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dc.contributor.authorErnst, Zacharyeng
dc.date.issued2005eng
dc.descriptionhttp://philpapers.org/s/Zachary%20Ernsteng
dc.description.abstractA variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship between moral concepts and formal characterizations of games.eng
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy of Science 72 (5):1187-1196.eng
dc.identifier.issn0031-8248eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/10699eng
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Presseng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshInterpersonal relationseng
dc.subject.lcshEthicseng
dc.subject.lcshSocial sciences -- Philosophyeng
dc.titleRobustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theoryeng
dc.typeArticleeng


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