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dc.contributor.authorWeirich, Paul, 1946-eng
dc.date.issued2007-12eng
dc.description.abstractHow do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium.eng
dc.identifier.citationPhilosophy of Science, 74 (December 2007) pp. 790-801.eng
dc.identifier.issn0031-8248eng
dc.identifier.otherDOI: 10.1086/525622eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/8589eng
dc.publisherPhilosophy of Scienceeng
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophy publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophyeng
dc.source.harvestedChicago Journals. Philosophy of Science web siteeng
dc.subjectprinciples of rationalityeng
dc.subject.lcshGame theoryeng
dc.subject.lcshEquilibrium (Economics)eng
dc.subject.lcshEconomics, Mathematicaleng
dc.titleInitiating Coordinationeng
dc.typeArticleeng


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