Disclosure and CEO turnover

MOspace/Manakin Repository

Breadcrumbs Navigation

Disclosure and CEO turnover

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/12014

[-] show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisor Pereira, Raynolde en_US
dc.contributor.author Peterson, Ryan K., 1982- en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2011-11-04T13:54:59Z
dc.date.available 2011-11-04T13:54:59Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2010 Summer en_US
dc.identifier.other PetersonR-073010-D624 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10355/12014
dc.description The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. en_US
dc.description Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on October 28, 2010). en_US
dc.description Thesis advisor: Dr. Raynolde Pereira. en_US
dc.description Vita. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references. en_US
dc.description Ph. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010. en_US
dc.description Dissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Accountancy. en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper examines the influence of firm disclosure on CEO turnover. Two competing theoretical views motivate my inquiry. One view is that an expanded disclosure policy improves firm information environment and hence allows for greater monitoring. Greater monitoring, in turn, constrains managers from undertaking actions that are contrary to shareholder interest. As such, this view anticipates a negative relation between disclosure and CEO turnover. A contrary view is that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to manipulate performance metrics such as a firm's earnings. Consequently, managers have limited ability to conceal poor firm performance. Greater disclosure is also argued to improve board ability to assess managerial talent. Both these arguments point to a positive association between firm disclosure policy and CEO turnover. In my dissertation, I evaluate the empirical validity of these two competing views. Following prior research, I evaluate disclosure based on firm management earnings guidance policy. In general, I find a positive association between involuntary CEO turnover and disclosure quality. This finding is robust across several tests and supports the view that an expanded disclosure policy limits managerial ability to conceal bad news and improves board ability to assess CEO talent. Overall, my study highlights the influence of disclosure policy on CEO succession. en_US
dc.format.extent x, 125 pages en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Missouri--Columbia en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Chief executive officers -- Dismissal of en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Executive succession en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Corporate governance en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Disclosure of information en_US
dc.title Disclosure and CEO turnover en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
thesis.degree.discipline Accountancy en_US
thesis.degree.grantor University of Missouri--Columbia en_US
thesis.degree.name Ph. D. en_US
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en_US
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity University of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Dissertations. 2010 Dissertations


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

[-] show simple item record