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    • Graduate Studies - Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Theses and Dissertations (MU)
    • Dissertations (MU)
    • 2008 Dissertations (MU)
    • 2008 MU dissertations - Freely available online
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    Intuitions and adequate philosophical solutions

    Haugen, Christopher Allen
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    [PDF] research.pdf (556.1Kb)
    Date
    2008
    Format
    Thesis
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Philosophical investigation relies on intuition; among other things, intuitions are used to discover problems and intuitions are used to provide solutions to those problems. I provide an analysis of three kinds of philosophical problems and their solutions. "No principle" problems are rather basic; roughly this is the problem of justifying and explaining intuitive particular judgments. I largely assume that a subsuming principle is a solution to this problem. There is a problem of competing solutions; i.e. that several solutions to no principle problems can be offered and yet at most only one can be true. I call this the "too many principles" problem. Finally there is are aporia; this is a set of individually plausible and yet jointly inconsistent propositions. My thesis is that if one's solution to either a too many principle problem or an aporia crucially relies on intuition, then the solution is not an adequate solution.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5554
    Degree
    Ph. D.
    Thesis Department
    Philosophy (MU)
    Part of
    2008 Freely available dissertations (MU)
    Collections
    • Philosophy electronic theses and dissertations (MU)
    • 2008 MU dissertations - Freely available online

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