[-] Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorFantl, Jeremyeng
dc.contributor.authorMcGrath, Mattheweng
dc.descriptionThis is a preprint of an article published in Noûs, Volume 43, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages: 178-192,. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01701.x/abstract. The definitive version is available at www3.interscience.wiley.com doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01701.xeng
dc.description.abstractIn two important recent books, John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley each argue that non-evidential factors, such as the cost of being wrong and salience of possible error, have a place in epistemological theorizing. This point is familiar from the work of epistemological contextualists, who emphasize non-evidential speaker factors: factors which, when present in a speaker's conversational context, affect the semantic content of her knowledge attributions. According to Hawthorne and Stanley, the appropriate focus is on the subject, rather than the speaker: when the relevant non-evidential factors are present in a subject they can affect whether the subject knows. This suggests a reorientation for epistemology, away from the standard “intellectualist” (Stanley's term) model, endorsed even by contextualists, according to which only evidential or more broadly truth-related factors (evidence, safety, sensitivity, reliability, etc.) bear on whether a subject knows. If Hawthorne and Stanley are right, then the contextualist program should give way to a program of anti-intellectualist invariantism, or to use a more common label, subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI).eng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.subjectEpistemic Possibility Constrainteng
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory ofeng
dc.subject.lcshContextualism (Philosophy)eng
dc.titleCritical Study of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interestseng

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Philosophy publications (MU)
    The items in this collection are the scholarly output of the faculty, staff, and students of the Department of Philosophy.

[-] Show simple item record