On the possibility of nonaggregative priority for the worst off.
Abstract
We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., well-being) of individuals and shall explore the possibility of such theories' ascribing some priority to benefits to those
who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives
by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) ascribes absolute priority to the worse off (i.e., favors even a very small benefit to a worse-off person over very large benefits to
large numbers of better-off people). Neither extreme view, we assume, is plausible.
Part of
Citation
Social Philosophy and Policy (2009), 26: 258-285