[-] Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHarstad, Ronald M.eng
dc.contributor.authorMares, Vladeng
dc.date.issued2005eng
dc.description.abstractConsider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidders' types. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidders' types are affiliated or independent. We highlight the link between the estimator and full surplus extraction, providing a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-post full surplus extraction, including the possibility of independent types. The results offer sharp insights into the strengths and limits of simple auctions by identifying the source of informational rents in such environments.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2005eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/2626eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 05-15eng
dc.source.urihttp://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2005/wp0515_harstad.pdfeng
dc.subject.lcshAuctions -- Econometric modelseng
dc.subject.lcshSurplus (Economics) -- Econometric modelseng
dc.titleEx-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardlyeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng


Files in this item

[PDF]

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • Economics publications (MU)
    The items in this collection are the scholarly output of the faculty, staff, and students of the Department of Economics.

[-] Show simple item record