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    • University of Missouri-Columbia
    • Graduate School - MU Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Dissertations (MU)
    • 2008 Dissertations (MU)
    • 2008 MU dissertations - Freely available online
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    A defense of moral perception

    McBrayer, Justin Patrick
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    Date
    2008
    Format
    Thesis
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    I defend the possibility of moral perception and the contentious view that at least some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. The first part of the dissertation is spent establishing the possibility of moral perception by showing that putative cases of moral perception meet both the internal and external constraints on perception. For example, I argue that it is possible for a subject to have a mental state that represents a moral property and that we can be in the appropriate causal relation with moral facts regardless of whether they turn out to be secondary natural properties, non-secondary natural properties, or non-natural properties. The second part of the dissertation is spent showing that moral perception has epistemic import. I show that moral perception is sufficient for moral knowledge on a number of contemporary accounts of the epistemology of perception, including indirect realist, direct realist, evidentialist, and proper functionalist accounts of perceptual knowledge.
    URI
    https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/5510
    https://hdl.handle.net/10355/5510
    Degree
    Ph. D.
    Thesis Department
    Philosophy (MU)
    Rights
    OpenAccess.
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
    Collections
    • 2008 MU dissertations - Freely available online
    • Philosophy electronic theses and dissertations (MU)

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