Individual differences in intuitive processing and moral judgment

Abstract

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is a broad theory of personality proposing a dual-process approach to information processing, involving an analytical-rational and an intuitive-experiential system. This paper integrates CEST into moral psychology to examine whether individual differences in reliance on intuitive processing (faith in intuition, or FI) and need for cognition (NC) affect moral judgments and behavior. Questionnaire data in Study 1 indicated that FI interacted with moral identity and private body consciousness to predict inclinations towards immoral behavior. Results from experimental studies indicate that after thinking about a moral transgression, people high in FI engaged in more compensatory behavior (Study 2), cheated less on an unsolvable IQ test (Study 3), and completed more tasks for charity donations (Study 4). Need for cognition was unrelated to these outcomes. Implications for further examining FI and NC within the context of moral judgments and behavior are discussed.