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dc.contributor.advisorPereira, Raynoldeen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Ryan K., 1982-en_US
dc.date.issued2010eng
dc.date.submitted2010 Summeren_US
dc.descriptionThe entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.en_US
dc.descriptionTitle from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on October 28, 2010).en_US
dc.descriptionThesis advisor: Dr. Raynolde Pereira.en_US
dc.descriptionVita.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.en_US
dc.descriptionPh. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010.en_US
dc.descriptionDissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Accountancy.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the influence of firm disclosure on CEO turnover. Two competing theoretical views motivate my inquiry. One view is that an expanded disclosure policy improves firm information environment and hence allows for greater monitoring. Greater monitoring, in turn, constrains managers from undertaking actions that are contrary to shareholder interest. As such, this view anticipates a negative relation between disclosure and CEO turnover. A contrary view is that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to manipulate performance metrics such as a firm's earnings. Consequently, managers have limited ability to conceal poor firm performance. Greater disclosure is also argued to improve board ability to assess managerial talent. Both these arguments point to a positive association between firm disclosure policy and CEO turnover. In my dissertation, I evaluate the empirical validity of these two competing views. Following prior research, I evaluate disclosure based on firm management earnings guidance policy. In general, I find a positive association between involuntary CEO turnover and disclosure quality. This finding is robust across several tests and supports the view that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to conceal bad news and improves board ability to assess CEO talent. Overall, my study highlights the influence of disclosure policy on CEO succession.en_US
dc.format.extentx, 125 pagesen_US
dc.identifier.otherPetersonR-073010-D624en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/12014
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Dissertations. 2010 Dissertations
dc.subject.lcshChief executive officers -- Dismissal ofen_US
dc.subject.lcshExecutive successionen_US
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.lcshDisclosure of informationen_US
dc.titleDisclosure and CEO turnoveren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountancy (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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