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dc.contributor.authorZhao, Jingangeng
dc.contributor.authorWang, X. H. (X. Henry), 1962-eng
dc.description.abstractThis paper establishes three new results for multiproduct oligopolies: 1) it presents the first explicit expression of Nash equilibria for asymmetric multiproduct oligopolies; 2) it shows that reducing a multiproduct firm's cost in Bertrand oligopolies will reduce its profits if the cost-reducing unit is sufficiently small; and 3) it demonstrates that a multiproduct firm has no incentive to eliminate a product whose sales are zero. Because a single-product firm whose sales are zero is indifferent between exiting and staying, and its cost reductions always increase its profits, our results are unique to the multiproduct firm, and they suggest that extending oligopoly studies from a single product to multi-products could be as significant as the extension of calculus from a single variable to multi-variables.eng
dc.identifier.citationDepartment of Economics, 2007eng
dc.publisherDepartment of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics publicationseng
dc.relation.ispartofcommunityUniversity of Missouri-Columbia. College of Arts and Sciences. Department of Economicseng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers (Department of Economics);WP 07-03eng
dc.subjectEffect of cost reductioneng
dc.subjectmultiproduct oligopolyeng
dc.subjectprice competitioneng
dc.subjectquantity competitioneng
dc.subject.lcshCost controleng
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial concentrationeng
dc.subject.lcshOpen price systemseng
dc.subject.lcshCompetition -- Quantityeng
dc.titleWhy Are Firms Sometimes Unwilling to Reduce Costs?eng
dc.typeWorking Papereng

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