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dc.contributor.authorSievert, Donald Edward, 1942-eng
dc.descriptionArticle Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106812eng
dc.description.abstractI shall argue that one cannot get to know a Strawsonian person, to speak in a popular way. To speak more philosophically, Strawson has a metaphysical theory of persons which involves serious epistemological difficulties. I shall begin by establishing that Strawson is committed to three claims: 1) the concept of a person is a priori, 2) persons are "items" or "things" which cannot be experienced, and 3) we apply the concept of a person to a particular Strawsonian person (subject of experiences and bodily characteristics) "via" his body. Then I shall argue that good reasons for this view are not provided and offer explanations of why Strawson does not recognize this difficulty.eng
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):515-527.eng
dc.publisherInternational Phenomenological Societyeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshAgent (Philosophy)eng
dc.subject.lcshExperience -- Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshHuman body (Philosophy)eng
dc.titleHow well can one get to know a Strawsonian person?eng

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