• On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation 

    Hsu, Judy; Wang, X. H. (X. Henry), 1962- (Department of Economics, 2004)
    This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under ...
  • On Welfare under Cournot and Bertrand Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies 

    Hsu, Judy; Wang, X. H. (X. Henry), 1962- (Department of Economics, 2005)
    Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of Singh and Vives (1984) ...