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dc.contributor.authorFantl, Jeremyeng
dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Mattheweng
dc.descriptionThis is a preprint of an article published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 75, Issue 3, pages 558-589, November 2007. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.xeng
dc.description.abstractWe argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver.eng
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume 75, Issue 3, pages 558-589, November 2007eng
dc.identifier.otherDOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.xeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.source.harvestedhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00093.x/abstract ;jsessionid=72443EF4843D8AFB9D4D1CACDEB480FF.d03t03eng
dc.subjectanalytic epistemologyeng
dc.subjectepistemic positionseng
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory of--Epistemicseng
dc.titleOn Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemologyeng

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