Self-deception and epistemic blame
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This dissertation consists of three papers, and each of the papers has a main question: a) how do we reconcile the knowledge thesis (namely, a view which says that it is impossible for an agent to act intentionally without knowing what she is doing) with self-deception? b) Do self-deceivers really believe a justified unpleasant proposition that not-P, while only accepting a pleasant unjustified proposition that P without believing it? c) What is the best account of epistemic blame? In the first chapter of my dissertation, I explain and then criticize Eric Marcus' (2019) solution for the reconciliation between the knowledge thesis and self-deception. Then, I offer an account of a self-deceiver's knowledge which shows how self-deception is compatible with the knowledge thesis. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I lay out different views of the belief- acceptance distinction and show that the views at issue cannot properly solve the static puzzle of self-deception (namely, a puzzle according to which a self-deceiver holds two contradictory beliefs simultaneously), in spite of Erik Funkhouser's (2019) claim that the belief-acceptance distinction is the best strategy to solve the puzzle. And the final chapter of my dissertation belongs to epistemic blame. In this chapter, after explaining four different theories of epistemic blame (namely, the relationship-based view, the agency-cultivation account, the desire-based view, and the emotion-based theory), I pick out the emotion-based theory of epistemic blame as the only theory potential to be revised. After revising the theory, I show why this theory has better explanatory power than the other theories of epistemic blame.
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Ph. D.