dc.contributor.author | Mandy, David M. | eng |
dc.contributor.author | Sappington, David E. M. | eng |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | eng |
dc.description.abstract | We show that the incentives a vertically integrated supplier may have to disadvantage or "sabotage" the activities of downstream rivals vary with both the type of sabotage and the nature of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage is typically profitable under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage is often profitable under Cournot competition, but unprofitable under Bertrand competition. Incentives for sabotage can vary non-monotonically with the degree of product differentiation. | eng |
dc.identifier.citation | Department of Economics, 2004 | eng |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2713 | eng |
dc.publisher | Department of Economics | eng |
dc.relation.ispartof | Economics publications | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity | University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economics | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working papers (Department of Economics);WP 04-04 | eng |
dc.rights | OpenAccess. | eng |
dc.rights.license | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License. | |
dc.source.uri | http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2004/wp0404_mandy.pdf | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Trade regulation | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Pricing | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Competition | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Vertical integration | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Sabotage | eng |
dc.title | Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically Related Industries | eng |
dc.type | Working Paper | eng |