The nonepistemic psychological requirements for knowledge

Abstract

A question tracing back to Plato's Meno asks, "What is knowledge?" Very plausibly, a person knows a proposition only if he believes it and it is true. However, true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. A person who believes that the smiling man next to me is a murderer because of his schizophrenia does not know that the man is a murderer, even if his belief happens to be true. Hence, many epistemologists think that knowledge requires a justified or rational, true belief, one that was not acquired by luck or accident. Understanding this epistemic (ornormative) requirement for knowledge has been a focus of contemporary epistemology. Unfortunately, there has been a neglect of the important question of whether there are any further nonepistemic, psychological requirements for knowledge beyond simple belief. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore this question. I examine whether degrees of belief, confidence, the absence of doubt, and certainty are required for knowledge. I argue that beliefs do not come in degrees, confidence is not required for knowledge, the absence of doubt is required for knowledge, and certainty is not required for knowledge. In short, the only nonepistemic, psychological requirement for knowledge other than belief is the absence of doubt.