What were we thinking?: an analysis of Department of Defense advanced studies group theses from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 1992-2002

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What were we thinking?: an analysis of Department of Defense advanced studies group theses from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 1992-2002

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/8886

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dc.contributor.advisor Hutchinson, Sandra L. (Sandra Lynn), 1956- en_US
dc.contributor.author Gebara, Andrew J., 1969- en_US
dc.coverage.spatial United States
dc.coverage.spatial Iraq
dc.coverage.temporal 1991-2003 en_US
dc.coverage.temporal 1979-1991 en_US
dc.coverage.temporal 1900-1999 en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2010-10-26T13:54:40Z
dc.date.available 2010-10-26T13:54:40Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2010 Summer en_US
dc.identifier.other GebaraA-072210-D283 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10355/8886
dc.description Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on August 16, 2010). en_US
dc.description The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. en_US
dc.description Dissertation advisor: Dr. Sandra Hutchinson. en_US
dc.description Vita. en_US
dc.description Includes bibliographical references. en_US
dc.description Ed. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010. en_US
dc.description Dissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Educational leadership and policy analysis. en_US
dc.description.abstract The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq left little doubt that many military and civilian leaders downplayed or entirely missed the possibility of an Iraqi insurgency. Volumes have been or will be written about the major decisions made by senior civilian and military leaders at the time. Similarly, historians have attempted to record the attitudes of those junior Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen tasked with implementing the operations derived from those decisions. Absent from the research, however, is a concentrated analysis of countless operational-level decisions made by mid-level officers, or the motivations behind these decisions. A mixed-methods study investigating the research produced by the 1,124 graduates of each of the armed services' elite Advanced Studies Group planning schools provides an avenue to answer the question, "What issues did key mid-level military officers perceive to be compelling in the 1992-2002 timeframe?" Through a qualitative assessment of graduates' theses and a quantitative review through collation along the Range of Military Operations instrument, the researcher gained important insights into what key mid-level military officers were thinking during the time between the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A review of the data shows little substantive difference between the graduates of the three schools: one third of the graduates wrote theses concerning conventional warfare and another one fifth wrote about routine military operations. With few exceptions, these officers, studying at three different locations in Kansas, Virginia, and Alabama, thought the same issues were compelling during the last decade of the twentieth century. It is notable that only 2.7% of graduates wrote their papers about the topics that have defined the military operating environment in the first decade of the twenty-first century: terrorism and counterinsurgency. While the failure to anticipate the operating environment is disappointing, the goals of these schools are not to produce graduates that predict the future, but ones who can engage in double-loop learning and thus adapt quickly to changing circumstances. By discouraging or even restricting students from writing about topics in their primary field of expertise, Advanced Studies Group faculty can better exercise the intellectual flexibility of their students, to the long-term benefit of their graduates, the military, and the United States. en_US
dc.format.extent xiii, 242 pages en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Missouri--Columbia en_US
dc.relation.ispartof 2010 Freely available dissertations (MU) en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Armed Forces -- Officers -- Decision making en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Military art and science -- Bibliography en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Leadership en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Dissertations, Academic en_US
dc.subject.lcsh United States -- History, Military en_US
dc.subject.lcsh Iraq -- History en_US
dc.title What were we thinking?: an analysis of Department of Defense advanced studies group theses from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 1992-2002 en_US
dc.type Thesis en_US
thesis.degree.discipline Educational leadership and policy analysis en_US
thesis.degree.grantor University of Missouri--Columbia en_US
thesis.degree.name Ed. D. en_US
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en_US
dc.identifier.merlin b8017047x en_US
dc.identifier.merlin b8017047x
dc.identifier.oclc 668451888 en_US
dc.relation.ispartofcommunity University of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Dissertations. 2010 Dissertations


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