Enlarging the possibility space for scientific model-based explanation
Abstract
Two prominent views in the scientific explanation literature are: (1) that scientific explanations should be ontic or track causal or constitutive relations between the explanans and explanandum; (2) Idealizations in scientific models can be either epistemically dispensable or indispensable in principle. (1) manifests in the requirements which proponents of that view hold for scientific models to be deemed explanatory. Per these advocates, scientific models must not only track causal or constitutive relations but must include some mapping from the model components to the target system. (2) represents something like the current state of play for understanding the place of idealizations in scientific models and involves the longstanding issue of intertheoretic reduction. Idealizations can either be epistemically indispensable (that is not derivable from or reducible to) the relevant micro-level theory or epistemically dispensable in principle. The following project aims to rebut both of these views, thereby seeking to enlarge the possibility space for scientific explanation. For this reason, this project gestures towards and develops new dimensions for scientific model-based explanation. Pace (1), there are many scientific models which do not track ontic or causal relations but are nevertheless explanatory. The first chapter considers a cognitive dynamical model --the HKB model of bimanual coordination-- which fails these requirements for explanation but is one which I claim can still be shown to be explanatory. This represents a promising bit of evidence which can be marshalled and directed against this commitment. Along the lines of (1), proponents of this requirement claim that scientific models must be ontic or risk facing a problematic "directionality problem." The second chapter provides a route of response for the advocate of non-ontic scientific explanations, demonstrating how this problem can be resolved along pragmatic lines. Finally, the partition of the possibility space for understanding the role of idealizations in scientific models encapsulated in (2) is challenged in the third chapter. Therein, a certain species of idealization -continuum idealizations- are discussed and a pragmatic and deflationary approach to the issue of intertheoretic reduction is argued for. These chapters all serve to demonstrate countervailing considerations which, if successful, act as important challenges for the veracity of both (1) and (2). Rather than achieving a mere refutation of these commitments, the success of this project calls for a re-imagining and enlargement of the possibility space for scientific model-based explanations.
Degree
Ph. D.