On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

dc.contributor.author	Hsu, Judy	eng
dc.contributor.author	Wang, X. H. (X. Henry), 1962-	eng
dc.date.issued	2004	eng
dc.description.abstract	This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.	eng
dc.identifier.citation	Department of Economics, 2004	eng
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2647	eng
dc.publisher	Department of Economics	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Economics publications	eng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity	University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economics	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working papers (Department of Economics);WP 04-16	eng
dc.source.uri	http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2004/wp0416_wang.pdf	eng
dc.subject	licensing	eng
dc.subject	strategic delegation	eng
dc.subject.lcsh	Patent licenses	eng
dc.subject.lcsh	Delegation of authority	eng
dc.title	On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation	eng
dc.type	Working Paper	eng

Economics publications (MU)
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