dc.contributor.author | Foss, Nicolai J., 1964- | eng |
dc.contributor.author | Klein, Peter G. | eng |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | eng |
dc.description | "Revised version: 8 June 2008" | eng |
dc.description | "Prepared for Raphael Wittek, Tom Snijders, and Victor Nee, eds., The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research." | eng |
dc.description | Includes bibliographical references. | eng |
dc.description.abstract | This chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance.
These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward. | eng |
dc.identifier.citation | Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008. | eng |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10355/45 | eng |
dc.language | English | eng |
dc.publisher | Russell Sage Foundation | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofcollection | Agricultural Economics publications (MU) | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity | University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. Division of Applied Social Sciences. Department of Agricultural Economics | eng |
dc.subject | Organizational Economics | eng |
dc.subject | governance structures | eng |
dc.subject | governance mechanisms | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Corporate governance | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Rational choice theory | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Industrial organization (Economic theory) | eng |
dc.title | Organizational Governance | eng |
dc.type | Book chapter | eng |