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dc.contributor.advisorPereira, Raynoldeeng
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Ryan K., 1982-eng
dc.date.issued2010eng
dc.date.submitted2010 Summereng
dc.descriptionThe entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionTitle from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on October 28, 2010).eng
dc.descriptionThesis advisor: Dr. Raynolde Pereira.eng
dc.descriptionVita.eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.descriptionPh. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010.eng
dc.descriptionDissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Accountancy.eng
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the influence of firm disclosure on CEO turnover. Two competing theoretical views motivate my inquiry. One view is that an expanded disclosure policy improves firm information environment and hence allows for greater monitoring. Greater monitoring, in turn, constrains managers from undertaking actions that are contrary to shareholder interest. As such, this view anticipates a negative relation between disclosure and CEO turnover. A contrary view is that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to manipulate performance metrics such as a firm's earnings. Consequently, managers have limited ability to conceal poor firm performance. Greater disclosure is also argued to improve board ability to assess managerial talent. Both these arguments point to a positive association between firm disclosure policy and CEO turnover. In my dissertation, I evaluate the empirical validity of these two competing views. Following prior research, I evaluate disclosure based on firm management earnings guidance policy. In general, I find a positive association between involuntary CEO turnover and disclosure quality. This finding is robust across several tests and supports the view that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to conceal bad news and improves board ability to assess CEO talent. Overall, my study highlights the influence of disclosure policy on CEO succession.eng
dc.format.extentx, 125 pageseng
dc.identifier.oclc872561734eng
dc.identifier.otherPetersonR-073010-D624eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/12014eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartofcollectionUniversity of Missouri--Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertationseng
dc.subject.lcshChief executive officers -- Dismissal ofeng
dc.subject.lcshExecutive successioneng
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governanceeng
dc.subject.lcshDisclosure of informationeng
dc.titleDisclosure and CEO turnovereng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountancy (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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