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dc.contributor.advisorHutchinson, Sandra L. (Sandra Lynn), 1956-eng
dc.contributor.authorGebara, Andrew J., 1969-eng
dc.coverage.spatialUnited Stateseng
dc.coverage.spatialIraqeng
dc.coverage.temporal1991-2003eng
dc.coverage.temporal1979-1991eng
dc.coverage.temporal1900-1999eng
dc.date.issued2010eng
dc.date.submitted2010 Summereng
dc.descriptionTitle from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on August 16, 2010).eng
dc.descriptionThe entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file.eng
dc.descriptionDissertation advisor: Dr. Sandra Hutchinson.eng
dc.descriptionVita.eng
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references.eng
dc.descriptionEd. D. University of Missouri--Columbia 2010.eng
dc.descriptionDissertations, Academic -- University of Missouri--Columbia -- Educational leadership and policy analysis.eng
dc.description.abstractThe aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq left little doubt that many military and civilian leaders downplayed or entirely missed the possibility of an Iraqi insurgency. Volumes have been or will be written about the major decisions made by senior civilian and military leaders at the time. Similarly, historians have attempted to record the attitudes of those junior Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen tasked with implementing the operations derived from those decisions. Absent from the research, however, is a concentrated analysis of countless operational-level decisions made by mid-level officers, or the motivations behind these decisions. A mixed-methods study investigating the research produced by the 1,124 graduates of each of the armed services' elite Advanced Studies Group planning schools provides an avenue to answer the question, "What issues did key mid-level military officers perceive to be compelling in the 1992-2002 timeframe?" Through a qualitative assessment of graduates' theses and a quantitative review through collation along the Range of Military Operations instrument, the researcher gained important insights into what key mid-level military officers were thinking during the time between the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A review of the data shows little substantive difference between the graduates of the three schools: one third of the graduates wrote theses concerning conventional warfare and another one fifth wrote about routine military operations. With few exceptions, these officers, studying at three different locations in Kansas, Virginia, and Alabama, thought the same issues were compelling during the last decade of the twentieth century. It is notable that only 2.7% of graduates wrote their papers about the topics that have defined the military operating environment in the first decade of the twenty-first century: terrorism and counterinsurgency. While the failure to anticipate the operating environment is disappointing, the goals of these schools are not to produce graduates that predict the future, but ones who can engage in double-loop learning and thus adapt quickly to changing circumstances. By discouraging or even restricting students from writing about topics in their primary field of expertise, Advanced Studies Group faculty can better exercise the intellectual flexibility of their students, to the long-term benefit of their graduates, the military, and the United States.eng
dc.format.extentxiii, 242 pageseng
dc.identifier.merlinb8017047xeng
dc.identifier.merlinb8017047xeng
dc.identifier.oclc668451888eng
dc.identifier.otherGebaraA-072210-D283eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10355/8886eng
dc.publisherUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
dc.relation.ispartof2010 Freely available dissertations (MU)eng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. Graduate School. Theses and Dissertations. Dissertations. 2010 Dissertationseng
dc.subject.lcshArmed Forces -- Officers -- Decision makingeng
dc.subject.lcshMilitary art and science -- Bibliographyeng
dc.subject.lcshLeadershipeng
dc.subject.lcshDissertations, Academiceng
dc.subject.lcshUnited States -- History, Militaryeng
dc.subject.lcshIraq -- Historyeng
dc.titleWhat were we thinking?: an analysis of Department of Defense advanced studies group theses from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom I, 1992-2002eng
dc.typeThesiseng
thesis.degree.disciplineEducational leadership and policy analysis (MU)eng
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Missouri--Columbiaeng
thesis.degree.levelDoctoraleng
thesis.degree.nameEd. D.eng


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