dc.contributor.author | Weirich, Paul, 1946- | eng |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | eng |
dc.description.abstract | How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his
strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium. | eng |
dc.identifier.citation | Philosophy of Science, 74 (December 2007) pp. 790-801. | eng |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8248 | eng |
dc.identifier.other | DOI: 10.1086/525622 | eng |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10355/8589 | eng |
dc.publisher | Philosophy of Science | eng |
dc.relation.ispartof | Philosophy publications | eng |
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity | University of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Philosophy | eng |
dc.source | Harvested from: Chicago Journals. Philosophy of Science web site | eng |
dc.subject | principles of rationality | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Game theory | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Equilibrium (Economics) | eng |
dc.subject.lcsh | Economics, Mathematical | eng |
dc.title | Initiating Coordination | eng |
dc.type | Article | eng |