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    Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders

    Harstad, Ronald M.
    Pekeč, Aleksandar
    Tsetlin, Ilia
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    [PDF] InformationAggregationAuctions.pdf (337.9Kb)
    Date
    2005
    Format
    Working Paper
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    Abstract
    Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It is possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this makes the proportion of winners known, and thus provides all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2613
    Part of
    Working papers (Department of Economics);WP 06-05
    Part of
    Economics publications
    Citation
    Department of Economics, 2005
    Collections
    • Economics publications (MU)

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