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governance spillover effects from cross-listing

dc.contributor.advisorFerris, Stephen P.eng
dc.contributor.authorLiao, Min-Yu (Stella)eng
dc.contributor.otherUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Dissertations. 2012 Dissertationseng
dc.date.issued2013eng
dc.date.submitted2013 Summereng
dc.description"July 2013."eng
dc.description"A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri--Columbia In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy."eng
dc.descriptionDissertation supervisor: Dr. Stephen P. Ferris.eng
dc.descriptionIncludes vita.eng
dc.description.abstract[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] I propose that firms have incentives to respond to their rivals' cross-listings, thereby generating a spillover effect from the cross-listing. The existence of a spillover is an indirect effect of cross-listing and is largely ignored in the literature. More specifically, I test for the possibility of a governance spillover effect on non-cross listing rivals. Because cross-listing creates value for cross-listed firms and increases their attractiveness to investors who value transparency, cross-listing places non-listing rivals at a competitive disadvantage in the financial markets. To remain competitive, these non-cross listing rivals might decide to imitate the governance changes resulting from cross-listing. I use earnings management as my primary governance measure, and find that rivals from the same industry and country as the cross-listing firms exhibit imitative behavior by improving their governance in response to cross-listing. The improvement of governance is achieved through reduced earnings management. This response is immediate and is the strongest in the year of cross-listing. The response persists for at least four years, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, rivals with greater growth opportunities, lower market share, stronger past performance, and larger size exhibit greater improvements in governance. Rivals also react more positively to the listings of the most stringent Level III ADRs. The extent to which non-cross-listing rivals change their governance also depends on various country, industry and firm, characteristics.eng
dc.description.bibrefIncludes bibliographical references (pages 72-77).eng
dc.format.extent1 online resource (vi, 110 pages)eng
dc.identifier.oclc898589237eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/44050
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32469/10355/44050eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartof2012 MU restricted dissertations (MU)eng
dc.rightsAccess is limited to the campus of the University of Missouri--Columbia.eng
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governance -- Evaluationeng
dc.subject.lcshEarnings managementeng
dc.subject.lcshInternational business enterpriseseng
dc.subject.lcshSecuritieseng
dc.subject.lcshStockseng
dc.subject.lcshStock exchangeseng
dc.titleIndirect bonding :eng
dc.titlegovernance spillover effects from cross-listingeng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplineBusiness administration (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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