Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better

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Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better

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Title: Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better
Author: Vallentyne, Peter; Lauwers, Luc
Keywords: utilitarianism
Weak Pareto
Date: 2004-10
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Citation: Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330
Abstract: We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero have argued that Weak Pareto is implausible in the infinite case and defended alternative principles. We here defend Weak Pareto against their criticisms and argue against an isomorphism principle that they defend. Where locations are the same in both worlds but have no natural order, our argument leads to an endorsement, and strengthening, of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan, and to an endorsement of a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi and by von Weizsäcker.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10021
ISSN: 0266-2671

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  • Philosophy publications (MU) [74]
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