Quantifying communication device vulnerabilities: assessing energy requirements through front door and back door coupling

Abstract

In modern military operations, the disruption of enemy communication systems is crucial for mission success. High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) attacks offer a method to disable electronic communication devices by generating powerful electromagnetic pulses. The work presented in this thesis investigates the optimal parameters for HPEM attacks to effectively disrupt electronic devices through direct injection, free-field, and back door coupling. For the direct injection setup, the Device Under Test (DUT) was placed and subjected to an HPEM signal through the use of a series of cables and equipment in a bench top setup. For the free-field and back door setups, the DUT was placed inside a Gigahertz Transverse Electromagnetic (GTEM) device and exposed to incoming propagating HPEM signals. Subsequently, the findings from direct injection tests were compared back to results gained from free-field testing to verify the accuracy of both setups and to generate a transfer function relating both types of setups. Lastly, back-door testing was conducted to compare the energy requirements for effective HPEM disruption via back-door coupling versus front-door coupling.