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dc.contributor.advisorJohnson, Robert N.eng
dc.contributor.authorBerntsen, Jason, 1972-eng
dc.date.issued2007eng
dc.date.submitted2007 Summereng
dc.descriptionThe entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionTitle from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on November 26, 2007)eng
dc.descriptionVita.eng
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph. D.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2007.eng
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation is about the prospects for non-cognitivism. Chapter One provides some background and introduces the remaining chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the distinction between non-cognitivism about moral thought and non-cognitivism about moral discourse. This distinction is often overlooked. I show, however, that it has at least two important philosophical implications. I also show that Richard Joyce's recent attempt to show that the "real" philosophical debate is over the truth of non-cognitivism about moral discourse fails. Motivation internalism figures in both a standard objection to non-cognitivism and a standard argument for non-cognitivism. In Chapter 3 I show that two popular versions of motivation internalism cannot explain why moral matters are practical matters. Chapters Four and Five both deal with what is widely considered to be one of the most pressing objections to non-cognitivism, the so-called Frege-Geach problem. In Chapter Four I argue that there is, in fact, no such thing as the Frege-Geach problem and distinguish four distinct arguments that have been discussed under that heading. I show that while none of these arguments are conclusive as they stand, they each provide the non-cognitivist with a distinct challenge. I briefly sketch ways in which non-cognitivists can attempt to answer each challenge. In Chapter Five I present a recently proposed solution to "the problem of reasoning," a Frege-Geach style argument against non-cognitivism, and argue that that solution does not work.eng
dc.description.bibrefIncludes bibliographical referenceseng
dc.identifier.merlinb61466864eng
dc.identifier.oclc182520355eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32469/10355/4659eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/4659
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri--Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertationseng
dc.rightsOpenAccess.eng
dc.rights.licenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
dc.subjectFrege-Geach problem.eng
dc.subjectFrege-Geach problemeng
dc.subject.lcshInternalism (Theory of knowledge)eng
dc.subject.lcshEmotivismeng
dc.subject.lcshTruthfulness and falsehoodeng
dc.titleNon-cognitivism, internalism, and the Frege-Geach problemeng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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