The systemc and domestic determinants of antidumping trade remedies

Abstract

[EMBARGOED UNTIL 8/1/2024] Why do firms demand antidumping protectionism? The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how domestic and systemic factors affect national filing patterns throughout the global political economy. I first argue that countries that are economically integrated into global markets should be associated with less demand for antidumping protectionism. In particular, countries with higher leves of trade and financial flows should receive fewer petitions for antidumping protectionism from firms overall, ceteris paribus. I secondly argue that government responsiveness to petition filings is further conditioned by incumbent government ideology, finding that right wing governments are significantly less likely to respond to filed petitions compared to other types of government. Finally, I argue that governments with highly institutionalized incumbent political parties are more likely to respond to petition filings in order to maintain power and liberal trade regimes. I test this theoretical argument with a series of international and political indicators collected from 33 countries between 1978-2015, finding support for these arguments. The findings suggest that systemic economic variables structure country-level preferences for antidumping policies, while domestic political variables condition responses to systemic-level phenomena.