• A defense of moral perception 

    McBrayer, Justin Patrick (University of Missouri--Columbia, 2008)
    I defend the possibility of moral perception and the contentious view that at least some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. The first part of the dissertation is spent establishing the possibility of moral ...
  • The nonepistemic psychological requirements for knowledge 

    Moon, Andrew Y., 1982- (University of Missouri--Columbia, 2010)
    A question tracing back to Plato's Meno asks, "What is knowledge?" Very plausibly, a person knows a proposition only if he believes it and it is true. However, true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. A person who ...
  • Philosophical intuitions--philosophical analysis 

    McBain, James F., 1971- (University of Missouri--Columbia, 2008)
    This work is a defense of philosophical intuitions and the use of them in philosophy. First, I survey the main forms of intuition-based philosophical methods - conceptual analysis, explication, and reflective equilibrium ...
  • Three questions concerning Reid's moral epistemology 

    Zema, Phillip Matthew, 1985- (University of Missouri--Columbia, 2016)
    In my dissertation, I argue for a novel interpretation of Reid's moral epistemology. Accordingly, I attempt to show that Reid is committed to the view that we obtain moral knowledge by way of moral intuition and moral ...