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dc.contributor.authorFoss, Nicolai J., 1964-eng
dc.contributor.authorKlein, Peter G.eng
dc.date.issued2008eng
dc.description"Revised version: 8 June 2008"eng
dc.description"Prepared for Raphael Wittek, Tom Snijders, and Victor Nee, eds., The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research."eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.description.abstractThis chapter reviews and discusses rational-choice approaches to organizational governance. These approaches are found primarily in organizational economics (virtually no rational-choice organizational sociology exists), particularly in transaction cost economics, principal-agent theory, and the incomplete-contracts or property-rights approach. We distill the main unifying characteristics of these streams, survey each stream, and offer some critical commentary and suggestions for moving forward.eng
dc.identifier.citationHandbook of Rational Choice Social Research, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008.eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/45eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherRussell Sage Foundationeng
dc.relation.ispartofcollectionAgricultural Economics publications (MU)eng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. Division of Applied Social Sciences. Department of Agricultural Economicseng
dc.subjectOrganizational Economicseng
dc.subjectgovernance structureseng
dc.subjectgovernance mechanismseng
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governanceeng
dc.subject.lcshRational choice theoryeng
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial organization (Economic theory)eng
dc.titleOrganizational Governanceeng
dc.typeBook chaptereng


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