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dc.contributor.authorMandy, David M.eng
dc.contributor.authorChikhladze, George, 1978-eng
dc.date.issued2009eng
dc.description.abstractInput price and novel vertical control regulations are derived for a vertically integrated upstream monopolist when the monopolist can engage in non-price discrimination against a downstream rival. The paper extends the literature on sabotage in network industries by characterizing welfare-optimal regulatory policy with a realistic set of policy tools when sabotage can be undertaken, at a cost, by a monopoly access provider who also competes in a differentiated products Bertrand retail duopoly. Welfare optimal regulation balances the conflicting goals of reducing non-price discrimination and stimulating efficient production levels downstream. The regulator can induce the rst best in limited cases when the downstream rival is efficient relative to the downstream affiliate of the monopoly access provider, non-price discrimination by the integrated monopolist is sufficiently costly and downstream competition is not too intense. Otherwise, the regulator faces a trade-off between reducing the double markup problem by pricing access low while imposing restrictions on the control the monopoly input provider can exercise over its retail affiliate, versus pricing access high and allowing unrestricted vertical control within the vertically integrated rm in order to deter non-price discrimination. Discrimination costs and competition intensity determine which policy is optimal.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2009eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/2738eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 01-13eng
dc.rightsOpenAccess.eng
dc.rights.licenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.eng
dc.source.urihttp://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2001/WP0113_Mandy.pdfeng
dc.subjectvertical integrationeng
dc.subject.lcshPrice regulationeng
dc.subject.lcshBanality (Law)eng
dc.subject.lcshDuopolieseng
dc.subject.lcshMonopolistic competitioneng
dc.titleAccess Price and Vertical Control Policies for a Vertically Integrated Upstream Monopolist when Sabotage is Costlyeng
dc.typeWorking Papereng


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