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dc.contributor.advisorMelnyk, Andrew, 1962-eng
dc.contributor.authorHedderman, Jason, 1973-eng
dc.date.issued2008eng
dc.date.submitted2008 Falleng
dc.descriptionTitle from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb. 25, 2010).eng
dc.descriptionThe entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionDissertation advisor: Dr. Andrew Melnyk.eng
dc.descriptionVita.eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.descriptionPh. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2008.eng
dc.descriptionDissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Philosophy.eng
dc.description.abstractIt is currently popular among physicalist philosophers of mind to suppose that phenomenal consciousness is essentially a representational phenomenon and that a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness will prove to be the best sort of reductive theory physicalists can offer. In my dissertation I take steps to show that this is not the case and suggest that a phenomenal-neural type identity theory should be the preferred physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. Specifically, I consider the prospects for Michael Tye's PANIC theory. The PANIC theory is the most fully developed, and perhaps most promising, representational theory of phenomenal consciousness to date. The main thesis of Tye's theory is the reductive claim that phenomenal character is one and same as a certain sort of representational content. Tye argues for this thesis by appealing to its explanatory power. I show, however, that the thesis in question is inessential to the relevant explanatory features of the PANIC theory and that phenomenal-neural type identity theory, when supplemented with those features, enjoys all the explanatory benefits the PANIC theory. Furthermore, I argue that the PANIC theory cannot adequately account for how phenomenal character could be causally relevant to behavior, which is a problem the phenomenal-neural type identity theory easily avoids. Though these considerations alone may not establish the superiority of the phenomenal-neural type identity theory over that of that of the PANIC theory, I hope to demonstrate that the phenomenal-neural type identity approach to reducing phenomenal consciousness has much more going for it than is typically acknowledged and that the phenomenal-neural type identity theory I develop is a serious rival to the PANIC theory.eng
dc.format.extentiv, 130 pageseng
dc.identifier.oclc554741298eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/6610
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32469/10355/6610eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartofcollectionUniversity of Missouri--Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertationseng
dc.subject.lcshConsciousnesseng
dc.subject.lcshPhilosophy of mindeng
dc.subject.lcshMaterialismeng
dc.titleThe phenomenal brain : making room for a phenomenal-neural type identity theory of phenomenal consciousnesseng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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