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dc.contributor.authorVallentyne, Petereng
dc.date.issued2011eng
dc.descriptionhttp://klinechair.missouri.edu/Vita_Revised.htm (#43 on the list)eng
dc.description.abstractI argue that, under a broad range of circumstances, consensual killing (suicide, assisted suicide, and killing another person with their permission) is morally permissible and forcible prevention is not. The argument depends crucially on the following claims: (1) Agents have certain control rights over the use of their person (a form of self-ownership). (2) These rights are understood in choice-protecting terms. (3) The relevant consent is that of the agent at or prior to the time of action (and not that of the agent in the future). (4) There are no impersonal duties. (5) God, if he exists, has given us no commands not to use natural resources for the purposes of consensual killing.eng
dc.identifier.citationREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LOUVAIN (2003): 5-25eng
dc.identifier.issn0035-3841eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/10369eng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshSuicideeng
dc.subject.lcshEuthanasiaeng
dc.subject.lcshSocial sciences -- Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshPolitical science -- Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshAssisted suicideeng
dc.titleLibertarianism, Self-Ownership and Consensual Killingeng
dc.title.alternativeLibertarisme, propriété de soi, et homicide consensueleng
dc.typeArticleeng


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