Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory

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Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10699

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Title: Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory
Author: Ernst, Zachary
Date: 2005
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Citation: Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.
Abstract: A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship between moral concepts and formal characterizations of games.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/10699
ISSN: 0031-8248

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  • Philosophy publications (MU) [74]
    The items in this collection are the scholarly output of the faculty, staff, and students of the Department of Philosophy.

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