The limitations of the Ricardian theory of rent : a study of static theory in relation to changing business practice

Abstract

PART I. Adaptation of the theory of rent to the time of its origin. The early dominance of the landlord class -- The rise of a trading class -- The competitive theory in the natural order of Adam Smith -- The historical basis for the belief in free competition -- The monopoly theory of rent in the natural order -- Wealth centralized in the hands of tradesmen in the existing order -- James Anderson's theory of the relation of the landlord and capitalistic classes -- Ricardo's Theory of Rent, an analysis of the relation of the landlord and capitalistic classes -- Adaptation of the theory of rent to the time of its origin -- The early dominance of the landlord class -- The rise of a trading class -- The competitive theory in the natural order of Adam Smith -- The historical basis for the belief in free competition -- The monopoly theory of rent in the natural order -- Wealth centralized in the hands of tradesmen in the existing order -- James Anderson's theory of the relation of the landlord and capitalistic classes -- Ricardo's Theory of Rent, an analysis of the relation of the landlord and capitalistic classes. PART II. Relation of the landed interests to the promotion and capitalization of railroads -- The distribution of land and the development of railroad traffic -- The relation of farming to the large scale business -- Early theories of the relation of transportation to agriculture -- Rail roads made subsidiary to the development of agriculture -- An improvement in the method of transportation expected to be of advantage to the landlord -- Railroads not operated at cost -- Belief in the sufficiency of competition to determine prices -- The first recognition of the monopoly character of railroads -- Early struggle between the railroads and the landlords -- Resultant high costs of English railways -- Constant increase in the capitalization of English railways -- Depreciation in English land values. PART III. The relation of t ransportation charges to the incone of railroads and of agricultural lands -- The disappearance of the monopoly advantage of the lands near the old centers of population -- Failures of doctrine of costs -- Disadvantage of small shipper during the period of rebates -- The organization of large scale business favored by rebates -- Impossible for the farmer to become his own shipper -- The development of large middlemen organizations -- The rebate or quantity price, granted large business, a restriction on free competition -- Early period of individualistic competition in the grain business -- Railroads side with the grain dealers -- The elevator not simply a labor-saving instrument but a device for the control of the grain business -- Farmers' organizations not confronted by the industrial competition assumed by the classical school -- No profits from integration of processes in agriculture -- Accumulation of intangible assets in manufacturing through the sale of standardized products -- Relation to the rate of interest charged farmers -- PART IV. The co-operative form of agricultural organization not favorable to the centralization of wealth.