with the relationship between the pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with one's significant other.

Third, the path model between the pleasure motivation and frequency of political talk with siblings demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (50) = 113.21, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.26). Much like the relationship with significant others and community leaders, the path coefficient between T1 pleasure motivation and T3 frequency of talk with siblings indicated a significant and negative relationship (Figure 6.3). This implies that the more motivated by pleasure that one is to discuss politics at T1, the less frequently s/he will discuss politics with their siblings once the campaign season is over. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 frequency of political talk with siblings and T3 global motivation was not significant.

For the fourth model (Figure 6.4), between the pleasure motivation and classmates, an adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (32) = 87.82, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.74). Of the main relationships being examined, we again see that the path coefficient from the pleasure motivation at T2 to frequency of political talk with classmates at T3 was significant and positive. Therefore, as with significant others and community leaders, the more motivated participants were by pleasure at the height of the

campaign season, the more frequently they engaged in political conversations with their classmates once the campaign season had ended. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

Lastly, the fifth path model between pleasure and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (8) = 20.10, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 2.51). Here we can see that this model demonstrated a significant and positive path coefficient between T2 pleasure and T3 frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (Figure 6.5). Thus, the more motivated individuals were to engage in political talk for enjoyment at the height of the campaign, the more frequently they engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances once the campaign season ended. These results are consistent with the paths between the pleasure motivation and significant others, community leaders, and classmates, as explained earlier in this section. Additionally, of the main relationships being examined, there was also a significant and positive path coefficient from the frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and the pleasure motivation at T2. That is, the more frequently participants engaged in political talk with their casual acquaintances at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more motivated they were by pleasure to engage in political conversations during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. However, this model also indicated a significant and positive path between frequency of talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and the pleasure motivation at T3. Here, we can conclude that the more frequently individuals engaged in political talk with their casual

acquaintances at the onset of the campaign season, the more they were motivated to engage in political talk for enjoyment once the campaign season ended.

Demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last three models depicting the relationship between individuals' pleasure motivation and frequency of political talk with parents (χ^2 (49) = 85.30, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = .98, CMIN = 1.74), coworkers (χ^2 (20) = 66.82, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 3.34), and professors (χ^2 (26) = 58.39, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.25) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

Overall, these results revealed that the phase of the campaign season plays an important role in the relationship between young citizens' motivation to talk politics for pleasure and frequency of political talk with various discussants. In the early phase of the campaign season, the more motivated by pleasure that individuals were, the less frequently they talked about politics with their significant others, community leaders, and siblings after the campaign dissipated. Yet, at the height of the campaign season, the more motivated by pleasure young citizens were, the more frequently they discussed politics with their significant others, community leaders, classmates, and casual acquaintances.

Persuasion and political discussants. Of the nine possible models between the persuasion motivation and political discussants, five were considered to have significant main relationships. Figures 7.1-7.5 illustrate the path models representing the relationships between the persuasion motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. Similar to the main relationships between the pleasure motivation and the various political discussants, two of the persuasion models illustrated

significant paths between persuasion at T2 and a political discussant at T3. Additionally, one model had significant and positive paths between persuasion at T1 and a particular discussant at T3. This continues to support the finding that individuals' motivation to talk about politics predicted frequency of talk with particular political discussants. Also, like the global motivation and information acquisition models, three of the five models indicated that frequency of talk with discussants at T1 predicted the persuasion motivation at T3. Below, these models are explained in greater detail.

First, the model between persuasion and close friends demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (51) = 119.85, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.35). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from the persuasion motivation at T1 to frequency of political talk with close friends at T3 was significant and negative (Figure 7.1). Thus, the more individuals were motivated to engage in political talk to persuade others at the onset of the election, the less frequently they talked about politics with their close friends once the campaign season had ended. The corresponding path coefficient between the persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with close friends was not significant, indicating that at T1 the persuasion motivation predicts frequency of talk with one's friends at T3. However, the path coefficient between the persuasion motivation at T2 and close friends at T3 was positive and significant. This indicates that the more motivated by persuasion individuals were to engage in political talk at T2, the more frequently they talked about politics with their close friends at T3. These paths emulate those depicted in the pleasure models (Figures 6.1-2), providing further support for the role of the campaign phase in these relationships.

Next, the second path model (Figure 7.2) illustrates the relationship between one's motivation to engage in political talk to persuade others and frequency of political talk with significant others. This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (19) = 24.35, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.28). However, only one of the main relationships' path coefficients was significant. The T2 persuasion motivation had a positive relationship with frequency of talk with significant others at T3. Hence, the more individuals were motivated to engage in political talk to persuade others at the height of the election cycle, the more frequently they talked about politics with their significant others once the campaign dissipated. This path replicates the significant and positive relationships found in the previously mentioned persuasion model (Figure 7.1), and the model illustrating the relationship between the pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with significant others (Figure 6.1).

Third, the path model between persuasion and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (4) = 7.87, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.97). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from the persuasion motivation at T1 and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 7.3). That is, the more participants were motivated to engage in political talk by persuading others at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more frequently they engaged in political conversations with their casual acquaintances during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. Again, these results are consistent with those found in the model depicting the relationship between the pleasure motivation and casual

acquaintances (Figure 6.5). However, this model also indicated a significant and positive path between frequency of talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and the persuasion motivation at T3. Here, we can conclude that the more frequently individuals engaged in political talk with their casual acquaintances at the onset of the campaign season, the more they were motivated to engage in political talk by their desire to persuade others once the campaign season ended.

For the fourth model (Figure 7.4), between the persuasion motivation and frequency of political talk with classmates, an adequate fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (35) = 93.51, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.67). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and persuasion at T3 was significant and positive. Therefore, the more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more likely they were motivated to have political conversations for persuasion once the campaign season had ended. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season. However, it is important to note that this model is similar to the previously mentioned model describing the relationship between persuasion and casual acquaintances as well as the corresponding pleasure model (Figure 6.5).

Lastly, the fifth path model between motivation by persuasion and frequency of political talk with professors also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (29) = 56.81, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.96). Consistent with the results between persuasion and classmates, the path coefficient between frequency of political

talk with professors at T1 and motivation to engage in political talk for persuasion at T3 was significant and positive (Figure 7.5). Thus, the more individuals engaged in political talk with their professors at T1, the more they were motivated by persuasion to talk about politics at T3. However, the corresponding coefficient between frequency of talk with professors and the persuasion motivation was not significant.

Demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last three models depicting the relationship between individuals' persuasion motivation and frequency of political talk with parents (χ^2 (42) = 63.00, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.50), siblings (χ^2 (44) = 97.22, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.21), coworkers (χ^2 (15) = 37.81, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.52), and community leaders (χ^2 (28) = 85.22, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.04) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

Much like the MTP pleasure variable, the analysis of the relationship between the persuasion motivation and political discussants revealed that most often the persuasion motivation preceded the political discussant variable. Specifically, over the course of the campaign cycle, the more motivated young citizens were to engage in political talk for persuasion, the more frequently they discussed politics with their close friends, significant others, and casual acquaintances. However, the results also revealed that frequency of talk with casual acquaintances, classmates and professors at T2 positively predicted young citizens' persuasion motivation at T3.

Conflict avoidance and political discussants. Lastly, research question 2b explored the relationship between the conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of one's

political talk with various political discussants at different phases of the election campaign. Of the nine possible models between the conflict avoidance motivation and political discussants, five contained significant relationships among the main variables. Figures 8.1-8.5 illustrate the path models representing the relationships between the conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. Again, because this analysis used the recoded conflict avoidance items, a higher conflict avoidance score indicates an individuals' motivation to engage in political talk for its potential conflict; however, a lower score represents a lack of motivation to engage in political talk because of its potential conflict. Like the main relationships between the pleasure and persuasion motivations and the various political discussants, most often, the conflict motivation predicted the frequency of talk with various political discussants. In fact, all five of the conflict models being discussed illustrated significant paths between the conflict variable at T1 and a political discussant at T2. Additionally, two of the five models indicated a significant and positive relationship between T2 conflict and T3 political discussants. Again, these models support the findings demonstrated by the pleasure and persuasion models; motivation to talk about politics predicted individuals' frequency of talk with their political discussants. The results are described in greater detail in the following section.

First, the model between conflict and close friends demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (42) = 117.79, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.81). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from conflict at T1 and frequency of political talk with close friends at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 8.1). Thus, the more motivated by the conflict from political talk that young citizens were

at the beginning of the campaign season, the more they talked about politics with their close friends at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between conflict at T2 and frequency of talk with close friends at T1 was not significant. Additionally, a significant and positive path coefficient was present between conflict at T2 and frequency of political talk with close friends at T3. None of the other main relationships demonstrated significant paths. The significant and positive path between motivation at T2 and discussant at T3 is consistent with the results explicated in Figures 6.1 (pleasure motivation) and 7.1 (persuasion motivation).

Second, the path model between the conflict motivation and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (25) = 57.79, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.31). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from the conflict motivation at T1 and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 8.2). As illustrated in the previous conflict model and the persuasion/casual acquaintance model (Figure 7.4), this relationship explains that the more participants were motivated to have political conversations, because of the conflict generated by the conversation, at T1 the more frequently they talked about politics with their casual acquaintances at T2. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. Mirroring the previous conflict model's results, a significant and positive path coefficient was present between T2 conflict avoidance and T3 frequency of talk with casual acquaintances. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season. This relationship is also consistent with the significant and positive relationship between T2 pleasure and T3 casual acquaintances.

Third, the path model between the conflict motivation and frequency of political talk with coworkers demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (37) = 84.25, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.28). Again, the path coefficient between T1 conflict avoidance and T2 frequency of talk with coworkers indicated a significant and positive relationship (Figure 8.3). Thus, the more motivated to engage in political conversation for conflict that a participant was at T1, the more frequently s/he discussed politics with their coworkers at the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 frequency of political talk with coworkers and T2 conflict motivation was not significant.

The fourth path model (Figure 8.4) illustrates the relationship between one's motivation to avoid conflict in political talk and the frequency of political talk with professors. This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (46) = 116.21, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.53). As with the other models in this section of the analysis, the T1 conflict motivation had a significant and positive relationship with frequency of talk with professors at T2. Hence, the more an individual was motivated by conflict in political talk at the beginning of the election cycle, the less frequently s/he talked about politics with their professors at the height of the election cycle.

Finally, the fifth path model between the conflict motivation and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (33) = 94.54, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.87). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from the conflict motivation at T1 to frequency of political talk with classmates at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 8.5). Therefore, participants that were motivated to engage in political talk because of potential conflict at

the beginning campaign stages, engaged in political conversations more frequently with their classmates during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

Although demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last four models depicting the relationship between individuals' conflict motivation and frequency of political talk with parents (χ^2 (52) = 96.50, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.89), siblings (χ^2 (43) = 111.93, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.60), significant others (χ^2 (45) = 118.09, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.62), and community leaders (χ^2 (45) = 126.72, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.82) revealed no significant main relationships. As with the previous models that have no significant main relationships, these models were not included in the analysis.

In general, the results for the MTP variable conflict revealed that the conflict motivation at T1 is a consistent predictor of frequency of talk with particular discussants at T2. In other words, in all five of the conflict models, individuals' conflict motivation at T1 preceded frequency of political talk with particular discussants at T2. Thus, individuals engaged in political talk with their close friends, casual acquaintances, coworkers, professors, and classmates at T2 due to their motivation for conflict in political conversation at T1. Following the trend established by the pleasure and persuasion models, individuals' motivation to engage in political conversations for conflict positively predicted their frequency of talk with close friends, casual

acquaintances, coworkers, professors, and classmates. In all, the results of RQ2a and b indicated that MTP is a predictor of frequency of political talk throughout the campaign season. Yet, frequency of talk also predicted individuals' specific motivations for talking politics at various points in the campaign season.

Hypothesis 1: Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk

H1 stated that greater use of political media will positively predict the frequency of one's political talk. The results of this analysis indicate support for this hypothesis. Figure 9 illustrates the path model representing this relationship.

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk

The zero-order correlations between the political media diet variable (i.e., the 25-item media use scale), the variable measuring frequency of political talk, and the control variables are shown in Table 11. The results revealed a significant positive correlation between political media diet at T1 and the frequency individuals talked about politics at T1, T2, and T3. The political media diet variable at T2 was also positively correlated with frequency of talk at T2 and T3. Lastly, political media diet at T3 was significantly and positively correlated to frequency of talk at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk

To investigate H1, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of the political media diet variable and frequency of political talk. Because there was only one political media diet variable used in the analysis, there was only a potential for one model. Generally, the model indicated that political media use was a predictor of frequency of talk. However, the analysis also revealed that, in some

instances, the opposite was also true: frequency of political talk positively predicts political media use. Following, the results of the model are described.

The path model depicts the relationship between individuals' use of a variety of media sources for obtaining political information and frequency of political talk (Figure 9). For this model, borderline fit to the data was demonstrated (χ^2 (61) = 265.40, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = 0.91, CMIN = 4.35). From this path model it is apparent that individuals' political media use at T1 was significantly and positively related to their frequency of political talk at T2. Further, the model revealed that frequency of talk at T1 positively predicts one's political media use at T2. Therefore, we can conclude that at T1 and T2 of the campaign season, the relationship between one's political media use and frequency of political talk was reciprocal. In other words, the more young citizens talked about politics, the more political media they consumed and vice versa. This result confirms the hypothesis that media use predicts frequency of political talk; however, it also brings to light that early on in the campaign season, frequency of talk predicted political media use. Additionally, a significant and positive relationship was also present for individuals' political media diet at T2 and frequency of political talk at T3. As the campaign season progresses and comes to a close, the more political media people consume, and the more often they talk about politics. These results offer further support for the hypothesis, indicating that political media use predicted the frequency of political conversation.

Research Question 3: Political Media Diet and Political Discussants

RQ3 explored the relationship between participants' overall political media diet and the frequency of political talk with various discussants at different phases of the

election campaign. In general, individuals' political media diet predicted frequency of talk with various discussants. Figures 10.1-10.8 illustrate the path models representing these relationships.

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

The zero-order correlations between the collapsed political media diet variable, the variables measuring frequency of political talk with specific discussants, and the control variables are shown in Tables 12.1-12.9. The results indicate a significant positive correlation between political media diet at T1 and the frequency individuals talked about politics with specific discussants at T1, T2, and T3. The political media diet measure at T2 was also positively correlated with frequency of talk with specific discussants at T2 and T3. Lastly, political media diet at T3 was significantly and positively correlated to all of the political discussants at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

To answer RQ3, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of the political media diet variable and frequency of political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, professors, classmates, and community leaders. Because nine discussants were used in the analysis, there was a potential of nine different models for RQ3. Overall, the results indicated that eight of the nine models contained significant paths among the main relationships. The relationships between political media diet and the discussants paralleled that of the relationship between political media diet and frequency of political

talk (Figure 9). In particular these results indicated that six of the models had significant and positive relationships between political media diet at T1 and a discussant at T2. Also of interest, five of the nine models had significant and positive paths between T2 political media diet and the T3 discussants. The results of these models are described in the following section.

The first path model depicts the relationship between individuals' use of media sources for obtaining political information and frequency of political talk with parents. For this model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (43) = 148.63, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 3.46). The path coefficients of main relationships in the model indicated that the path coefficient from the political media diet variable at T1 and frequency of political talk with parents at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 10.1). Thus, the more frequently young citizens used media sources for the purpose of gathering political information at the beginning of the campaign season, the more frequently they talked about politics with their parents at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between media diet and frequency of talk with parents was not significant, indicating that this relationship was not reciprocal.

Second, the path model between the collapsed media diet variable and frequency of political talk with siblings demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (47) = 165.84, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 3.53). Much like the media diet/parent model, this model had only one relationship that produced significant results. The path coefficient between T1 political media diet and T2 frequency of talk with siblings indicated a significant and positive relationship (Figure 10.2). This implies that the more individuals draw on media sources as part of their political media diet at T1, the more

frequently they discussed politics with their siblings at T2. The corresponding path coefficient between T2 frequency of political talk with siblings and T1 political media diet was not significant.

Next, the third model between the political media diet variable and frequency of political talk with significant others also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (63) = 194.46, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 3.09). Of the main relationships being examined, only one had a significant and positive relationship. The path coefficient from political media diet at T1 to frequency of political talk with classmates at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 10.3). As was evident in the sibling and parent model, the more participants accessed political information from media sources at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more frequently they engaged in political talk with their significant others at the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal.

Fourth, the path model between political media diet and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (39) = 50.46, $p = .10$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.29). Of the main relationships being examined, three were significant. First, a positive and significant relationship existed between T1 Political Media Diet and T2 frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances (Figure 10.4). At the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more often young citizens utilized media sources for political information, the more often they engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances at the height of the campaign season. In this model the corresponding path coefficient was also significant and positive. Therefore, the more frequently individuals' engaged in political talk with their casual

acquaintances at T1, the more frequently they gathered information from political media sources at T2. Third, at T2, the more political media consumed by participants, the more often they talked about politics with their casual acquaintances at T3. This was confirmed by a significant and positive path coefficient between these variables. The corresponding path coefficient for this relationship was not significant, indicating that this relationship was not reciprocal. From this analysis we can conclude that the political media diet variable was a positive predictor of frequency of talk with casual acquaintances.

Next, the fifth path model illustrates the relationship between one's political media diet and frequency of political talk with their coworkers. This model demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (39) = 52.41, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.34). Similarly to the political media diet and casual acquaintances model, the path coefficient between T1 media diet and T2 frequency of talk with coworkers, as well as media diet at T2 and coworkers at T3, indicated a significant and positive relationship (Figure 10.5). From this we can conclude that the more young citizens used media sources to obtain political information at T1 and T2, the more frequently they discussed politics with their coworkers at T2 and T3.

The sixth path model illustrated the relationship between one's use of media sources for political information and the frequency of political talk with professors (Figure 10.6). This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (48) = 90.91, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.89). Yet, again, this model displayed a significant and positive relationship between media diet and a political discussant. Specifically, political media diet at T2 was a significant and positive predictor of the discussant variable, frequency of talk with professors, at T3. Consequently, the more an individual

utilized media sources for political information at the height of the campaign season, the more frequently s/he discussed politics with their professors once the campaign season has dissipated.

Next, the seventh path model between the political media diet variable and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (36) = 72.72, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.02). Of the main relationships being examined, three had significant and positive relationships. First, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and media diet at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 10.7). The more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more they obtained political information from media sources during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. Frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 was also determined to be a positive predictor of political media diet at T3. Lastly, this model revealed a significant and positive main relationship between one's use of media sources for political information at the height of the campaign and frequency of talk with their classmates after the campaign season was complete.

Lastly, the model between the political media diet variable and community leaders demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (50) = 47.64, $p = .57$, RMSEA = 0.00, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 0.95). Of the main relationships, four significant path coefficients were present. First, media diet at T1 was a positive predictor of frequency of political talk with community leaders at T2 (Figure 10.8). Thus, the more individuals sought political information via media sources at T1, the more frequently they talked about politics with

community leaders at T2. The corresponding coefficient between frequency of talk with community leaders at T1 and political media diet at T2 was also positive and significant. Hence, the relationship between the collapsed media diet variable and frequency of talk with community leaders between T1 and T2 is reciprocal. Also, the media diet variable at T2 was found to positively predict frequency of talk with community leaders at T3. As a result, the more young citizens used media sources for their political information at the height of the presidential campaign, the more they talked about politics with community leaders when the campaign season was complete. Lastly, the paths in this model indicated that the reciprocal of this relationship was also significant; however, a negative relationship was present for this path. Specifically, T2 talk with community leaders negatively predicted use of media sources for political information at T3. In sum, as young citizens talked more often with community leaders at the height of the campaign season, they less frequently utilized media sources for political information once the campaign had dissipated.

Although demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the model depicting the relationship between individuals' political media use and frequency of political talk with close friends (χ^2 (44) = 141.42, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 3.21) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, this model was not included in the analysis.

From this analysis it is clear that young citizens' political media use predicted their frequency of talk with discussants at different phases of the political campaign season. The more frequently individuals used media sources for their political information at the onset of the campaign season, the more frequently they discussed politics with their

parents, siblings, significant others, casual acquaintances, coworkers, and community leaders at the height of the campaign. Furthermore, strengthening this relationship, media diet at T2 predicted frequency of talk with casual acquaintances, coworkers, professors, classmates, and community leaders at T3.

Research Question 4: Political Media Diet and MTP

The fourth research question inquired about the relationship between individuals' political media diet and motivations for talking about politics. The first goal of this analysis was to determine how often individuals' utilized their political media diet throughout the election cycle (RQ4). The second goal was to understanding the relationship between ones' motivation for talking politics and particular political media diet sources (RQ4a and b). The results of these analyses are explicated below.

Paired Samples T-Tests: Political Media Diet Variables

A series of paired samples *t*-tests were conducted to determine possible differences in frequency scores were located within each time period of analysis. As Table 13 illustrates, the highest mean frequency score across each of the three time points was Television Sources, indicating that at each phase of the campaign cycle young citizens used Television Sources most often for obtaining political information. In each time period, Internet Sources were the second most frequently used source for young citizens' political information. The lowest scores were Social Sources at T1, Print Sources at T2, and Social and Print Sources were tied at T3, implying that young citizens used these sources least often for political information during the time periods.

Political media diet frequency at T1, T2, and T3. The paired samples *t*-tests revealed a significant difference, at T1, in the frequency of use for Television Sources

and the frequency of use for Internet Sources ($t(429) = 8.07$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .13$), Print Sources ($t(429) = 13.11$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .29$), and Social Sources ($t(429) = 12.02$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .25$). This indicates that young citizens utilized Television Sources for their political information significantly more often than the other political media diet sources at the onset of the election. Similar results were present at both T2 and T3.[5]

Additionally at T1, use of Internet Sources for political information was also significantly greater than individuals' reported use of Print Sources ($t(429) = 4.46$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$) and Social Sources ($t(429) = 4.66$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .05$). Thus, as depicted in Table 13, young citizens use Internet Sources for their political information second only to Television Sources. Furthermore, the analysis revealed consistent results at T2 and T3.[6]

Lastly, there was no significant difference reported between individuals' use of Print Sources or Social Sources for political information ($t(429) = 0.98$, $p = 0.33$, power = .30). This suggests that participants spent approximately the same amount of time using print sources and social sources for their political information in the early campaign stage. Additionally, there were no significant differences between Print and Social Sources at T2 or T3.[7]

Overall, this analysis reveals that for young citizens, Television Sources are the most frequently used media resources for political information, followed by Internet Sources. Interestingly, there is no statistical difference in the amount that young citizens use Print or Social Sources for their political information.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Political Media Diet

Next, the zero-order correlations between the motivations for talking politics, the variables measuring political media diet, and the control variables are shown in Tables 14.1-14.6. Much like the previous relationships between the MTP variables and the other variables in this study, the results revealed significant positive correlations between global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict avoidance at T1 and the political media diet variables Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, and Social Sources at T1, T2, and T3. Global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict avoidance at T2 were also positively correlated with the political media diet variables at T2 and T3. Lastly, each of the motivators to talk politics at T3 were significantly and positively correlated with Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, and Social Sources at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Media Diet

To answer the remaining components of RQ4, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, conflict, and frequency of political talk with Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, or Social Sources. The four political media diet subscales were used in the analysis, thus, there was a potential for four good-fitting models for global motivation and each of the five MTP subscales.

Although all of the 24 possible models between the MTP variables and the political media diet subscales were considered good-fitting, only 10 models contained

significant paths among the main relationships. Thus, Figures 11.1-15.3 depict the best-fitting path models of the data representing the relationships between MTP and individuals' political media diet. Overall, these models indicate that in five of the models the MTP variable predicted the political media diet source. However, five of the models also indicated that the media diet sources were predictors of motivations. The models are described in detail in the following sections.

Global motivation and political media diet. Figures 11.1 and 11.2 depict the path models between global motivation and the political media diet variables (RQ4a). The first path model (Figure 11.1) explicated the relationship between individuals' overall motivation to engage in political talk with others and their use of social media sources to obtain political information throughout the campaign season. This model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (52) = 124.22, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.39). Of the main relationships outlined in the model, a significant and negative path was present between global motivation at T1 and Social Sources at T3. Thus, in this relationship, as individuals' motivation to engage in political talk with others increased at the onset of the election, the frequency with which individuals used social sources (YouTube, SNS, cell phones, and classmates) to obtain political information decreased after the campaign season was complete.

Next, the second path model (Figure 11.2) illustrating the relationship between global motivation and use of print sources for political information demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (59) = 134.37, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.78). In this model a significant and positive path existed between T2 global motivation and T3 Print Sources. Therefore, the more motivated young citizens were to

engage in political talk with others at the onset of the election, the more frequently they utilized print media sources to gather political information once the campaign season dissipated.

Also demonstrating an adequate fit to the data, the remaining two models depicting the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk politics with others and the political media diet variables Internet Sources (χ^2 (43) = 106.67, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.48) and Television Sources (χ^2 (37) = 101.49, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.74) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

The results of RQ4a indicated that there was no significant relationship between global motivation and gathering political information from Television or Internet sources. However, global motivation was a predictor of using Print and Social Sources for political information once the campaign season was complete. Similar results between other MTP variables and one's political media diet are explicated below.

Television sources and MTP. Research question 4b explored the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics and one's use of television sources as part of their political media diet at different phases of the election campaign. Of the five possible models between MTP variables and Television Sources, only one demonstrated significant paths between the main variables. Figure 12 shows the path model representing this relationship.

Specifically, the path model illustrates a significant relationship between the motivation variable information acquisition and use of television sources for political information. For this model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (33) = 87.24, *p* <

.001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.64). Among the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from Television Sources at T1 and information acquisition at T2 was significant and positive. Thus, the more individuals utilized Television Sources to gather political information at the beginning of the campaign season, the more motivated, by information acquisition, they were to talk about politics at the height of the campaign. The corresponding path coefficient between conflict at T1 and Television Sources at T2 was not significant.

Further, demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the remaining five models depicting the relationship between individuals' use of Television Sources for political information and motivation for understanding others' perspectives (χ^2 (25) = 52.89, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 2.12), pleasure (χ^2 (34) = 97.09, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.86), persuasion (χ^2 (31) = 90.47, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.92), and conflict (χ^2 (35) = 87.43, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.50) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

Internet sources and MTP. Figures 13.1 and 13.2 depict the best fitting path models of the data representing the relationships between the political media diet variable Internet Sources and the MTP variables. Although all five models had an acceptable fit to the data, only two demonstrated significant paths between the main variables. Similar to the relationship between information acquisition and Television Sources, Internet Sources also positively predicted the information acquisition motivation. However, the other significant path indicated that the conflict motivation predicted individuals' use of Internet Sources for political information.

First, the model between information acquisition and Internet Sources demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (30) = 64.13, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.14). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from the information motivation at T1 to Internet Sources at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 13.1). Thus, the more frequently individuals used Internet Sources, such as online newspapers, as part of their political media diet, the more they were motivated to engage in political talk for information. The corresponding coefficient between the T1 information motivation and T2 Internet Sources was not significant.

Second, the path model between the conflict motivation and use of Internet Sources for political information (Figure 13.2) also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (31) = 89.85, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.90). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from the conflict motivation variable at T1 and Internet Sources variable at T3 was significant and positive. In other words, the more young citizens were motivated to talk politics for conflict at the beginning of the campaign season, the more often they utilized internet sources as part of their political media diet at the end of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. This model parallels the relationship between global motivation and Social Sources seen in Figure 14.1. In both models, motivation at T1 predicted the media diet variable at T3.

Also demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the remaining three models illustrate the relationship between individuals' use of Internet Sources for political information and motivation for understanding others' perspectives (χ^2 (21) = 47.55, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 2.26), pleasure (χ^2 (38) = 102.81, $p < .001$,

RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.71), and persuasion (χ^2 (44) = 107.47, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.44) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

Print sources and MTP. RQ4b also explored the relationship between individuals' use of Print Sources as a means for retrieving political information and their motivations for talking about politics with others at different phases of the election campaign. Figures 14.1 and 14.2 illustrate the path models representing these relationships. Here, two of the five models demonstrated significant main relationships. Resembling the global/print model in Figure 11.2, motivation for pleasure was also revealed as positive predictor of Print Sources. Additionally, these models indicated that Print Sources was determined to be a positive predictor of the conflict motivation.

The first path model (Figure 14.1) illustrating the relationship between the pleasure motivation and Print Sources also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (37) = 115.50, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.12). In this model there was a significant and positive path coefficient between T2 pleasure and T3 Print Sources. Thus, the more participants' were motivated by pleasure when they engaged in political conversations at the height of the campaign cycle, the more frequently they used Print Sources as part of their political media diet once the campaign season was finished. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. As with the previous model, this model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season. Like the Internet Sources/conflict model, this model provided more support for individuals' motivation preceding their political media diet.

The second path model depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk because of its conflict potential and individuals' use of Print Sources for political information (Figure 14.2). For this model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (48) = 107.47, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.24). Of the model's main relationships, only the path coefficient from Print Sources at T1 and conflict avoidance at T2 was significant and positive. Thus, the more individuals used print sources for their political information at the beginning of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to engage in political talk for potential conflict at the height of the campaign. The corresponding path coefficient between conflict avoidance at T1 and Print Sources at T2 was not significant. Thus, this relationship was not reciprocal. Additionally, none of the other main relationships in this model demonstrated significant paths. This model is another example of the relationship between media diet and MTP. Again, as with the information acquisition models previously mentioned, young citizens' specific media diet was a predictor of motivation.

As with the other political media diet variables, not all of the models demonstrated significant paths between the main variables. Demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the remaining models depicting the relationship between individuals' use of Print Sources for political information and motivation to talk about politics for information acquisition (χ^2 (44) = 84.12, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 1.91), understanding others' perspectives (χ^2 (37) = 70.59, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.91), and persuasion (χ^2 (31) = 88.18, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.85) were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

Social sources and MTP. Figures 15.1-15.3 depict the best-fitting path models of the data representing the relationships between individuals' motivation for talking politics and the political media diet variable Social Sources. One of the five models indicated that motivation predicted use of Social Sources and the other two models suggested that Social Sources predicted motivation. The details of these models are discussed below.

The first path model revealed a relationship between Social Sources and the information acquisition motivation also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (38) = 73.11, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.92). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from the information acquisition variable at T1 and the Social Sources variable at T3 was significant and negative (Figure 15.1). Therefore, the more frequently participants were motivated to engage in political conversations by information acquisition during the onset of the election cycle, the less frequently they used Social Sources for obtaining political information once the campaign season was complete. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal. This model mirrors the global motivation/Social Sources model. In both models, T1 motivation had a negative relationship with T2 Social Sources.

Second, the path model between the Social Sources variable and understanding others' perspectives motivation also demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (42) = 63.49, $p < .05$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.51). The path coefficient between T1 political media diet variable, Social Sources, and T3 understanding others' perspectives motivation indicated a significant and negative relationship (Figure 15.2). This implied that the more one used social sources for political information at T1, the less s/he was motivated by understanding others' perspectives when engaging in political talk with

others once the campaign season was over. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 understanding others' perspectives motivation and T3 Social Sources variable was not significant.

Lastly, the model between Social Sources and the conflict motivation demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (54) = 91.80, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.70). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from the Social Sources variable at T2 to the conflict motivation at T3 was significant and positive (Figure 15.3). Thus, the more individuals used social sources to retrieve political information at the height of the election (T2), the more motivated they were to engage in political talk with others, because of its potential conflict, once the election ended (T3). The corresponding path coefficient between the conflict motivation (T2) and Social Sources (T3) was not significant. However, T1 Social Sources was found to have a significant and negative relationship with conflict at T3. Therefore, as young citizens used social sources for political information at the onset of the election, their motivation to engage in political talk for potential conflict decreased once the campaign season ends. This relationship echoed the path between T1 Social Sources and the T3 understanding motivation outlined previously.

The last two models also demonstrated good fit to the data. Illustrating the relationship between individuals' use of Social Sources for political information and motivation to talk about politics for pleasure (χ^2 (61) = 142.39, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.33), and persuasion (χ^2 (67) = 140.93, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.10), these models were not included in this analysis because they did not reveal any significant main relationships.

When looking at the relationship between global motivation and political media diet as proposed in RQ4a, it becomes clear that global motivation was a positive predictor of Print and a negative predictor of Social Sources. Thus, individuals' motivation to talk about politics impacts which sources they utilize most for political information. Unfortunately, the findings for RQ4b are less clear. Of the eight models discussed in this section, five models found a particular political media diet source to be a predictor of a particular MTP variable. Specifically, motivation for information acquisition was predicted by individuals' use of Television and Internet Sources for gathering political information whereas the information motivation negatively predicted use of Social Sources for political information. Conversely, individuals' use of Social Sources for political information was a negative predictor of motivation to understand others' perspectives. Similar findings existed for conflict avoidance. Here, the conflict motivation was predicted by use of Social and Print Sources, but was found to be a predictor of Internet Sources. Likewise, the pleasure motivation positively predicted use of Print Sources. Thus, we should conclude that on a global level one's motivation to talk politics predicts use of particular political media diet sources; however, on a micro level, frequency of using various media sources for political information predicts individuals' level of motivation for talking politics during the campaign season.

Research Question 5: MTP and Voting Behavior

The fifth research question inquired about the relationship between individuals' voting behavior and motivations for talking politics. Overall, the results of RQ5a and b revealed that motivation does not increase the odds of voting at T3. However, intention to vote at T1 and T2 was a significant predictor of casting a ballot on Election Day.

Binary Logistic Regression

Prior to analysis, data were screened for missing data and outliers. A preliminary linear regression was conducted to calculate Mahalanobis' Distance and to evaluate multicollinearity among the predictors. Because multicollinearity was not violated, Explore Statistic was then conducted to determine which cases exceeded the chi-square criteria of $\chi^2(2) = 13.816$ at $p = .001$. All subjects that exceeded this value were eliminated from the analysis. Binary Logistic Regression was then conducted using the Enter model. Models were produced for both T1 and T2 predictors for each of the six MTP variables, resulting in 12 models (Tables 15.1-15.6). The dependent variable was T3 voting behavior (0 = no; 1 = yes), and the predictors included intention to vote (0 = no; 1 = yes) and the motivation variables (1 = *Strongly Disagree*; 5 = *Strongly Agree*) for both T1 and T2. Intention to vote variable was used as a control variable in these models because it is highly correlated with voting behavior at T3.

Global Motivation and Voting Behavior

First, to answer RQ5a, the regression results indicated the overall model fit for T1 global motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 243.98, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 95.70$, $p < .001$), revealing that the inclusion of the predictors fit the model well. The model correctly classified 88.5% of the cases in the analyses. The Regression coefficients are presented in Table 15.1. *Wald* statistics indicate that individuals' intention to vote at T1 significantly predicted their voting behavior at T3; however, T1 global motivation was not a significant predictor of T3 voting behavior. For individuals intending to vote at T1 (response = 1), the odds of actually voting at T3 (versus not voting) decreased by a factor of .05 (odds ratio). Thus, for individuals with an average level of motivation to talk

politics with others (3 = neutral) and who intend to vote at T1, the probability of these people actually voting at T3 is 94.2%.[8]

Similar results existed for the predictor variables at T2. Again, the overall model fit for the T2 predictors global motivation and vote intention was significant (-2 log likelihood = 177.19, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 163.40$, $p < .001$). The T2 model correctly classified 93.8% of the cases. However, as with the previous model, the *Wald* statistics indicated that T2 global motivation was not a significant predictor of voting behavior at T3. Nonetheless, individuals' intention to vote at T2 was a significant predictor of their voting behavior at T3. Again, for individuals intending to vote at T2, the odds of actually voting at T3 decreased by a factor of .01. The probability for those intending to vote at T2 reporting they voted at T3 is 90.3%.

Information Acquisition and Voting Behavior

RQ5b inquired as to whether specific motivations for talking politics increased the odds of voting in the 2008 presidential election. Much like the global motivation models, the regression results indicated the overall model fit for T1 information acquisition motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 242.33, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 97.35$, $p < .001$). The model correctly classified 88.2% of the cases in the analyses. The regression coefficients are presented in Table 15.2. Here, the *Wald* statistics indicate that individuals' intention to vote at T1 significantly predicted their voting behavior at T3; however, T1 information motivation was not a significant predictor of T3 voting behavior. For individuals intending to vote at T1, the odds of voting at T3 decreased by a factor of .05. Further, for young citizens with an average level of information motivation and who indicated intention to vote at T1, the probability of voting at T3 is 93.1%.

At T2 the overall model fit for the T2 predictors, information motivation and vote intention, was significant (-2 log likelihood = 176.36, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 164.23$, $p < .001$). The T2 model correctly classified 93.8% of the cases. The *Wald* statistics indicated that T2 information acquisition motivation was not a significant predictor of voting behavior at T3. However, individuals' intention to vote at T2 was a significant predictor of their voting behavior at T3. For those who reported their intention to vote at T2, the odds of voting at T3 decreased by a factor of .01. Additionally, the probability for those intending to vote at T2 reporting they voted at T3 is 95.4%.

Pleasure Motivation and Voting Behavior

As with the previous models, the regression results indicated the overall model fit for T1 pleasure motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 244.24, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 95.43$, $p < .001$). This model correctly classified 88.5% of the cases in the analyses. The regression coefficients presented in Table 15.3 indicate that the pleasure motivation was not a significant predictor of voting behavior. From the analysis we can infer that for young citizens with an average level of pleasure motivation at T1 and who intend to vote at T1, the probability of voting at T3 is 94.1%. Further, the overall model fit for the T2 predictors, pleasure motivation and vote intention, was significant (-2 log likelihood = 176.64, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 163.95$, $p < .001$). Additionally, the T2 model correctly classified 93.8% of the cases in this analysis; however, T2 pleasure motivation was not a significant predictor of voting behavior at T3. At T2, for those with an average pleasure motivation score and an intention to vote, the probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election is 95.6%.

Persuasion Motivation and Voting Behavior

Next, the regression results indicated the overall model fit for T1 persuasion motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 244.19, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 95.49$, $p < .001$). The model correctly classified 88.5% of the cases in the analyses. As the regression coefficients presented in Table 15.4 suggest, the T1 and T2 persuasion motivation was not a significant predictor of T3 voting behavior. For young citizens with an average level of persuasion motivation and who intended to vote at T1, the probability of voting at T3 was 94.4%. The overall model fit for the T2 predictors, persuasion motivation and vote intention, was significant (-2 log likelihood = 177.19, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 163.40$, $p < .001$). The probability for those with an average level of persuasion motivation and who intend to vote at T2 reporting they voted at T3 is 96.1%.

Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation and Voting Behavior

As with the previous models, the regression results indicated the overall model fit for T1 understanding motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 242.96, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 96.72$, $p < .001$). This model correctly classified 88.7% of the cases in the analyses; however, the T1 understanding motivation was not a significant predictor of T3 voting behavior (Table 15.5). For young citizens with an average level of understanding motivation at T1 and who intend to vote at T1, the probability of voting at T3 is 93.3%. Additionally, the overall model fit for the T2 predictors, understanding others' perspectives and vote intention, was significant (-2 log likelihood = 176.26, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 164.33$, $p < .001$). At T2, for those with an average level of understanding motivation and an intention to vote, the probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election was 95.4%.

Conflict Avoidance and Voting Behavior

Lastly, the regression results revealed that the overall model fit for T1 conflict motivation was significant (-2 log likelihood = 242.85, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 96.83$, $p < .001$). This model correctly classified 88.7% of the cases in the analyses. As Table 15.6 illustrates, the T1 conflict motivation was not a significant predictor of T3 voting behavior. The statistics reveal that for young citizens with an average level of conflict motivation at T1 and who intend to vote at T1, the probability of voting at T3 is 94.5%. Consistent with the previously outlined models, the overall model fit for the T2 predictors, conflict avoidance and vote intention, was significant (-2 log likelihood = 176.29, $\chi^2(2, n = 424) = 164.30$, $p < .001$). Additionally, the T2 model correctly classified 93.8% of the cases in this analysis. The *Wald* statistics reveal that the T2 conflict motivation was not a significant predictor of voting behavior at T3. However, there is a 99.7% probability of voting in the 2008 presidential election for those with an average level of conflict motivation and who indicated that they intended to vote at T2.

Research Question 6: MTP and Political Campaign Involvement

RQ6 examines the potential relationship between MTP and participants' political campaign involvement. Although data were collected at three different time points in this study, it was assumed that participants' campaign involvement would drop off significantly once the campaign had ended (T3). As such, the data used to answer this research question were collected at T1 and T2 only. Figures 16.1-16.6 illustrate these relationships.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Political Campaign Involvement

Tables 16.1-16.6 present the zero-order correlations between MTP, the political campaign involvement variable, and the control variables. Much like the previous relationships between the MTP variables and the other variables in this study, the results revealed a significant positive correlation between global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict avoidance at T1 and political campaign involvement at T1 and T2. Global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict avoidance at T2 were also positively correlated with the political campaign involvement variables at T2.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Campaign Involvement

In the next step, path analyses were computed. These analyses included the T1 and T2 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, or conflict avoidance and political campaign involvement. Because all of the motivation variables were included in the analysis, a total of six models were possible. In general, the results for RQ6 revealed that T1 political involvement was a significant and positive predictor of each T2 motivation variable. Thus, these models present consistent evidence that a priori political involvement contributes to a motivation to talk politics and not vice versa. The following results describe the details of these relationships.

The first path model illustrated in Figure 16.1 shows the relationship between global motivation and political campaign involvement (RQ5a). This model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (32) = 85.88, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN

= 2.68). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from political campaign involvement at T1 and global motivation at T2 was significant and positive. Thus, the more individuals were involved in the political campaign at the beginning of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to talk about politics with others at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between T1 global motivation and T2 campaign involvement was not significant. The results of RQ6a indicate that campaign involvement early on in the election predicts one's motivation to talk about politics with others as the campaign progressed.

Research question 6b explored the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics and political campaign involvement at different phases of the election campaign. Figures 16.2-16.6 illustrate the remaining five path models representing these relationships.

The first path model (Figure 16.2) depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk about politics with others for information acquisition and frequency of political talk. For the information acquisition model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (23) = 43.60, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 1.90). From this path model, campaign involvement at T1 was revealed as a significant positive predictor of MTP information acquisition at T2. Thus, as people participated more in political campaigns during the beginning stages of the campaign season, they were more motivated to talk about politics for information acquisition at the campaign's peak. The corresponding path for this relationship was not significant

Second, the path model between the understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of political talk (Figure 16.3) demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (19)

= 65.50, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 3.45). The path coefficient between T1 campaign involvement and T2 understanding others' perspectives revealed a significant positive relationship. This implies that the more one was involved with political campaigns at T1, the more motivation s/he had to talk about politics to understand others' perspectives at T2. However, the reciprocal of this relationship was not present.

Third, the path model between the pleasure motivation and political campaign involvement (Figure 16.4) also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (24) = 66.60, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.78). Of the main relationships being examined, campaign involvement at T1 was a positive predictor of motivation to engage in political talk for pleasure at T2. Therefore, the more participants engaged in campaign activities at the beginning of the campaign cycle, they were more likely to be motivated to have political conversation with others for enjoyment during the height of the campaign season. Again, the corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal, thus, campaign involvement predicts the pleasure motivation.

Next, the fourth path model illustrates the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk to persuade others and campaign involvement (Figure 16.5). This model also demonstrated a good fit of the data (χ^2 (31) = 93.84, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.95, CMIN = 3.02). As the figure indicates, the path coefficient from campaign involvement at T1 and persuasion at T2 was significant and positive. The corresponding path coefficient between persuasion at T1 and political campaign involvement at T2 was not significant, revealing that the more involved people

were with political campaigns at the onset of the election (T1), the more motivated by persuasion they were to engage in political talk at the height of the election (T2).

Lastly, the fifth path model for research question 6b illustrates the relationship between one's motivation to engage in political talk for potential conflict and political campaign involvement (Figure 16.6). This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (26) = 96.86, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.94, CMIN = 3.73). However, only one of the main relationships' path coefficients was significant: T1 campaign involvement had a significant and positive relationship with T2 conflict motivation. Therefore, the more young citizens were involved in political campaigns during the early stages of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to engage in political talk for potential conflict at the height of the campaign season.

In sum, from these analyses we can begin to understand the relationship between individuals' motivations for talking politics and political campaign involvement. Each model revealed a significant positive relationship between overall motivation and each specific motivator and campaign involvement. As a result, we can conclude that campaign involvement precedes a motivation to engage in political talk.

Research Question 7: MTP and Political Cynicism

Research question 7a and b explores the relationship between MTP and young citizens' political cynicism. In general, the results revealed that MTP and political cynicism had a significant inverse relationship. Figures 17.1-17.4 illustrate these findings in greater detail.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Political Cynicism

Tables 17.1-17.6 presents the zero-order correlations between the motivations for talking politics, political cynicism, and the control variables. The results of this analysis reveal a significant negative correlation between global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict avoidance at T1 and political campaign involvement at T1, T2, and T3. However, information acquisition at T1 did not have a significant relationship with cynicism at T2. Global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, and conflict at T2 were also negatively correlated with the political cynicism measure at T2 and T3. Lastly, all of the motivation variables at T3 were significantly and negatively related to cynicism at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Cynicism

In the next step, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, or conflict avoidance and political cynicism. Again, because there are six motivation variables in this analysis, there are potentially six models to analyze. Of these, four were found to have an adequate fit to the data and contained significant paths among the main relationships. Specifically, all four models contained significant and negative relationships between the T2 motivation and T3 political cynicism. From this we can conclude that as individuals' motivation increases at T2, their political cynicism decreases at T3. Further, two models indicated a significant and positive relationship between the T1 motivation and T3 cynicism variables. The results of these models are further explicated below.

The first path model reveals the relationship between global motivation and political cynicism (RQ7a). This model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (43) = 97.09, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.26). In this model, however, none of the main relationships were significant. As such, this model was not explored further in the analysis.

Research question 7b explored the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics and political cynicism at different phases of the election campaign. Figures 17.1-17.4 illustrate the four path models representing these relationships.

The first path model depicts the relationship between individuals' understanding others' perspectives motivation and political cynicism (Figure 17.1) demonstrating an adequate model fit (χ^2 (24) = 40.60, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.69). The path coefficient between T2 understanding others' perspectives and T3 political cynicism revealed a significantly negative relationship. This implies that the more motivated an individual was to talk about politics to understand others' perspectives at T2, the less cynical s/he was about politics at T3. However, the reciprocal of this relationship was not present.

Next, the second path model illustrates the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk to persuade others and political cynicism (Figure 17.2). This model also demonstrated an adequate fit of the data (χ^2 (41) = 99.77, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.43). As the figure indicates, the path coefficient from persuasion at T2 and political cynicism at T3 was significant and negative. The corresponding path coefficient between political cynicism at T2 and persuasion at T3 was not significant. Therefore, we can conclude that, like Figure 17.1, the more motivated by

persuasion young citizens were to engage in political talk at the height of the election (T2), the less politically cynical they were once the campaign has concluded.

Third, the path model between the pleasure motivation and political cynicism also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (38) = 110.18, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.90). Of the main relationships being examined, the pleasure motivation at T2 was again a significant and negative predictor of political cynicism at T3. Hence, the more participants were motivated to have political conversations for enjoyment during the height of the campaign season (T2), the less cynical they became about politics once the campaign season had ended (T3). The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal (Figure 17.3). However, this model also revealed a significant and positive path coefficient between T1 pleasure and T3 political cynicism. This result indicates that as young citizens were more motivated to engage in political talk for pleasure at the onset of the campaign season, the more cynical about politics they were once the campaign season was complete.

The fourth path model for research question 7b illustrates the relationship between one's motivation to engage in political talk for potential conflict and political cynicism (Figure 17.4). This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (31) = 89.15, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.88). Unlike the previously mentioned models, in this model, four of the main relationships' path coefficients were significant. First, T1 political cynicism had a significant and negative relationship with T2 conflict motivation. Therefore, the more cynical young citizens were during the early stages of the campaign season, the less motivated they were to engage in political talk for potential conflict at the height of the campaign season. Conversely, the corresponding path coefficient was also

significantly and negatively related. Thus, the more young citizens were motivated to engage in political talk at the beginning of the campaign season, the less cynical they were about politics and government at the height of the campaign. Similar to the relationships depicted in the understanding, persuasion and pleasure models (Figures 17.1-17.3), T2 conflict motivation was a significant and negative predictor of T3 political cynicism. Lastly, as seen in the pleasure/cynicism model (Figure 17.3), the path coefficient between T1 conflict motivation and T3 political cynicism was significant and positive.

Demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last model depicting the relationship between individuals' level of political cynicism and information acquisition motivation (χ^2 (30) = 41.89, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.40) was not included in this analysis because it did not reveal any significant main relationships.

From these analyses we gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between individuals' motivation for talking politics and the democratic attitudinal variable, political cynicism. The majority of the models in RQ7 revealed a significant negative relationship between MTP variables and political cynicism. Thus, motivation decreases cynicism. From this we can conclude that certain motivations to engage in political talk predicted individuals' level of political cynicism. Yet, in some instances, motivations early on in the campaign season were found to increase cynicism.

Research Question 8: Political Cynicism and Political Discussants

RQ8 inquires about the relationship between political cynicism and participants' political discussants. Although the zero order correlations revealed relationships among the main variables, most of the relationships did not withstand the introduction of the

control variables into the models, thus, we can conclude that there is relatively no relationship between political cynicism and political discussants. The results of this research question are detailed below.

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Cynicism and Political Talk With Specific Discussants

The zero-order correlations between political cynicism, the variables measuring frequency of political talk with specific discussants, and the control variables are shown in Tables 18.1 and 18.2. However, because the inter-correlations between political cynicism and the control variables were already presented in Tables 17.1-17.6 and the inter-correlations between the discussants and control variables were presented in Tables 5.1-5.9, they were omitted from Tables 18.1 and 18.2. The results reveal a significant negative correlation between political cynicism at T1 and the frequency individuals talked about politics with casual acquaintances and parents at T1, T2, and T3. Political cynicism at T2 was also significantly and negatively correlated with frequency of talk with casual acquaintances, parents, professors, and community leaders at T2 and T3. Lastly, political cynicism at T3 was significantly negatively correlated to frequency of talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, significant others, coworkers, professors, and community leaders at T3. Figure 18 illustrates the significant findings of this research question.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between Political Cynicism and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

To answer RQ8, path analyses were estimated. These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of political cynicism, and frequency of political talk with close

friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, professors, classmates, or community leaders. Because there were nine political discussant variables, this research question had a potential of nine corresponding models. Interestingly, only one of the nine models demonstrated a statistically significant relationship among the main variables.

This path model (Figure 18) depicts the relationship between individuals' political cynicism and frequency of political talk with close friends. For the close friends model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (34) = 64.44, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.90). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with close friends at T2 and political cynicism at T3 was significant and negative. Thus, the more individuals talked about politics with their close friends at the height of the campaign season, the less politically cynical they were once the campaign season had ended. The corresponding coefficient between political cynicism and frequency of talk with close friends was not significant. Further, none of the other main relationships in this model demonstrated significant paths.

Although demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the remaining eight models depicting the relationship between individuals' level of political cynicism and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances (χ^2 (42) = 89.01, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.12), parents (χ^2 (57) = 87.17, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.53), siblings (χ^2 (35) = 70.77, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.02), significant others (χ^2 (50) = 116.39, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.33), coworkers (χ^2 (30) = 42.40, $p = .07$, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.41), classmates (χ^2 (38) = 87.10, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN

= 2.29), professors (χ^2 (38) = 79.26, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.09), and community leaders (χ^2 (50) = 120.85, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.42) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, these models were not included in the analysis.

Using this analysis as a guide, we can conclude that, the relationships between political cynicism and frequency of talk with political discussants depicted by the zero-order correlation tables (Table 18.1-2) were spurious. Thus, once the control variables were entered into the models the relationship between the main variables was explained away. Therefore, overall, there is not a significant relationship between young citizens' political cynicism and with whom they choose to engage in political talk.

Research Question 9: MTP and Political Information Efficacy (PIE)

Research question 9a and b explored the relationship between MTP and young citizens' political information efficacy.

Zero-Order Correlations Between MTP and Political Information Efficacy

Tables 19.1-19.6 present the zero-order correlations between the motivations for talking politics, political information efficacy, and the control variables. The results of this analysis reveal a significant positive correlation between global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance at T1 with political information efficacy (PIE) at T1, T2, and T3. Global motivation, information acquisition, understanding others' perspectives, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance at T2 were also positively correlated with PIE at T2. Lastly, all of the motivation variables at T3 were significantly and positively related to PIE at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Information Efficacy

These path analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of global motivation, information acquisition, pleasure, persuasion, understanding others' perspectives, or conflict avoidance and political information efficacy. This research question included a potential of six models (six motivations * PIE). Of those, four models indicated significant paths among the main relationships. Specifically, two models (pleasure and persuasion) revealed PIE to be a predictor of motivation. The remaining two models (information acquisition and conflict avoidance) indicated that motivations predicted PIE. Details about each of these models follow.

The first path model explicated the relationship between global motivation and PIE (RQ9a). This model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (40) = 114.08, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.85). However, in this model, none of the main relationships were significant. Thus, we can conclude that, similarly to the democratic engagement variable political cynicism, there were not any relationships between global motivation and PIE.

Research question 9b explored the relationship between specific motivations for talking politics and political information efficacy at different phases of the election campaign. Figure 19.1-19.4 illustrates the four path models representing these relationships. The first path model (Figure 19.1) depicts the relationship between individuals' motivation to talk politics with others for pleasure and PIE. For the pleasure model, there was an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (14) = 31.60, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 2.26). Of the main relationships being examined, political information efficacy at T1 was a significant and positive predictor of the pleasure

motivation at T2. Hence, the more confident participants felt in their political knowledge at the onset of the campaign (T1), the more motivated they were to have political conversations for enjoyment during the height of the campaign season (T2). The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship was not reciprocal.

Next, the second path model illustrates the relationship between individuals' motivation to engage in political talk to persuade others and PIE (Figure 19.2). This model also demonstrated a good fit of the data (χ^2 (17) = 30.37, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.79). As the figure indicates, the path coefficient from PIE at T2 and persuasion at T3 was significant and positive. The corresponding path coefficient between persuasion at T2 and PIE at T3 was not significant. Therefore, we can conclude that the more political information efficacy young citizens had at the height of the election (T2), the more they were motivated by persuasion for political talk once the campaign concluded (T3).

Third, the path model between the information acquisition motivation and PIE (Figure 19.3) demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (28) = 70.41, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.51). The path between T1 information acquisition and T3 PIE revealed a significant positive relationship. This implies that the more motivated an individual was to talk about politics for information acquisition at T1, the more political information efficacy s/he had at T3. However, the reciprocal of this relationship was not present. From this, we can conclude that information acquisition positively predicts PIE.

The fourth path model for research question 9b illustrates the relationship between one's motivation to engage in political talk for potential conflict and PIE (Figure 19.4).

This model also had an acceptable fit to the data (χ^2 (17) = 56.53, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 3.33). Interestingly, in this model, two of the main relationships' path coefficients were significant. First, T2 conflict motivation was a significant and negative predictor of T3 PIE. Thus, the more young citizens were motivated to engage in political talk for potential conflict at the height of the campaign season, the less confident they felt in their political knowledge once the campaign season was complete. Also, the path coefficient between T1 conflict motivation and T3 PIE was significant and positive.

Demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the last model depicting the relationship between individuals' level of political information efficacy and the understanding others' perspectives motivation (χ^2 (22) = 67.34, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 3.06) was not included in this analysis because it did not reveal any significant main relationships.

These models have illustrated the relationship between PIE and individuals' motivations for talking politics. From these results we conclude three important findings. First, a significant relationship between the overall motivation measure and PIE was not present. Second, the pleasure and persuasion motivations have similar relationships with PIE: PIE preceded motivation in both models. Third, the information acquisition motivation and conflict motivation's results were also similar to each other: both motivations at T1 were predictors of PIE at T3.

Research Question 10: Political Information Efficacy (PIE) and Political Discussants

RQ10 inquires about the relationship between political information efficacy and participants' political discussants. Figures 20.1-20.7 illustrate these relationships.

Zero-Order Correlations Between PIE and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

The zero-order correlations between PIE, the variable measuring frequency of political talk with specific discussants, and the control variables are shown in Tables 20.1 and 20.2. However, because the inter-correlations between PIE and the control variables were already presented in Tables 19.1-19.6, and the inter-correlations between the discussants and control variables were presented in Tables 5.1-5.9, they were omitted from Tables 20.1 and 20.2. The results revealed significant and positive correlations between PIE at T1 and the frequency individuals talked about politics with specific discussants at T1, T2, and T3. PIE at T2 was also positively correlated with frequency of talk at T2 and T3. Lastly, PIE at T3 was significantly and positively correlated to frequency of talk at T3.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between PIE and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants

These analyses included the T1, T2, and T3 measures of PIE and frequency of political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, professors, classmates, or community leaders. This research question had a potential of nine corresponding path models. Although the results revealed nine acceptable fitting models, only seven of the models had significant relationships among

the main variables being examined. Specifically, four of the models showed a significant and positive path between the discussant variable at T1 and PIE at T2, while five of the models indicated T1 PIE as a predictor of political discussants at T2. The trends are examined in greater detail in the following text.

Figures 20.1-20.7 depict the best-fitting path models of the data representing the relationship between PIE and frequency of political talk among the various political discussants. First, the model between PIE and close friends demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (45) = 132.15, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.94). For the main relationships in the model, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with close friends at T1 and PIE at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 20.1). Thus, the more individuals talked about politics with their close friends at the beginning of the campaign season, the more confident they were in the political knowledge they possessed at the height of the campaign. The corresponding coefficient between PIE at T1 and frequency of talk with close friends at T2 was also positive and significant. Also, T2 PIE has a positive and significant relationship with frequency of talk with close friends at T3. Hence, at both T1 and T2 the more confident young citizens felt in the political knowledge they possessed, the more frequently they engaged in political conversations with their close friends during the preceding phase of the campaign.

Second, the path model between PIE and frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (21) = 53.73, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 2.56). Of the main relationships being examined, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with casual acquaintances at T1 and PIE at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 20.2). Therefore, the more participants

engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more confident they felt in their political knowledge at the height of the campaign season. Like the close friends/PIE model previously mentioned, the corresponding path coefficient was also significant, indicating that the relationship is reciprocal.

Next, the third path model between PIE and frequency of political talk with siblings demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (46) = 115.18, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.50). The path coefficient between T1 PIE and T2 frequency of talk with siblings indicated a significant and positive relationship (Figure 20.3). This implied that the more confident one felt in their political knowledge at T1, the more frequently s/he discussed politics with their siblings at the height of the campaign season. As seen in both the close friends/PIE and casual acquaintances/PIE models, the corresponding path coefficient between T1 frequency of political talk with siblings and T2 PIE was also positive and significant. Hence, the more frequently young citizens talked about politics with their siblings at T1, the more confident they were with their political knowledge at T2. There was also a significant and positive path coefficient between T2 frequency of talk with siblings and T3 PIE. Therefore, the more young citizens talked to their siblings at the height of the campaign season, the more confident they felt in their political knowledge once the campaign ended. Lastly, there was a significant and negative path coefficient between T1 frequency of talk with siblings and T3 PIE. This indicates that over the course of the campaign season, if participants discussed politics with their siblings more frequently at the onset, by the time the election ended they felt less confident in their level of political knowledge.

The fourth path model illustrated the relationship between individuals' level of PIE and frequency of political talk with parents. This model also demonstrated a good fit of the data (χ^2 (45) = 104.05, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.31). As Figure 20.4 indicates, the path coefficient from PIE at T1 to frequency of political talk with parents at T2 was significant and positive. The corresponding path coefficient between frequency of political talk with parents at T1 and PIE at T2 was not significant, suggesting that the more political information efficacy individuals had at T1, the more frequently they discussed politics with their parents at T2. This positive and significant path between T1 PIE and the discussant variable was also present in the previous three models.

Next, the path model between PIE and frequency of political talk with coworkers demonstrated an adequate model fit (χ^2 (32) = 57.27, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.79). Continuing the trend noted above, the path coefficient between the T1 PIE and T2 frequency of talk with coworkers indicated a significant and positive relationship (Figure 20.5). This implies that the greater one's political information efficacy at T1, the more frequently s/he discussed politics with their coworkers at the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient between T1 frequency of political talk with coworkers and T2 PIE was not significant. Note that this is the same relationship explicated in the parent/PIE model (Figure 20.4) above.

Sixth, the path model between PIE and frequency of political talk with professors also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data (χ^2 (40) = 90.09, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.45). Of the main relationships, only the path coefficient between T1 PIE and T2 frequency of political talk with professors was significant and positive

(Figure 20.6). Thus, the greater one's political information efficacy at T1 the more frequently they engaged in political talk with their professors at T2. However, the corresponding coefficient between frequency of talk with professors and PIE was not significant. Again, these results mirror those in the relationships between coworkers and parents and PIE.

Lastly, the path model between PIE and frequency of political talk with classmates also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data χ^2 (28) = 82.80, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.07, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.96). Much like the relationship between T1 close friends, casual acquaintances, and siblings and T2 PIE, the path coefficient from frequency of political talk with classmates at T1 and PIE at T2 was significant and positive (Figure 20.7). Thus, the more participants engaged in political talk with their classmates at the beginning of the campaign cycle, the more confident they felt in their political knowledge during the height of the campaign season. The corresponding path coefficient was not significant, indicating that the relationship is not reciprocal. This model did not reveal any other significant main relationships over the course of the campaign season.

Although demonstrating an acceptable fit to the data, the models depicting the relationship between PIE and community leaders (χ^2 (48) = 110.48, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.30) and significant others (χ^2 (39) = 95.72, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.96, CMIN = 2.45) revealed no significant main relationships. As such, these models were not included in this section.

Unlike the relationship between the democratic engagement attitude of political cynicism and frequency of political talk with various discussants, this analysis has revealed the importance of the relationship between political information efficacy and the

frequency of political talk with various discussants throughout the course of the campaign cycle. From this we can conclude that who individuals engage in political talk with has an effect on the confidence they have in the political knowledge they possess. Specifically, the more participants discussed politics with their close friends, casual acquaintances, siblings and classmates at T1, the more political information efficacy they had at T2. Further, the level of one's political information efficacy at T1 determined how frequently h/she engaged in political talk with close friends, parents, siblings, coworkers, and professors at T2.

Research Question 11: Political Talk as a Mediator

RQ1l explored the role that frequency of political talk played as a mediator in the relationships between MTP and individuals' political discussants, political media diet, political cynicism, and political information efficacy. Due to the potential size of this model, the analysis was divided into three smaller subsets examining frequency of political talk as a mediator between each of the MTP variables and: a) political discussants, b) political media diet, and c) democratic variables. Because the purpose of this research question was to explore the potential mediating role of political talk, control variables were not included in the models. In general, the results revealed that frequency of political talk was a significant mediator between the MTP variables and political media diet, political cynicism, and political information efficacy (PIE), but not between MTP and individuals' political discussants. These relationships are explained in more detail below.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Frequency of Political Talk With Specific Discussants Mediated by Frequency of Political Talk

The first analysis included the T1 measure of the MTP variables, T2 measure of frequency of political talk, and T3 measures of frequency of political talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, siblings, significant others, coworkers, professors, classmates, and community leaders. Because there were a total of six motivation variables, this component of RQ11 had a potential of six corresponding path models. The results revealed that none of the models had an acceptable fit, thus, mediation could not be tested (Holbert & Stephenson, 2003).

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Media Diet Mediated by Frequency of Political Talk

The second set of analyses included the T1 measure of the MTP variables, T2 measure of frequency of political talk, and T3 measures of the political media diet subscales: Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, and Social Sources. Again, because there were a total of six motivation variables, there was a potential for six corresponding path models. All six of these models were acceptable fitting models and indicated that frequency of talk was a significant mediator between the MTP variables and political media diet variables. Figures 21.1-21.6 depict the best fitting path models of the data representing these mediated relationships.

First, the models between T1 global motivation (Figure 21.1), pleasure motivation (Figure 21.2), persuasion motivation (Figure 21.3), and conflict avoidance motivation (Figure 21.4) and the T3 political media diet variables mediated by frequency of political talk at T2 demonstrated an adequate fit to the data: global motivation, (χ^2 (2) = 5.13, p =

.08, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.56); pleasure, (χ^2 (2) = 5.44, p = .07, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.72); persuasion, (χ^2 (2) = 4.74, p = .09, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.37); and conflict, (χ^2 (2) = 5.12, p = .08, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.56). An investigation of the component paths of the model revealed that T1 global motivation, pleasure motivation, persuasion motivation, and conflict motivation positively predicted frequency of political talk at T2, which, in turn, positively predicted T3 Television, Internet, Print and Social Sources. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict on each of the political media diet variables was statistically significant and positive in direction.[9] Additionally, T1 global motivation, pleasure motivation, persuasion motivation, and conflict motivation also had a direct effect on the T3 political media diet variables, as each variable was found to positively predict Television Sources, Internet Sources, Print Sources, and Social Sources.

Next, the models between the T1 information acquisition motivation (Figure 21.5) and the understanding others' perspectives motivation (Figure 21.6) and the T3 political media diet variables mediated by T2 frequency of political talk also demonstrated an adequate fit to the data: information, (χ^2 (2) = 5.26, p = .07, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.63); understanding, (χ^2 (2) = 5.33, p = .07, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.67). The direct paths of the models revealed that T1 information motivation and understanding others' perspectives motivation positively predicted Television and Internet Sources at T3. However, the information acquisition motivation and understanding motivation at T1 were not significant predictors of Print or Social Sources at T3. Further examination of the models' paths indicated that the information and understanding others' perspectives motivations at T1 positively predicted frequency of

political talk at T2, which, in turn, positively predicted Television, Internet, Print and Social Sources at T3. Thus, the indirect effect of the information acquisition motivation and understanding motivation on each of the political media diet variables through frequency of talk was statistically significant and positive in direction.[10] Although the information and understanding others' perspectives motivations at T1 may not have had a direct effect on obtaining political information from Print and Social Sources at T3, the information motivation does have a significant indirect positive influence on Print and Social Sources through its effect on frequency of political talk.

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Democratic Variables (PIE and Political Cynicism) Mediated by Frequency of Political Talk

Lastly, the third set of analyses included the T1 measure of the MTP variables, T2 measure of frequency of political talk, and T3 measures of the democratic variables: PIE and political cynicism. As with the previous analyses, there were a total of six motivation variables, thus, there was a potential for six corresponding path models. The results revealed four models with significant main relationships, thus, these models were tested for mediation. The results indicated that T2 frequency of talk was a significant mediator between the T1 global, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict motivation and T3 PIE and political cynicism. Figures 22.1-22.4 depict the best fitting path models of the data representing these mediated relationships.

The models between global motivation (Figure 22.1), pleasure motivation (Figure 22.2), persuasion motivation (Figure 22.3), conflict motivation (Figure 22.4) and the democratic engagement variables (PIE and political cynicism) mediated by frequency of political talk demonstrated an adequate fit to the data: global motivation, (χ^2 (1) = 4.95, *p*

< .05, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .97, CMIN = 4.95); pleasure, (χ^2 (1) = 3.83, p = .05, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = .97, CMIN = 3.83); persuasion, (χ^2 (1) = 4.95, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .96, CMIN = 4.95); and conflict, (χ^2 (1) = 4.41, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .97, CMIN = 4.41). An investigation of the component paths of the models revealed that T1 global motivation, pleasure motivation, persuasion motivation, and conflict motivation positively predicted frequency of political talk at T2, which, in turn, positively predicted T3 PIE. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict on PIE was statistically significant and positive in direction.[11] Additionally, T1 global motivation, pleasure motivation, persuasion motivation, and conflict motivation also had a direct effect on PIE at T3. Each variable was found to positively predict PIE.

Further investigation of the component paths revealed that frequency of political talk at T2 also significantly predicted T3 political cynicism; however, this relationship was negative. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation, pleasure, persuasion, and conflict avoidance on T3 political cynicism through frequency of talk at T2 was statistically significant and negative in direction.[12] Corresponding with these findings, T1 global motivation, pleasure motivation, persuasion motivation, and conflict motivation also had a direct effect on political cynicism at T3. Each variable was found to negatively predict political cynicism.

Research Question 12: Political Talk Model

Combining all of the results found throughout this study, RQ12 sought to explore the overall fit of a cohesive political talk model. Using path analysis to describe the relationship between individuals' MTP, political media diet, network of discussants,

frequency of talk, political cynicism, PIE, and political involvement, a political talk model was constructed (Figure 23).

Cross-Lagged Path Models Between MTP and Political Media Diet Mediated by Frequency of Political Talk

The analysis included the T1 measures of the global motivation and political involvement variables, T2 measures of frequency of political talk, political media diet, and political discussants, and the T3 measures of PIE, political cynicism and voting behavior. This data driven model (i.e., derived from the data rather than theory) demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data ($\chi^2(35) = 127.33$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, CMIN = 3.64).

Tying the variables together, this model reinforced three pertinent findings. First, young citizens' frequency of political talk (how often they engage in talk and with whom they talk with) had a mediating role in the overall relationship between motivations and both democratic engagement attitudes and behaviors. Specifically, frequency of talk in combination with talking to close friends influenced the relationship between T1 global motivation and both T3 PIE and political cynicism. An investigation of the component paths of the model revealed that T1 global motivation positively predicted frequency of political talk at T2, which then positively predicted T2 frequency of talk with close friends, which, in turn, positively predicted PIE and negatively predicted political cynicism. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation on the PIE variable was statistically significant and positive in direction, and the indirect effect of global motivation on the Political cynicism variable was statistically significant and negative in direction.[13] Additionally, T1 global motivation also had a significant and positive direct

effect on the T3 PIE variable (standardized path coefficient for global motivation to PIE = .19). However, there was not a significant direct effect present between T1 global motivation and T3 political cynicism in the overall talk model. From this we can glean that global motivation does impact political cynicism but only through frequency of talk and talk with close friends.

The overall talk model also revealed that frequency of talk in conjunction with talking about politics with siblings and classmates had a positive relationship with PIE. An investigation of the component paths of the model revealed that T1 global motivation positively predicted frequency of political talk at T2, which then positively predicted T2 frequency of talk with siblings and classmates, which, in turn, positively predicted T3 PIE. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation on PIE was statistically significant and positive in direction.[14]

Further, the model brought to light a significant mediating relationship between global motivation and voting behavior through frequency of talk. The indirect paths depicted in the model illustrated that individuals' motivation to talk about politics at T1 positively predicted T2 frequency of political talk, which, in turn, positively predicted voting behavior. Therefore, the indirect effect of global motivation on the voting variable was statistically significant and positive in direction.[15] Although direct effects were not present in RQ5a, it is apparent form this model that young citizens' motivation to talk about politics affects their voting behavior through their frequency of political talk.

The second pertinent finding was that individuals' media diet also played an integral role in the political talk process. This model revealed that young citizens' political media diet mediated the relationship between global motivation and frequency

of talk. An investigation of the component paths of the model revealed that T1 global motivation positively predicted Political Media Diet at T2, which, in turn, positively predicted frequency of political talk at T2. Thus, the indirect effect of global motivation on frequency of political talk through political media diet was statistically significant and positive in direction.[16] Additionally, T1 global motivation also had a significant and positive direct effect on the T2 frequency of political talk variable (standardized path coefficient = .07). Although young citizens motivation predicted their frequency of political talk, the model indicated that this relationship is enhanced by use of media for political information.

Lastly, global motivation had both direct and indirect effects on democratic engagement attitudes and behaviors. As stated previously, from this model we can glean that global motivation has both a direct and indirect effect on political information efficacy, and an indirect effect on political cynicism and voting behavior. These findings reinforce the general purpose of this study: motivations for talking about politics matters. When taking into account many other factors of the presidential campaign season, individuals' motivations for talking about politics had a relationship with important democratic outcomes.

CHAPTER FOUR: NOTES

[1] At T2, significant differences in frequency of talk existed between parents and casual acquaintances ($t(428) = 19.76$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .48$), siblings ($t(354) = 11.00$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .26$), significant others ($t(378) = 8.90$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .17$), coworkers ($t(350) = 16.80$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .45$), professors ($t(426) = 21.15$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .51$), classmates ($t(426) = 16.27$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .38$), and community leaders ($t(426) = 29.64$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .67$).

[2] At T2, significant differences in frequency of talk existed between close friends and casual acquaintances ($t(428) = 23.42$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .56$), siblings ($t(354) = 9.41$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .20$), significant others ($t(377) = 9.22$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .18$), coworkers ($t(349) = 18.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .50$), professors ($t(426) = 22.50$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .54$), classmates ($t(427) = 18.59$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .45$), and community leaders ($t(426) = 32.22$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .71$).

[3] At T2, participants indicated talking about politics with their significant others more often than their casual acquaintances ($t(378) = 9.06$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .18$), coworkers ($t(321) = 8.47$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .18$), professors ($t(376) = 11.53$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .26$), classmates ($t(376) = 6.39$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .10$), and community leaders ($t(376) = 18.30$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .47$). Young citizens also reported talking to their siblings significantly more frequently than they talked to their casual acquaintances ($t(355) = 7.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$), coworkers ($t(303) = 7.27$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$), professors ($t(354) = 10.16$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .23$), classmates ($t(354) = 5.54$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$), and community leaders ($t(353) = 17.45$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .46$). Additionally, individuals reported talking about politics with their casual acquaintances significantly more often than they discussed politics with their professors ($t(427) = 4.42$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$) and community leaders ($t(427) = 15.23$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .35$). No significant difference existed between casual acquaintances and coworkers ($t(350) = 1.75$, $p = .08$, power = .08). Young citizens also reported talking about politics significantly more often with their classmates than their casual acquaintances ($t(427) = 3.18$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$), coworkers ($t(348) = 3.79$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$), professors ($t(425) = 8.36$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$), and community leaders ($t(425) = 17.27$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .41$) at the peak of the election season. Participants also indicated engaging in political talk with their coworkers more frequently than their community leaders ($t(348) = 11.73$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .28$) and professors ($t(348) = 2.65$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$) and between their professors and community leaders ($t(425) = 8.59$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$).

[4] At T3, significant differences existed for the frequency of talk with parents and the frequency of talk with casual acquaintances ($t(429) = 21.70$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .52$), siblings ($t(355) = 11.02$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .26$), significant others ($t(379) = 7.71$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$), coworkers ($t(353) = 16.49$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .44$), professors ($t(428) = 19.19$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .46$), classmates ($t(427) = 16.13$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .38$), and community leaders ($t(429) = 27.82$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .64$). However, there was not a significant difference present for the relationship with close friends ($t(429) = 1.54$, $p = 0.12$, power = .10). Young citizens also talked about politics with their close friends significantly more often than their casual

acquaintances ($t(429) = 23.38$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .56$), siblings ($t(355) = 7.92$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$), significant others ($t(379) = 7.04$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .12$), coworkers ($t(353) = 16.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .44$), professors ($t(428) = 19.45$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .47$), classmates ($t(427) = 16.30$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .38$), and community leaders ($t(429) = 29.26$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .67$). Additionally, participants reported talking about politics with their significant others significantly more often than their casual acquaintances ($t(379) = 12.18$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .28$), coworkers ($t(323) = 10.03$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .24$), professors ($t(378) = 11.86$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .27$), classmates ($t(378) = 7.48$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .13$), and community leaders ($t(379) = 19.95$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .51$), but not with siblings ($t(324) = 1.74$, $p = .08$, power = .10). Participants did report talking about politics with their siblings more frequently than their casual acquaintances ($t(355) = 7.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$), coworkers ($t(305) = 7.27$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .15$), professors ($t(354) = 9.64$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .21$), classmates ($t(353) = 5.94$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$), and community leaders ($t(355) = 17.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .46$). Participants reported talking to their casual acquaintances about politics more often than community leaders ($t(429) = 11.37$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .23$). Discussion with classmates occurred more frequently than with casual acquaintances ($t(427) = 5.93$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$), coworkers ($t(352) = 3.39$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$), professors ($t(426) = 7.06$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .10$), and community leaders ($t(427) = 16.47$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .39$). Participants indicated engaging in political talk with their coworkers only more frequently than their community leaders ($t(353) = 11.07$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .26$) and professors ($t(352) = 2.00$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$). Young citizens engaged in political discussions significantly more frequently with their professors than they do their community leaders after the campaign has ended ($t(428) = 9.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .17$).

[5] At T2, participants reported using Television Sources for their political information more often than their use of Internet Sources ($t(428) = 3.87$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .03$), Print Sources ($t(428) = 10.46$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .20$), and Social Sources ($t(428) = 8.15$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .13$). At T3 a significant difference was also present between in the frequency of using Television Sources and the frequency of using Internet Sources ($t(429) = 2.07$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .01$), Print Sources ($t(429) = 9.57$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .18$), and Social Sources ($t(429) = 8.44$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .14$) for obtaining political information.

[6] At T2, Internet Sources were used to gather political information significantly more often than Print Sources ($t(428) = 5.98$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$) and Social Sources ($t(428) = 4.48$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$). In T3, Internet Sources were used to gather political information significantly more often than they used Print Sources ($t(429) = 7.39$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .11$) or Social Sources ($t(429) = 6.50$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .09$).

[7] The T2 relationship between the use of Print Sources and Social Sources was not significant at T2 ($t(428) = -0.96$, $p = 0.34$, power = .30), nor was the relationship significant at T3 ($t(429) = 0.12$, $p = 0.90$, power = .90).

[8] Effect on probability from 1 unit change in X = (β)*(P)*(1-P); (1-P) = $1/\exp[\alpha + \beta1*X1 + \beta2*X2 \ldots]$.

[9] For global motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 31.02, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06. For global motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 34.47, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .08. For global motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 17.23, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For global motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 20.68, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06.

For pleasure motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 21.30, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .04. For pleasure motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 23.68, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For pleasure motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 11.83, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .03. For pleasure motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 15.37, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .04.

For persuasion motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 23.40, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For persuasion motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 24.00, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06. For persuasion motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 13.20, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .04. For persuasion motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 15.60, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .04.

For conflict motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 28.86, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06. For conflict motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 29.60, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .07. For conflict motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 16.29, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For conflict motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 19.24, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06.

[10] For the information acquisition motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 36.00, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06. For the information motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 31.50, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .08. For information acquisition motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 18.00, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For the information motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 21.00, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06.

For the understanding others' perspectives motivation on Television Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 26.66, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .07. For the information motivation on Internet Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 46.04, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .11. For information acquisition motivation on Print Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 26.66, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .08. For the information motivation on Social Sources through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 31.50, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06.

[11] For global motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 9.75, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06. For pleasure motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 22.75, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For persuasion motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 25.20, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .05. For conflict motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 31.08, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .06.

[12] For global motivation on political cynicism through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = -10.20, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = -.03. For pleasure motivation on political cynicism through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = -6.50, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = -.02. For persuasion motivation on political cynicism through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = -9.00, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = -.03. For conflict motivation on political cynicism through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = -8.88, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = -.03.

[13] For global motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk and talk with close friends: *z*-score product = 42.04, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .01. For global motivation on political cynicism through frequency of political talk and talk with close friends: *z*-score product = -33.64, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = -.01.

[14] For global motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk and talk with siblings: *z*-score product = 35.92, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .01. For global motivation on PIE through frequency of political talk and talk with classmates: *z*-score product = 41.99, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .01.

[15] For global motivation on voting behavior through frequency of political talk: *z*-score product = 6.51, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .01.

[16] For global motivation on frequency of political talk through political media diet: *z*-score product = 63.11, $p < .001$, standardized specific indirect effect = .13.

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

The primary purpose of this study was to understand how individuals' motivations for talking politics are related to a variety of facets associated with political talk behavior. The study also sought to understand young citizens' talk behavior across the course of a general-election campaign. While the breadth of this study — including 25 main variables measured at three different times — led to several statistically significant findings, the following discussion of key findings will focus on the most telling patterns and relationships that evolved from this study. The discussion of major findings is organized and presented around the central variables of analysis previously outlined. Second, the chapter will address limitations of this research project. Last, the discussion explores future directions for research examining motivations for talking politics.

Findings and Implications

Global Motivation for Talking Politics and Frequency of Political Talk

First, this study was interested in examining the relationship between individuals' global motivation for talking about politics and their frequency of political talk over the course of the campaign season. Overall, these findings revealed that frequency of political talk at the outset of the general-election campaign predicted one's global motivation for talking politics at latter stages of the campaign season. Here, we learn that those individuals who were more frequently talking politics early in the campaign cycle were more motivated to discuss politics as the campaign cycle progressed. While this

relationship may seem rather intuitive, the dynamic revealed here suggests that the act of engaging in political talk feeds one's motivation to seek out further conversations.

Specific Motivations for Talking Politics and Frequency of Political Talk

Second, this study also explored the relationship between specific motivations and one's frequency of talk. These results indicated that particular motivations on the MTP scale, in conjunction with one's frequency of political talk, work much like one's global motivation and frequency of political talk. Specifically, people's need or desire for information acquisition and understanding others' perspectives was predicted by the frequency in which they engaged in political talk with others. Thus, those who more frequently talked politics are more motivated to do so to gather political information from others and come to understand others' perspectives. This finding points to a rather utilitarian motive for one's political talk behavior (also note that these two motivations were the highest individual motivators across all measurement periods). Talk with others produces valuable resources for the citizen interlocutor, including political information and a greater understanding of others' views. In fact, McClurg (2006) also concluded that one of the benefits for engaging in political talk is the information that is acquired via the conversation. While, for many, talking about politics may not be the primary focus of their social interactions with others, a byproduct of these conversations — particularly when they do turn to political matters — may be that one becomes more motivated to engage in future political conversations to meet the needs of understanding others' perspectives and for information acquisition.

Next, the pleasure, persuasion, and conflict motivations can also be grouped together as similar in nature because each of these motivations predicted frequency of

one's political talk (the more highly one was motivated to talk politics for these reasons, the more often one engaged in political talk). Here, we might think of pleasure, persuasion, and conflict motivations as satisfying an internal personal desire. Unlike the utilitarian needs of information acquisition and understanding others' perspectives, these motivators encourage individuals to talk politics with others to fulfill a more personal need — pleasure in interacting with others, ego fulfillment through persuading others to agree with one's views, and sparring with others in political conversations marked by conflict — all motivations that have little to do with learning about others or learning about the political world. The basic tenants of Uses and Gratifications theory (Blumler & Katz, 1974) remind us that individuals will engage in conversations to meet their personal needs. Much like the motivations represented on the Interpersonal Communication Motives scale (Rubin, Perse, Barbato, 1988), results for the pleasure, persuasion, and conflict motives to talk politics with others reveal similar findings: individual's personal motivations to fulfill their need for pleasure, persuasion, and conflict through conversation drive their political interpersonal interactions.

Motivators across time. The longitudinal nature of this study allows us to see that what occurs at one time point in the campaign season affects behavior at a later time point; thus, these across-time results help us better understand the nature of the basic relationships between one's motivations and talk behavior. As Figure 2.4 illustrated, as one's pleasure motivation increased at T1, the frequency of one's political talk actually decreased at T2. These results suggest that people who were more motivated to talk politics for fun and enjoyment at the outset of the campaign reduced the amount of time that they engaged in political conversations at the height of the campaign season. Because

the pleasure motivation is representative of a desire to fulfill more personal needs, we might speculate that individuals high in this motivation may see politics as more of a game — an activity that allows for social banter that perhaps focuses on the entertaining or amusing aspects of politics.

Yet, at the height of the election cycle when the serious issue of voting occurs, when one must actually make a decision regarding their vote choice and commit to engaging in the electoral process, those individuals who were previously motivated to talk politics for fun and enjoyment now spend less time talking politics at the very apex of the election cycle. With the sober reality of the ballot box, and our country's future now to be decided, the "politics as fun and games" crowd finds much less to talk about. This interpretation seems further supported by the fact that as pleasure motivation at T2 increased, the frequency of one's political talk at T3 also began to increase again. While the "politics as game" voices were somewhat muted at the most crucial moment of the campaign — the time of voting — their political talk resumed once the campaign was over. As the post-election stage of the campaign requires much less action and typically features more postmortem commentary, the "game" features of a political campaign — who won and who lost — become paramount. Those who are more motivated to talk politics for pleasure more frequently engage in the conversation at this final stage of the campaign.

Also predicting the frequency of political talk was young citizens' motivation to engage in talk to persuade others. Figure 2.5 revealed that T1 persuasion was negatively related to frequency of political talk at T3 (the more motivated by persuasion an individual was at the outset of the campaign, the less frequently they talked politics with

others when the campaign season was over). Again, this finding is rather intuitive. We expect frequency of political talk to drop off after the campaign has dissipated, and this is especially true for those most motivated to talk for the purposes of persuading others. Indeed, after the results of the election have been decided there is less reason for political persuasion at this point in the campaign cycle. This T1 to T3 relationship provides a more holistic picture of what is happening over the course of the entire campaign. While individuals' personal need to persuade others is fulfilled through their political talk at an early stage in the campaign, after the campaign season is over there was a shift in the need to fulfill one's desire to persuade others.

Finally, moderate, but significant and positive, effects between T1 conflict motivation and T3 frequency of political talk continue to support the pattern previously discussed between the pleasure motivation and frequency of talk. The more people enjoy conflict in their political conversations, the more conversations they continued to engage in even after the campaign was over. This finding suggests that those individuals were still seeking political conflict afforded through their interpersonal interactions with others and, as such, were likely still hashing out the election results — perhaps bragging or bemoaning the outcome — even after all of the ballots were tallied.

Although the effects were modest (.09 to .16), for the majority of the relationships between specific motivators and frequency of political talk, the statistically significant results indicate that there is indeed a relationship between these two variables. Further, as Dewey (1927) suggested, democracy begins in conversation. Through this newly discovered link between motivations and frequency of talk, we can see that our motivations for talking about politics play an apparent role in our political

communication with others. Looking next at the role of political discussants in political talk, we will see how motivations also play a role in building our interpersonal communities, an integral component of Dewey's normative theory of democracy.

Political Discussants

This study also probed deeper into our understanding of political talk and the role of young citizens' political discussants. First, we explored whom citizens engage in political talk with at different phases of the political campaign. Young citizens engaged in political talk most frequently with their parents, followed by close friends, significant others, siblings, classmates, coworkers, casual acquaintances, professors, and least often with community leaders at each phase of the campaign season. These findings reveal two important points. First, as Marsden (1987) suggested, some people are more significant in our lives than others, and our interpersonal social networks are most often composed of immediate family and friends. Similarly, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found that political topics are discussed most often with those in our closest of social networks — with those who agree with us — and also whose views and perspectives more closely match our own. The results of this study support this notion (see Table 4).

At first blush, one might assume that college students would be talking to their parents less often than other discussants, as these young citizens have now "left the nest" and are off developing their own identity (and this is particularly the case for a large residential college campus); however, this study contradicts this notion as it found that young citizens engaged in political talk with their parents significantly more often than with other discussants. McDevitt and Kiousis (2007) found that among high school and junior high students the discussion of politics in school curriculum increased the amount

of political discussion at home between children and parents. Interestingly, the current study suggests that perhaps this parent-child political discussion does not stop once teenagers leave home, but continues into young adulthood. Young citizens, it appears, are actually in close contact with their parents, continuing their political conversations throughout the campaign season. In fact, the results of this study suggest young citizens may be more active in developing their political identity and views and not the passive receptors of political identity formation that political socialization scholars once thought (Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986). The frequent parent-young citizens' political talk identified in this study may well extend the familial political interaction dynamic McDevitt (2005) explained, "whereby initiating discussion, adolescents can generate information from parents as a bases for comparison, contrast, reflection, and debate" (p. 67). It seems that conversation between parents and their college-aged children serves as a means by which the family continues to function as an important arena for political communication.

Second, by only examining a small component of one's social network (our interactions with family members and close friends), past research has failed to thoroughly examine the multiple relationships in which political talk might occur, leaving our conclusions about interpersonal political talk incomplete. The good news for political conversation is that it not only occurs with those in our private circles. Young citizens are consistently talking about politics with a variety of people in their social sphere, beyond their family and friends. The list of discussants analyzed in this study showed that although there was a consistent rank order in frequency of talk throughout the entire campaign cycle, even those discussants at the bottom of the list were still frequent

contributors to our political conversations. This is an important finding as previous research (e.g., McKinney et al., 2005) has suggested that public deliberation of political and social affairs may suffer because, for most people, the range of interactants with whom we are willing to engage is a rather narrow group.

An interesting finding regarding young citizens' political discussants is that professors are ranked consistently at the bottom of the list. This may seem counterintuitive as one might believe that educators are the very people with whom these young citizens — all college students — would be engaging in philosophical political conversations (especially in the midst of an historic election campaign). Yet, because interaction with one's professors might most often occur in the classroom (the public domain), it is plausible that respondents ranked professors less frequently as political discussants because the communication that occurred was viewed less as one-on-one interpersonal interaction and more like one-to-many instruction. Furthermore, it is often the case that many view those within academia as having a liberal political bias. Thus, students may engage with professors less often because of this presumed bias; and professors may also limit their political discussions with students because they are concerned that students may perceive their liberal professors are trying to unduly influence students' political views. In the end, though not with the same frequency as other discussants, young citizens still engaged in a modest level of political talk with their professors.

Overall, the findings relating to young citizens' political discussants are important to political communication research as the results establish a more comprehensive picture of young citizens' political discussants and provides a clearer understanding of the

specific interactants with whom one engages in political talk. The results also lead us to a very hopeful picture of participatory democracy, one where young citizens are active in constructing their own political identity. The relationship between young citizens and their parents is especially insightful as it challenges previous political socialization research and further emphasizes the importance of interpersonal communication about politics within the family unit, even among young adults and their parents.

Global Motivation and Political Discussants Across Time

A main goal of this study was to question Dewey's normative democratic theory that posits interpersonal communication as the soul of democracy. To that end, this study explored the relationship between individuals' motivations for engaging in political talk and their political discussant network. On a global level, we discovered that the discussants citizens chose to engage in political talk with influenced their future motivation to engage in political talk. More specifically, the findings indicated that talking to specific discussants (i.e., close friends, casual acquaintances, parents, and classmates) early on in the campaign cycle made people feel generally more motivated to talk about politics at the height of the campaign season. This early and frequent interaction with a range of discussants seems to fuel one's desire to talk politics as the campaign heats up. These early political discussions may provide one with an internal catalyst to keep the conversations going as the campaign progresses.

Furthermore, the more motivated individuals were to talk about politics at the height of the campaign, the more frequently they discussed politics with their significant others when the campaign season was complete. Two issues seem salient in this observation. First, as young citizens were talking to a wider range of discussants during

the earlier part of the campaign season, it is possible that by the time the long campaign season had ended, participants' drive or motivations to continue talking politics extended only to those closest to them, their significant others. It is also plausible that conversations between young citizens and their significant others may be uniquely different than their political talk with other discussants. For example, young citizens may have deeper, more philosophical political conversations with their significant others, as opposed to the more surface level conversations that might occur with the wider range of individuals while the campaign season is in full swing. Yet, once the seemingly non-stop media blitz of the long campaign ends following the election, our continuing political conversations occur largely with those closest to us.

Specific Motivations and Political Discussants Across Time

When examining the role of specific motivations with specific political discussants this study found that, much like with global motivation, frequency of talk early on in the campaign season with close friends, casual acquaintances, classmates, and coworkers leads individuals to be more motivated to engage in political talk for information acquisition and to understand others' perspectives at the height of the campaign. This may be for three reasons. First, as noted previously, these motivations might be best understood for their utilitarian qualities; thus, in keeping with the utilitarian aspects of political talk, it is possible that individuals were motivated to gain information from their political conversations at the height of the campaign to help prepare them for their voting decision. Second, these specific discussants are most likely the people that are frequent in one's day-to-day environment; therefore, young citizens may be especially motivated to understand the perspectives of those with whom they are most commonly

around, and particularly at the height of a hard-fought election, so one could interact with various acquaintances with greater ease. A third explanation is that these various discussants offered alternative points of view, allowing young citizens to gather contrasting information so that one might sort out their own political opinions and beliefs when it mattered most, right before Election Day.

Unlike global motivation and the specific motivators of information acquisition and the understanding others' perspectives, the pleasure motivation for political talk predicted one's frequency of talk with specific discussants. As it is possible for the various motivations to yield different results, the pleasure motivation was found to have a positive relationship with some discussants and a negative relationship with others. First, the pleasure motivation at T1 had a relatively strong negative relationship with significant others, community leaders, and siblings at T3. In other words, the more young citizens' were motivated to engage in political talk for enjoyment at the outset of the election, the less often they discussed politics with their significant others, community leaders, and siblings when the campaign season was complete. This negative relationship may be due to the fact that these particular discussants were less likely to view the political process as a game or an activity from which to derive enjoyment or fun, particularly after the election had ended. A positive relationship was found between the pleasure motivation at T2 and classmates and casual acquaintances at T3. Thus, the more motivated individuals were to engage in political talk for enjoyment at the height of the campaign, the more often they talked politics with their classmates and casual acquaintances when the campaign season ended. This finding suggests that conversations with casual acquaintances and classmates are likely to be more casual in nature, with discussion of

politics perhaps at a more surface level marked by more entertaining conversation about the candidates and campaign events especially after the election has taken place.

Lastly, the conflict motivation displayed a unique relationship with political discussants. For frequency of talk with close friends, casual acquaintances, coworkers, professors, and classmates, the conflict motivation was a positive predictor. Thus, the more individuals were motivated by the potential for conflict in their political conversations, the more they engaged in political talk with this wide range of discussants at the height of the campaign season. This finding suggests that those who are more highly motivated to talk politics for the conflict that might occur, these individuals engage in conversations with a wide circle of interactants and find the very height of the campaign a prime time for their potentially conflictual conversations. Conflict seekers' motivations to talk politics held true even after the election was over, but only for both close friends and casual acquaintances; for coworkers, professors, and classmates this relationship did not exist. It appears, therefore, that while the conflict seeker still engaged in political conversations even after the election had been decided, they engaged in such conversations with fewer targets than they had previously engaged at the height of the campaign.

In summary, the political discussants whom young citizens chose to engage in political talk with predicted their overall motivation for talking politics. Additionally, it appears that for particular motivations, such as information acquisition and understanding others' perspectives, this is also true. Conversely, the pleasure, persuasion, and conflict motivations were found to predict talk with specific discussants. Further, we can also

glean from these results that political talk with particular discussants does not stop even after the election takes place.

Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk

Another objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between media use and political talk. In the extant literature, researchers have linked newspaper and television use to political talk (Kim et al., 1999; Koch 1994; Pan et al., 2006; Wyatt et al., 2000b). Specifically, this link has shown that those who watch or read more political media are said to also engage in more political talk. The current study confirms these findings. Individuals' use of media for political information at the outset of the campaign season predicted their frequency of talk at the height of the campaign. Further, individuals' greater political media use at the height of the campaign also had a significant and moderate relationship with greater frequency of talk once the campaign season was over. With these findings, we can conclude that the more individuals use media sources to obtain political information the more often they engage in political talk. Young citizens' media use seems to equip them with the information they need to generate their political talk with others. This finding speaks to Schudson's (1997) rejection of political talk as the foundation of democracy, whereby he points to public affairs media as the form of political communication that grounds our political understanding and behaviors (including our interpersonal interactions regarding social and political matters). The findings of this study point to the interrelationship between citizen talk and political media use.

Political Media Diet Sources

To gain a clearer picture of citizens' use of specific media for political information during the campaign season, four subscales comprising one's political media diet were created and analyzed in the current study. The analysis of various forms of media used at each campaign phase revealed interesting and salient results. For young citizens, Television Sources were used to obtain political information most frequently at all three time points. The use of the Internet for political information was consistently ranked second. Although Print Sources (including various types of print news and magazines) and Social Sources (including *YouTube*, cell phones, and social networking sites) were used for political information significantly less frequently than both television and Internet sources, Print and Social Sources were not ranked significantly different from each other. So, even though the 2008 election was touted for featuring new technologies to reach the public, especially young voters, the young citizens who were part of this study did not report utilizing these new technologies for their political information any more frequently than more traditional communication sources. Notwithstanding Moy and Gastil's (2006) call for more research on the role of new technologies in the political communication process, this project found young citizens continued to use Television Sources most frequently, and even the most traditional media sources available (i.e., Print Sources) were used by young citizens just as frequently as the newest of the nontraditional media sources (those defined as Social Sources).

This finding is important for two reasons. First, while studies show that new communication technologies are popular with young citizens, these sources may not be as popular (among this age group) when it comes to utilizing them for one's political

information. Second, with the difficulties that the journalism industry is currently facing as it struggles to maintain financial viability of its traditional print sources, it may be surprising to learn that this study found print newspapers to be used by young citizens more often than various digital sources (such as social networking sites) as their preferred source for political information. This finding also suggests, contrary to some popular depictions of young citizens as ill-informed slackards, that these citizens maintain an interest in seeking out "hard" news sources as frequently as nontraditional sources for their political information. Furthermore, it is important to remember that participants in this study were located on a college campus with a campus readership program that encouraged young citizens to read newspapers by distributing free copies across campus. Therefore, it is not far fetched to believe that when newspapers are both convenient — and perhaps free — young citizens will utilize this source for their political information.

Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk with Specific Discussants

Not only did this study reinforce the finding that media use predicts frequency of political talk, but the current study also reveals that one's overall media use is a predictor of who one is most likely to engage in political talk. Specifically, individuals' political media diet was found to be a predictor of frequency of talk among their family unit. In fact, the more often young citizens utilized media sources for political information at the outset of the campaign season, the more often they discussed politics with their parents and siblings at the height of the campaign. This finding corresponds with past research by McDevitt and Chaffee (2000) who found that as political news consumption increased in the home, discussion among family members also increased. Although the current study collapsed multiple forms of political media use into one variable to examine its

relationship with various discussants, the results were still consistent with McDevitt and Chaffee's conclusion.

Moreover, this study also revealed that the relationship between media use for political information and specific discussants extended beyond family members. In particular, one's overall political media diet at T1 was a positive predictor of frequency of political talk with significant others, casual acquaintances, and coworkers at T2. Therefore, the more young citizens utilized media sources for their political information at the outset of the campaign season, the more often they engaged in political talk with these discussants at the height of the campaign.

Furthermore, the more young citizens utilized media sources for their political information at the beginning of the campaign season, the more often they engaged in political talk with professors, classmates, and community leaders once the campaign season was complete. This result suggests that more media use early in the campaign cycle equips one with information that can be used for political conversations throughout the full campaign. Additionally, we might surmise that specific discussants — one's professors, fellow classmates, and community leaders — are the very type of interactants the young citizens would seek to impress with their political knowledge (again, accumulated from heavy political media use that began early in the campaign).

Political Media Diet and Frequency of Political Talk with Specific Discussants Across Time

Results continue to support the finding that political talk does not dissipate once the election is over, as the overall political media diet measure at T2 predicted frequency of political talk at T3. Thus, the more young citizens turned to the media for their

political information at the height of the election cycle, the more often they engaged in political talk with casual acquaintances, coworkers, professors, classmates, and community leaders when the election was complete. These relationships indicate that political talk continues even after young citizens have had the opportunity to cast their ballots; and also that our overall media use influences with whom we discuss politics.

Global Motivation for Talking Politics and Political Media Diet

Because individuals' motivation for talking politics is a new area of research, it was important to explore its relationship with media use. These exploratory analyses revealed that the more individuals were motivated to engage in political talk, the more often they utilized Print and Social Sources for their political information. However, there was no significant relationship between young citizens' global motivation for talking politics and their use of Television or Internet Sources for political information. Past research has suggested a rather linear model for political conversation, whereby media messages serve as the impetus for political talk (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). The results of the current study, however, suggest that this may not be the best conceptualization of political talk behavior as global motivation actually served as the impetus for one's media use. This result, in combination with previous findings reporting that political talk preceded global motivation, points to the conclusion that motivation may in fact serve as an intervening variable in the relationship between frequency of political talk and political media use.

Results such as these lead us to two conclusions. First, we need further exploration of the role of political media use in the political talk process. Secondly, it is clear that motivations to talk politics play an important role in where and how people

choose to retrieve their information to be used in their political conversation. Specifically, the more motivated people were to discuss politics with others, the more they gravitated towards Print and Social Sources for their political information. Therefore, although all young citizens, when grouped together, utilized these media resources less than other sources for their political information, the most highly motivated individuals were drawn to Print and Social Sources for their information resources to be used in their political conversations. The attraction to Social Sources may be such informational "nuggets" as the latest clip on *YouTube* mocking Sarah Palin or a friend's *Facebook* posting revealing one's political affiliation and/or candidate support. While these items may not provide in depth sources for political information, they may well serve as a way to fulfill one's personal needs associated with the pleasure and persuasion components of the global motivation, as excellent sources of information for engaging in more casual political conversations. The more in depth "hard" news sources, such as those in the Print Sources category, may likely fulfill the utilitarian desires associated with global motivation (such as information acquisition and understanding others' perspectives). Here, young citizens can find political information that allows for more sustained political discussion.

Specific Motivations for Talking Politics and Political Media Diet

Television and Internet Sources. The analyses of the specific motivations and political media diet sources over the course of the campaign season were not as straightforward as the relationships between global motivation and the various political media diet sources. However, we can draw conclusions about the general relationships between each motivator and the specific media source variable. First, young citizens' use of Television and Internet Sources for political information early in the campaign cycle

predicted their motivation to engage in political talk for information acquisition at the height of the campaign season. In other words, the more individuals utilized Television and Internet Sources for their political information at the outset of the campaign season, the more they were motivated to engage in political talk for information acquisition at the height of the campaign. This need for greater information acquisition talk likely stemmed from a desire to confirm what one had learned from news sources, to validate one's already established opinions by agreement from interactions with trusted individuals, or simply to increase one's general political knowledge by learning from others. Thus, for young citizens, utilizing these specific political information sources increased a desire to obtain political information through conversations with others.

Conversely, those who were highly motivated to engage in political conversation for conflict at the outset of the campaign cycle more frequently relied on Internet Sources for their political information once the campaign season had dissipated. Here, I propose that Internet Sources were utilized for political information at this point in the campaign as this resource offers a multitude of perspectives and competing facts, from political blogs to viral videos, providing fodder for all manner of political arguments. Thus, those young citizens' seeking conflict through their political conversations could tap into this rich resource for varied information to be used as a catalyst for conflict in one's political conversations.

Print Sources. Those who more often used Print Sources for their political information at the outset of the campaign were more motivated to engage in political talk for conflict at the height of the campaign season. Here, we might think of those young citizens that more frequently utilize "hard" news for their political information, such as

the sources identified in the Print Source category, as individuals who are more closely following the general-election campaign (known to some perhaps as "political junkies"). These individuals may be attracted to those sources of information that provide them with the "hard facts" to be employed in their argumentative conversations, especially as voting nears.

Social Sources. Lastly, the relationships between Social Sources and the specific motivation variables yielded interesting results. First, the more young citizens utilized Social Sources for their political information at the outset of the campaign, the less often they were motivated to engage in political talk for conflict or to understand others' perspectives once the campaign season was over. From these results I argue that Social Sources perhaps serve as a resource for the sharing of political entertainment rather than more serious political information. The more often young citizens are accessing the latest clip on *YouTube* or watching their friends post on *Facebook*, the less they are motivated to engage in political talk for conflict and to understand others' political views. For those accessing Social Sources more often for their understanding of the political world, politics may be less serious. Thus, we might conclude that the array of informational resources in the Social Sources variable serve more to fulfill one's entertainment needs and motives rather than one's more utilitarian need for information. Indeed, the more motivated individuals were to talk politics for information acquisition, the less often they used Social Sources for their information once the campaign season had dissipated. These results also correspond with previous findings. People use resources such as *YouTube* and *Facebook* more for political entertainment, but not for political information acquisition.

Together, these findings explain why as one's motivation for information increases young citizens' use of Social Sources for gathering political information decreases.

To summarize, individuals' overall motivation to talk politics predicted their use of Print and Social Sources, leaving us to further question the role of specific motivations in the relationship between frequency of political talk and specific political media use. These exploratory analyses revealed that specific motivators predict use of various media resources, but also that political media diet variables precede particular motivators. We can also glean from these analyses that even after the political campaign season is complete, people are still seeking political information from various media sources. Further, in some instances, one's specific motivations for talking politics relate to use of particular media sources.

Motivations for Talking Politics and Democratic Variables

This study also uncovered key links between one's motivations for talking politics and democratic behaviors and engagement attitudes. These findings provide us with important clues for understanding the role of political talk in the electoral process.

Voting behavior. First, to gain a deeper understanding of how political talk may influence the casting of one's ballot on Election Day, this study examined the relationship between MTP and voting behavior. Past research has found relationships between frequency of political talk and voting behavior (Lee, 2005), suggesting the more one talks politics with others the more likely one is to vote. Past research also points to a significant relationship between political discussants and voting (McDevitt & Kiousis, 2004), concluding that child-parent conversations about politics lead directly to the likelihood of parents casting a ballot. However, this study revealed that a direct

relationship between one's overall motivation to talk politics and reported voting was not significant after controlling for individuals' intention to vote. This research further indicated that although MTP is related to frequency of talk, and in some cases precedes it, motivation to talk about politics at T1 and T2 was not a strong enough predictor, by itself, to predict reported voting behavior at T3.

However, knowing that past research reveals that a relationship exists between frequency of one's political talk and voting suggests that there may be more to the relationship between MTP and voting. In fact, the current study found particular motivators for talking politics to be predictors of frequency of talk. This finding, in conjunction with past research linking frequency of political talk to reported voting behavior, leads us to speculate that the relationship between MTP and reported voting behavior may exist with an intervening variable (frequency of political talk).

Political campaign involvement. Second, this study explored the relationship between one's overall campaign involvement and motivations for talking politics. As past research has found, frequency of talk and other forms of campaign involvement are positively correlated (Kim et al., 1999; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2000; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2004; Pan et al., 2006), thus, we start with the assumption that political talk plays an integral role in citizens' democratic engagement behaviors. Therefore, in this study it was important to better understand how individuals' motivations to talk politics might be related to one's level of campaign involvement. The longitudinal nature of the study's design revealed that motivations to talk politics did not predict individuals' political campaign involvement; but rather, young citizens' overall involvement in the ongoing political campaign predicted how motivated they were to talk about politics with others.

Here, it appears that being involved in political campaign activities provides the catalyst that motivates one to talk politics. This suggests that the more involved one is in political activities, the more likely one will be to engage others — through talk — about one's campaign involvement. What is most interesting about these results is that the involvement at the outset of the campaign consistently predicted each specific MTP variable at the height of the campaign. Indeed, we can conclude that involvement is a universal predictor of motivations to talk politics. Thus, if political talk truly is the soul of democracy, then getting people involved in campaign activities, such as attending political rallies, or volunteering for a candidate, early on is a robust way to generate greater motivation to talk politics among citizens.

Political cynicism. This study also explored the relationship between the democratic engagement attitude of political cynicism and individual's motivation for talking about politics. Past research has shown political cynicism to be a relevant democratic attitude for analysis. Specifically, the relationship between political cynicism and voting suggests that indeed this attitude affects individuals' voting behavior (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2000). In particular, the less cynical individuals are, the more likely they are to report having voted in elections. To build on past research, this study explored the relationship between one's motivations to talk politics and one's political cynicism as a way to further our understanding of the role of political talk in the election process.

The results revealed that, overall, motivation did not have a significant relationship with cynicism. Although one might expect an increase in motivation to lead to a decrease in one's political cynicism, it is possible that this non-significant finding

can be explained by MTP's subscales. Because the subscales are combined to create a global measure, different motivations may actually be working against each other in relationship to political cynicism. It is also possible that there is not a direct effect between global motivation and political cynicism, but that there may be an indirect effect mediated by other variables such as frequency of political talk, political discussants, or political knowledge.

However, when looking at specific motivations for talking politics a moderate effect emerged. The more motivated young citizens were to talk politics at the height of the campaign, the less cynical about politics one was once the campaign was over. This pattern was true for the conflict, pleasure, persuasion, and understanding others' perspectives motivations. Thus, we find that if individuals are motivated to talk about politics for four of the five specific talk motivators just before the election occurs, they will in turn be less cynical regarding politics when the campaign season is over. Achieving less political cynicism is a good thing for democracy, as those citizens with lower political cynicism are more likely to engage in the democratic process. It is possible that exposure to multiple perspectives, via one's political talk, helps young citizens feel less cynical about government. It is also possible that those who are more motivated to talk politics with others just before an election may be those individuals who anticipate an election outcome favoring the candidate they support; and following such an outcome — after the election — they are less cynical about politics.

This study also explored the relationship between political cynicism and political discussants. This examination allowed us to uncover possible relationships between those with whom we most frequently engage in political discussion and one's level of political

cynicism. Until now, there has not been any research on the relationship between political discussants and cynicism. Results of this analysis revealed that most of the discussants did not affect ones' level of political cynicism, with only one exception. Thus, we conclude that the people with whom we talk politics do not affect our level of political cynicism. The results did show that the more individuals talk to their close friends at the height of the election the less cynical they were when the election was over. Therefore, interaction with our close friends seems to reduce our feelings of political cynicism. We might assume that young citizens' close friends are also those individuals with whom they share similar views. As one's views are validated and reinforced, through political conversations with those closest to us, our political cynicism decreases.

Political information efficacy. The last democratic engagement variable examined in this study was political information efficacy. The study explored its relationship with motivations to talk politics as well as with political discussants to determine how motivations and our talk may impact how confident we are with the political information we posses. This study revealed that motivation for information acquisition through political conversation at T1 predicted political information efficacy at T3. Therefore, the more motivated young citizens were to engage in political talk for information acquisition at the beginning of the campaign season, the more confident in their political knowledge they were once the campaign season was complete. In fact, the strongest effect was between information acquisition and PIE (.16).

This finding is in line with the theoretical underpinnings of PIE, which suggests that one's communicative behavior can increase the confidence one has in his/her political knowledge, and bolster feelings that one possesses sufficient knowledge to

effectively engage in the political process. As previously noted, there is a relationship between the information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk (as individuals' frequency of political talk increases, their motivation to engage in political talk for information acquisition also increases); thus, as these young citizens are talking more about politics, and presumably engaging in talk with others that seeks to acquire political knowledge to satisfy their need for information, they too are building their political information efficacy that culminates in its highest level at the conclusion of the campaign.

Next, the relationship between conflict motivation and PIE also falls in line with what we know about PIE. The more motivated young citizens were to engage in political talk for conflict at the outset of the campaign season, the more confident they were in the political knowledge they possessed once the campaign cycle had ended. Specifically, motivation to engage in political talk for conflict implies that individuals are engaging in talk with others to fulfill their desire for argument in political conversations. So, how does this particular motivator connect to PIE? First, the conflictual nature of these conversations should provide one exposure to alternative views, generating political knowledge that increases one's confidence in the information they posses. Second, engaging in conversations marked by conflict may well reinforce individuals' beliefs and their personal view, which, in turn, makes them feel more confident in their political knowledge.

Conversely, the results revealed that PIE predicted both the motivation for pleasure and persuasion. Specifically, the more political information efficacy participants had at the beginning of the campaign season, the more motivated they were to engage in

political talk for pleasure at the height of the campaign. Also, the more political information efficacy participants possessed at the height of the campaign, the more motivated they were to engage in political talk to persuade others once the campaign season had dissipated. Again, if we think about the construct of PIE and its foundation, as a measurement that points to an individual's confidence in their own political knowledge, these relationships make sense. The more confident and secure one is in his or her political knowledge, it is plausible that one would be motivated to talk politics with others by the pleasure he/she gained from such conversations. Indeed, political talk is exciting and fun when individuals think they know what they are talking about. Also, if one is more confident in their political knowledge it is likely that he/she will feel they have an appropriate foundation of information from which to persuade others. Thus, as PIE increases, one's motivation to talk politics for persuasion also increases.

Not only is it important to gain a deeper understanding of how motivations impact political attitudes, but it is also imperative that we look at how our "community" — our group of discussants — affects our democratic attitudes. Here, we are testing whether or not those with whom we most frequently talk politics might influence PIE. As already noted, frequent political talk with close friends decreases our level of political cynicism, but do our interpersonal relationships have an effect on our political information efficacy? The answer is yes: with whom we most frequently engage in political talk affects our level of confidence in our political knowledge. However, our feelings of confidence in our political knowledge also affect whom we have political conversations with. Specifically, the main conclusions for this analysis suggest that the more young citizens engaged in political talk with their close friends, casual acquaintances, siblings,

and classmates at the outset of the campaign (T1), the more confident they were in their political knowledge at the height of the campaign (T2). Also, PIE at T1 was found to be a predictor of talk with close friends, parents, siblings, coworkers and professors at T2.

One interpretation of these results is that talk with close friends, casual acquaintances and siblings make individuals more confident in the knowledge they posses. This may be because this group of discussants represents our closest relationships; and, as such, we are more trusting of the information we receive in our conversations with these individuals. This trust may well translate into increased confidence in the knowledge we have gained from these interactions with our close confidants. For siblings and close fiends, this relationship is reciprocal. Thus, individuals become more confident in their political knowledge through conversations with these discussants and individuals also share in political conversations with these discussants because they are more confident in the political knowledge they posses.

Ones' level of confidence is also a predictor of political talk with coworkers and professors. Again, this is a rather intuitive finding, and yet again supports the presuppositions of the PIE construct. The more confident you feel in your political knowledge the more apt you will be to put your political "self" on the line through conversations with peers and even authority figures such as professors. The political talk with these individuals serves as an opportunity to perhaps test — or show off — your knowledge with others, allowing one to appear "smart" in front of people who may be evaluating your political intelligence. It is quite plausible to think that in interactions with certain individuals, such as coworkers and professors, you would need to feel confident in your knowledge before you are willing to engage these individuals in conversation.

Motivations and Talk Throughout the Campaign Season

Drawing on Dewey's (1927) claim that democracy stands on citizen-to-citizen communication, the last two components of this study worked to tie all of the preceding variables together to determine if empirical evidence might, in fact, support Dewey's grandiose idea of citizen's communication serving as the building blocks of a democratic system.

First, in an attempt to bring all of the pieces together, the study inquired if talk mediated the relationships between the MTP variables and political cynicism, political information efficacy, political media diet and political discussants. It was important to examine the role of talk as a mediator between MTP and the other variables because it enables us to see an otherwise overlooked link between these seemingly disparate variables. The results revealed frequency of one's political talk does indeed mediate the relationship between motivation and media use as well as the relationship between MTP and PIE and political cynicism. What we can glean from these findings is that young citizens' motivations to talk politics at the outset of the campaign have an effect on democratic outcomes and political media use once the election is over, a relationship mediated by frequency of talk at the height of the campaign. Ultimately, these results provide empirical evidence for Dewey's normative theory of democracy: Citizen-to-citizen communication does function as the heart of democracy. Further, by exploring motivations and talk in conjunction with democratic behaviors and attitudes, these results have given us a more comprehensive picture of how political talk functions throughout the campaign season as well as in the democratic process.

Next, these results were taken one step further and were used to create a political talk model (see Figure 23). Here, the role of frequency of political talk as a mediator between global motivation and the other variables is highlighted. It also becomes apparent that individual's political media diet is a significant mediator between global motivation and frequency of talk with moderate indirect effects (.13). From this we can conclude that individuals' political media use enhances the relationship between motivation to talk politics and their frequency of talking politics. When incorporating the mediation models into the overall talk model the indirect effect of frequency of talk is strengthened.

The exploratory talk model begins to paint a picture of what the political talk process may look like over the course of the campaign season. With motivation as the impetus for frequency of one's political talk, and frequency of talk with particular political discussants being the center of the model, Dewey's rather simplistic and linear model of communication building community which allows the achievement of a democratic system can actually be found in our model of political talk in the 21st century. Even though the political talk model confirms Dewey's assertions that communication serves as the heart of democracy, it also brings to light other key variables that also contribute to democratic and electoral processes. Specially, one's campaign involvement and media consumption play an integral role in how much we talk politics with others, which, in turn, affects our political engagement attitudes and behaviors. As such, these variables should not go unnoticed for their contribution. The wild web of political communication we weave continues to be as complex as ever, indicating many avenues for discovery left to be explored.

Taking on the challenge set forth by Schudson (1997) and Schroll (1999), to better understand the role of citizen-to-citizen communication in the democratic process, this project has extended existing research and broadened our understanding of "ordinary" citizens' political conversations. Through these findings, we have a much deeper understanding of how citizens' political talk functions in our electoral and democratic processes, and this knowledge allows us to confirm Dewey's philosophical musings that conversation really is the "soul of democracy."

Limitations

Like all studies, this study also has its limitations. The first, and probably the largest limitation, was that every possible relationship between the many variables was not tested. Because the scope of this study was so large, some relationships were left unexplored for future analyses. For example, MTP was not tested as a mediator, nor were the relationships between the democratic variables explored. These relationships may prove useful in further development of an overall political talk model; however, because the model presented was exploratory in nature, these possible relationships leave room for future research.

A second limitation to consider is related to the study's instrumentation and measurement. First, future studies should include a control for participants that may not have siblings, coworkers, or significant others. This study asked how often individuals engaged in political talk with each of these discussants, but failed to account for participants who may have had little or no access to these particular discussants. Thus, for this study, any of these discussants that were classified as "never" at all three time points were deleted from the analysis. This measurement limitation could be addressed better in

future research by simply asking participants to indicate whether the people on the list of discussants are people in their lives.

A third shortcoming of this study was that the longitudinal component could have benefited from longer spacing between data collection points. The longitudinal nature of this study was a good step in supplying much needed research in political campaign research. However, adding longer time periods between data collection, especially between T1 and T2 as well as between T2 and T3, may lead to different results.

Lastly, a fourth limitation of this study was in the creation of the political media diet subscales. Because of the nature of the mass media in our society, there is a constant evolution in and blending of media used by citizens. Thus, empirically, specific media sources used in this study did not combine to make discrete factors. However, as an alternative, the media subscales composed for this analysis were representative of theoretically similar media sources. Because the political media diet subscales produced acceptable reliabilities as well as consistency across time, they were considered reliable for use in the analysis.

Future Directions

Although this study examined a plethora of relationships surrounding political talk, as the limitations section mentioned, there is still much more to uncover relating to citizens' political talk behaviors. First, future research should delve deeper into the media's role in relationship to one's political talk. Specifically, we should examine media diet as a mediator between motivations and the democratic engagement variables. Also, it may be useful to incorporate political knowledge as a variable of interest, as much of the current political talk research focuses on this important construct.

Next, the concept of motivation is woven throughout psychological research. Here it is suggested that a large number of personality characteristics are related to motivation (Ames, 1992; Atkinson, 1964; Deci & Ryan, 1985). This research asserts that individuals are motivated towards personal goals (or fulfilling their needs) based on their personality traits (McClelland, 1975). Combining political communication research with this research in psychology may provide a unique opportunity when examining MTP. For example, individuals that are classified as "high achievers" may score higher on the information acquisition motivation measure because they desire to gather possible information to inform their political conversations and decision-making. Specifically, the relationships between motivators and the other variables should begin to be explored by degree of motivation as well as in conjunction with individuals' personality characteristics. It is plausible to think that how high or low an individual is on a given motivation, combined with their psychological predispositions, could affect the relationship between MTP and the other variables related to the political talk process.

Further, incorporating conversation dyads into the analysis could yield very revealing results. One of the problems with current research, and not addressed by this study, is that very little talk research examines actual talk. Taking time to collect and analyze political dialogue while also incorporating motivation to talk will provide a fuller understanding of the political talk process.

Lastly, including a more diverse population in future research will allow for broader causal claims. Determining if the effects found in this study are consistent among various ages and racial categories would add more generalizability to the results.

Conclusion

This chapter explained how the empirical evidence generated by this study supported the normative democratic theory as outlined by Dewey (1927). We now know some of what motivates people to engage in political talk, as well as some elements that contributed to changes in young citizens' political talk behavior throughout the course of the campaign season. Mutz (2006) encouraged researchers to "break down the various components of [political talk] to understand its effects" (p. 6). This study has done just that. Through this research we have been able to better understand the communicative underpinnings of democracy, expound upon normative democratic theory, illuminate the role of the interpersonal dimensions of citizen-to-citizen political engagement, and amplify our understanding of how political talk functions in the democratic process. Most importantly, through this empirical analysis, we were able to confirm two very important conclusions. First, political talk, and the motivations to talk politics, contributes to our democratic process. Second, Dewey (1927) was absolutely correct, citizen-to-citizen engagement is the foundation of democracy.

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Table 1
Comparison of Participants' Scores for Those Completing T1 Data Collection with Those Completing T1, T2, and T3 Data Collection

Variable	Lost after T1	Retained across T1, T2, and T3	*t*	χ^2
Frequency of Talk	3.17	2.81	0.97	--
Motivation for Talking Politics (MTP)				
Global motivation	3.04	3.00	-0.33	--
Information acquisition	3.62	3.62	0.01	--
Understanding others' perspectives	3.81	3.65	-0.93	--
Pleasure	2.22	2.19	-0.20	--
Persuasion	2.70	2.64	-0.29	--
Conflict avoidance	2.97	2.90	-0.33	--
Political Discussants				
Close friends	3.71	3.81	0.31	--

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	Lost after T1	Retained across T1, T2, and T3	*t*	χ^2
Political Discussants				
Casual Acquaintances	2.33	2.36	0.11	--
Parents	3.95	4.00	0.14	--
Siblings	2.29	2.75	1.28	--
Significant Others	3.00	3.01	0.04	--
Coworkers	2.48	2.34	-0.43	--
Professors	2.38	2.15	-0.77	--
Classmates	2.80	2.74	-0.19	--
Community Leaders	2.23	1.70	-2.27*	--

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	Lost after T1	Retained across T1, T2, and T3	*t*	χ^2
Political Media Diet				
Television Sources	2.76	2.92	0.78	--
Internet Sources	2.51	2.57	0.25	--
Print Sources	2.17	2.38	1.01	--
Social Sources	2.30	2.34	0.17	--
Democratic Variables				
Political cynicism	3.30	3.25	-0.31	--
Political information efficacy (PIE)	2.88	2.98	0.48	--
Political campaign involvement	1.33	1.20	-0.31	--
Voting behavior	1.38	1.28	--	0.58

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	Lost after T1	Retained across T1, T2, and T3	*t*	χ^2
Control Variables				
Political interest	3.00	3.44	1.71	--
Voter registration	1.15	1.10	--	0.51
Vote intention	1.38	1.28	--	0.57
Political ideology	2.86	2.87	--	0.73
Political affiliation	3.19	3.13	--	1.54
Sex	1.48	1.64	--	2.25
Age	19.48	19.57	-1.41	--
Race	0.81	0.83	--	0.04
Participant's year in college	2.33	2.34	1.78	--

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	Lost after T1	Retained across T1, T2, and T3	*t*	χ^2
Control Variables				
Father's education level	3.99	3.40	0.96	--
Mother's education level	3.62	3.90	0.41	--
Household income	4.57	4.68	0.41	--

Note. Table displays item means. Differences in mean scores for continuous variables are represented by a *t* value. Mean differences in categorical variables are represented by χ^2.
* $p < .05$

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

	Time 1		Time 2		Time 3		T1-T2	T1-T3	T2-T3
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*t*	*t*
Frequency of Talk	2.18	1.67	3.15	1.85	1.49	1.29	-11.87*	9.08*	20.08*
Motivations (MTP)									
Global	3.00	0.48	3.07	0.47	3.07	0.47	4.02*	3.81*	0.29
Information acquisition	3.62	0.75	3.66	0.70	3.64	0.72	1.36	0.59	-0.84
Understanding others' perspectives	3.65	0.78	3.64	0.72	3.62	0.74	-0.23	-0.91	-0.78
Pleasure	2.18	0.77	2.29	0.79	2.33	0.83	4.35*	5.14*	1.71
Persuasion	2.64	0.92	2.72	0.91	2.70	0.86	2.63*	1.70	-0.80
Conflict avoidance	2.88	1.00	2.77	0.95	2.73	0.98	-3.03*	-4.08*	-1.29

Table 2 (continued)

	Time 1		Time 2		Time 3		T1-T2	T1-T3	T2-T3
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*t*	*t*
Political Discussants									
Close friends	3.80	1.37	4.08	1.30	3.74	1.38	-4.81*	0.91	5.85*
Casual acquaintances	2.36	1.15	2.58	1.22	2.30	1.12	-3.80*	1.17	5.43*
Parents	4.00	1.50	4.14	1.49	3.84	1.47	-2.47*	2.53*	5.27*
Siblings	3.11	1.54	3.37	1.52	3.24	1.48	-3.37*	-1.83	1.84
Significant others	3.26	1.57	3.45	1.55	3.32	1.57	-2.42*	-0.73	1.55
Coworkers	2.60	1.35	2.63	1.37	2.51	1.27	-0.52	1.34	2.00*
Professors	2.16	1.35	2.29	1.46	2.26	1.32	-2.18*	-1.70	0.57

Table 2 (continued)

	Time 1		Time 2		Time 3		T1-T2	T1-T3	T2-T3
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*t*	*t*
Political Discussants									
Classmates	2.76	1.36	2.76	1.38	2.63	1.28	-0.04	2.20*	2.51*
Community leaders	1.71	1.03	1.73	1.08	1.69	1.05	-0.55	0.38	0.83
Political Media Diet									
Media diet scale	2.55	0.80	2.56	0.80	2.48	0.85	-0.24	2.21*	2.79*
Television sources	2.92	0.92	2.84	0.90	2.71	0.94	2.43*	5.37*	3.67*
Internet sources	2.57	1.09	2.65	1.07	2.62	1.11	6.98*	7.46*	0.97
Print sources	2.38	0.95	2.39	1.02	2.33	0.98	-.24	1.16	1.43

Table 2 (continued)

	Time 1		Time 2		Time 3		T1-T2	T1-T3	T2-T3
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*t*	*t*
Political Media Diet									
Social sources	2.34	1.05	2.44	1.05	2.33	1.07	-2.29*	0.22	2.77*
Democratic Variables									
Political cynicism	3.26	0.61	3.24	0.59	3.20	0.62	0.76	2.19*	1.69
Political information efficacy (PIE)	2.98	0.95	3.11	0.89	3.17	0.92*	-3.78*	-4.93*	-1.72
Campaign involvement	1.20	1.83	1.38	1.87	-	-	-2.38*	-	-
Control Variables									
Political interest	2.44	1.15	2.63	1.09	2.59	1.08	4.66*	3.15*	-1.19

Table 2 (continued)

	Time 1		Time 2		Time 3		T1-T2	T1-T3	T2-T3
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*	*t*	*t*
Control Variables									
Political ideology	2.88	0.92	2.90	0.93	2.90	0.95	-0.77	-0.82	-0.18
Political affiliation	3.15	0.06	3.06	0.06	3.02	0.06	1.55	2.44*	0.62

Note. *$p < .05$

Table 3.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.45*	.42*	.44*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.24*	.36*	.31*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.23*	.32*	.31*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 3.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.35*	.33*	.36*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.22*	.32*	.29*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.22*	.26*	.30*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 3.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Frequency of Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.49*	.42*	.43*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.34*	.37*	.34*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.29*	.29*	.338	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 3.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.428	.38*	.38*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.16*	.25*	.22*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.26*	.34*	.28*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 3.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.34*	.32*	.33*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.18*	.29*	.24*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.16*	.26*	.22*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 3.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.38*	.32*	.32*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.22*	.23*	.24*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.34*	.31*	.32*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 4

Paired Samples T-test of Political Discussant Means

Discussants	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
Parents	$3.99(1)_a$	$4.14(1)_a$	$3.84(1)_a$
Close Friends	$3.79(2)_b$	$4.07(2)_a$	$3.72(2)_a$
Significant Others	$3.25(3)_c$	$3.45(3)_b$	$3.32(3)_b$
Siblings	$3.11(4)_d$	$3.37(4)_b$	$3.24(4)_b$
Classmates	$2.76(5)_e$	$2.76(5)_c$	$2.61(5)_c$
Coworkers	$2.60(6)_f$	$2.63(6)_d$	$2.51(6)_d$
Casual Acquaintances	$2.35(7)_f$	$2.57(7)_d$	$2.29(7)_d$
Professors	$2.15(8)_g$	$2.28(8)_e$	$2.24(8)_d$
Community Leaders	$1.71(9)_h$	$1.71(9)_f$	$1.67(9)_e$

Note. Differing subscripts in each column indicate statistically significant different mean scores. $p < .05$

Table 5.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.45*	.43*	.39*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.34*	.41*	.34*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.29*	.32*	.37*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.37*	.38*	.36*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.28*	.38*	.32*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.29*	.34*	.40*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 5.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.34*	.33*	.31*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.26*	.31*	.24*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.21*	.24*	.26*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.16*	.16*	.18*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.11*	.17*	.14*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	-.01	.09	.12*	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.24*	.21*	.21*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.13*	.16*	.16*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.15*	.20*	.17*	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.27*	.25*	.22*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.13*	.19*	.13*	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.12*	.19*	.23*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.39*	.38*	.36*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.28*	.33*	.29*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.23*	.28*	.28*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.23*	.23*	.27*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.17*	.23*	.24*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.16*	.21*	.24*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 5.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.30*	.26*	.30*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.15*	.21*	.22*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.16*	.22*	.28*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 6.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.42*	.40*	.35*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.29*	.38*	.33*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.32*	.33*	.39*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 6.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.21*	.24*	.20*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.17*	.27*	.20*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.18*	.23*	.26*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 6.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.31*	.27*	.27*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.19*	.23*	.19*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.18*	.21*	.26*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 6.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.10	.15*	.15*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.05	.11*	.07	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	.00	.08	.08	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-.02	-.03	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 6.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.23*	.20*	.20*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.10	.14*	.18*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.16*	.16*	.15*	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 6.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.14*	.18*	.14*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.01	.08	.05	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	-.01	.11*	.09	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 6.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.32*	.33*	.27*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.21*	.25*	.21*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.17*	.22*	.22*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 6.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.18*	.20*	.19*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.13*	.18*	.16*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.11*	.16*	.16*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 6.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquisition Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.18*	.19*	.19*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.08	.15*	.12*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.13*	.20*	.18*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.49*	.46*	.39*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.37*	.42*	.37*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.38*	.39*	.44*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.30*	.30*	.26*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.26*	.31*	.25*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.26*	.28*	.32*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.32*	.33*	.29*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.22*	.29*	.25*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.23*	.26*	.29*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.20*	.23*	.19*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.16*	.18*	.17*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	.07	.14*	.14*	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.28*	.25*	.22*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.19*	.24*	.20*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.20*	.22*	.19*	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. $^*p < 0.05$

Table 7.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.24*	.25*	.17*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.11*	.16*	.09	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.07	.12*	.12*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. $^*p < 0.05$

Table 7.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.39*	.36*	.33*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.29*	.31*	.26*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.25*	.23*	.27*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. $^*p < 0.05$

Table 7.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.20*	.21*	.20*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.15*	.20*	.19*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.14*	.15*	.17*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 7.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.26*	.22*	.22*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.15*	.21*	.16*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.18*	.20*	.23*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.32*	.29*	.28*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.27*	.31*	.25*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.18*	.22*	.20*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.37*	.36*	.38*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.32*	.40*	.37*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.31*	.37*	.40*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.22*	.24*	.23*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.22*	.24*	.19*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.15*	.18*	.15*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.09	.08	.12*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.09	.17*	.14*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	-.03	.06	.07	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.12*	.14*	.12*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.07	.11*	.09	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.04	.14*	.08	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.29*	.22*	.22*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.20*	.26*	.22*	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.21*	.23*	.29*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.33*	.31*	.31*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.27*	.29*	.28*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.23*	.29*	.25*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.23*	.21*	.25*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.21*	.24*	.25*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.16*	.20*	.22*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 8.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.32*	.25*	.28*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.20*	.22*	.24*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.15*	.20*	.25*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.31*	.29*	.28*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.29*	.32*	.25*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.17*	.24*	.25*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.32*	.28*	.30*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.30*	.30*	.27*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.26*	.27*	.32*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.21*	.18*	.16*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.22*	.21*	.15*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.15*	.14*	.13*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.10	.07	.14*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.12*	.13*	.17*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	.02	.05	.11*	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.11*	.08	.11*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.13*	.14*	.14*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.11*	.16*	.17*	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.16*	.13*	.17*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.18*	.22*	.20*	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.13*	.17*	.26*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.32*	.29*	.31*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.27*	.28*	.25*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.23*	.24*	.26*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.19*	.15*	.17*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.15*	.16*	.20*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.14*	.15*	.31*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 9.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.28*	.26*	.27*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.15*	.17*	.18*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.16*	.16*	.24*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.27*	.21*	.24*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.28*	.29*	.28*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.24*	.29*	.24*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.21*	.17*	.21*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.30*	.29*	.30*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.25*	.27*	.25*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.11*	.09	.11*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.15*	.12*	.11*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.13*	.13*	.10*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.07	.07	.11*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.14*	.16*	.18*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	.08	.09	.07	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.09	.08	.06	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.13*	.21*	.16*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.09	.13*	.08	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.15*	.18*	.18*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.19*	.30*	.28*	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.14*	.21*	.22*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.27*	.25*	.24*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.26*	.24*	.26*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.26*	.25*	.27*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.17*	.16*	.16*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.21*	.21*	.17*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.12*	.10*	.10*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 10.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.21*	.20*	.17*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.19*	.19*	.16*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.19*	.20*	.17*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 11

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Frequency of Political Talk, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Frequency of Talk	.44*	.42*	.39*	1.00														
5. T2 Frequency of Talk	.33*	.44*	.33*	.52*	1.00													
6. T3 Frequency of Talk	.31*	.38*	.43*	.51*	.48*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.10*	-.02	-.09	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.04	.06	.12*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.06	.10	.12*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	.01	-.01	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	-.04	.01	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	-.02	-.01	.03	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.01	.02	-.03	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.57*	.45*	.37*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.16*	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.16*	-.12*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Close Friends, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.45*	.35*	.33*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.36*	.44*	.39*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.35*	.38*	.50*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.03	.06	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.10*	.10*	.10*	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.11*	.14*	.11*	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.06	.00	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.03	.10*	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.08	.03	.07	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.51*	.45*	.38*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.12*	-.09	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.08	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.19*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Casual Acquaintances, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.37*	.36*	.30*	1.00														
5. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.36*	.52*	.43*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.36*	.46*	.57*	.49*	.59*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.08	-.15*	-.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.07	.03	.00	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.09	.05	.04	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.03	.01	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.00	.03	.07	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.01	.02	.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.34*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.01	-.04	.07	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	.01	-.04	.05	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.09	-.09	.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Parents, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Parents	.38*	.30*	.34*	1.00														
5. T2 Parents	.36*	.35*	.48*	.66*	1.00													
6. T3 Parents	.36*	.36*	.18*	.61*	.68*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	.00	-.01	.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.05	.03	.03	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.05	.03	.02	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	-.02	.08	.01	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.10	.15*	.14*	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.13*	.06	.11*	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.18*	.14*	.12*	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.41*	.35*	.32*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.08	-.01	-.03	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.14*	-.08	-.10*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.11*	-.07	-.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.12*	-.09	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Siblings, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Siblings	.35*	.19*	.18*	1.00														
5. T2 Siblings	.31*	.30*	.26*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Siblings	.26*	.24*	.41*	.56*	.57*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	.10	.08	.08	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.09	.12*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.07	.12*	.08	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	.00	.07	.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.07	.08	.07	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.01	.03	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.06	.04	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.26*	.25*	.19*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.10	-.04	-.10	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.13*	-.05	-.12*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.12*	-.10	-.21*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.16*	-.11*	-.17*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Significant Others, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Significant Others	.31*	.21*	.22*	1.00														
5. T2 Significant Others	.30*	.30*	.26*	.55*	1.00													
6. T3 Significant Others	.26*	.24*	.42*	.48*	.55*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	.08	.05	.14*	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.12*	.11*	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.14*	.13*	.10	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	.07	.03	.04	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.03	.08	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	-.03	-.04	.00	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.01	.02	.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.36*	.28*	.27*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.10*	-.03	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.11*	-.04	-.07	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.09	-.05	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Coworkers, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Coworkers	.33*	.24*	.21*	1.00														
5. T2 Coworkers	.25*	.41*	.28*	.42*	1.00													
6. T3 Coworkers	.24*	.38*	.45*	.40*	.53*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.06	-.06	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.15*	.07	.06	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.12*	.08	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	.03	-.04	-.02	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	-.06	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	-.06	.00	-.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.06	.04	-.08	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.29*	.23*	.26*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.04	-.08	-.02	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.01	-.03	.02	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.03	-.08	-.03	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.7

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Classmates, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Classmates	.47*	.45*	.45*	1.00														
5. T2 Classmates	.32*	.53*	.41*	.59*	1.00													
6. T3 Classmates	.41*	.48*	.53*	.53*	.61*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.03	-.03	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	-.01	-.01	.02	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.02	.05	.05	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	-.11*	-.12*	-.11*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.04	.00	.08	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.03	.03	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.42*	.35*	.31*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.13*	-.06	-.04	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.13*	-.05	-.09	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.08	-.01	-.10*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.13*	-.04	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.8

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Professors, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Professors	.35*	.30*	.25*	1.00														
5. T2 Professors	.27*	.46*	.34*	.58*	1.00													
6. T3 Professors	.27*	.39*	.44*	.58*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	.03	-.03	.04	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	.07	.05	.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	.10	.09	.07	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	-.07	-.09	-.10*	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	.03	-.01	.04	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	.02	.04	-.02	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	.00	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.27*	.23*	.20*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.11*	-.02	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.06	.01	-.04	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.07	.00	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 12.9

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Media Diet, Community Leaders, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Media Diet	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Media Diet	.67*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Media Diet	.62*	.71*	1.00															
4. T1 Community Leaders	.41*	.38*	.34*	1.00														
5. T2 Community Leaders	.30*	.47*	.29*	.51*	1.00													
6. T3 Community Leaders	.31*	.40*	.48*	.53*	.52*	1.00												
7. Sex	.02	-.01	-.02	-.13*	-.04	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	-.04	-.01	.01	-.12*	-.13*	-.09	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.02	.00	-.12*	.13*	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.00	-.09	-.12*	-.10*	-.07	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.06	.09	.06	-.09	-.04	.01	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.07	.02	.04	-.06	.01	.01	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.10*	.06	.05	-.03	.00	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.44*	.36*	.35*	.30*	.20*	.21*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.08	-.07	-.06	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.06	-.01	-.04	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.10*	-.05	-.11*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 13

Analysis of Political Media Diet Means

Political Media Diet	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3
Television Sources	$2.92(1)_a$	$2.83(1)_a$	$2.70(1)_a$
Internet Sources	$2.56(2)_b$	$2.65(2)_b$	$2.61(2)_b$
Print Sources	$2.38(3)_c$	$2.39(4)_c$	$2.33(3)_c$
Social Sources	$2.34(4)_c$	$2.44(3)_c$	$2.33(4)_c$

Note. Differing subscripts in each column indicate statistically significant different mean scores. $p < .05$

Table 14.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.42*	.35*	.36*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.31*	.37*	.34*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.27*	.32*	.34*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 14.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.30*	.28*	.24*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.20*	.25*	.19*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.17*	.22*	.21*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 14.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.37*	.28*	.24*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.27*	.26*	.23*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.23*	.21*	.23*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 14.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.38*	.33*	.35*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.31*	.39*	.37*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.28*	.33*	.34*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 14.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.28*	.25*	.27*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.23*	.29*	.26*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.24*	.27*	.30*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 14.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Political Media Diet, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Media Diet	.18*	.21*	.16*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Media Diet	.18*	.23*	.20*	.67*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Media Diet	.34*	.31*	.32*	.62*	.71*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	.02	-.01	-.02	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	.00	.00	-.09	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.06	.09	.06	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.07	.02	.04	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.10*	.06	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.44*	.36*	.35*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.09	-.11*	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.12*	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.06	-.09	-.14*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.12*	-.09	-.15*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 15.1
Logistic Regression Analysis of Global Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Global	0.20	0.37	0.29	1	0.59	1.22
T1 Vote Intent	-3.09	0.35	79.30	1	0.00	0.05
Constant	5.29	1.30	16.69	1	0.00	197.83

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Global	0.01	0.50	0.00	1	0.99	1.01
T2 Vote Intent	-4.53	0.43	110.23	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	7.72	1.75	19.54	1	0.00	2250.14

Table 15.2
Logistic Regression Analysis of Information Acquisition Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Information	0.32	0.23	1.96	1	0.16	1.37
T1 Vote Intent	-3.03	0.34	77.93	1	0.00	0.05
Constant	4.69	1.00	21.80	1	0.00	108.28

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Information	0.29	0.31	0.84	1	0.36	1.33
T2 Vote Intent	-4.51	0.43	112.67	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	6.68	1.28	27.15	1	0.00	796.84

Table 15.3
Logistic Regression Analysis of Pleasure Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Pleasure	-0.04	0.22	0.03	1	0.86	0.96
T1 Vote Intent	-3.14	0.34	84.16	1	0.00	0.04
Constant	6.03	0.76	62.85	1	0.00	413.89

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Pleasure	-0.21	0.28	0.56	1	0.46	0.82
T2 Vote Intent	-4.60	0.44	109.47	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	8.30	1.01	67.84	1	0.00	4029.31

Table 15.4
Logistic Regression Analysis of Persuasion Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Persuasion	0.06	0.20	0.09	1	0.77	1.06
T1 Vote Intent	-3.11	0.35	79.73	1	0.00	0.05
Constant	5.75	0.80	51.61	1	0.00	315.02

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Persuasion	0.01	0.24	0.00	1	0.97	1.01
T2 Vote Intent	-4.53	0.43	110.86	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	7.72	0.97	63.52	1	0.00	2242.64

Table 15.5
Logistic Regression Analysis of Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Understanding	0.25	0.22	1.33	1	0.25	1.29
T1 Vote Intent	-3.06	0.34	79.99	1	0.00	0.05
Constant	4.94	0.98	25.19	1	0.00	139.47

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Understanding	0.30	0.31	0.95	1	0.33	1.35
T2 Vote Intent	-4.46	0.43	108.44	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	6.58	1.31	25.21	1	0.00	722.90

Table 15.6
Logistic Regression Analysis of Conflict Avoidance Motivation and Voting Behavior

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T1 Conflict	0.20	0.17	1.41	1	0.234	1.23
T1 Vote Intent	-3.09	0.34	82.49	1	0.00	0.05
Constant	5.31	0.72	54.42	1	0.00	202.22

	ß	S.E.	*Wald*	*df*	Sig.	Exp(ß)
Step 1						
T2 Conflict	0.22	0.24	0.89	1	0.35	1.25
T2 Vote Intent	-4.47	0.43	109.38	1	0.00	0.01
Constant	7.07	0.92	58.97	1	0.00	1178.90

Table 16.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.24*	.29*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.19*	.27*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	-.03	-.06	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	.00	-.01	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	.01	.01	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	.02	.05	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	.02	.00	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	.08	.02	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 16.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.18*	.23*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.16*	.21*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	.09	.00	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	.04	-,02	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	.06	.04	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	.00	.03	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	.02	.02	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	.09	.02	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 16.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.28*	.28*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.20*	.26*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	.03	.01	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	.18	.03	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	.05	.07	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	-.02	.04	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	-.04	-.02	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	.05	.03	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 16.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.22*	.27*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.19*	.25*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	-.01	-.01	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	-.02	.00	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	-.01	-.01	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	.02	.00	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	.03	.00	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 16.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.24*	.20*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.25*	.26*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	.01	.01	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	.01	-.01	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	.00	-.02	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	.01	.00	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 16.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Political Campaign Involvement, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00														
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00													
3. T1 Political Involvement	.25*	.26*	1.00												
4. T2 Political Involvement	.22*	.25*	.65*	1.00											
5. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.02	-.03	1.00										
6. Age	.08	.06	-.15*	-.15*	.03	1.00									
7. Grade	.09	.07	-.13*	-.13*	.08	.89*	1.00								
8. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.19*	.03	.04	.00	1.00							
9. Income	-.05	-.04	-.02	-.10	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00						
10. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00					
11. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	.05	-.01	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00				
12. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.36*	.30*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00			
13. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.19*	-.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00		
14. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.16*	-.18*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00	
15. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.16*	-.18*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 17.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.19*	-.18*	-.18*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.15*	-.21*	-.19*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.12*	-.18*	-.25*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 17.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.10*	-.13*	-.13*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.06	-.14*	-.13*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.10*	-.148	-.18*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 17.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.16*	-.17*	-.14*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.16*	-.16*	-.16*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.18*	-.17*	-.16*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 17.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.28*	-.25*	-.23*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.25*	-.29*	-.23*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.16*	-.24*	-.27*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Table 17.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.15*	-.13*	-.14*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.15*	-.20*	-.20*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.12*	-.18*	-.27*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 17.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Political Cynicism, and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 Political Cynicism	-.23*	-.25*	-.21*	1.00														
5. T2 Political Cynicism	-.27*	-.27*	-.26*	.65*	1.00													
6. T3 Political Cynicism	-.19*	-.29*	-.27*	.57*	.65*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.02	.00	-.06	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	-.05	.00	-.04	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	-.11*	-.08	-.09	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.04	.00	.03	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	.00	.03	.03	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	-.07	-.06	-.05	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.07	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	-.23*	-.23*	-.18*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	.03	.12*	.15*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.01	.10*	.13*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.04	.07	.12*	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	.04	.13*	.19*	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 18.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Cynicism, Close Friends, Casual Acquaintances, Parents, Siblings, and Significant Others

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Political Cynicism	1.00																	
2. T2 Political Cynicism	.65*	1.00																
3. T3 Political Cynicism	.57*	.65*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	-.13*	-.13*	-.15*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	-.11*	-.15*	-.18*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	-.08	-.09	-.16*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. T1 Casual Acquaintences	-.18*	-.12*	-.13*				1.00											
8. T2 Casual Acquaintences	-.10*	-.16*	-.14*				.51*	1.00										
9. T3 Casual Acquaintences	-.10*	-.11*	-.17*				.49*	.59*	1.00									
10. T1 Parents	-.08	-.10*	-.03							1.00								
11. T2 Parents	-.05	-.08	-.02							.66*	1.00							
12. T3 Parents	-.03	-.08	-.05							.61*	.68*	1.00						
13. T1 Siblings	-.08	-.10	-.13*										1.00					
14. T2 Siblings	-.11*	-.19*	-.16*										.58*	1.00				
15. T3 Siblings	.00	-.09	-.10										.56*	.57*	1.00			
16. T1 Significant Others	.00	-.03	-.05													1.00		
17. T2 Significant Others	-.11*	-.10*	-.12*													.55*	1.00	
18. T3 Significant Others	-.10*	-.12*	-.23*													.48*	.55*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 18.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Cynicism, Coworkers, Classmates, Professors, and Community Leaders

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 Political Cynicism	1.00														
2. T2 Political Cynicism	.65*	1.00													
3. T3 Political Cynicism	.57*	.65*	1.00												
4. T1 Coworkers	-.06	-.03	.04	1.00											
5. T2 Coworkers	-.05	-.08	-.02	.42*	1.00										
6. T3 Coworkers	-.09	-.06	-.10	.40*	.53*	1.00									
7. T1 Classmates	-.20*	-.22*	-.21*				1.00								
8. T2 Classmates	-.10*	-.19*	-.15*				.59*	1.00							
9. T3 Classmates	-.12*	-.16*	-.17*				.53*	.61*	1.00						
10. T1 Professors	-.14*	-.16*	-.18*							1.00					
11. T2 Professors	-.05	-.15*	-.16*							.58*	1.00				
12. T3 Professors	-.07	-.12*	-.17*							.58*	.69*	1.00			
13. T1 Community Leaders	-.15*	-.16*	-.16*										1.00		
14. T2 Community Leaders	-.06	-.15*	-.09										.51*	1.00	
15. T3 Community Leaders	-.13*	-.16*	-.20*										.53*	.52*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 19.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Global Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Global Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Global Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Global Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.36*	.35*	.29*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.35*	.43*	.37*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.33*	.35*	.36*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.03	-.06	.01	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	.00	-.01	-.05	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	.01	-.04	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.02	.05	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.03	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.12	.08	.07	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.08	.02	.04	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.54*	.47*	.45*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.09	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.10*	-.06	-.06	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.15*	-.14*	-.10	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 19.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Information Acquistion Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Information Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Information Motivation	.62*	1.00																
3. T3 Information Motivation	.61*	.68*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.15*	.17*	.12*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.19*	.27*	.21*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.24*	.20*	.21*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	.09	.00	.05	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	.04	-,02	-.03	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.06	.04	.01	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	.00	.03	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.02	.00	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.11*	.06	.07	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.09	.02	.08	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.43*	.36*	.34*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.05	-.07	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.09	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.16*	-.13*	-.12*	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *p < 0.05

Table 19.3

Zero-Order Correlations Between Understanding Others' Perspectives Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Understanding Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Understanding Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Understanding Motivation	.65*	.70*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.30*	.25*	.26*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.33*	.36*	.33*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.29*	.28*	.32*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	.03	.01	.05	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	.18	.03	-.02	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.05	.07	.01	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.02	.04	.02	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.10	.07	.05	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.05	.03	.03	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.56*	.46*	.46*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.18*	-.13*	-.14*	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.17*	-.09	-.09	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.12*	-.11*	-.11*	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.19*	-.18*	-.14*	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 19.4

Zero-Order Correlations Between Pleasure Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Pleasure Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Pleasure Motivation	.77*	1.00																
3. T3 Pleasure Motivation	.70*	.80*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.42*	.42*	.36*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.34*	.42*	.38*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.31*	.35*	.33*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.15*	-.16*	-.10*	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	-.01	-.01	-.02	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	-.02	.00	-.03	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.09	.07	.06	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.03	.00	-.01	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.46*	.43*	.40*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.05	-.11*	-.09	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.04	-.06	-.07	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	.01	-.01	.00	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 19.5

Zero-Order Correlations Between Persuasion Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Persuasion Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Persuasion Motivation	.72*	1.00																
3. T3 Persuasion Motivation	.65*	.73*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.43*	.33*	.29*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.36*	.38*	.36*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.30*	.28*	.33*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.17*	-.13*	-.08	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	.01	.01	-.01	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.01	-.01	-.02	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.05	-.02	-.08	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	.00	-.02	.03	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.02	.04	.04	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	.01	.00	-.01	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.37*	.31*	.31*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.02	-.04	-.04	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.07	-.07	-.04	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.09	-.07	-.05	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 19.6

Zero-Order Correlations Between Conflict Avoidance Motivation, Political Information Efficacy (PIE), and Control Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 Conflict Motivation	1.00																	
2. T2 Conflict Motivation	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 Conflict Motivation	.68*	.76*	1.00															
4. T1 PIE	.31*	.29*	.30*	1.00														
5. T2 PIE	.23*	.28*	.29*	.68*	1.00													
6. T3 PIE	.24*	.19*	.25*	.62*	.69*	1.00												
7. Sex	-.14*	-.14*	-.14*	-.23*	-.14*	-11*	1.00											
8. Age	.08	.06	.05	.03	.04	.01	.03	1.00										
9. Grade	.09	.07	.08	.02	.04	.00	.08	.89*	1.00									
10. Race	-.12*	-.10*	-.08	-.03	-.03	-.05	.03	.04	.00	1.00								
11. Income	-.05	-.04	-.04	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.02	.27*	1.00							
12. Mother's Education	.00	.05	.02	.02	.08	.09	.05	-.04	-.01	.05	.21*	1.00						
13. Father's Education	-.04	-.02	-.03	.01	.01	-.02	-.02	-.01	.01	.17*	.39*	.48*	1.00					
14. T1 Political Interest	.34*	.30*	.31*	.52*	.51*	.41*	-.10*	.04	.09	.00	-.02	.00	.03	1.00				
15. T1 Political Ideology	-.13*	-.10*	-.13*	-.10*	-.06	-.10*	-.14*	.02	-.03	.15*	.17*	-.08	.09	-.12*	1.00			
16. T1 Affiliation	-.13*	-.11*	-.12*	-.10*	-.15*	-.0*	-.17*	.06	.03	.23*	.20*	-.01	.05	-.17*	.52*	1.00		
17. T2 Affiliation	-.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.08	-.13*	-.09	-.13*	-.07	-.12*	.21*	.20*	.04	.09	-.12*	.55*	.64*	1.00	
18. T3 Affiliation	-.04	-.02	-.08	-.11*	.10*	-.07	-.14*	-.05	-.08	.25*	.24*	.04	.10*	-.17*	.61*	.68*	.73*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 20.1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Information Efficacy (PIE), Close Friends, Casual Acquaintances, Parents, Siblings, and Significant Others

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
1. T1 PIE	1.00																	
2. T2 PIE	.68*	1.00																
3. T3 PIE	.62*	.69*	1.00															
4. T1 Close Friends	.37*	.41*	.31*	1.00														
5. T2 Close Friends	.38*	.45*	.38*	.60*	1.00													
6. T3 Close Friends	.32*	.44*	.41*	.53*	.60*	1.00												
7. T1 Casual Acquaintences	.33*	.32*	.25*				1.00											
8. T2 Casual Acquaintences	.37*	.36*	.26*				.51*	1.00										
9. T3 Casual Acquaintences	.28*	.31*	.26*				.49*	.59*	1.00									
10. T1 Parents	.33*	.31*	.28*							1.00								
11. T2 Parents	.35*	.34*	.32*							.66*	1.00							
12. T3 Parents	.30*	.31*	.30*							.61*	.68*	1.00						
13. T1 Siblings	.19*	.23*	.13*										1.00					
14. T2 Siblings	.28*	.35*	.30*										.58*	1.00				
15. T3 Siblings	.18*	.22*	.19*										.56*	.57*	1.00			
16. T1 Significant Others	.28*	.29*	.24*													1.00		
17. T2 Significant Others	.25*	.26*	.23*													.55*	1.00	
18. T3 Significant Others	.25*	.27*	.25*													.48*	.55*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$

Table 20.2

Zero-Order Correlations Between Political Information Efficacy (PIE), Coworkers, Classmates, Professors, and Community Leaders

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. T1 PIE	1.00														
2. T2 PIE	.68*	1.00													
3. T3 PIE	.62*	.69*	1.00												
4. T1 Coworkers	.18*	.22*	.12*	1.00											
5. T2 Coworkers	.27*	.24*	.13*	.42*	1.00										
6. T3 Coworkers	.25*	.24*	.3*	.40*	.53*	1.00									
7. T1 Classmates	.35*	.39*	.32*				1.00								
8. T2 Classmates	.32*	.33*	.29*				.59*	1.00							
9. T3 Classmates	.30*	.33*	.28*				.53*	.61*	1.00						
10. T1 Professors	.23*	.23*	.18*							1.00					
11. T2 Professors	.24*	.23*	.17*							.58*	1.00				
12. T3 Professors	.23*	.21*	.13*							.58*	.69*	1.00			
13. T1 Community Leaders	.25*	.24*	.20*										1.00		
14. T2 Community Leaders	.21*	.19*	.18*										.51*	1.00	
15. T3 Community Leaders	.27*	.25*	.19*										.53*	.52*	1.00

Note. *$p < 0.05$



Figure 1. Motivation for talking politics confirmatory factor analysis



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(47) = 115.66, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.46

Figure 2.1. Global Motivation and Frequency of Talk (RQ1a)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(45) = 118.85, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .94, CMIN = 2.64

Figure 2.2. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk (RQ1b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(35) = 117.78, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .94, CMIN = 3.37

Figure 2.3. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of talk



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(34) = 89.14, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.62

Figure 2.4. Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk (RQ1b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(36) = 92.96, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.58

Figure 2.5. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk (RQ1b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(37) = 108.44, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.93

Figure 2.6. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk (RQ1b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(55) = 175.61, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .95, CMIN = 3.19

Figure 3.1. Global motivation and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(40) = 127.53, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .95, CMIN = 3.19

Figure 3.2. Global motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(41) = 95.58, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.33

Figure 3.3. Global motivation and frequency of talk with parents (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(45) = 118.12, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.63

Figure 3.4. Global motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(60) = 142.44, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .95, CMIN = 2.37

Figure 3.5. Global motivation and frequency of talk with significant others (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(60) = 162.00, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .94, CMIN = 2.70

Figure 3.6. Global motivation and frequency of talk with community leaders (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(56) = 125.72, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.25

Figure 3.7. Global motivation and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ2a)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(38) = 121.16, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .95, CMIN = 3.19

Figure 4.1. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(34) = 76.84, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.26

Figure 4.2. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(39) = 79.98, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.05

Figure 4.3. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(55) = 120.85$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.20

Figure 4.4. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with community leaders (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(35) = 41.10, p < .001$, RMSEA = .02, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.17

Figure 4.5. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with coworkers (RQ2b)



Figure 4.6. Information acquisition motivation and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ2b)



Figure 5.1. Understand others' motivation and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(30) = 75.04, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.50

Figure 5.2. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(43) = 87.36, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.03

Figure 5.3. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of talk with parents (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(27) = 85.84, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 3.18

Figure 5.4. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(30) = 48.85, p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.63

Figure 5.5. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and frequency of talk with coworkers (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(35) = 72.22, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.06

Figure 5.6. Understanding others' perspective motivation and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ2b)



Figure 6.1 Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with significant others (RQ2b)



Figure 6.2. Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with community leaders (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(50) = 113.21, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.26

Figure 6.3. Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(32) = 87.82, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.74

Figure 6.4. Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(8) = 20.10$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .99, CMIN = 2.51

Figrue 6.5. Pleasure motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(51) = 119.85, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.35

Figure 7.1. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(19) = 24.35, p < .001$, RMSEA = .03, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.28

Figure 7.2. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with significant others (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(4) = 7.87, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.97

Figure 7.3. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(35) = 93.51, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.67

Figure 7.4. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(29) = 56.81, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 1.96

Figure 7.5. Persuasion motivation and frequency of talk with professors (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(42) = 117.79, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.81

Figure 8.1. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(25) = 57.79$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.31

Figure 8.2. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(37) = 84.25, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.28

Figure 8.3. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk with coworkers (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(46) = 116.21, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .987 CMIN = 2.53

Figure 8.4. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk with professors (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(33) = 94.54, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.87

Figure 8.5. Conflict avoidance motivation and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ2b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(61) = 265.40$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .91, CMIN = 4.35

Figure 9. Political media diet and frequency of talk (H1)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(43) = 148.63, p < .001$, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .96, CMIN = 3.46

Figure 10.1. Political media diet and frequency of talk with parents (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(47) = 165.84, p < .001$, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, CMIN = 3.53

Figure 10.2. Political media diet and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

(χ^2 (48) = 90.91, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.89)

Figure 10.3. Political media diet and frequency of talk with significant others (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(39) = 50.46, p = .10$, RMSEA = .03, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 1.29

Figure 10.4. Political media diet and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

(χ^2 (39) = 52.41, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.99, CMIN = 1.34)

Figure 10.5. Political media diet and frequency of talk with coworkers (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

(χ^2 (48) = 90.91, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.89)

Figure 10.6. Political media diet and frequency of talk with professors (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White. $\chi^2(36) = 72.72$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.02

Figure 10.7. Political media diet and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ3)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(50) = 47.64$, $p = .57$, RMSEA = .00, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = .95

Figure 10.8. Political media diet and frequency of talk with community leaders (RQ3)



Figure 11.1. Global motivation and media diet: Social sources (RQ4a)



Figure 11.2. Global motivation and media diet: Print sources (RQ4a)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(33) = 87.27$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.64

Figure 12. Information acquisition motivation and media diet: Television sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(30) = 64.13$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.14

Figure 13.1. Information acquisition motivation and media diet: Internet sources (RQ3b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(31) = 89.85$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.90

Figure 13.2. Conflict avoidance and motivation and media diet: Internet sources (RQ3b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(37) = 115.50$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .95, CMIN = 3.12

Figure 14.1. Pleasure motivation and media diet: Print sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(48) = 107.47$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.24

Figure 14.2. Conflict avoidance motivation and media diet: Print sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(38) = 73.11$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .98, CMIN = 1.92

Figure 15.1. Information acquisition motivation and media diet: Social sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(42) = 63.49$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.51

Figure 15.2. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and media diet: Social sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(54) = 91.80$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .98, CMIN = 1.70

Figure 15.3. Conflict avoidance motivation and media diet: Social sources (RQ4b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(32) = 85.88$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.68

Figure 16.1. Global motivation and political involvement (RQ6a)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(23) = 43.60, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .97, CMIN = 1.90

Figure 16.2. Information acquisition motivation and political involvement (RQ6b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(19) = 65.50, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .956 CMIN = 3.45

Figure 16.3. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and political involvement (RQ6b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(24) = 66.60$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.78

Figure 16.4. Pleasure motivation and political involvement (RQ6b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(31) = 93.84, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .95, CMIN = 3.02

Figure 16.5. Persuasion motivation and political involvement (RQ6b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(26) = 96.86$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, CMIN = 3.73

Figure 16.6. Conflict avoidance motivation and political involvement (RQ6b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(24) = 40.60$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.69

Figure 17.1. Understanding others' perspectives motivation and political cynicism (RQ7b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(41) = 99.77, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.43

Figure 17.2. Persuasion motivation and political cynicism (RQ7b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(38) = 110.18, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.90

Figure 17.3. Pleasure motivation and political cynicism (RQ7b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(31) = 89.15$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.88

Figure 17.4. Conflict avoidance motivation and political cynicism (RQ7b)



Dotted paths are non-significant.

$\chi^2(34) = 64.44, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.90

Figure 18. Political cynicism and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ8)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(14) = 31.60, p < .001$, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, CMIN = 2.26

Figure 19.1 Pleasure motivation and political information efficacy (RQ9b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(17) = 30.37, p < .001$, RMSEA = .04, CFI = .99, CMIN = 1.79

Figure 19.2. Persuasion motivation and political information efficacy (RQ9b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(28) = 70.41, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .98, CMIN = 2.51

Figure 19.3. Information acquisition motivation and political information efficacy (RQ9b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(17) = 56.53$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .98, CMIN = 3.33

Figure 19.4. Conflict avoidance motivation and political information efficacy (RQ9b)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(45) = 132.15, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .96, CMIN = 2.94

Figure 20.1. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with close friends (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(21) = 53.73, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .98 CMIN = 2.56

Figure 20.2. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with casual acquaintances (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(46) = 115.18, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.50

Figure 20.3. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with siblings (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

$\chi^2(45) = 104.05, p < .001$, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.31

Figure 20.4. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with parents (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

χ^2 (32) = 57.27, $p < .01$, RMSEA = 0.04, CFI = 0.98, CMIN = 1.79

Figure 20.5. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with coworkers (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

χ^2 (40) = 98.09, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.97, CMIN = 2.45

Figure 20.6. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with professors (RQ10)



Dotted paths are non-significant. Sex is coded as 1 = Male, 2 =Female.

Race is coded as 0 = Non-white, 1 = White.

$\chi^2(28) = 82.80, p < .001$, RMSEA = .07, CFI = .97, CMIN = 2.96

Figure 20.7. Political information efficacy and frequency of talk with classmates (RQ10)



Figure 21.1. Frequency of talk mediating global motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



χ^2 (2) = 5.44, p = .07, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 1.0, CMIN = 2.72

Figure 21.2. Frequency of talk mediating pleasure motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



Figure 21.3. Frequency of talk mediating persuasion motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



Figure 21.4. Frequency of talk mediating conflict avoidance motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



Figure 21.5. Frequency of talk mediating information acquisition motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



Figure 21.6. Frequency of talk mediating understanding others' perspectives motivation and political media diet (RQ11)



Note. χ^2 (1) = 4.95, $p < .05$, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .97, CMIN = 4.95

Figure 22.1. Frequency of talk mediating global motivation and democratic attitudes (RQ11)



χ^2 (1) = 3.83, p = .05, RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = .97, CMIN = 3.83

Figure 22.2. Frequency of talk mediating pleasure motivation and democratic attitudes (RQ11)



χ^2 (1) = 4.95, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .96, CMIN = 4.95

Figure 22.3. Frequency of talk mediating persuasion motivation and democratic attitudes (RQ11)



χ^2 (1) = 4.41, p < .05, RMSEA = 0.09, CFI = .97, CMIN = 4.41

Figure 22.4 Frequency of talk mediating conflict avoidance motivation and democratic attitudes (RQ11)



Dotted paths are non-significant. T3_Vote is coded as 1 = Yes, 0 =No.

$\chi^2(35) = 127.33, p < .001$, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .94, CMIN = 3.64

Figure 23. Political talk model (RQ12)

APPENDIX A-1

MOTIVATIONS FOR TALKING POLITICS (MTP)

Directions: Here are several reasons people give for why they talk about politics with other people. For each statement, click on the response that best expresses your agreement with the following reasons for talking with others about politics. When responding to the statements below think of specific conversations you've had with others about politics.

Responses to statements will be:

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Strongly Agree

Information Acquisition

I talk about politics with others because I want to find out what is going on in the political world.
I talk about politics with others to get political news.
I talk about politics with others to help me discover what I know or don't know about politics.
I talk about politics with others to gain information about the political process.
I talk about politics with others to learn more about politics.
I talk about politics with others because I want to become a more informed citizen.
I talk about politics with others to help me figure out public policies.
I talk about politics with others because I am curious about a specific political issue.

Understanding Others' Perspectives

I talk about politics with others because I want to hear their opinions.
I talk about politics with others because it helps me understand how politics affects other's lives.
I talk about politics with others because it allows me to gain a different perspective from my own.
I talk about politics with others because I am interested in other's political views.
I talk about politics with others because politics has an influence on everyone's life.
I talk about politics with others because it allows me to hear people's political needs and desires.
I talk about politics with others to get to know their positions on various issues.

Pleasure

I talk about politics with others because it is a hobby.
I talk about politics with others because I feel smart when I discuss politics.
I talk about politics with others because it allows me to be in control of the conversation.
I talk about politics with others because it is my way of showing off.
I talk about politics with others because it makes me feel important.
I talk about politics with others because it is like a game to me.
I talk about politics with others because I enjoy arguing about politics.

I talk about politics with others because I want to impress them.
I talk about politics with others because it amuses me.
I talk about politics with others because I know more than other people know about politics.

Persuasion
I talk about politics with others because I want to make sure others get the "right" information.
I talk about politics with others because I want to convince them of my political views.
I talk about politics with others because I have definite political opinions that need to be shared.
I talk about politics with others because I want them to agree with my positions.
I talk about politics with others because I want to influence people.

Conflict Avoidance
I don't talk about politics with others because it is too controversial.
I don't talk about politics with others because it causes too much tension.
I don't talk about politics with others because I don't like the conflict that arises from such conversations.
I don't talk about politics with others because someone always thinks they are "right".
I don't talk about politics with others because it frequently leads to an argument.

Note: Items in the MTP scale should be randomized.

APPENDIX A-2

FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL TALK

1. How many days in the past week did you talk about politics with other people? (0-7)

2. In a typical day, how many political conversations do you engage in with others?

3. On average, how long (in minutes) does your typical political conversation last?

APPENDIX A-3

POLITICAL DISCUSSANTS

Directions: Different people talk to various people about politics. Listed below are several sources with whom you may engage in political conversation with. Please indicate how much you talk about politics with **each** of these sources:

Close Friends	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Casual Acquaintances	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Parents	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Siblings	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Significant Other(s)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Coworkers	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Professors	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Classmates	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Community Leaders	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
Other	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)

APPENDIX A-4

POLITICAL MEDIA DIET

Directions: Different people use different sources to get information about current events. Listed below are several sources from which you may gather information about politics. Please indicate just how much you use **each** source to obtain political information.

1. local television news (e.g., *KOMU, KMIZ, KRCG, KQFX*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
2. national broadcast television news (e.g., *CBS Evening News with Katie Couric, NBC Nightly News with Brian Williams, ABC World News Tonight with Charlie Gibson)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
3. cable television news (e.g., *CNN, FOX News, MSNBC)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
4. CSPAN	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
5. television news talk shows (e.g., *The O'Reilly Factor, Hardball with Chris Matthews, Larry King Live*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
6. television late-night shows (e.g., *The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Late Show with David Letterman*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
7. entertainment programming (e.g., *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, Colbert Report, Saturday Night Live*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
8. morning television talk shows (e.g., *The Today Show, Good Morning America, Fox and Friends*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
9. campus newspaper (e.g., *MUSN, Maneater)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
10. national newspapers (e.g., *USA Today, New York Times, Wall Street Journal)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
11. state/regional newspapers	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)

(e.g., *St. Louis Post-Dispatch)*

12. local newspapers (e.g., *newspapers from the town/city you live in that are not considered regional newspapers: Columbia Tribune)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
13. newspapers online (e.g., *USA Today, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, state or local newspapers online)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
14. weekly news magazines (e.g., *Newsweek, Time, U.S. News and World Report*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
15. popular magazines (e.g., *People, Fortune, GQ, Cosmopolitan*)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
16. radio news (e.g., local news on the radio, national news briefs given on the hour or half hour)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
17. political radio talk shows (e.g., *Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Air America Radio)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
18. news websites (e.g., ABC, NBC, CBS, MSNBC, CNN, FoxNews, BBC)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
19. internet search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
20. political candidate websites (e.g., JohnMcCain.com, BarackObama.com)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
21. political blogs/websites (e.g., individual citizens' blogs/websites)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
22. YouTube	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
23. social networking sites (e.g., *Facebook, MySpace, Friendster)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
24. cell phone (e.g., *text messaging)*	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)
25. classroom (e.g., class discussion)	0 (never)	1 (rarely)	2	3	4	5 (a lot)

APPENDIX A-5

VOTING BEHAVIOR

Responses to statements will be: Yes or No

Time 1 & 2:

1. Are you registered to vote?
2. Do you plan to vote in the 2008 presidential election?
3. If the election were held today for whom would you vote? (McCain, Obama, Barr, McKinney, Nader)

Time 3:

1. Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?
2. For whom did you vote for in the 2008 presidential election? (McCain or Obama)

APPENDIX A-6

POLITICAL CAMPIAGN INVOLVEMENT

Directions: Some people engage in various activities related to political campaigns. Please indicate if you have participated in any of the following campaign activities in the past 12 months.

Responses to statements will be: Yes or No

1. Wore a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or placed a campaign related sign on your window or in front of your house.
2. Attended any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things alike in support of a particular candidate.
3. Worked or volunteered in any capacity for one of the parties or candidates.
4. Contributed money to any political party or individual candidate running for public office.
5. Contributed money to any group that supported or opposed the candidates.
6. Wrote or emailed a letter or somehow expressed your opinion to a political candidate.

APPENDIX A-7

POLITICAL CYNICISM

Directions: Following are some feelings about politics and politicians. For each one, indicate whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, have no opinion, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly.

Responses to statements will be:

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Strongly Agree

1. Whether I vote or not has no influence on what politicians do.

2. One never knows what politicians really think.

3. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

4. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

5. One can be confident that politicians will always do the right thing.

6. Politicians often quickly forget their election promises after a political campaign is over.

7. Politicians are more interested in power than in what the people think.

8. One cannot always trust what politicians say.

APPENDIX A-8

POLITICAL INFORMATION EFFICACY (PIE)

Directions: Following are some feelings about politics and politicians. For each one, indicate whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, have no opinion, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly.

Responses to statements will be:

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Strongly Agree

1. I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.

2. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.

3. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.

4. If a friend asked me about the presidential primary campaign, I feel I would have enough information to help my friend figure out who to vote for.

APPENDIX A-9

CONTROL VARIABLES

1. What is your sex? Male Female

2. What is your age? _____

3. Which of he following best represents your race/ethnic background (circle one):

(1) Asian or Pacific Islander (2) Caucasian (3) African-American

(4) Spanish or Hispanic Origin (5) Multi-racial (6) Native American

(7) Other (name): _____

4. How would you describe your personal ideology?

1	2	3	4	5
strongly liberal	liberal	moderate	conservative	strongly conservative

5. How would you describe your political affiliation?

1	2	3	4	5
Strong Democrat	Democrat	Independent	Republican	Strong Republican

6. I am interested in politics.

1	2	3	4	5
Disagree Strongly	Disagree Somewhat	Neutral	Agree Somewhat	Strongly Agree

7. What is your current standing in school?

_____ Freshman

_____ Sophomore

_____ Junior

_____ Senior

_____ Some graduate school

_____ Graduate degree completed

8. How many years of schooling did your father complete?

   _____ Less than high school

   _____ High school graduation

   _____ Some college

   _____ College graduation

   _____ Some graduate school

   _____ Graduate degree completed

9. How many years of schooling did your mother complete?

   _____ Less than high school

   _____ High school graduation

   _____ Some college

   _____ College graduation

   _____ Some graduate school

   _____ Graduate degree completed

10. Please give your best estimate of your family's average yearly income (before taxes).

    _____ Less than $10,000

    _____ 10,000 - 30,000

    _____ 30,000 - 50,000

    _____ 50,000 - 75,000

    _____ 75,000 - 150,000

    _____ More than $150,000

VITA

Leslie Rill was born in Frankfurt, Germany, and was raised in Southern California. She earned her Bachelor's degree in Communication from the University of Nebraska Omaha in 2003, and her Master's of Arts in Communication from the same university in 2005. Rill completed her doctoral studies at the University of Missouri in 2009. Her published research has appeared in *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Communication Studies,* and *American Behavioral Scientist*. She has accepted an assistant professor position in the Department of Communication at Portland State University where she will teach political and mass communication courses.