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dc.contributor.authorMandy, David M.eng
dc.contributor.authorSappington, David E. M.eng
dc.date.issued2004eng
dc.description.abstractWe show that the incentives a vertically integrated supplier may have to disadvantage or "sabotage" the activities of downstream rivals vary with both the type of sabotage and the nature of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage is typically profitable under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage is often profitable under Cournot competition, but unprofitable under Bertrand competition. Incentives for sabotage can vary non-monotonically with the degree of product differentiation.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2004eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/2713eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 04-04eng
dc.rightsOpenAccess.eng
dc.rights.licenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
dc.source.urihttp://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2004/wp0404_mandy.pdfeng
dc.subject.lcshTrade regulationeng
dc.subject.lcshPricingeng
dc.subject.lcshCompetitioneng
dc.subject.lcshVertical integrationeng
dc.subject.lcshSabotageeng
dc.titleIncentives for Sabotage in Vertically Related Industrieseng
dc.typeWorking Papereng


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