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dc.contributor.authorKeiser, Lael R.eng
dc.contributor.authorMueser, Peter R., 1952-eng
dc.contributor.authorChoi, Seung-Whaneng
dc.coverage.spatialUnited Stateseng
dc.date.issued2003eng
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the impact of the race of individual clients and of the local racial context on the implementation of sanctions for recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in a Midwestern state. We find that although nonwhites are sanctioned at lower rates than whites overall, nonwhites are sanctioned more compared to whites in each local area. This paradox occurs because nonwhites tend to live in areas with lower sanction rates. Consistent with the literature on race and policy, we find that sanction rates increase as the nonwhite population increases until a threshold is reached where nonwhites gain political power.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2003eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/2719eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 03-07eng
dc.rightsOpenAccess.eng
dc.rights.licenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
dc.source.urihttp://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2003/WP0307-Mueser.pdfeng
dc.subjectraceeng
dc.subjectracial dynamicseng
dc.subjectwelfareeng
dc.subject.lcshRaceeng
dc.subject.lcshPublic welfareeng
dc.subject.lcshWelfare recipientseng
dc.titleRace, Bureaucratic Discretion, and the Implementation of Welfare Reformeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng


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