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dc.contributor.authorAura, Saku, 1971-eng
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies married couple's dynamic investment and consumption choices under the assumption that the couple cannot commit across time to not to renegotiate their decisions. The inefficiencies that can arise are characterized. Efficiency properties of different divorce asset division regimes are examined. A stylized common law regime is shown to lead to a fully efficiency in a simple model while it is shown that under community property regime the couple is unlikely to attain full efficiency. The effect of inability to commit across time on the savings level is examined under a tractable special case of the model.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2002eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 02-17eng
dc.subjectrelationship dynamicseng
dc.subject.lcshRelationship qualityeng
dc.subject.lcshCommitment (Psychology)eng
dc.titleUncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargainingeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng

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