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    • University of Missouri-Columbia
    • Graduate School - MU Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Dissertations (MU)
    • 2006 Dissertations (MU)
    • 2006 MU dissertations - Freely available online
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    Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology

    Poston, Ted L.
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    [PDF] research.pdf (792.8Kb)
    Date
    2006
    Format
    Thesis
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    Abstract
    The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question.
    URI
    https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4494
    https://hdl.handle.net/10355/4494
    Degree
    Ph. D.
    Thesis Department
    Philosophy (MU)
    Rights
    OpenAccess.
    Collections
    • 2006 MU dissertations - Freely available online
    • Philosophy electronic theses and dissertations (MU)

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