| dc.contributor.author | Sievert, Donald Edward, 1942- | eng |
| dc.date.issued | 1974 | eng |
| dc.description | Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106812 | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | I shall argue that one cannot get to know a Strawsonian person, to speak in a popular way. To speak more philosophically, Strawson has a metaphysical theory of persons which involves serious epistemological difficulties. I shall begin by establishing that Strawson is committed to three claims: 1) the concept of a person is a priori, 2) persons are "items" or "things" which cannot be experienced, and 3) we apply the concept of a person to a particular Strawsonian person (subject of experiences and bodily characteristics) "via" his body. Then I shall argue that good reasons for this view are not provided and offer explanations of why Strawson does not recognize this difficulty. | eng |
| dc.identifier.citation | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):515-527. | eng |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8205 | eng |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10019 | eng |
| dc.language | English | eng |
| dc.publisher | International Phenomenological Society | eng |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Philosophy publications | eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofcommunity | University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophy | eng |
| dc.subject | Strawson | eng |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Agent (Philosophy) | eng |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Personalism | eng |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Experience -- Philosophy | eng |
| dc.subject.lcsh | Human body (Philosophy) | eng |
| dc.title | How well can one get to know a Strawsonian person? | eng |
| dc.type | Article | eng |
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