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dc.contributor.advisorMarkie, Peter J., 1950-eng
dc.contributor.authorMoon, Andrew Y., 1982-eng
dc.date.issued2010eng
dc.date.submitted2010 Summereng
dc.descriptionTitle from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on August 23, 2010).eng
dc.descriptionThe entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionDissertation advisor: Dr. Peter J. Markie.eng
dc.descriptionVita.eng
dc.descriptionPh. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010.eng
dc.description.abstractA question tracing back to Plato's Meno asks, "What is knowledge?" Very plausibly, a person knows a proposition only if he believes it and it is true. However, true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. A person who believes that the smiling man next to me is a murderer because of his schizophrenia does not know that the man is a murderer, even if his belief happens to be true. Hence, many epistemologists think that knowledge requires a justified or rational, true belief, one that was not acquired by luck or accident. Understanding this epistemic (ornormative) requirement for knowledge has been a focus of contemporary epistemology. Unfortunately, there has been a neglect of the important question of whether there are any further nonepistemic, psychological requirements for knowledge beyond simple belief. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore this question. I examine whether degrees of belief, confidence, the absence of doubt, and certainty are required for knowledge. I argue that beliefs do not come in degrees, confidence is not required for knowledge, the absence of doubt is required for knowledge, and certainty is not required for knowledge. In short, the only nonepistemic, psychological requirement for knowledge other than belief is the absence of doubt.eng
dc.description.bibrefIncludes bibliographical referenceseng
dc.format.extentv, 102 pageseng
dc.identifier.merlinb80170717eng
dc.identifier.oclc671484409eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10355/8881
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.32469/10355/8881eng
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri--Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertationseng
dc.rightsOpenAccess.eng
dc.rights.licenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
dc.subject.lcshKnowledge, Theory ofeng
dc.subject.lcshBelief and doubteng
dc.titleThe nonepistemic psychological requirements for knowledgeeng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.namePh. D.eng


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