Sellars and Socrates : an investigation of the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology
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The Sellars problem threatens the viability of epistemic foundationalism. Foundationalism claims that there are some beliefs whose justification does not depend upon other beliefs. Foundationalism is a popular, non-skeptical response to the epistemic regress problem. In this dissertation I investigate the Sellars problem for a Socratic epistemology, an epistemological theory that takes the egocentric good reasons question as primary. I argue that the Sellars problem forces one to abandon the foundationalist project for empirical justification. In the place of foundationalist I offer a nondoxastic coherentist account of empirical justification. This account solves the epistemic regress problem. It also secures a positive answer to the egocentric good reasons question.