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dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Matthew
dc.descriptionThis is a preprint of an article published in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 24, Issue 1, pages 383-405, December 2010. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00197.xen_US
dc.description.abstractThe main goal of this paper is to show that the common ground between Jason Stanley and Keith DeRose concerning contextualism against subject-sensitive invariantism, which is assumed in the literature generally, is a false assumption. If I am right about this, then one of the main motivations for accepting contextualism over SSI is undermined. This might seem to be good news for SSI. However, other key test cases provide motivations for contextualism, even once intellectualism is abandoned. In fact, I will argue that anti-intellectualist contextualism is not merely a coherent possibility but that it has distinct advantages over SSI.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationsen_US
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophy
dc.subjectepistemic positionsen_US
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory ofen_US
dc.titleContextualism and Intellectualismen_US

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