Shared more. Cited more. Safe forever.
    • advanced search
    • submit works
    • about
    • help
    • contact us
    • login
    View Item 
    •   MOspace Home
    • University of Missouri-Columbia
    • Graduate School - MU Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Dissertations (MU)
    • 2009 Dissertations (MU)
    • 2009 MU dissertations - Freely available online
    • View Item
    •   MOspace Home
    • University of Missouri-Columbia
    • Graduate School - MU Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Dissertations (MU)
    • 2009 Dissertations (MU)
    • 2009 MU dissertations - Freely available online
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.
    advanced searchsubmit worksabouthelpcontact us

    Browse

    All of MOspaceCommunities & CollectionsDate IssuedAuthor/ContributorTitleIdentifierThesis DepartmentThesis AdvisorThesis SemesterThis CollectionDate IssuedAuthor/ContributorTitleIdentifierThesis DepartmentThesis AdvisorThesis Semester

    Statistics

    Most Popular ItemsStatistics by CountryMost Popular AuthorsStatistics by Referrer

    What economic sanctions signal : cheap talk, or putting your money where your mouth is?

    Venteicher, Jerome Felix, 1981-
    View/Open
    [PDF] public.pdf (2.375Kb)
    [PDF] short.pdf (9.999Kb)
    [PDF] research.pdf (541.5Kb)
    Date
    2009
    Format
    Thesis
    Metadata
    [+] Show full item record
    Abstract
    This study addresses the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy through two research questions. The first assesses the relationship between economic and military coercion, the studies of which have remained largely unlinked theoretically and empirically. My study bridges these gaps, developing a formal model of international dispute escalation beginning with the threat of a sanction, escalating through sanction imposition, and culminating with armed force. Presenting a simple argument of issue salience, the model predicts that the more the sender (challenger) values the issue under dispute, the more likely the dispute is to escalate to violence. Empirical evidence supports my theory that sender issue salience remains a key variable in determining dispute escalation. Since the end of the Cold War in particular, states have used economic coercion as a precursor to military force. My findings have significant implications for scholars and policymakers alike, as I argue that the way states use sanctions has changed dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second research question tests a long-standing assumption in the literature. Researchers have presumed that sanctions serve as tacit signals to states other than their primary target to avoid the target's behavior that brought about the sanction. I put this assumption to the test and find no direct evidence of this signaling channel. However, I argue that further research is needed to fully uncover this signaling process.
    URI
    https://hdl.handle.net/10355/6164
    https://doi.org/10.32469/10355/6164
    Degree
    Ph. D.
    Thesis Department
    Political science (MU)
    Rights
    OpenAccess.
    This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
    Collections
    • Political Science electronic theses and dissertations (MU)
    • 2009 MU dissertations - Freely available online

    Send Feedback
    hosted by University of Missouri Library Systems
     

     


    Send Feedback
    hosted by University of Missouri Library Systems