[-] Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorGupta, Bina, 1947-eng
dc.contributor.authorWilcox, William C.eng
dc.date.issued1984eng
dc.descriptionhttp://philpapers.org/s/Bina%20Guptaeng
dc.description.abstractBefore one can reasonably investigate the question of whether two things are identical, it stands to reason that one must have a clear understanding not only of what counts as a thing but, even more importantly, of what it means for two things to be identical. The question of the nature of identity is indeed a perplexing one, and has served as a starting point for much recent philosophical investigations. It drove Frege to make the distinction between sense and reference,1 has been a central factor in much of Quine's ontological analysis, and recently has played a central role in Butchvarov's protometaphysical Being Qua Being.eng
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy East and West Vol. 34, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 85-94eng
dc.identifier.issn0031-8221eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/10701eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Hawaii Presseng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.subject.lcshOntologyeng
dc.subject.lcshSense (Philosophy)eng
dc.subject.lcshReference (Philosophy)eng
dc.title"Tat tvam asi": An Important Identity Statement or a Mere Tautologyeng
dc.typeArticleeng


Files in this item

[PDF]

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Philosophy publications (MU)
    The items in this collection are the scholarly output of the faculty, staff, and students of the Department of Philosophy.

[-] Show simple item record