Multi-Dimensional Ideology in the Multi-Member District: An Analysis of the Arizona Legislature

Abstract

American state legislatures provide considerable institutional variation for testing theories of legislative representation, and one such feature is the multi-member district system (MMD). Whereas the U.S. House and most American state legislatures use the single member district system (SMD) in which a single legislator represents one geographic district, several state legislatures still use a system in which more than one legislator is elected from the same district in the same election. Although there can be considerable variation in the rules for such MMDs, one structure common to many state legislatures is a situation in which multiplecandidates run against each other for two seats from one district, and the two receiving the most votes are elected. Clearly, the electoral game is quite different in a situation in which a candidate is likely to be running against not only members of other parties but also another candidate of the same party. The incentives inherent in such a system are quite different than those for a legislator in an SMD, and it likely that such incentives change legislative representation in a number of ways.