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dc.contributor.advisorMilyo, Jeffreyeng
dc.contributor.authorLynch, Andrew A.eng
dc.date.issued2007eng
dc.date.submitted2007 Summereng
dc.descriptionThe entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionTitle from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on January 7, 2008)eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.descriptionThesis (M.A.) University of Missouri-Columbia 2007.eng
dc.descriptionDissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Economics.eng
dc.description.abstractWhile much time has been spent delving into relationship between campaign spending and election outcomes, little has been spent on the question of campaign finance laws on elections. Until Eom and Gross addressed the issue in, "Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions between Gubernatorial Candidates," the effects of laws on campaign spending were always assumed to be uniform between all candidates. Running a standard OLS regression with the disparity between campaign spending of incumbent and challengers in gubernatorial elections as the dependent and contribution limits and other control variables as independents, they conclude that these laws do not impact the disparity between candidates in spending. I recognized flaws in their analysis in three areas: 1) small data set of 57 observations, 2) lack of adequate control variables, and 3) an ill defined law independent variable. Before proposing other models or doing further work, I determined it best to instead retest their model after fixing these three flaws. Using a data set of 368 observations, including state control variables and disaggregating the law variable into separate corporate and individual limitations yielded the opposite conclusion of their paper. Using the model they have proposed corporate contribution limits have a significant negative impact on spending disparity while individual contribution limits have a significant positive impact on spending disparity. Borrowing their terminology, this would imply corporate limits increase election competition while individual limits decrease election competition.eng
dc.identifier.merlinb61733891eng
dc.identifier.oclc187905728eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/5104
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32469/10355/5104eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartof2007 Freely available theses (MU)eng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Theses. 2007 Theseseng
dc.subject.lcshCampaign funds -- Law and legislationeng
dc.subject.lcshGovernors -- Electionseng
dc.subject.lcshCorporations -- Political activityeng
dc.titleRe-examining the effects of contribution limits on campaign expenditures in gubernatorial electionseng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelMasterseng
thesis.degree.nameM.A.eng


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