The division of moral labor : prospects, problems and progress in examining the moral status/social category relationship
Abstract
[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT REQUEST OF AUTHOR.] This thesis outlines a theoretical framework that yields testable predictions concerning how social categorization impacts moral regard. According to the model, thinking about a person in terms of their social category influences ascriptions of responsibility and conferrals of rights because individuals tend to sort social groups into moral kinds. Empirical studies demonstrate that the extent to which a person is perceived as deserving of responsibility (blame, punishment) and worthy of consideration (concern, protection) depends on their perceived gender: men receive more responsibility for wrongdoing, while women receive more consideration when wronged. Each bias correlates positively with benevolent, but not hostile, sexism; modern sexism is associated with the considerability, but not responsibility, biases. A different paradigm failed to find support for these predictions. Follow-up studies suggest stereotype-incongruent (high agency/competence) and gender-normative (high communality/warmth) women receive comparatively greater ascriptions of responsibility and considerability, respectively. Asymmetrical ascriptions of moral regard also emerge as a function of racial categorization (White versus Black), and are related to modern forms of racism (symbolic racism). In addition to confirming links between social categorization and moral cognition, these results have important implications for theories of moral status ascription in that, e.g., they suggest that researchers should attend to how perceived psychological dispositions (and not just capacities) are relevant to moral status ascription, provide support for research suggesting agency and patiency ascriptions are inversely related, and challenge literature that suggests ascriptions of moral responsibility are amplified by perceptions of intentional agency, broadly, and cognitive sophistication, in particular.--From public.pdf
Degree
M.A.
Thesis Department
Rights
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