Philosophy electronic theses and dissertations (MU)
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Item Contrastive knowledge how(University of Missouri--Columbia, 2024) Shahi, Sukhvinder Kaur; Ariew, AndréClassical empiricists are notorious for claiming that knowledge-how is a complex disposition or ability that is directly exhibited in action. This dissertation evaluates that claim against the background of contemporary cognitive science. More specifically, it develops a broadly cognitivist theory of knowledge how and argues that this theory outperforms other theories. In the first chapter, I explain and address a key desiderata that any adequate theory of knowledge how should explain, namely novelty. I argue that the argument from versatility of knowledge how needs to start by delineating two aspects of novelty: variability and robustness. I argue that none of the leading theories that have been developed has a convincing reply to the novelty challenge. In the second chapter, I propose an alternative theory, which proposes that understanding practical knowledge requires acknowledging a contrastive dimension. A contrast set (or a set of alternatives) in epistemology refers to a group of propositions or possibilities that are relevant to a specific knowledge claim. When a person knows a fact, they don't just know that one specific thing is true; they also know that certain other possibilities are false. This set of excluded possibilities forms the contrast set. I argue that contrastivism lends itself to an economical account of knowledge how by explaining the other features of knowledge how: gradability, flexibility, generativity. In offering the proposal of contrastive knowledge how, I develop a viable alternative to the intellectualism/anti-intellectualism debate, and I outline a hybrid model of acquisition of knowledge how. The third chapter raises an objection to the contrastive account, about the much discussed thought experiment involving Mary, the color scientist who is confined to a black and white room and the knowledge she acquires when she encounters red for the first time. I reframe the famous Knowledge Argument into what I call the "Surprise Argument," focusing on the surprise and novel insight Mary gains upon seeing red. I provide a contrastive solution to this challenge by proposing that Mary's new knowledge is contrastive in nature--she not only learns what red is but also what it is not, highlighting a relational aspect to perceptual knowledge. I address an objection to applying contrastive knowledge to Mary's case of seeing red for the first time which centers on whether her knowledge of red is inherently singular and non-relational. This objection stems from theories of "quality space" in sensory perception, which argue that sensory experiences are organized by relational contrasts, helping individuals distinguish qualities like color only through perceptual differences. The contrastive proposal suggests that knowledge of a single color can inherently include a capacity to reject non-matches, challenging the necessity of a quality space where knowledge of one color requires knowledge of others. This approach underscores that color knowledge in particular and knowledge how in general involves complex relational processing, where contrastive understanding doesn't always demand explicit comparisons.Item Could gender be an attribute of God?(University of Missouri--Columbia, 2024) Nourbakhshi, Hamid; Boyce, KennethThis thesis examines whether gender can be considered an attribute of God, examining Biblical depictions of God in masculine terms alongside modern egalitarian concerns within the context of Abrahamic religious traditions, particularly focusing on Catholic tradition in Christianity. One of the key questions that this thesis addresses is if attributing gender to God conflicts with imago Dei doctrine that says all humans equally bear the divine image. I argue that there is a conceptual gap between God's full attributes and those relevant for human embodiment of the imago Dei. I argue that God's gender needs not determine attributes within the imago Dei--that God's gender can be image-irrelevant. This distinction allows for harmonizing the traditional view of God's gender with the concepts of God's perfection and equal human dignity. Men and women can be equal image-bearers of a gendered God, if God's gender is not a constitutive part of the image. Furthermore, I give an argument why God's gender cannot be an image-relevant attribute, even if God is equally gendered or non-gendered. Because if God is gendered or nongendered and God's gender is image-relevant, then the people who have both genders or none, would be respectively greater and inferior image-bearers of God. Although in my proposal God can be metaphysically gendered, I argue that gender diversity beyond binaries, plus ethical issues with parenting metaphors, may favor a non-gendered language for the God-talk--that the most metaphysically accurate language may not be the best language for God-talk.Item The confusion of natural selection(University of Missouri--Columbia, 2024) Wei, Chuanke; Ariew, AndreThis dissertation is divided into four parts: an introduction and three papers. The introduction offers a concise overview of natural selection and elucidates how the three papers are interconnected within this dissertation. Each of the three papers addresses a crucial aspect of natural selection. The first paper delves into the debate on whether natural selection can be characterized as a mechanism within the framework of the new Mechanists. It argues that such characterization is implausible due to the difficulty in identifying appropriate phenomena for which natural selection is responsible. The second paper examines the relationship between adaptive just-so stories and adequate explanations. It argues that some adaptive just-so stories fail to transition into adequate explanations, even when supported by empirical evidence. Furthermore, it suggests that even if certain adaptive just-so stories can transition into adequate explanations, the required evidence differs due to the presence of two models of natural selection. The last paper discusses natural selection explanations involved in evolutionary debunking arguments. It argues against basing these arguments on natural selection, proposing instead that addressing challenges arising from the explanatory scope of natural selection is more plausible through focusing on mutation as the basis for such arguments.Item Virtue reliabilism and favorable epistemic environments(University of Missouri--Columbia, 2024) Alvear, Fernando; Boyce, KennethThis dissertation develops a virtue-theoretic framework that properly considers the role of the epistemic environment in the acquisition of knowledge and other related normative statuses. It argues that such a framework provides a series of theoretical benefits: it enables an improved articulation of the safety condition for knowledge, motivates an appropriate analysis of fake barn cases, and furnishes tools to assess the epistemic harms caused by deepfakes. The main strategy used to understand the effects of the epistemic environment in these issues is to analyze the normativity of the practices in which skillful performances take place. The central idea is that these practices involve norms that require the agent's local environment to be shaped in specific ways.Item A defense of the relational account of morality(University of Missouri--Columbia, 2023) Tiwari, Alok; Johnson, Robert N.In this essay I shall defend the thesis that morality is an intrinsically relational normative domain constituted by relational claims and corresponding directed duties. On the relational approach to morality, moral considerations are requirements on one's agency that are grounded in the claims that particular others have against the agent. My central thesis is that all moral obligations are directed duties: an agent A has a moral obligation to do X if and only if A owes a duty to some patient B to do X. Moral wrongs, it follows, always wrong someone.