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dc.contributor.authorSykuta, Michael E.eng
dc.contributor.authorCook, Michael L. (Michael Lee), 1943-eng
dc.date.issued2001-09eng
dc.descriptionThis paper was prepared as an invited Principal Paper for the 2001 annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association. Forthcoming in American Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 83, No. 5, 2001.eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.description.abstractOur purpose in this paper is to highlight the role of organizational structure and incentives in the design of contracts between buyers and sellers of agricultural products. In particular, we consider how differences between investor-owned (IOF) and producer-oriented (POF) firms, and differences between alternate types of POFs, may affect the types of contract terms those respective organizations are likely to prefer in their contracts with agricultural producers. New institutional economics theories of contracting, agency and property rights allocation suggest that cooperative contractors may be able to design contracts that enhance economic efficiency that IOFs cannot easily replicate.eng
dc.identifier.citationContracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI), Working Paper No. 2001-04, September 2001.eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/194eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri - Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartofcollectionAgricultural Economics publications (MU)eng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. Division of Applied Social Sciences. Department of Agricultural Economicseng
dc.subjectcontractingeng
dc.subjectcooperativeseng
dc.subjectorganizational structureeng
dc.subjectnew institutional economicseng
dc.subject.lcshContracts, Agricultural -- Economic aspectseng
dc.subject.lcshAgriculture, Cooperative -- Economic aspectseng
dc.titleA New Institutional Economics Approach to Contracts and Cooperativeseng
dc.typeWorking Papereng


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